

**THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE DOCTRINES OF DIVINE
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREE WILL: JUDAS ISCARIOT AS
A TESTCASE**

James Partee Toga

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Supervisor: Dr Annang Asumang

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted to any institution for a degree.

James Partee Toga

Monrovia, Liberia

October 2018

DEDICATION

To Annang Asumang,

Who unknowingly motivated me to persist in my studies and produce a credible work

Jesus answered them, 'Did I not choose you, the twelve? Yet one of you is a devil'
(John 6:70)

In those days Peter stood up among the believers... 'Friends, the scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit through David foretold concerning Judas, who became a guide for those who arrested Jesus for he was numbered among us and was allotted his share in this ministry. (Now this man acquired a field with the reward of his wickedness....)

(Acts 1:15-18)

ABSTRACT

The New Testament indicates that Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus was foreknown by God and by Jesus, and that it was in fulfillment of Scripture, and yet at the same time it judges him culpable for his actions. In that case, to what degree is divine foreknowledge compatible with human free will? This represents a difficult challenge and demands investigation. How does the Bible envisage the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will with particular reference to the case of Judas Iscariot?

The gospels persistently use παραδίδωμι with Judas Iscariot instead of προδίδωμι or προδότης (except Luke's single use of προδότης with him, Luke 6:16). This study discovers their possible reason(s) for doing so. Thus, this study examines relevant New Testament passages, which explicitly or implicitly identify Judas Iscariot. Determining how Judas Iscariot's choice to carry out his act of betrayal fits into God's choice and foreknowledge of him is significant. Thus, the study surveys the views of philosophers, major Christian traditions and some literature of Second Temple Judaism in order to assemble some of the solutions to the problem being investigated.

It is observed that all the New Testament passages in relation to Judas Iscariot underline the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in a non-contrastive transcendent manner, even though some place different emphases on the degree of this compatibility, and others underline a complicated role for even Satan. Specifically, it is asserted that when it comes to Judas Iscariot, the New Testament holds divine foreknowledge in tension with human freedom to the extent that there is no conflict between them, apparent though that might seem. Some of the differences in emphases between the Gospels with regard to Judas Iscariot are also shown to reflect respective socio-pastoral contexts of their first readers.

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ABBREVIATIONS OF BIBLE TRANSLATIONS AND OTHER SOURCES

Abbreviation	Full Title (Author)
<i>Ant.</i>	Jewish Antiquities (Josephus)
<i>BDAG (third edition)</i>	A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature (3 rd edition)
<i>DB</i>	Darby Bible
<i>CJB</i>	Complete Jewish Bible
<i>EDNT</i>	Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament
<i>Esd.</i>	Esdras
<i>ESV</i>	English Standard Version
<i>Gos. Jud.</i>	Gospel of Judas
<i>Institutes</i>	Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion
<i>JSNT</i>	Journal for the Study of the New Testament
<i>Jdt.</i>	Judith
<i>KJV</i>	King James Version
<i>Macc.</i>	Maccabees
<i>NASB</i>	New American Standard Bible
<i>NCV</i>	New Century Version
<i>NETB</i>	New English Translation Bible
<i>NIV</i>	New International Version
<i>NKJV</i>	New King James Version
<i>NLT</i>	New Living Translation
<i>NRSV</i>	New Revised Standard Version ¹
<i>NT</i>	New Testament
<i>OT</i>	Old Testament
<i>Sir.</i>	Sirach

¹Unless otherwise stated, the NRSV shall be the default translation for this study.

<i>STJ</i>	Second Temple Judaism
<i>Thayer</i>	Thayer's Lexicon of the New Testament
<i>War</i>	Wars of the Jews (Josephus)
<i>WENT</i>	Wuest Expanded New Testament
<i>Wis.</i>	Wisdom
<i>YLT</i>	Young's Literal Translation

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Zwiep (2004:3) is right in saying, ‘The study of Judas...is a historical and theological minefield’, because it has raised a long, ‘fierce controversy between Jews and Christians and between Protestants and Catholics’. I suppose this controversy is based on the Gospels’ accounts that a personal disciple who was selected by Jesus himself betrayed him. The accounts about Judas Iscariot’s betrayal of Jesus in the four Gospels implicitly and explicitly place the responsibility for Jesus’ betrayal on Judas Iscariot (e.g. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11), on Satan (e.g. Luke 22:3-6; John 13:2, 27) and on Jesus himself (e.g. Matt 10:2-4; Mark 3:14-19; Luke 6:12-16; John 6:70).

For instance Matthew (26:14-16) and Mark (14:10, 11) portray Judas as willingly going to the chief priests to negotiate the price for betraying Jesus to them. Matthew (26:15) implies that Judas Iscariot resolved to betray Jesus before going to the chief priests. This implication is shown by Judas’ question to the chief priests: Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν; (‘What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto you?’ YLT). Furthermore, Matthew (26:16) suggests that Judas was actually determined to betray Jesus to the chief priests. The passage says καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐζήτει εὐκαιρίαν ἵνα αὐτὸν παραδῶ (‘And from that moment he began to look for an opportunity to betray him’). In view of these, it makes sense to assume that Judas made a conscious, calculated decision to go to negotiate with the chief priests, according to Marshall (2008:1).

Judas Iscariot’s question to the chief priests (Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν) presents three implications. In the first place, the first part of the question (Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι) implies that Judas Iscariot was eager to betray Jesus to the chief priests. Secondly, it implies that Judas Iscariot was willing to accept an offer of any amount of money from the chief priest. Thirdly, the complete question implies that Judas was self-centered, greedy and treacherous and was determined to achieve his plan (cf. Adeyemo 2006:1165; Blomberg 1992:389; Carlson 2010:472-478; Robertson 2011:90; Turner 2008:621, 622, 625). Judas’ determination to betray

Jesus is suggested by the Synoptic Gospels' (Matt 26:16; Mark 14:11; Luke 22:6) accounts that Judas 'sought' for the convenient time to accomplish what he had promised to the chief priests.

However, Mark (14:41) suggests that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would betray him. The passage states, ἦλθεν ἡ ὥρα, ἰδοὺ παραδίδοται ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν ἀμαρτωλῶν ('The hour has come; behold, the Son of Man is being betrayed into the hands of sinners' NKJV). Additionally, Mark (14:42) suggests that Jesus foreknew who his betrayer was. The passage states, ἐγείρεσθε ἄγωμεν: ἰδοὺ ὁ παραδιδούς με ἤγγικεν ('Rise, let us be going: behold, he that is betraying me is at hand'—my translation). Jesus' statements in Matt 17:22 ('The Son of Man is going to be betrayed into humans hands') and John 13:18d ('He who is eating the bread with me, did lift up against me his heel', YLT) strengthen this verdict against Judas Iscariot.

Keener (2003: 912-913) notes, 'Lifting up of one's heel' (i.e. by raising the bottom of the foot) in the Mediterranean society, including ancient Judaism, was an expression of deep contempt; it was therefore regarded as 'more heinous than any insult by an enemy'. In this case, a friend who lifted up his/heel against a friend would have made himself/herself an enemy. In addition, it would have been difficult to forgive such a person. In the same way, Judas Iscariot made himself an enemy of Jesus by 'lifting up [his] heel' against him. I think Jesus could have forgiven him had he not been 'lost' already (John 17:12).

Walvoord and Zuck (1988-2007:n.p.) think Jesus' statement in John 13:18b is a citation of Psalm 41:9. Therefore, it links it to King David's reference to Ahithophel, his counselor and the grandfather of Bathsheba who became a traitor by joining Absalom's rebellion against David (2 Sam 11:3; 15:12; 16:15-17:23). Before Ahithophel's defection to Absalom, David had trusted his counsel (2 Sam 16:23). For that reason, Ahithophel's action was a betrayal of a trusted master; consequently, he became an enemy of David. Ahithophel hanged himself when he realized that he had betrayed David (2 Sam 17:23).

Ahithophel's betrayal of his master may have influenced John's application of Psalm 41:9 to Judas Iscariot. Moreover, Jesus may have applied Ahithophel's betrayal of King David to his imminent betrayal by Judas Iscariot. Jesus might have noticed a

similarity between Ahithophel and Judas Iscariot, because the two men were confidants of their masters whom they betrayed. Both of them betrayed their master to their master's enemies (2 Sam 17:23; Psa 41:9; John 13:18). Thus, it is likely that Jesus applied David's reference to the treacherous act of his friend (Ahithophel) to Judas Iscariot (Psa 41:9; John 13:18; cf. Menken 1990:70-73; Zola 2010:417). While the Gospels do not suggest that Judas Iscariot was an advisor to Jesus as Ahithophel was to King David, he was certainly an inner-circle friend of Jesus (cf. Matt 26:50) just as Ahithophel was to the king. This is indicated by Judas' presence at the table with Jesus and eating bread with him.

On the face of it, Luke (22:3-6) and John (13:27) may appear to acquit Judas of personal culpability regarding the betrayal of Jesus. They seem to blame Satan for causing Judas to betray Jesus. Finally, all the Gospels (e.g. Matthew 10:2-4; Mark 3:14-19; Luke 6:12-16; John 6:70) by implication may also appear to hold Jesus responsible for his betrayal by Judas. They show that Jesus intentionally chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his inner circles of disciples, having known that Judas would betray him, and that that betrayal would fulfill the Scripture (cf. Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22).

These accounts in the Gospels have given rise to the long-running debate on the extent and implications of Judas Iscariot's role in the death of Jesus. Secondly, they have given rise to Judas Iscariot's labeling (i.e. as a betrayer). Thirdly, they have given rise to Judas' damnation and/or his acquittal by different theological schools. The meaning of the identification of Judas Iscariot as a 'betrayer' has been a source of disagreement amongst biblical interpreters. For example, some interpreters understand the label 'betrayer' in negative terms, while others understand it at worst in neutral terms as one who 'handed Jesus over'.

Adeyemo (2006), Evans (2010), Keener (2003), Martin (2006), Wright (2009), Zerwick and Grosvenor (1993) and Zola (2010) for example, prefer to label Judas Iscariot as a 'betrayer'. They prefer to translate παραδίδωμι as 'to betray', thus they place the blame squarely on Judas Iscariot. Wright (2009:552-559), for example, thinks that the Gospel of John describes Judas' character as being morally corrupt, so that Judas could only be disloyal, devilish, hypocritical, vicious and wicked. Robertson (2011:5, 12-16, 52-69) also stresses this further through his argument

that the manner in which Judas Iscariot died (by hanging himself and his body falling, swelling and bursting) indicates that he had a bad character.

The case for Judas Iscariot's moral corruptness is highlighted further by the manner in which some scholars portray him. For example, Martin (2006:13-14) and Zola (2010:407-419) describe Judas as a betrayer. Taylor (2010:368, 375-377) in addition analyzes and explains the descriptive name "Ἰσκαριώθ" (Iscariot) etymologically and linguistically, and posits that it has various meanings, including 'the liar', 'the false one', 'robber', 'assassin', 'betrayal'. Evans (2010:573) perceives Judas Iscariot as 'a tragic figure' and the worst of the disciples. Additionally, Adeyemo (2006:1266) points out that Jesus rightly called Judas 'a devil' (John 6:70), because he followed Satan and accomplished his goal.

Robertson (2011:86-87) argues that it is appropriate to translate παραδίδωμι as 'betray' in the passages dealing with Judas, on the ground that the term also means 'to give up to, or place in the power of an enemy, by treachery or disloyalty'. Furthermore, he argues that this definition is 'evident in the case of Judas' throughout the Gospels. He bases his assertion on the usage of παραδίδωμι in the LXX, which, according to him, 'frequently refers to handing someone over to an enemy' (2011:87). Robertson argues also that, like the usage of the term in the LXX, Judas Iscariot moved 'Jesus from the circle of those who participate in the kingdom of God, into the hands of those who opposed God's kingdom' (ibid.; cf. Janzen 2008:26).

Other scholars attenuate the blame placed on Judas Iscariot by preferring to render παραδίδωμι as 'hand over' or 'give up', rather than 'betray'. The term 'betray' is only the secondary meaning (BDAG) 2000:761, 762). Klassen (1996:47, 49) argues from a lexicographical analysis of παραδίδωμι that all of the citations of παραδίδωμι in the New Testament have the concept of 'hand over' rather than 'betray' or 'treachery'. Furthermore, Klassen and these like-minded scholars contend that first-century Greek literature has no example of παραδίδωμι meaning 'betrayal', 'disloyalty', or 'deceit' (Klassen 1996:47-74; cf. Carlson 2010:472-474; Derrett 1980:3-4). Instead, Klassen asserts that the words they used for 'betray' and 'traitor' were προδίδωμι and προδότης respectively (1966:47-58). It is worth pointing out that BDAG

(2000:761, 762) also defines παραδίδωμι with reference to persons, as 'hand over, turn over, give up'.

Even though Klassen and his colleagues have a point, their view appears to come short when compared to a passage such as Luke 6:16. This passage describes Judas Iscariot as 'Ιούδαν Ἰσκαριώθ, ὃς ἐγένετο προδότης ('and Judas Iscariot, who became a traitor'). The description of Judas Iscariot's character is not a matter of political parliamentary procedure, where the 'Majority wins'. In other words, even though Mark and Matthew employ παραδίδωμι rather than προδίδωμι or προδότης, Luke employs προδότης. Assuming therefore that Mark and Matthew do not intend to describe Judas Iscariot as a 'betrayed', Luke does portray him as a 'traitor' by his use of προδότης.

Prominent English Bible translations differ in their translations of παραδίδωμι in the Gospels with reference to Judas Iscariot and other people. For example, the ASV, the CEV, the CJB, the ESV, the KJV, the NASB, the NIV, the NKJV, the NLT and the NRSV render παραδίδωμι used with Judas as 'betray' in Matthew 26:23, 24, 25 and 27:4. These passages record Jesus unveiling Judas as his imminent betrayer, as well as Judas Iscariot's admission that he had 'sinned by betraying innocent blood'. In addition, the CEV, ESV, and the NIV, NLT and NKJV, render παραδίδωμι as 'betray' apart from its use with Judas Iscariot, in Matthew 24:10. This passage predicts many people betraying one another at the end of the age. Notwithstanding, the Darby Bible and the YLT translate παραδίδωμι consistently as 'delivered up', both with reference to Judas (Matt 26:23, 24, 25; 27:4) and with reference to other people (Matt 24:10; John 18:30).

The possible explanation for the majority of English Bibles translations rendering παραδίδωμι as 'betray' when used with Judas could be their perception of Judas Iscariot's character. Greenberg, for example, thinks that παραδίδωμι is best translated as 'betray' when used with Judas and 'hand over' when used with others (Greenberg 2007:138-151). The examples just cited from the various English translations do not support this view. Greenberg (2007:133) thinks that the argument against translating παραδίδωμι as 'betray' within the Gospels will cause a 'significant problem'. It is uncertain why the gospel writers chose to use παραδίδωμι rather than προδίδωμι. It seems as if they must have had compelling reasons for doing so.

The second problem that the Gospels' accounts of Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus have caused is Mark's (10:45) record of Jesus' statement of his coming into the world 'to give (his) life as a ransom for many'. 'To give' (δοῦναι), is aorist infinitive of δίδωμι. The term is used in the same way in verse 40 (the NIV translates it as 'grant'). In addition, John states that Jesus chose Judas to be one of his disciples even though he foreknew that Judas was 'a devil' (6:70) and that he would be 'lost...[as] one doomed to destruction so that Scripture would be fulfilled' (17:12; cf. 13:18; Matt 26:24 NIV).

John and Mark are implying in these passages that Judas Iscariot's act of betrayal was divinely foreknown and determined in advance. It is not surprising, then, for Paul to state that God 'gave [Jesus] up for us all...' (Rom 8:32, NIV). Paul uses the aorist active indicative (παρέδωκεν) of παραδίδομι in this passage. In view of Mark's, John's and Paul's statements, labeling Judas Iscariot's action as betrayal of Jesus would appear to be unjust. He was an agent only, to fulfill the divine plan. Thirdly, Luke (22:3-6) and John (13:2, 27) seem to place the responsibility for Judas Iscariot's betrayal on Satan, because Satan both prompted Judas and entered into him to betray the Christ. This apparent contradiction constitutes a challenging problem worthy of further analysis.

Like the debate over how to characterize Judas Iscariot's actions, the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will has attracted endless theological controversy. The Scriptures have contributed to or prompted this debate via their apparently two-facet presentations of these doctrines. For instance, certain passages show that humans do exercise their free will in response to divine plans and instructions (e.g. Gen 2:16, 17; 3:9-13, 16-19; Exod 25:1, 2; 35:4, 5, 20-29; Lev 1:3; 2 Chr 29:9, 10, 31; 36:11-16; Josh 25:14, 15; 1 Sam 23:10-12; 1 Kgs 12:25-14:20; Dan 1:8; 3:16-18; John 3:16). On the other hand, other passages reveal God overruling human plans and or appointing them to fulfill his purposes (e.g. Gen 50:20; Exod 14:4-8; Exod 28:30; Josh 14:1-2; Judg 14:1-4; 1 Sam 14:38-43; 2 Sam 16:7-12; 1 Kgs 12:1-15; 1 Chr 25:8-31; 2 Chr 21:16; 29:11; 36:22-23; Job 2:10; Psa 119:133; Prov 16:9; Jer 10:23; Dan 5:23-30; Jonah 1:7; Acts 1:26).

These apparently contradictory passages may have given rise to the two schools of theological thought, namely, (1) those adhering to the incompatibility view of human

freedom (also called ‘incompatibilist view’) of divine foreknowledge and human free will, and (2) those adhering to the compatibilist view of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Whilst the incompatibilists’ stance has scriptural support (cf. John 15:16; 17:6-12; Eph 2:1-10; Phil 2:13), it apparently contradicts those passages that portray Judas Iscariot willingly initiating his betrayal of Christ (e.g. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:3-6). The problem with the incompatibilists’ view is, Judas Iscariot cannot be held liable for his actions—whether those actions lead to obedience and belief or disobedience and unbelief. In this case, God would be charged with being ‘the author of sin’ if Judas Iscariot did exercise his free will (Reymond 1998:346). Incompatibilists would not charge God as ‘the author of sin’, because they accept scriptural teachings that ‘God is light’ (1 John 1:5) and that he ‘cannot be tempted by evil and he himself tempts no one’ (Jas 1:13). James 1:14 states explicitly that humans who sin do so willfully and are thus liable for their sins: ‘But one is tempted by one’s own desire, being lured and enticed by it’.

Unlike the incompatibilists, the compatibilists argue that divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible. They teach generally that God possesses absolute foreknowledge (omniscience) of future human actions. However, God’s absolute foreknowledge does not annul human freedom. Okun (2012:38), especially, points out that humans do follow God freely and act freely, so that those who commit evils do so because of their free will. Oden (1987:92) adds, ‘Human volition is and remains...always the gift of the divine volition’, so that, although God foreknows all human acts, he does not destroy their freedom to act, but that he ‘deals with [humans]...on the basis of [their] freedom and its ever-present correlate, human responsibility’ (cf. Newman 1996; Psa 143:10; Rom 1:10; 1 Cor 15:12; Eph 1:1-9).

God’s foreknowledge includes his knowledge of the total, spiritual depravity of man, so that man has ‘wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation...being altogether averse from good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself hereunto’(Cunningham 1994:586, 587).Therefore, God graciously, sovereignly and unconditionally predestines or elects to eternal salvation those he wants to and condemns others eternally. Furthermore, God elects to his service the people whom he wishes to call (Peterson 2004; 2007; McCall and Stanglin 2005; Schreiner 1993:25; Shellrude 2009:307, 308; cf. Gen 21:12; Exod 9:16; Deut 7:6, 7; 14:2; Judg 13:1-25; 1 Sam

9:15-10:1; 1 Kgs 12:15; Isa 44:1, 2; Jer 1:4, 5; Psa 51:1-14; Matt 20:23; 24:40-41; Luke 10:20; John 3:16-36; 6:37, 39, 44, 45; 17:2, 6, 9; 15:16, 19; Acts 2:39; 9:15; 13:48; 17:26, 27; Rom 8:28-30; 9:1-29; 11:1-8; Gal 1:15, 16; Eph 1:3-6, 9-11; 2:1-10; 2 Thess 2:13; 1 Tim 5:21; Titus 3:3-6).

Proponents of the incompatibilist view of divine foreknowledge and human free will object to the compatibility between the two doctrines. The ground for their objection is that 'If God foreknows...future actions then those actions cannot be voluntarily performed' (Nartey 2016:137). These advocates argue that every human action is 'infinitely determined [in order] that the realm of human action would fall under the rule of determinism' (Nartey 2016:136). In other words, all human choices have been divinely predetermined so that what appear to be free human actions are mere illusions (ibid., 144).

In addition, God would not hold people liable for their actions, which he has not predetermined, because they carried out those actions unconsciously (ibid., 145-147cf. Harris 2012; Watson 2003; Timpe 2013; Balaguer 2014; Libet et al. 1983; Libet 1985, 2001, 2002; Wegner 2002). Luther (in Cole 1823:26) argues that God's nature compels him to possess infinite, immutable foreknowledge. He accepts that humans do have free will, but that without the enabling grace of God, that will is free to do evil only, rather than to do good—to receive God's offer of salvation and to obey God's command (ibid., 62-66, 120).

The arguments by these incompatibilists imply, for example, that Adam's disobedience of God's command (Gen 2:16, 17; 3:7-11), Saul's disobedience of God's command (1 Sam 15:1-24) and Jonah's initial disobedience of God's command (Jonah 1:1-3) occurred without God's foreknowledge. Their thought is that if God foreknew that these men would disobey him, then they would do so unconsciously. The question is, how would these proponents interpret Genesis 2:16, 17 ('And the LORD God commanded the man, "You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day you eat of it you shall die"')? These two verses show that God offered Adam an alternative to not eating 'from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil'. These verses do not record God forbidding Adam from eating from 'the tree of life', which was 'in the middle of the garden' also. However, Adam chose to eat of 'the tree of

tree of the knowledge of good and evil'. His eating the fruit of this tree must have been volitional.

God could hold Adam liable for his disobedience, because he gave him alternatives to choose from (cf. Nartey 2016:147; Hicks 2012:5-12; Laing 2004:457, 58; Voak 2009:173-175). In the case of Moses, Saul and Jonah, the passages referring to them indicate that they chose, consciously, their own alternative responses to God's commands. Edwards (2000:2) would argue in favor of these men using 'the act of the will' to disobey God's commands. By an 'act of the will' Edwards means the ability of a person to choose to receive or refuse, to approve or disapprove, to embrace or reject (Edwards 2000:2). Nartey (2016:152) concludes therefore that the incompatibilists' argument that divine foreknowledge of human actions annuls human freedom is not convincing.

Concerning the role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest and death of Jesus, proponents of the incompatibilism view acquit him of the charge of betrayal and liability. The grounds for their acquittal are the Gospels' use of παραδίωμι with Judas' role in the arrest and death of Jesus, instead of προδίωμι and προδότης (only Luke uses προδότης to describe Judas, Luke 6:16). Secondly, Jesus chose Judas to be his disciple, in spite of the fact that he foreknew Judas' character. Thirdly, Judas' action fulfilled the divine plan. Fourthly, it is Satan, rather than Judas, who is responsible for Jesus' arrest and death, because he influenced Judas to betray Jesus (Luke 22:3).

On the other hand, proponents of the compatibilism view hold Judas Iscariot culpable, even though Jesus chose him, and that his action fulfilled the divine plan. They point out too that Luke describes Judas as a 'traitor' (προδότης). Judas therefore could have willingly betrayed Jesus. Thus, he would suffer 'woe' for his action (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22). Thirdly, the compatibilists regard Judas Iscariot's admission of sinning 'against innocent blood' (Matt 27:4) as proof of Judas' culpability. Jesus chose Judas Iscariot; however, Judas willfully betrayed Jesus. This outcome indicates compatibilism rather than incompatibilism.

1.2 The Problem and Status Quaestionis

The root of the problem seems to be twofold: (1) the rift amongst biblical scholars about the Gospels' accounts of Judas' role in Christ's betrayal. In giving their

accounts, they use παραδίδωμι, which, according to Klassen, suggests that Judas merely handed Jesus over to the Jewish authorities rather than betrayed him. He argues that had Judas betrayed Jesus, the gospel writers would have used προδίδωμι or προδότης (Klassen 1996:47, 49). (2) On a more general level, the rift amongst biblical and systematic theologians is about the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will, especially as it relates to Judas exercising his free will in betraying Jesus.

The status quaestionis may therefore be stated as follows—how should Judas Iscariot’s betrayal of Jesus as portrayed by the New Testament be conceptualized in order to explain the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will? This status quaestionis has four intrinsic sub-questions:

1. In what ways have the various Christian and philosophical traditions addressed the difficulty posed by the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will?
2. To what extent did Judas Iscariot’s character, as suggested by the Synoptic Gospels, the Gospel of John, Acts and Paul’s Letter to the Romans influence his betrayal of Jesus?
3. How do the Synoptic Gospels, the Gospel of John and Acts indicate that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human free will in the specific case of Judas Iscariot?
4. How did Jesus’ foreknowledge of Judas’ actions correlate to Judas’ free choice to betray Jesus?

1.3 Objectives and Rationale

The status quaestionis has theological, analytical and pastoral implications. Theologically, the problem relates to how Scripture depicts the interface between God’s foreknowledge of and his sovereign rule in human affairs (cf. Gen 12:1-3; 17:19-21; 21:12, 13; 47:7, 8; 50:20; Exod 14:4-8; 28:30; Josh 14:1, 2; Judg 14:1-4; 1 Sam 14:38-43; 2 Sam 16:7-12; 1 Kgs 12:1-15; 1 Chr 25:8-31; 2 Chr 21:16; 29:11;36:22, 23; Ezra 1:1; Job 2:10; Psa 119:133; Prov 16:9; Jer 10:23; Dan 5:23-30; Jonah 1:7; Acts 1:26). The second theological problem is how the Scriptures configure human free will (cf. Gen 2:16, 17; 3:9-13, 16-19; Exod 25:1, 2; 35:4, 5, 20-

29; 2 Chr 29:9, 10, 31; 36:11-16; Josh 24:14, 15; 1 Sam 23:10-12; 1 Kgs 12:25-14:20; Dan 1:8; 3:16-18; John 3:16). These two theological issues do pose a couple of problems when people look at them together. In the first place, they portray Scripture to be dichotomous and paradoxical. Secondly, they baffle and restrain the Bible student concerning which view to promote doubtlessly and convincingly.

These two issues traverse the whole of Scripture. Given that the story of Judas Iscariot also constitutes the most sustained and graphic illustration of the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will, answering the question is bound to have wider implications for framing Biblical Theology as the foundation of Systematic Theology. When considered, the Gospels' accounts of Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus reveal that they present Judas (Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10-11; John 6:70b-71), Satan (Luke 22:3-6; John 13:2, 30) and Jesus (Mark 10:45; John 6:70a) himself as agents for Jesus' betrayal. It is true that Matthew (26:15, 16) and John (12:6) suggest strongly that Judas' thieving character and greed for money drove him to betray Jesus.

Even so, these passages make it difficult to determine whether Judas Iscariot was the ultimate cause of his action, or whether Christ or Satan was the 'agent' who caused Judas Iscariot to betray Christ. A more in-depth analysis of the constraining social-pastoral contexts that have shaped the writing of the text is likely to shed some light on why and how the texts coped with the apparent contradictions.

Unlike compatibilists, incompatibilists state that God's foreknowledge is sovereignly deterministic and annuls all human freedom. Incompatibilists think that God has already fixed all happenings to occur at some point in time (Pike 1977; cf. Peterson 2004; 2007; McCall and Stanglin 2005). Concerning Judas Iscariot's role in the arrest and death of Jesus, incompatibilists would theoretically therefore acquit him of the charge of betrayal. In spite of their differences of opinion concerning the use of human free will, compatibilists and incompatibilists accept that humans do possess free will, whether they use that will to do good acts or to do evil acts (cf. Cole 1823:28; Franks 2015:117).

A sub-section of Arminian theologians who postulate 'The Openness of God' (also called 'Openness Model of God') theology teach that God's foreknowledge of future events is voluntarily limited. This voluntary limitation prevents God from having a

'complete knowledge of the future' (Neff 1995:30; cf. Reymond 1998:347; Blount 2005:178-179), apart from those events that are logically possible for him to know and events that he has foreordained (Cudby 2005:15; cf. Warden 2004). Furthermore, they argue that God lacks a complete knowledge of the 'future free decisions and actions of (his) creatures' (Neff 1995:30).

It appears as though proponents of 'Openness Theology' have used passages such as Genesis 6:5, 6; 22:12; Deuteronomy 13:3; and Jeremiah 26:3 to assert that God is in effect caught unawares by human actions. For example, Genesis 6:5-6 says, God was grief-stricken and 'sorry that he had made humankind on the earth' when he 'saw' their wickedness. Another example is Genesis 22:12. It records God telling Abraham, 'Now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me'.

If God can be caught unawares about the actions of his creatures as these theologians claim, then he might be limited in his omniscience. Such positions need to be tested in the light of specific analyses of biblical passages which have been proposed as supporting their claim. Lamerson (2008:27-36) for example, refutes 'Openness Theology' categorically. Other theologians go further to refute 'Openness Theology' as alien to the Bible (e.g. Tiessen 2000:77) and that it downgrades God's 'ultimate sovereignty and power over the outcome of human history' (Neff 1995:31). Westphal (2011:246) describes 'Openness Theology' as 'heretical' because it is unscriptural. Additionally, he argues that it diminishes God's omniscience vis-à-vis his foreknowledge, and obliterates his infallibility.

Tiessen's and Westphal's arguments may appear to make sense. For 'Openness Theology' may appear to question the Scriptures' suggestion that Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus would fulfill prophecy (Matt 26:24a; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; cf. Dan 9:26). Yet this can only be done by examining a particularly sustained account of the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will in the Bible. The story of Judas Iscariot is such a test case. The present project thus offers the opportunity to test how Openness Theology would address the apparent contradiction in Judas Iscariot and whether it offers a viable way of configuring the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

The subject of divine foreknowledge is disputed between proponents of ‘Openness of God’ theology and those of Molina’s ‘Middle Knowledge’ (e.g. Bryant 1992; Crossan 2000). For example, proponents of ‘Openness of God’ theology teach that God is self-limited in his foreknowledge of future events. On the other hand, proponents of Molina’s ‘Middle Knowledge’ (*sciatica media*) teach that God has complete knowledge of past and future events, including ‘knowledge of conditional future contingents’ (Laing 2004:457). Firstly, these ‘future contingents’ refer to free choices that humans make based on present circumstances (ibid.). Secondly, they refer to God’s intended actions, of future actions of individuals that he might create (ibid.). Thirdly, they refer to God’s knowledge of counterfactuals—hypothetical events (Tiessen 2007:349).

Counterfactuals are the free choices that people make; their occurrence depends on prevailing circumstances (Laing 2004:457, 458; Campbell 2006:3). God’s knowledge of counterfactuals would suggest that his absolute omniscience of all events is protected, as against the ‘Openness Theology’ point of view. In my view, God’s knowledge of counterfactuals does not cause him to annul the free will of his creatures. Thus, his foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot’s imminent betrayal of Jesus did not annul Judas’ free will.

Nonetheless, like the ‘Openness of God’ view, Molina’s ‘Middle Knowledge’ view has objectors. The ground for their objection is that the ‘Middle Knowledge’ view enables God’s creatures to possess libertarian freedom, whereby they ‘have the power of contrary choice’ rather than ‘the liberty of spontaneity’ (Tiessen 2007:347). Calvinists, for example, object to this view, because libertarian freedom ‘reduces human choosing to arbitrariness’, as well as that it is incompatible with the strong scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty (Tiessen 2007:349).

Tiessen agrees with the Calvinists on the ground that libertarian freedom would make it impossible for humans and God ‘to know what a libertarianly free creature would do in a hypothetical situation’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, Tiessen concedes, ‘God can know the odds that a person will act in a particular way’ (ibid.). In my view, humans have both libertarian freedom and ‘the liberty of spontaneity’, as was demonstrated by Adam (Gen 2:16, 17; 3:6-12, 17), Saul (1 Sam 15:1-23) and Jonah (Jonah 1:1-3).

Laing (2004:467) objects to the 'Middle Knowledge' view of counterfactuals—the free human choices that people make, according to their prevailing circumstances. The basis for his objection is that the Middle Knowledge view puts its proponents 'between the horns of a dilemma'. Laing argues that the doctrine of counterfactuals diminishes and limits God's omniscience and elevates human free will, even though God's omniscience does not permit him to be ignorant of truths or events. Thus, God does not become aware of truths or events only at their moments of occurrence (Beilby and Eddy 2001:120-121). He thinks that God is fully aware of all counterfactuals and of creaturely freedom that are compatible with his divine will. Otherwise, the doctrine of compatibilist freedom would be 'virtually indistinguishable from libertarian freedom' (Laing 2004:467).

Pastorally, the subject of God's foreknowledge, his sovereign, providential rule in human affairs and human free will is significant. The basis for this significance is that this subject impinges on very important aspects of our theological understanding of Christian existence. In this context of apparent contradiction, how should we, for example, theologially formulate the role of the choices that the individual Christian might play? How does this influence our theological understanding of Christian mission in the world, of suffering and evil in the world? How does it influence the doctrine of eschatology, or of prayer? Moreover, how does this influence an individual Christian ministry? It is evident that the correct formulation of all these important Christian theological issues depends on our biblical understanding of the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Examining how this interface is evident in one prominent biblical character is likely to yield some pastoral lessons for contemporary Christians.

Biblically and analytically, the problem also relates to the Gospels' use of παραδίδωμι to describe Judas Iscariot's actions instead of προδίδωμι or προδότης. This has led to scholars disagreeing about whether Judas could be justly labeled as betrayer. An objective of this study is to perform a biblical examination of how the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will, is exemplified in how the Bible portrays the particular case of Judas. While it is unlikely to address this translation issue conclusively, understanding the theological underpinnings of the characterization of Judas Iscariot will likely contribute to evaluating which of the scholarly interpretations appropriately define him.

The New Testament presents four apparently conflicting views about Judas Iscariot's role in Jesus' betrayal. Firstly, it suggests that Judas Iscariot freely and determinedly betrayed Jesus ((Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; John 13:18). Secondly, it suggests that Satan entered into Judas Iscariot and prompted him to betray Jesus (Luke 22:3-6; John 13:2, 27). Thirdly, it suggests that Jesus himself chose Judas Iscariot to betray him (John 6:70, 71; cf. 17:12). Lastly, it suggests that Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus was necessary to fulfill the divine plan (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22). These four views evidently relate to the question of the interaction between human free will and agency and divine foreknowledge. This study hopes therefore to make some relevant contributions to shedding light on the current discussions.

At a personal level, I have had a pastoral and professional interest in the subject of the primary cause of Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus—whether he personally chose to do so, or whether God chose him to do it. In other words, I want to know the driving force behind Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus. There is therefore an enormous personal interest to investigating the theological and biblical foundations of the subject.

1.4 Design and Methodology

The foundation of the proposed study is Judas Iscariot's role in Jesus' arrest and death. The Gospels persistently use παραδίωμι with Judas Iscariot instead of προδίωμι or προδότης (except Luke's single use of προδότης with him, Luke 6:16). This study intends to discover their possible reason(s) for doing so. Thus, this study has examined relevant New Testament passages, which explicitly or implicitly identify Judas Iscariot. It has also sought to determine how Judas Iscariot's choice to carry out his act of betrayal fits into God's choice and foreknowledge of him.

The methodology of this study is, therefore, designed to help answer these concerns. The study is essentially literary in design. It has employed the anchor-text analytical method as the primary tool for collecting the data from the Gospels, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans (Smith 2010:20-25). Moreover, given that it has significant intersections with formulations in Biblical and Systematic Theology, the study has examined a number of selected pertinent scholarly contributions to shed light on the subject matter. Thus, the study may be conceived as belonging to

Biblical Theology, yet employing interdisciplinary insights where appropriate from Systematic Theology.

There are good reasons for adopting this approach. The issue of the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will has been well discussed in systematic theological literature (e.g. Bird 2013; Blount 2005; Crossan 2000; Cudby 2005; Edwards 2000; Franks 2015; 2011; Hicks 2012; Lamerson 2008; Lehrer 2016; McCall and Stanglin 2005; Nartey 2016; Neff 1995; Okun 2012; Perry 2004; Peterson 2004; 2007; Picirilli 2000; Raymond 1998; Roach 2008; Shedd 1999; Shook 2010; Tiessen 2000; Vilhauer 2015; Warden 2004). However, these discussions have often tended to be quite theoretical and divorced from the biblical textual foundations upon which these issues are purported to be based. Moreover, by not grounding the discussions in the realities of Scripture, these debates have often not resulted in clear biblically sound theological formulations guiding Christians on how their agency relates to God's sovereignty.

An advantage of marrying the two disciplines, namely Biblical Studies and Systematic Theology, is to avoid these two errors and ensure that the biblical witness will remain paramount for addressing the difficult question. Furthermore, the recent successful trend among biblical scholars to produce theological tomes (e.g. Bird 2013) indicates that a marriage of these two disciplines, namely systematic and biblical studies, is not just possible but necessary, given the unsatisfactory nature of the divorce between the disciplines. Bray (2014:18, 19) agrees that it is possible to marry these two disciplines and that they should be married, even though it is a difficult task. He thinks that Systematic Theology can be best understood by 'using the evidence of [the biblical] narrative and going behind it in ways that do not contract but illuminate it better' (ibid., 25; cf. Moberly 2002). Hamilton (2008:34) thinks the book of Acts emphasizes 'the human responsibility for [Jesus'] death.' Yet at the same time, Acts indicates that this 'human responsibility' is not without divine foreknowledge (Acts 2:22, 23).

The mention of human responsibility implies the use of human free will, a subject discussed by systematic theologians as well. In view of this, Biblical Theology, like systematic theologians of compatibilism persuasion particularly, holds Adam and Eve culpable for their 'wrongdoing', and therefore they deserved God's judgment

(Hamilton 2006:61, 62). Furthermore, like incompatibilists and compatibilists, Biblical Theology teaches that God sovereignly chooses those whom he wants to be his people; however, he 'demands obedience' from them (Chisholm 2013:211-226). The need therefore to marry the disciplines of Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology cannot be overemphasized. This study intends to travel this path. I now briefly explain the method.

1.4.1 The Anchor-Text Method

The anchor-text method is the method whereby a researcher examines a single key passage or passages that provide an informing theology, analyzes them in detail and applies the truths established in them (Smith 2010:23, 42). I have therefore employed this method to analyze key passages of the Gospels, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans in which Judas is mentioned explicitly or implicitly, in order to justifiably present the truth that they contain.

Additionally, this method has made it possible to investigate passages of these books in which divine foreknowledge and human free will are used explicitly or implicitly. These passages have served as the hub around which this study has been conducted. The Greek texts of these passages have been analyzed, though not necessarily exhaustively, but adequate to serve the purpose for the data collection. The truths in them have been established. Moreover, where necessary, critical and redaction critical insights have been invoked on specific texts, but not consistently applied, in order that the study might not be overbearing. The choice not to engage in an exhaustive analysis of all relevant biblical texts appertaining to the subject poses a couple of potential problems. One potential problem is that the findings of the study might be limited. A second potential problem is that the conclusion reached might not satisfy all of the academic quests of some of its readers and researchers. Notwithstanding, I have taken great care to limit these potential dangers by generating wide consultation with published scholarship, ensuring that my conclusions are generally not too deviant.

1.5 Hypothesis

In response to the *status quaestionis*, I will evaluate the following hypothesis: That the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible.

1.6 Definitions

Some of terminologies used in this dissertation call for clear, precise definitions. They are given below:

1. Predestination (Προορίζω): The term means, 'To decide upon beforehand, predetermine' (BDAG 2000:873; Thayer 1988-2007:n.p). It is used in this dissertation to refer to the predetermined action of God whereby he sovereignly and graciously elects unto his service those whom he so desires, whether prior to or following their conception and birth.
2. Election (ἐκλέγομαι): The term means, 'To make a choice in accordance with significant preference' (BDAG 2000:305). It is used in the dissertation to refer to the action of God whereby he chooses individuals unto salvation and unto his service.
3. Divine Foreknowledge: The term 'divine foreknowledge' is used in the dissertation to describe God's supernatural ability to foreknow all past, present and future events and peoples exhaustively. He elects individuals to particular services within his foreknowledge, but without his foreknowledge being the necessary cause for him to elect people to eternal salvation or to eternal damnation arbitrarily (BDAG 2006:866; EDNT 1988-2007; Nartey 2016:135-155).
4. Human Free Will: The term 'human free will' in the dissertation is used to describe the innate capability of humans to freely and non-coercively choose to accept or reject God's offer of salvation, his election to service and to plan their course of action and execute those plans of action (cf. Ferguson and Wright 1998:722, 723; Reymond 1998:373; Franks 2015:108-119).
5. Compatibilism: The term 'compatibilism' is used in this dissertation to mean, human freedom is compatible with divine omniscience, divine determination and divine foreknowledge (Helm 2011:184-205; Nartey 2016:135-155).
6. Incompatibilism: The term 'incompatibilism' is used in this dissertation to mean, human freedom is incompatible with divine foreknowledge and divine determination (Nartey 2016:135-155; Mele 2015:297-309).

7. Divine Agency: In this dissertation, the term refers to God himself who acts intentionally to accomplish his divine purposes (Schwöbel 1987:225-244).

1.7 Declaration of Known Presuppositions

I am an ordained pastor within the Wesleyan Church. I have taught at a Baptist seminary and interacted with Baptist scholars and pastors; I hold to the Wesleyan-Arminian theology. While I may strive to be objective, my own personal presuppositions and experiences might influence the direction of my conclusions. I believe in the divine inspiration and inerrancy of the evangelical Bible.

1.8 Delimitations

This research has not attempted to resolve the intractable debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism, regarding the practical operation of divine foreknowledge vis-à-vis God's sovereign, providential rule and human free will. It has also not attempted to determine the biblical and theological correctness of either position. Instead, the research has sought to examine how the Judas pericopae reflect elements of this debate (i.e. divine foreknowledge and human free will and their implications for Judas Iscariot) and has postulated some of the ways in which the New Testament writers employed it to address socio-pastoral issues among their readers.

1.9 Overview of Chapters

This dissertation has six more chapters. Chapter two conducts a literature review of studies which have examined literature concerning two broad schools of thought, namely, compatibilism and incompatibilism. In doing so, the chapter examines the works of philosophers (Aristotle, Boethius, Frankfurt, Ockham), of major Christian Traditions (Reformed Tradition, Arminian Tradition, Lutheran Tradition), of open theists and of free will theists on the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will. This chapter also examines the current scholarship on Judas Iscariot's role in Jesus' death. The review reveals that scholars from these two schools do not agree on how the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will generally interact with each other. However, they do agree on some points.

For example, The Westminster Confession, which promulgates the doctrine of incompatibilism states, 'Every promise and every warning of God is addressed to man as a free agent, and not as one who cannot be saved' (Shedd 1999:21). Similarly, Wesleyans (advocates of compatibilism) 'believe that humanity's creation in the image of God included the ability to choose between right and wrong [and] individuals were made morally responsible for their choices' (*The Discipline of The Wesleyan Church*, paragraph 224). On the whole, chapter two indicates that whereas incompatibilist and compatibilist scholars have examined these debates, they have not done enough to seek conciliation between them in a manner that explicates the biblical passages which relate to Judas Iscariot.

This lays a foundation for chapter three, which focuses on a twofold task. Firstly, it is to show that the Scriptures themselves give rise to these debates on the apparent contradiction between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Secondly, it is to show specifically how these traditions handle some key biblical passages on these two doctrines.

A related objective will be to demonstrate that the phenomenon of different approaches to compatibilism is also reflected in Second Temple Jewish Literature that is contemporaneous with the New Testament times. The chapter examines the varieties of approaches to resolving the tensions between divine foreknowledge and human free will, according to literature of Second Temple Judaism resolving the tensions between divine foreknowledge and human free will, according to literature of Second Temple Judaism. These approaches apparently reflect the different socio-historical and cultural contexts of the writers and communities the text represents.

In fulfilling these objectives this chapter will lay a strong foundation for examining how the New Testament account on Judas Iscariot demonstrates how the first Christians handled the question of the compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. The chapter therefore examines examples of biblical individuals and nations that God foreknew and predestined/elected to fulfill particular tasks, as well as examining key biblical passages on divine foreknowledge and human free will, which are the bases for the debates between incompatibilists and compatibilists. The goal is to show that the two schools of thought have biblical bases. In addition,

this chapter shows that there are biblical passages that support the arguments of these schools.

Chapter four examines relevant passages of Matthew, Mark, Luke, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans on Judas Iscariot. The goal is to seek to establish whether these passages exhibit variations in how they characterized Judas Iscariot in the light of the confluence between divine foreknowledge and human free will, and if so what may well account for any differences identified. In other words, these examinations will help test whether the ways in which these passages implicitly and explicitly portray Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Christ might help explain the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. The goal is to help determine how the use of παραδίδωμι to describe Judas Iscariot's role in Christ's death—both active (e.g. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Acts 1:15-25) and passive (e.g. Luke 22:3, 4)—reflect their general theological understanding of Judas Iscariot's character and choice within the context of God's foreknowledge.

Finally, chapter four shows the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in Judas Iscariot's role in the betrayal and arrest of Jesus (e.g. John 6:70). In general, the chapter indicates that these evangelists may have intended to teach their audiences about the probability of any of them apostatizing, if their characters are like Judas Iscariot's character.

Chapter five focuses on examination of relevant passages on Judas Iscariot in the Gospel of John. My reason for choosing to treat the Gospel of John separately from the Synoptic Gospels is because John's narrative about Jesus, Jesus' ministry and John's theological contents are somehow different from the Synoptic Gospels'. It is safe therefore to investigate John separately and seek to explain whether its unique characterizations relate to any specific socio-pastoral contexts. John differs from the Synoptic Gospels in several ways. In the first place, John much more emphasizes Jesus' deity (1:1-18; 8:12-19, 48-58; 10:27-30; 14:1-11, 16, 17, 26; cf. Michaels 2010:39). Secondly, John portrays Jesus' mission differently (1:29, 30, 36; 3:14-18; 10:7-18). Thirdly, John portrays differently Jesus' choosing of his disciples (1:36-51). Fourthly, John depicts Jesus' relationship with his disciples differently (15:1-11). Fifthly, it depicts Jesus' relationship with the Father much more frequently (1:1, 2, 18, 33, 34; 5:16-30; 14:10, 11; 17:1-19). Sixthly, John more extensively stresses the

mission of the Holy Spirit (3:5-8; 14:15-26; 16:7-15). In other words, unlike the Synoptic Gospels, John speaks of Jesus' followers having the need to 'be born again' from above through the Holy Spirit, otherwise they will not enter into heaven (3:3-8).

The seventh difference between John and the Synoptic Gospels is that John narrates Jesus' miraculous signs differently (2:1-11; 5:1-15; 6:1-15; 9:1-12). The eighth difference is that John portrays faith / belief as the sine qua non to obtaining eternal life (3:14-8; 5:24; 20:30, 31). Whereas the Synoptic Gospels show miracles taking place because of faith (e.g. Matt 8:5-13; 9:18-26; Mark 5:22-43; Luke 7:1-10; 8:41-56), John shows that the miraculous signs of Jesus lead to faith (John 20:30, 31). Lastly, John portrays the characterization and role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest and death of Jesus, and the fate of Judas Iscariot differently (6:70, 71; 12:1-6; 17:12).

The examination of the Gospel of John explores why John characterizes Judas Iscariot as 'a devil' (6:70), a 'thief' (12:6) and as 'the one doomed to destruction' (17:12), especially since Judas Iscariot's action fulfills the Scripture (17:12). The chapter also reflects on John's possible motives for highlighting Judas Iscariot's bad character.

Chapter six synthesizes the insights gained from the examination of the preceding chapters, and theologically argues the hypothesis of this dissertation, namely: that the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible in the specific test case of Judas Iscariot. Specifically, it asserts that when it comes to Judas Iscariot, the New Testament holds divine foreknowledge in tension with human freedom to the extent that there is no conflict between them, apparent though that might seem. The chapter summarizes the philosophical approaches, the approaches of major Christian traditions, and the views of specific literature that relate to Judas Iscariot, which are pertinent to compatibilism, with the view to synthesizing the arguments that have been made. The chapter also highlights the approach of 'Openness Theology' on the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will in order to achieve the same objective.

Finally, chapter seven summarizes the findings of the study and draws a number of conclusions. It also suggests one main implication, and cautions that active, divinely

gifted church leaders or church members might apostatize because of greedy and diabolical character. The chapter therefore exhorts leaders and members of the Wesleyan Church of Liberia to pay heed to the Spirit's convictions so that they might repent from sins. The result would be that they will remain in good, acceptable, perpetual relationship with Jesus.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF SECONDARY LITERATURE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE DOCTRINES OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREE WILL

2.1 Introduction

Both philosophically and theologically, the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will has been conceived along two broad schools of thought, namely, compatibilism and incompatibilism. The compatibilism school believes that human freedom is compatible with divine omniscience and divine foreknowledge (Helm 2011:184-205; Nartey 2016:135-155). On the other hand, the incompatibilism school believes that human freedom is incompatible with divine foreknowledge and divine determination (Nartey 2016:135-155; Mele 2015:297-309). Between these two schools, especially within the compatibilism school of thought, there are various degrees of approaches, leading to several different shades of conceptualization of the interface. The current review has therefore been considered along these lines.

In spite of this dilemma, the study will investigate a sample of publications in each school. Furthermore, the review will focus on those studies that have been published in the English language, and interact, in a limited way, with the English translations of non-English secondary literature where applicable. In particular, it will be important to review publications that offer philosophical solutions, that show the approaches of major Christian traditions and that relate to Judas and are pertinent to compatibilism. Given the wide range of philosophical thought on the subject, I have, in some places, relied on secondary formulations and accounts of proposals. As will be shown by the sheer variety of proposed solutions, the issue remains intractable and a complete satisfactory solution is elusive, even though some proposals hold more promise for helping to shed light in the particular test case of Judas Iscariot.

2.2 Philosophical Solutions

2.2.1 *The Aristotelian Solution (Fieser 1998)*

Fieser's work (1998) focuses on Aristotle's perception of human reasoning and its outcome. According to Fieser, Aristotle held that humans are living souls who possess reasoning ability, and that 'Reason is the source of the first principles of knowledge' (Fieser 1998:47). Aristotle divided 'reason' into two kinds, passive and active. Passive reason is the act of receiving, combining and comparing 'the objects of thought'. Active reason, on the other hand, 'makes objects of thought...makes the world intelligible, and bestows on the materials of knowledge those ideas or categories which make them accessible to thought' (ibid.). Fieser (ibid.) points out that Aristotle acknowledged that human souls received the ability to reason from an external source—most likely from God who is 'the eternal and omnipresent thinker' (ibid.).

Furthermore, Fieser (1998:48) discloses that Aristotle also believed that humans are rational beings, and possess a well-defined ability to evaluate, contemplate and control their emotions and desires. Aristotle termed this reasoning ability to control the emotions and desires as 'moral virtue' (ibid.). Consequently, he put forth a couple of relevant arguments regarding human ability to control their desires. Firstly, he argued that the ability which humans have to control their desires 'is not instinctive, but learned and is the outcome of both teaching and practice' (ibid.). Secondly, he argued that humans are able to control their desires because of their 'character traits' (ibid.).

Thirdly, he argued that humans could not use their will without the ability to understand the matter at hand. Thus, human 'Freedom of the will is a factor with both virtuous choices and vicious choices'. This implies that such choices are voluntary rather than involuntary. Furthermore, Aristotle stated, 'Actions are voluntary when the originating cause of action (either virtuous or vicious) lies in [humans]' (Fieser 1998:50). Aristotle's arguments suggest that humans are able to choose their actions freely, in view of the fact that God gave them the ability to reason (cf. Shedd 1999:21; Josephus: *War* 2.163; *Ant.* 13:171). The argument put forth by the Aristotelian solution indicates that Aristotle was a compatibilist.

2.2.2 *The Boethian Solution (Wood 2010)*

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius was a sixth-century AD Roman senator, consul, *magister officiorum* ('Master of Offices') and philosopher. His works influenced Middle Age philosophy considerably and set in motion a philosophical school of thought that attempts to address the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will today. He believed in the sovereign, providential governance of God, to the extent that he invoked God's guidance during his tribulation (Cooper 2009:37). He also affirmed God's omniscience and foreknowledge.

Nevertheless, he argued that God possesses knowledge of 'all contingent things as they occur', but he does not have foreknowledge of the future (Wood 2010:47), because God is timeless. Rogers (2007a; 2007b) defends God's timelessness concerning his foreknowledge (cf. Timpe 2007; Rota 2010; Diekemper 2013; De Florio and Frigerio 2015). As a result, God cannot have beliefs about the past, or the present, or the future. Boethius describes God's foreknowledge as a mere 'simple awareness of the future', so that he is able to see with his mind 'all of existence immediately in one eternal moment' (Marenbon 2003).

Boethius' description of God indicates that he subscribes to a modified omniscience of God in which God has foreknowledge, but does not fully control what will happen within this foreknowledge. He argues that if God were to fully control what would happen within his foreknowledge, then he would deny humans of 'the power of contrary choices' (Wood 2010:41). Briefly, Boethius advocates for incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

2.2.3 *The Ockhamist Solution (Wood 1999)*

Ockham was a 13th-century medieval English scholastic philosopher and theologian. His influence spread across several fields, including science, physics, logic and theology. Rega Wood (1999) shows that Ockham supported the doctrine of human free will. To substantiate this claim, Ockham states that the willingness to act wickedly is 'just as bad as doing something wicked' (p. 72). Ockham proposes two kinds of human will, namely, conditional acts of (the) will and executive acts of (the) will. He describes conditional acts of (the) will as acts carried out without involving external action. The reason that it does not involve external actions is that the human

agent did not intend to carry out actual external actions (pp. 72, 89). On the contrary, the executive acts of (the) will involve carrying out compelling actions unless external circumstances impede those actions (ibid.). Ockham holds that doers of wicked acts do not act out of ignorance necessarily; they do understand what they do and allow their will to guide them (pp. 74, 84). In fact, he argues that people who carry out wicked acts 'have a well-developed understanding of the universal principles of moral science' (p. 75). Furthermore, he claims that the will serves as 'the primary moral faculty' (pp. 74, 77). Ockham's view implies that divine foreknowledge of what would occur out of necessity does not annul human liability, as Boethius argued.

2.2.4 The Frankfurtian Solution (McKenna 2008)

Harry Gordon Frankfurt's areas of interest included moral philosophy, philosophy of mind and action and 17th-century rationalism. He was a proponent of compatibilism to the extent that humans are culpable for their actions with or without available alternatives. McKenna's work (2008) summarizes Frankfurt's stance against the 'Principles of Alternative Possibilities' (PAP). McKenna shows that Frankfurt opposes the 'Principles of Alternative Possibilities' view. The 'Principles of Alternative Possibilities' argues that, 'A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise' (p. 770). In other words, proponents of this view would hold a person morally responsible for an act only if that person had the opportunity of contrary choice (p. 770; cf. Janzen 2013:1037). Frankfurt argues against this view, because he thinks, 'the absence of alternative possibilities has no bearing on moral responsibility' (p. 771-773). Babcock (1988:28-55) argues that individuals should be held morally liable for their actions only when they intentionally choose between alternatives being fully aware that they could have done otherwise.

Whilst Frankfurt's argument is important in emphasizing human freedom as opposed to divine determinism, the argument about holding a person morally responsible only when that person has been able to choose between alternatives emphasizes human freedom even more. These two views have interestingly attracted compatibilists and incompatibilists to either side of the debate. For example, some compatibilists have resisted Frankfurt's argument (e.g. Campbell 1997; Smith 2003); while some moderate incompatibilists have endorsed it (e.g. Hunt 2000; Pereboom 2001; Zagzebski 2000). Those incompatibilists who endorse Frankfurt's argument do so on

the ground that divine determinism 'undermines freedom and moral responsibility not because it precludes the freedom to do otherwise, but because a deterministic causal history corrupts the actual sources of agency' (p. 773). I think moderate incompatibilists see a comparison between the roles of divine determination and divine predestination. If God determines an action or predestines an agent to carry out an action, he cannot at the same time hold that agent liable for that action.

Frankfurt's argument shows that the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilist may or may never end. At present, it has certainly not solved the tension between these two groups. Instead, it has run into an 'irresolvable tension', as McKenna has noted (p. 785). Nonetheless, Frankfurt's argument has some logic, because, as McKenna observes, people would most likely pass judgment on others because of their actions rather than on what they could have done (pp. 788, 789).

2.2.5 Summary of Philosophical Solutions

This section shows that except Boethius (who advocates for incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will), the other philosophers argue that there is compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Firstly, the review of the Aristotelian Solution shows that humans are rational beings who have the capability to evaluate various factors and take necessary decisions. In addition, he argued that humans have the ability to choose their actions freely, in spite of the fact that God gave them the capability to think rationally. Secondly, the Ockhamist Solution indicates that divine foreknowledge of what would occur out of necessity does not annul human liability. Thirdly, the Frankfurtian Solution holds humans liable for their moral actions with or without divine alternatives, because 'the absence of alternative possibilities has no bearing on moral responsibility'. Having seen that majority of the philosophical approaches which this section has reviewed hold humans culpable for their actions, I intend to discover whether Judas Iscariot could be culpable for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus.

2.3 Approaches by Major Christian Traditions

2.3.1 Reformed Tradition

The term Reformed Tradition refers to the system of belief attributed to John Calvin, particularly, which holds generally to the view that God is sovereign and exerts his sovereign rule over all of his creation. He has thus sovereignly predestined certain people to eternal salvation whom he knows are saveable and condemned others to eternal damnation that he knows are damnable. He foreordains certain people to serve him, even before they come into existence, to the exclusion of their free will. In addition, he possesses an absolute foreknowledge of all past, present and future events, foreordains and influences these events, predetermines these events and annuls all human freedom, especially regarding their salvation (cf. Anderson 2004:459. Bird 2013; Peterson 2007; Pike 1977; Reymond 1998; Roach 2008; Sanders 2003:70-73; Shedd 1999). The implication of this teaching is that divine foreknowledge and divine foreordination are inseparable to some extent (cf. Picirilli 2000:265, 266).

Paul's statement to the Christians in Rome (Rom 8:29) appears to support this claim: ὅτι οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνης τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ ('For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his son'). Προέγνω is aorist active indicative of προγινώσκω. Προγινώσκω means to 'know beforehand' or to 'have foreknowledge' (BDAG 2000:866; EDNT 1988-2007). It may be observed that Paul uses Προγινώσκω in Romans 8:29 in relationship to προορίζω. Προορίζω means, 'To decide upon beforehand, predetermine, to foreordain' (BADG 2000:866; cf. Thayer 1988-2007; EDNT 1988-2007). Προορίζω occurs five other times in the New Testament (Acts 4:28; 1 Cor 2:7; Rom 8:30; Eph 1:11) with reference to God predestining or decreeing peoples and events before their existence or actual occurrence.

Review of the tenets of Calvinism (as summarized in The Westminster Confession of Faith 1643-1648) will highlight and explain the nature of the Calvinists' point of view. Furthermore, the contributions of Grudem (2009), Helm (2010) and Reymond (1988) will highlight the Calvinistic view. These three writers have been selected as

representative expositors of the Calvinistic tradition, because of the comprehensive manner in which they approach the subject.

2.3.1.1 The Westminster Confession of Faith

The Westminster Confession of Faith is 'The most complete, the most fully elaborated and carefully guarded, the most perfect, and the most vital expression' of the Presbyterian and Reformed Churches (Boettner 1965:342, 343). It was formulated at the Westminster Assembly of 1643-1648 by 'one hundred and twenty-one...theologians, eleven lords, twenty commoners from all counties of England and the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge (and) seven commissioners from Scotland' (Boettner 1965:342, 343). It addresses the consequences of Adam's fall, God's election of some humans to eternal salvation, justification, adoption, sanctification and preservation of the elect, and his leaving of the rest of humanity in their sins to eternal condemnation (Shedd 1999:1-28; cf. Boettner 1965:13). For example, Confession iii.3, 4 (Shedd 1999:17, 20) states,

By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. The angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

The Confession's assertion raises a couple of significant questions. One question is, why did Jesus command his first disciples (and us) to 'make disciples of all nations' (Matt 28:19) before his ascension, since God has already predestined and foreordained the saved and the damned? Another question is, why does the New Testament command and exhort sinners to 'Repent...for the forgiveness of...sins' (Acts 2:38)? The third question is why does the New Testament speak of faith/belief as necessary for salvation (e.g. John 3:16, 18, 36; 5:24; Rom 10:9, 10)?

Whereas this 'Confession' is the expression of the Calvinist faith, Shedd (1999:20, 21) claims that some reformed theologians have advocated for the revision of those sections of the 'Confession' that are scripturally erroneous and misleading, and provide room for misinterpretation. They propose that such sections should be

revised. One of those sections is section iii.4. It speaks certainly and definitely, of the number of angels and men who have been divinely predestined and foreordained.

Advocates for the revision cite a couple of reasons for their argument. Firstly, they point out that this section is wrongly expressed. Secondly, that it is scripturally misleading. The section seems to be ambiguous about the increment or diminishing of the number of those who have been divine predestined or foreordained. For instance, it does not state clearly whether the inability is on the part of men or the angels or God himself.

Another section of the 'Confession' that these advocates have proposed for revision is section X.4. This section states 'Men not professing the Christian religion cannot be saved in any other way whatsoever, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature and the law of that religion they do profess'. Shedd (1999:21) reveals that their reason for arguing in favor of the revision is the fact that 'every promise and every warning of God is addressed to man as a free agent, and not as one who cannot be saved'.

It is noticeable that the two sections of the Confession appear contradictory, due to the fact that it is unlikely that men and angels who are passively predestined to everlasting life would be 'a free agent' on the other hand. Thus, the argument for revising them appears sound. It should be pointed out that some Calvinists, including John Calvin himself, accept that divine foreknowledge does not completely eliminate human free will (Cunningham 1994:581).

For example, Reymond (1998:440-449) describes Adam as a 'covenant breaker' who deserved God's strong judgment of curse, expulsion and subsequent death, because he disobeyed God's command willingly. Evans (1974:128, 130, 131) adds that Adam as a moral agent had the 'power to resist or to yield to moral evil'. Thus, his disobedience of God's command was 'volitional' and 'a voluntary act of the will'. In other words, God judged Adam justly. In fact, God would have been unjust had he cursed and expelled Adam without Adam willfully having disobeyed his direct command (cf. Gen 2:15-17; 3). In addition, the Westminster Confession accepts repentance as important and necessary for salvation. The truth is repentance cannot occur without the exercise of free human will. The following sections of the Confession show this interplay (Shedd 1999:24-27):

Confession XV.1: 'Repentance unto life is an evangelical grace, the doctrine whereof is to be preached in season and out of season by every minister of the gospel, as well as that of faith in Christ'. The mentioning of 'faith in Christ', along with repentance, implies that the two terms are intertwined about salvation. Additionally, the terms are requisites for salvation (cf. Acts 2:38; 17:30; Rom 1:16, 17; 10:9, 10, 17; Gal 2:15, 16). Thus, this section of the Confession is antithetical to its teaching on passive, arbitrary predestination unto everlasting life.

Confession XV.5, 6: 'It is every man's duty to endeavor to repent of his particular sins particularly. Every man is bound to make private confession of his sins to God, praying for the pardon thereof, upon which, and the forsaking of them, he shall find mercy'. The mentioning of man having a 'duty' to repent of 'his particular sins' and 'forsaking...them' offers one probable conclusion—'Man' is responsible for preserving his salvific relationship with God, granted that God has already predestined him (e.g. Confession iii.3, 4).

Confession viii.3: 'Man by his fall having made himself incapable of life by that (legal) covenant, the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called covenant of grace: wherein he freely offered to sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in him, that they may be saved, and promising to give unto all those that are ordained unto life, his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and able to believe'. The phrase 'requiring of them faith in him, that they may be saved' indicates human involvement in their salvation, rather than God predestining them unto everlasting salvation arbitrarily.

The various sections of the Confession that have been reviewed show that it indicates the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will. For on the one hand it teaches that by God's decree some individuals have been predestined to everlasting life, while others have been foreordained to everlasting death. On the other hand, it teaches that sinners are required to repent and exercise faith for their salvation and continuous walk with God. I think that it does not make sense for God to foreordain to everlasting death (that is futuristic) and at the same time lack the capacity to foreknow those whom he has foreordained.

With regards to divine foreknowledge and eternal damnation, the Confession does not mention divine foreknowledge or its role in the salvation or damnation of sinful

humanity explicitly. It does, however, refer to it implicitly. For example, it states that God in his sovereign wisdom has withheld his saving mercy and grace from some persons and predestined them to eternal damnation just as he predestined others to eternal salvation. Article III/iii declares, 'By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His own glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death'.

The Confession's use of 'predestinated' and 'foreordained' implies that God has foreknowledge of those whom he predestines and foreordains; for both actions cannot occur without God's foreknowledge. Calvin speaks to this subject even more emphatically. For example, he states that just as God has elected some persons to eternal salvation, so has he elected the reprobate to eternal damnation (*Institutes*, 3.21.5). Calvin's statement implies divine impartiality and human inequality. It appears Calvin does not see a consequential difference between divine foreknowledge and divine foreordination.

Calvin comments on John 3:18 that the words of Jesus are referring to wicked unbelievers who will have exhibited open contempt for the Gospel of Jesus. They will be 'utterly ruined' (King 1988-2007:n.p). Calvin's statements suggest that wicked, unbelieving people are liable for their condemnation, rather than because God decreed their condemnation. In other words, he is suggesting that the 'wicked' are not predestined to be wicked so that they might be damned eternally. Rather, they are damned because they persist in their life of wickedness. In other words if people will be condemned because of their wickedness and their unbelief, then they must repent from their wickedness and believe.

However, that might not save people who persist in their wickedness and unbelief (cf. John 3:18). It makes sense then to speculate that the responsibility for salvation also falls on the sinner, so that salvation or damnation does not rest with God's decretive election alone (cf. Walls 1983:19-33; Greenbury 1995:125; Shedd 1999:69-83). Additionally, it suggests that humans do exercise some measure of choice regarding their salvation or damnation (cf. Walls 2009:618-632). The question is why should the wicked repent, if they are already damned eternally?

Both the Old Testament and the New Testament support the doctrine of the necessity of repentance unto life. For example, Ezekiel 18:21-32 places the

responsibility for salvation or damnation upon the heads of human agents—those who persist in their sins will die, while those who repent of their sins will live. The LXX version of this passage uses ἀποστρέφω to speak to both the righteous and the wicked. The term (ἀποστρέφω) means, ‘To turn something away from something, turn away’ (EDNT [1988-2007:n.p.; BDAG 2000:122, 123]). In verses 24 and 26 he uses ἀποστρέψαι to refer to the righteous that turned from their righteous ways and thus sentenced themselves to death. In verses 27 and 28 he uses ἀποστρέψαι and ἀπέστρεψεν to refer to the wicked that turned from their wicked ways and thus acquitted themselves from death. In verse 30 God called on Israel to ‘Repent and turn from (ἐπιστρέψατε καὶ ἀποστρέψατε) all [their] transgressions’.

Finally, God told Ezekiel that he had ‘no pleasure in the death of anyone’ (Ezek 18:32a). Rather, he commanded everyone to ‘Turn, then and live’ (18:32b). God’s command at the end of the passage is interesting. It indicates that he would not foreordain any one to eternal damnation arbitrarily, in spite of the fact that he foreknows that that person may persist in wickedness. Acts 3:26 uses the term in the same way, ‘When God raised up his servant, he sent him first to you, to bless you by turning (ἀποστρέφειν) each of you from your wicked ways’. Another word for turning away from something or from sin and become converted is μετανοέω (BDAG 2000:640). It is used in Acts 2:38; 3:19; 8:22; 17:30; and 2 Corinthians 12:21 for example, to speak of repentance from sins for forgiveness/salvation.

Calvin’s commentary on John 3:18 suggests that he believes that God does not save or condemn any individual apart from that individual’s involvement in his or her salvation or damnation (cf. Olson 2011:7-24). The questions now are how can God elect ‘the reprobate to eternal damnation’ and at the same time they are able to ‘resist the declared will of God’? Secondly, why would unbelief ruin people, if God has already predestined them to eternal damnation? It is likely that this is what Jesus refers to in John 3:18. The passage says, ‘Those who believe in him are not condemned, but those who do not believe are condemned already, because they have not believed in the name of the only Son of God’. Similarly, John 5:24 states, ‘Very truly, I tell you, anyone who hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life, and does not come under judgment, but has passed from death unto life’. Ezekiel 18, John 3:18 and John 5:24 indicate that God treated as free agents those

whom they were addressing. In the same way, God still treats as free agents those who read their accounts in the present age (cf. Marshall 1987:69-74).

The review of the Westminster Confession of Faith's article on the relationship between divine foreknowledge and eternal damnation has shown that the Confession does imply that God foreknows all those who will be damned eternally. This is implied in the Confession's statement that God foreordained some angels and men to 'everlasting death' (Article III/iii). Thus, it is unlikely that divine foreordination would occur without divine foreknowledge. I now review a representative sample of contemporary reformed scholars on the issue.

2.3.1.2 Francis Turrentin in Helm (2010)

The work of Paul Helm (2010) is his reflection of the book, *Reformed Thought on Freedom*. It contains the contributions Francis Turrentin and other respectable Reformed theologians. Helm especially reviews Turrentin's work on the nature of human freedom. Turrentin was an influential 17th-century Genevan reformed scholar whose works shaped Calvinistic thought for centuries. I have chosen to review Turrentin's work because he appears to take account of the immense complexities of human action and the forces which contribute to their taking those actions. Thus, the notion of human freedom in the light of the divine will receives a much more thorough analysis in his work.

Helm's objective is to see whether Turrentin held to human freedom (free use of the will) as 'the freedom of indifference' or whether 'human freedom relies on the notion of synchronic contingency' (p. 185). The term 'the freedom of indifference' (*indifferentia*), states that humans have the capacity to choose between alternatives and then decide what to do or what not to do (pp. 194, 195, 196; cf. Kim 2017:36).

According to Helm, Turrentin argues that a person may be 'in a state of indifference' even when he/she has not made up his/her mind about the kind of action to take (p. 199). He accepts that human 'freedom consists in choice...together with voluntariness, that is, without compulsion' (p. 197). At the same time, however, he states that even though humans have the freedom to exercise their will, their freedom is neither absolute nor independent. Instead, it is subject to God's will, control and determination (p, 205). I think that it is ironic to say that human freedom

is voluntary and without compulsion, and on other hand subject to God's will and is controlled by it.

It was mentioned earlier that Helm set off to determine whether Turrentin understood human freedom as 'the freedom of indifference' (the ability of humans to choose between alternatives and then take a decision) or whether 'human freedom relies on the notion of synchronic contingency'. This would mean the coexistence of human freedom of choice with divine choice. Helm shows that Turrentin uses 'synchronic contingency' in two main ways—actual, free human choice and actual, free choice of God (p. 187). In other words, humans are able to take independent, structural, alternative decisions (pp. 187, 188). Furthermore, this view harmonizes with compatibilists' opinion of human will (p. 205). Nonetheless, Helm discloses that Turrentin did not approve of 'freedom of synchronic contingency in actual instances of human action' (pp. 188, 190).

Helm's presentation of Turrentin's teaching on human freedom has made two revelations about the Reformed Tradition. Firstly, the presentation has revealed that the Reformed Tradition does not hold to an absolute state of indifference. Secondly, it has revealed that the Reformed Tradition does not hold to a freedom of synchronic contingency. I observe too that, like the Westminster Confession, the Reformed Tradition limits the freedom of the human will.

2.3.1.3 Robert Reymond (1998)

The work of the Reformed theologian, Reymond (1998) addresses the Calvinists' theological and biblical views, which the Westminster Confession of Faith summarizes. He expounds the teaching of the 'Confession' on matters of 'Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom', 'God's Foreknowledge and Predestination of the Elect' and 'Eternal Damnation'.

For example, Reymond argues that the sovereignty of God annuls human free will, because the omnipotence of God cannot coexist with an independent universe (pp. 352-355). Furthermore, he argues that the choices that humans make (i.e. mental, physical, moral) are the inevitable results of their individual configurations by the wise God of creation. This configuration causes humans to do or not to do what they do. For example, humans do not fly physically like birds because they have not been

configured with wings. Similarly, human nature does not enable humans to bear good moral fruit, or obey Christ's word so that they might have life eternal, or come to Christ apart from divine enablement (special grace), or understand spiritual truths given by God's Spirit, or be subject to God's Law (pp. 353-355).

Humans therefore can do nothing without God's decretive will, which is the single cause of everything that exists and the actions of the things that exist (pp. 356-372). God's decretive will is concomitant with his sovereignty and his providential governance of the universe (pp. 356, 357; cf. Shedd 1999:29-68). However, neither his decretive will, nor his sovereign, providential governance of the universe makes him the author or causer of sin. Additionally, they do not impart violence to human will, or remove 'the liberty or contingency of second causes' (pp. 343, 372-381).

Reymond's argument implies that his 'liberty or contingency of second causes' applies only to humans' ability to do evil acts rather than their ability to do good or come to salvation (pp. 352-381). In fact, the sinful human nature also controls them, so that they are not truly free (p. 374). Reymond's view here contradicts his earlier admission that Adam was a 'covenant breaker' who deserved God's strong judgment of curse, expulsion and subsequent death.

The problem is, if Adam's ability to exercise his free will was marred by the sinful human nature or overruled by God's decretive will so that he could not rationalize, then Adam was not truly free when he broke the covenant of God and should not have been cursed and expelled by God (pp. 440-449). However, the fact that God cursed him and expelled him indicates that God held him liable. Liability is not without the exercise of some measure of free will. In other words, if Adam did exercise his free will, then the sovereign rule of God did not override his free will at all (Voak 2009:173-75). Furthermore, had Adam not been free to act, then God would be responsible for Adam's fall, since Adam would not have had the capacity to willfully disobey God's command (cf. Hicks 2012:5-12).

Reymond thinks God willfully and completely determined, from eternity-past and prior to his creation of humans, both the chronological and logical components of salvation. As a result, all humans who have been saved or who will be saved have been determined and decreed by him in conformity to his eternal purpose in Jesus

Christ (461-465, 672; cf.; Bird 2013; Link 2009:105-121; Pike 1977; Roach 2008; Shedd 1999:29-68; Luke 22:22; Acts 2:23; Eph 3:11; Heb 13:20).

According to Reymond (479-489), reformists think that God made this determinant salvation intentionally for the elect whom he foreknew would fall. However, they do not agree over the logical or chronological order of God's decree. One group (called 'Infralapsarians') posits, 'God first decreed the fall and then decreed to save some and to condemn others' while the other (called 'Supralapsarians') argues that, 'God first decreed to save some and to condemn others and then decreed the fall' (pp. 480-489; cf. Ferguson and Wright 1998:529). Both groups agree, nevertheless, that the salvation of the elect is exclusively 'supernaturalistic' and 'particularistic' (pp. 471-473, 673-698; cf. Barro 2009:181).

By 'particularistic', Reymond means salvation is restricted to the elect, instead of being universally available to all fallen humans (p. 677). Salvation as 'supernaturalistic' places absolute responsibility on God and obliterates any kind of human responsibility. This is because fallen humans are totally depraved—innately corrupt morally and spiritually—that they cannot respond to God's gracious gift of salvation willingly (p. 450-456; cf. Boettner 1965:61-74; Greenbury 1995:121-134).

What God has done is provide his restraining influence (often labeled as Common Grace) to help humans against gross sin (1998:402, 403; cf. Ferguson and Wright 1998:280). God also provides 'special grace' to save sinners and teach them 'to say 'No' to ungodliness and worldly passions, and to live self-controlled, upright and godly lives in this present age' (Titus 2:11, 12). Titus 2:11, 12 seems to imply that it is God's salvific grace which he has given that enables those whom he has saved to resist ungodliness and live righteously.

Notwithstanding, in view of the contributions of the Confession above, it is unlikely that people have the ability to actively resist various evils and 'live self-controlled, upright and godly lives' without having to use their will to do so. Question 160 of the Westminster Larger Catechism requires explicit, active responsibility from those who hear God's Word. For example, it states that it is required of hearers of the God's Word 'to prayerfully and diligently examine what they hear, meditate upon it, hide it in their hearts, and bring forth the fruit of it in their lives'.

This statement indicates human participation in their salvation—perhaps, in retaining that salvation. Reymond acknowledges the necessity for repentance from sins/evil in order to be right with God just as the Westminster Confession of Faith does (721-725). He cites Old Testament passages such as Isaiah 55:7; Jeremiah 8:6; Ezekiel 33:11, 12; and Joel 2:12, 13 to discuss this subject. These passages speak of the sovereign Lord commanding the wicked to ‘turn from their wicked ways’ and ‘return’ to him and live. This command presupposed the willing, active involvement of the wicked in turning from their wickedness. Reymond also points out that John the Baptist, Jesus and the apostles commanded their audiences to repent for the forgiveness of their sins and for their entry into the kingdom of heaven (pp. 721-723; cf. Matt 3:2, 8, 11; 4:17; 11:20, 21; 12:41; 18:3; Mark 1:4, 15; 6:12 Luke 3:3, 8; 5:32; 10:13; 11:32; 13:3, 5; 24:46, 47; Acts 2:38; 3:19; 8:22; 13:24; 17:30; 19:4; 20:21; 26:20).

Just as the Westminster Confession’s reference to repentance leads to a problem of reconciling it with predestination and foreordination, so does Reymond’s insistence that human repentance is necessary, prior to justification. For example, it presents a problem for the Calvinistic doctrine of human passivity in salvation. In fact, Calvin himself admitted that the doctrine of election and predestination posed a problem. For example, he stated that if God has offered salvation spontaneously to some people, while other people do not have access to it and are destroyed, then it raises ‘great and difficult questions [that] are inexplicable’ (*Institutes* 3.21.1).

Reymond’s exposition and general conclusions reflect the classic Calvinistic position, which consistently grounds human responsibility in salvation to passivity. In other words, God is the one who sovereignly and providentially elects individuals to eternal salvation. This view forms the heart of the Calvinistic doctrine of human and divine responsibilities in salvation, as summarized in The Westminster Confession of Faith.

Of direct import to the present study is Reymond’s limited, but significant admission, that humans do have free will and that repentance is necessary for forgiveness of sin (pp. 721-725). In other words, he sees a degree of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will even though this compatibilism is resolved almost entirely in favor of divine foreknowledge. In the case of Adam, for example, he admits that Adam willingly disobeyed God’s command, which resulted in Adam’s

deserved expulsion from the garden and his subsequent death (440-449; cf. Essex 2012:209-224). Other advocates of the Reformed tradition share this view of the interplay between divine election and the exercise of human free will. For example, Berkouwer (Daane 1960:9) thinks that faith and election are 'correlatives'. In other words, faith and election complement each other. Divine election cannot occur without the exercising of faith, and human faith is necessary for election to occur. Berkouwer argues therefore that even though faith is not 'the cause of election', divine election is not without the exercising of human faith. This is like saying, 'divine foreknowledge is to election what faith is to human free will'. Briefly, God cannot elect an individual without firstly foreknowing that individual, and an individual cannot exercise faith without using his/her free will.

Berkouwer (ibid.) perceived the interplay between election and faith to the extent that he taught that 'nothing can be known about election which is not at the same time the knowledge of faith; nothing can be said about election which is not also a confession of faith'. His point of view has resonance with the Wesleyan-Arminian point of view that humans have free will to accept or to reject God's gift of salvation.

2.3.1.4 Wayne Grudem (2009)

Like Reymond, Wayne Grudem's work on 'God's Providence' (2009)² addresses adequately the theological and biblical views of the Reformed Tradition. Unlike Reymond, Grudem gives more credence to the Arminian doctrine of compatibilism between absolute divine sovereignty and human choices. Like Reymond and other Reformed theologians, Grudem argues that God providentially preserves and rules the universe and its contents. Grudem offers three clarifications regarding God's providential rule: (1) God keeps all creatures existing and allows them to maintain the properties he created them with; (2) God cooperates with his creatures 'in every action' and he directs 'their distinctive properties to cause them to act as they do'; and (3) God directs his creatures 'to fulfill his purposes'. In view of these clarifications, Grudem discusses three subtopics, which are core to God's providence, preservation, concurrence and government. They will now be summarized, according to Grudem's order.

² 'God's Providence' is found in chapter 16 of Grudem's textbook, *Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009. The electronic copy of this work does not have page numberings.

By preservation, Grudem means God's act of preserving 'all created things existing and maintaining the properties with which he created them'. Grudem cites several biblical passages to substantiate this claim (e.g. Neh 9:6; Job 34:14, 15; Psa 104:29; 2 Pet 3:7, 10-12). The passages just cited indicate that God is in absolute control of his creation to the extent that he has determined what happens to it and at what time. Nonetheless, the fact that God's providence does not erase the properties of his creation with which he created them implies that humans still have their original, God-given properties that made them humans, vis-à-vis their volitional capability. Because humans have this freedom of choice, they do not always do what God wants them to do. Peckham (2014:198) cites some passages that indicate that God does not always get what he desires, but that he holds people responsible for their actions.

For example, Yahweh told the prophet Isaiah (66:4), 'I also will choose to mock [Israel], and bring upon them what they fear; because, when I called, no one answered, when I spoke, they did not listen; but they did what was evil in my sight, and chose what did not please me'. In Jeremiah (19:5), Yahweh declares, 'They have built the high places of Baal to burn their sons in the fire as offerings—something I did not command or mention, nor did it enter my mind' (NIV). Luke (7:30) records that 'the Pharisees and experts in the law rejected God's purpose for themselves'. By government, Grudem means God 'providentially governs or directs all things in order that they accomplish [His] purposes' (cf. Psa 103:19; Dan 4:35). He brought all of creation into being (Rom 11:36) and 'has put [them] in subjection under his feet' (1 Cor 15:27; Eph 1:11).

By concurrence, Grudem refers to God's act of cooperating with everything that he created 'in every action, directing their distinctive properties to cause them to act as they do'. In other words, God and his creatures cause all events to occur. Like the doctrine of preservation, concurrence focuses on God's sovereign rule over his creation. However, his involvement is not clearly identifiable. Like preservation, concurrence allows God's creatures to exercise some level of freedom of the will. For example, he providentially controls his inanimate creation (e.g. sunrise, rain, snow, lightning, thunder, hail, green grass, etc.) by setting the times for their functions (Job 37:6-13; 38:22-30; Psa 104:4, 14; 135:6, 7). Nonetheless, he may actually control them (e.g. Psa 135, 6, 7; cf. 104:4, 14).

Another example is, God controls all animals providentially—he provides food and security for them (Psa 104:24-29; Matt 6:26; 10:29). A third example is, God controls the affairs of the nations providentially (cf. Job (12:23). This passage says, ‘He makes nations great, then destroys them; he enlarges nations, then leads them away’. David (Psa 22:28; cf. Dan 4:34, 35) adds, ‘For dominion belongs to the LORD, and he rules over the nations’. A fourth example is, God controls every aspect of human life providentially. That is, he plans the birth and death of humans (cf. Job 14:5; Psa 139:16; Jer 1:5). God’s concurrence extends to people’s evil deeds.

For instance, he does not cause people to sin or to do evil; nevertheless, their sinful, evil deeds may accomplish God’s purposes. For example, Rahab’s lie saved the Israeli spies and enabled them to return and assure Joshua and the army of Israel’s victory over the army of Jericho (Josh 2:1-24). Paul and Silas’ imprisonment served as an instrument by which the Philippian jailor and his entire family believed in God (Acts 16:16-34). Paul’s imprisonment caused the gospel to spread (Phil1:12-14).

Furthermore, God puts rulers into power, removes them and influences their decisions and activities (cf. Ezra 1:1; 6:22; Psa 33:14, 15; 75:6, 7; Prov 16:9; 21:1; 20:24; 10:23; Luke 1:52; Acts 17:28; Gal 1:15). In God’s concurrent relationship to his creation, he allows them to exercise their free will. Thus, he is not liable for their actions, but they are, according to Scripture (Matt 26:24; Mark14:21; Luke 22:22; Jas 1:13-16). This suggests creaturely liability. What Grudem notes about God’s involvement with evil is that ‘God ordained that evil would come about [but only] through the willing choices of his creatures’ (cf. Grudem 1988:106-110). The terms ‘God ordained’ and the ‘willing choices’ of humans imply compatibilism in the simplest term.

The review of the Reformed Tradition shows that, even though they hold generally to incompatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will and that divine foreknowledge annuls human freedom, they admit that humans have some level of free will. For example, Calvin accepts Jesus’ words in John 3:18 that God will condemn people because of their unbelief in the name of his Son rather than because of predestination. The Westminster Confession teaches about sinners repenting and exercising faith for salvation, even though it teaches also that God

predestines and foreordains certain people unto eternal life or to eternal damnation. In the same way, Turrentin, Reymond, Grudem admit that humans do exercise their 'willing choices', though in a limited way.

2.3.2 Lutheran Tradition

Lutherans are regarded generally as part of the Reformed Tradition. Nevertheless, they differ particularly from Calvinists regarding the extent and nature of divine foreknowledge and human free will, and on the doctrine of double predestination (Cooper 2015:6, 11-13, 22, 26, 33). For instance, Calvinists teach generally that God foreknows all who will be saved and damned, and that he has saved those who are saveable and condemned those who are damnable (cf. Sanders 2003:70-73; Beek 2000:174, 175). Lutherans on the other hand, teach that people are saved by faith/belief, repentance and personally choosing God's offer of salvation, though not apart from God's foreknowledge and his enabling grace (Senor 1999:268-270; Cooper 2015:11; cf. John 3:3-21,36; 5:24-29). The following will seek to summarize the shades of scholarly opinion among Lutherans regarding the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

2.3.2.1 The Confessions of the Lutheran Church

'The Confessions of the Lutheran Church' are the definitive standard of the tenets of the denomination. They, along with the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed, the Athanasian Creed, the Augsburg Confession, the Small Catechism, the Large Catechism and the Formula of Concord are contained within *The Book of Concord*, which was first published in 1580. 'The Augsburg Confession' is known also as 'The Confession of Faith'. It was submitted to His Imperial Majesty Charles V at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. The principal articles of 'The Confessions' include Justification (Article IV), Obedience (Article VI), God's Eternal Foreknowledge [Predestination] and Election (Article XI), Repentance (Article XII) and Human Free will (Article XVIII).

Concerning justification, Article IV.1, 2 states that no one can be justified in God's sight by his/her 'own strength, merits, or works.' Rather, people's sins are remitted and they are justified through their faith 'when they believe that they are received into favor'. Article XVIII (of Human Free will): Sections 1-7, 31 of the Confessions accept that humans do have free will and do exercise it freely. However, their free will is

limited to carrying out their civil duties and worshiping idols rather than worshiping God. Additionally, their free will does not enable them to accept God's gracious offer of salvation freely, or to serve him without God granting them the ability to do so (cf. Meehl et al. 1958:30-58). Article VI (of Obedience): Section 1.3 of this article states that faith enables those who have been forgiven and justified to do good works, which God commands.

Nonetheless, good works do not earn justification. This article states too that faith is necessary for the forgiveness of sins and justification. I think that the person who believes decides to believe, having digested a certain piece of information. While it is true that it is God who gives the ability to have faith unto salvation, God does expect people to express that faith, without which he cannot save them (cf. Gen 15:6; John 3:16, 18, 36; Acts 2:38; 16:31; Rom 4:1-5; Gal 2:15-21; Cooper 2015:33).

Article XI (of God's Eternal Foreknowledge [Predestination] and Election: This article distinguishes between *praescientia et praedestinatio* (God's foreknowledge and his eternal election). The Article states,

This foreknowledge extends alike over the godly and the wicked, but it is not the cause of evil, neither of sin, namely of doing what is wrong (which originally arises from the devil and the wicked, perverse will of man), nor of their ruin [that men perish], for which they themselves are responsible [which they must ascribe to themselves]; but it only regulates it, and fixes a limit to it [how far it should progress and] how long it should last, and all this to the end that it should serve His elect for their salvation (XI.4.3).

This Article states further that God's predestination or eternal election 'extends only over the godly, beloved children of God, being a cause of their salvation, which He also provides' (XI.5.4; cf. Cooper 2015:22). God does not predestine people to eternal damnation. Instead, people are eternally condemned because of their sins and wickedness. For example, Article XI.57, 61, 81, 83 states that 'God is not a cause of sins, so, too, He is no cause of punishment, of damnation. Secondly, that He also will punish those who willfully turn away from the holy commandment, and again entangle themselves in the filth of the world' (cf. 2 Pet2:20).

The Article suggests that people will be condemned eternally because of their persistent sinning, rather than because of an intentional sin (cf. Heb 10:26-31). The Lutheran teaching is contrary to the Calvinists', which teaches that, 'By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His own glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death' (Westminster Confession III/iii, v). It appears that the Lutheran teaching would hold Judas Iscariot liable for his fate and damnation, rather than attribute it to divine predestination. God's foreknowledge is indicated here as primarily knowing 'all things before they happen', but it is not the cause of things happening.

Article XII (of Repentance): Section 1 of this article shows that repentance is necessary for forgiveness of sin. It sees repentance as consisting of 'contrition' and 'faith'. 'Contrition' causes people's consciences to be terribly smitten 'through the knowledge of sin', while 'faith' being derived from hearing the gospel, causes people to believe that their sins have been forgiven (cf. Article XX.29). Luther himself argued that repentance was necessary for divine forgiveness. For example, his first thesis (of his '95 theses') states: 'When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ said, 'Repent' (Matt. 4:17), he willed the entire life of believers to be one of repentance'. Similarly, the thirty-sixth thesis states, 'Any truly repentant Christian has a right to full remission of penalty and guilt, even without indulgence letters'. Even though these theses were Luther's objection to Roman Catholicism's doctrine of indulgences, they reflected, and continue to reflect, the teaching of Scripture on the necessity of repentance for remission of sins (cf. Ezek 18:21-32; Matt 3:2; 4:17; 11:20; 21:32; Mark 6:12; Luke 13:3, 5; 15:7; Acts 2:38; 3:19; 17:30; 26:20; Rev 2:5, 16).

A comparison of 'The Confessions of the Lutheran Church' and the 'Westminster Confession' shows that both of them teach that faith and repentance are necessary for salvation. The comparison shows too that the Lutheran 'Confession', instead of the Westminster's Confession, accepts the doctrine of human free will, even though humans use their will for evil rather than good, and to worship idols rather than God. Additionally, the two 'Confessions' differ in their views on divine predestination. For example the 'Westminster Confession (Confession iii.3, 4) states that God has predestined a particular number of men and angels 'unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death', whereas the Lutheran 'Confession' (XI.5.4) states that God's predestination is for saving the godly only, and it does not extend to the

damnation of the wicked. Moreover, Lutherans suggest that those who have been saved should repent whenever they sin.

2.3.2.2 Martin Luther on 'Bondage of the Will'

Henry Cole (1823) translated Luther's 'Bondage of the Will' into English in order to present it to the British Church. Originally, Luther wrote this work to Erasmus of Rotterdam as his rejection of Erasmus' teaching about the power of the human will and the necessity of human free will for faith, repentance and salvation. Erasmus taught that 'Free will, is a power of the human will, which can, of itself, will and not will to embrace the word and work of God, by which it is to be led to those things which are beyond its capacity and comprehension' (p. 113). Luther understood this definition as giving humans the ability to love and hate, keep God's law, believe the gospel and decide on their eternal destiny (p. 113). Luther thought that ascribing these characteristics to human will was ascribing 'divinity to Free will' (p. 114). He argued, it is God alone who gives power to humans to accept his law and the gospel, to have the will not to sin and to have the will to die (ibid.).

Luther shortens Erasmus' definition of 'free will' as 'a power in the human will, by which, a man may apply himself to those things which lead unto eternal salvation, or turn away from the same' (p.108). He describes human free will as a 'mere lie' (p. 5) and that human will is not actively involved in obtaining eternal salvation (p. 20). Luther argues that human will is passive rather than active, regarding salvation. In other words, God acts upon the will to enable it to respond to his will (p. 24), and those who respond to God's will are the ones God elects (p. 55).

Luther adds that except the Spirit of God awakens the human heart and influences the will, humans will not be able to respond to God positively, because the 'Free will, or the human heart, is so bound by the power of Satan' (p. 102). He agrees with Augustine's view of free will that, apart from God's enabling grace, it 'cannot do anything but fall, nor avail unto anything but to sin' (p. 115-122). The key to Luther's objection to free will is that it cannot coexist with God's sovereign, providential control of his creation, including man (p. 109). Luther held to the doctrine of predestination (p. 378). Moreover, Luther says, proponents of the doctrine of free will do not speak by means of God's Spirit or speak from the scriptures, but from the

flesh (pp. 71-80). It appears Luther saw no compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

2.3.3 Arminian Tradition

The term, Arminian Tradition, refers to the biblical-theological belief of Jacobus Arminius and his supporters especially concerning the doctrines of human depravity, atonement, grace, the perseverance of the elect, God's sovereign rule and providence, predestination, divine foreknowledge and human freedom of choice. The Wesleyan denomination forms part of this Tradition. Its Articles of Religion represent the theological view of this Tradition generally. It will now be examined.

2.3.3.1 The Articles of Religion of the Wesleyan Church (paragraph 224)

'The Articles of Religion of the Wesleyan Church' consist of what Wesleyans believe about the Holy Trinity, the authority and sufficiency of Scripture, God's purpose for humanity, the atonement, repentance, faith, justification, regeneration, adoption, good works, sin after regeneration, the judgment of all persons, human destiny after death, personal choice, and other fundamental doctrines. Section 8, paragraph 224 refers to 'Personal Choice' thus:

We believe that humanity's creation in the image of God included ability to choose between right and wrong. Thus, individuals were made morally responsible for their choices. But since the fall of Adam, people are unable in their own strength to do the right. This is due to original sin, which is not simply the following of Adam's example, but rather the corruption of the nature of each mortal, and is reproduced naturally in Adam's descendants. Because of it, humans are very far gone from original righteousness, and by nature are continually inclined to evil. They cannot of themselves even call upon God or exercise faith for salvation. However, through Jesus Christ the prevenient grace of God makes possible what humans in self-effort cannot do. It is bestowed freely upon all, enabling all who will to turn and be saved.

This article may be analyzed as follows:

1. It states that humans are incapable of doing that which is right by their own will and strength, because of the fall of Adam.
2. It states that humans are inclined to commit evil continually because of the fall of Adam.
3. It states that humans are unable to call upon God by faith to be saved apart from God's enabling grace ('prevenient grace').
4. It does not state that humans have lost their ability to choose between right and wrong, but that they 'are continually inclined to evil'.
5. It states that God provides his 'prevenient grace' to enable all humans 'who will turn and be saved'.

Concerning the subject of eternal damnation, the 'Articles of Religion of the Wesleyan Church' speaks of God's decretive involvement in people's final destiny and their own involvement:

The final destiny of each person is determined by God's grace and that person's response, evidenced inevitably by a moral character, which results from that individual's personal and volitional choices and not from any arbitrary decree of God. Heaven with its eternal glory and the blessedness of Christ's presence is the final abode of those who choose the salvation, which God provides through Jesus Christ, but hell with its everlasting misery, and separation from God is the final abode of those who neglect this great salvation (*The Discipline of the Wesleyan Church*, paragraph 250).

The statement of 'The Articles' indicates that God's gracious determination of a person's final destiny occurs pursuant to God's foreknowledge. It indicates also that a person's moral character and his or her 'volitional choices' for his or her final destiny occur also pursuant to his or her free will rather than as the result of God's foreknowledge. There is therefore an implied relationship between divine foreknowledge and human free will in the 'The Articles' of the Wesleyan Church concerning human final destiny vis-à-vis eternal damnation. It is interesting to note that the book of Revelation concurs with 'The Articles'. For example, Revelation on at least two occasions holds people responsible for their names being written in 'the book of life' or omitted from it:

3:5: 'If you conquer, you will be clothed like them in white robes, and I will not blot your name out of the book of life'.

20:12: 'And I saw the dead, great and small, standing before the throne, and books were opened. Also another book was opened, the book of life. And the dead were judged according to their works, as recorded in the books'.

The review of 'The Articles' regarding the relationship between divine foreknowledge and eternal damnation has shown that 'The Articles' admit that God foreknows the people who would be damned eternally. However, they teach that the people who will be damned will be damned because of the choices they will have made, rather than because God will have, in his foreknowledge, foreordained them. The Articles of the Wesleyan Church and the Lutheran 'Confession' do agree on this subject.

2.3.3.2 Allan Coppedge

The work of Allan Coppedge (1987) investigates John Wesley's entire system of theology and shows how it differed with those of Calvinism apropos God's foreknowledge and sovereignty versus human free will in matters of eternal salvation and eternal damnation. With regards to Wesley's view about God's foreknowledge, Coppedge thinks that Wesley preferred using 'present knowledge' rather than foreknowledge, because God 'sees all things at once' (p. 133). With the 'present knowledge', God knows already everyone who is going to believe or disbelieve at any given time in the future. Similarly, God knows already everything that will occur at any given time in the future (p. 133).

Unlike most Calvinists, who believe that God's foreknowledge of future human actions rescinds all human freedom and causes some to believe (cf. Peterson 2007; Pike 1977; Reymond 1998; Roach 2008; Shedd 1999; Bird 2013), Coppedge argues that Wesley held that God's foreknowledge, as well as his present knowledge, is only affirmative and not causative. That is, God's foreknowledge of future events, including the salvation of some people and the condemnation of others, did not cause them to come into being; rather, God knows about them because they already exist (pp. 133, 134). In the same way, God knows about all future human actions without necessarily him causing them to occur.

Thus, the choices that people make—whether to receive God’s grace and receive eternal salvation or reject it and be damned eternally (pp. 133, 134) are a result of exercising their God-given freedom of the will rather than God predetermining their choice (pp. 133, 134). Coppedge claims that Wesley argued that the freedom of the human will is intrinsic, as the result of God making humans in his ‘image’. Coppedge thinks this divine image gives humans the ability to be aware of who they are, and their will and their ‘liberty to exercise that will’ (p. 131). Coppedge argues that without the ability to know oneself and exercise one’s will, humans ‘would cease to be a moral agent’ (ibid.).

Therefore, those whom God calls to salvation are those whom he knows will respond to the gospel by faith and then believe (cf. Acts 2:38, 39). According to Coppedge, Wesley described this ‘call’ in two ways. Firstly, that God makes an ‘outward call’ primarily through the proclamation of the word of his grace (cf. Rom 10:17). The proclamation of ‘the word’ (the Gospel) suggests that Christ’s atonement is limitless and universal rather than particularistic; it is for the redemption of every sinner who would repent of his/her sins and believe (Coppedge 1987:134, 222; cf. Kojiro 1996:4-23).

Secondly, in Coppedge’s view, Wesley argued that God makes an ‘inward call’ via the working of his Spirit within the individual. Coppedge states further that Wesley taught that this twofold ‘call’ is available to every sinner rather than to a select group of people. Otherwise, God would have excluded some from salvation, and would be unjust to punish those to whom he had not offered his enabling grace to respond to this salvation (Coppedge 1987:63, 134, 135).

Wesley called this grace ‘Prevenient Grace’. God gives this grace to all persons generally to ‘restore in them the ability to accept (his) offer of redemption’ (Coppedge 1987:135, 136; cf. Gunter 2007:7-24). Like the Calvinists’ ‘Common Grace’, prevenient grace offers a restrictive influence on the evil that exists in humans for the survival of society. However, prevenient grace reinstates every person’s liberty and ability to accept God’s gift of salvation freely (Coppedge 1987:136).

Faith and repentance involve an act of the will just as forsaking or turning away from the commands of God is (cf. Jer 17:5-13; Ezek18; Acts 2:36-41; 16:25-34). Thus, God’s election of some persons to eternal salvation is conditional; they would remain

saved only by walking in faithful obedience to God's known law in their daily affairs of life (pp. 60-64, 133-137; cf. Abraham 1989:231-242).

2.3.3.3 John Wesley

Wesley's work, *Serious Thoughts upon the Perseverance of the Saints* (2007), clarifies and summarizes his Arminian position on the perseverance of the saints. In this work, Wesley describes 'saints' and answers the crucial question, 'Can any [saint] fall away?' He describes 'saints' in the following manner:

Those who are holy or righteous in the judgment of God himself; those who are endure with the faith that purifies the heart, that produces a good conscience; those who are grafted into the good olive tree, the spiritual, invisible Church; those who are branches of the true vine of whom Christ says, 'I am the vine, ye are the branches;' those who so effectually know Christ, as by that knowledge to have escaped the pollutions of the world; those who see the light of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, and who have been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, of the witness and the fruits of the Spirit; those who live by faith in the Son of God; those who are sanctified by the blood of the covenant; those to whom all or any of these characters belong, I mean the term *saints* (p. 285).

Like Reformed Theologians, Wesley accepts the doctrine of the total depravity of fallen humanity, whereby humans are incapable of doing anything good, including responding positively to God's offer of salvation apart from God's enabling (prevenient) grace (Coppedge 1987:222). He also accepts all the Bible passages that speak of God preserving those who put their faith in him (e.g. John 3:36; 5:24; 10:27-29; Rom 8:38, 39; 1 Thess 5:19). Nonetheless, he argues that those who have been saved by means of God's grace may fall away by their own volition and perish eternally in hell (pp. 286, 289, 291, 294-296, 298).

Wesley cites several Bible passages to prove his argument (e.g. Ezek 18:24, 26; Ezek 33:13, 18; 1 Tim 1:18, 19; 2 Pet 2:20, 21; Heb 6:4, 6; 10:26-29). The key focus of these passages is human responsibility in maintaining faith in God and remaining righteous before God. Wesley's view of 1 Timothy 1:18, 19 ('I am giving these

instructions, Timothy, my child, in accordance with the prophecies made earlier about you, so that by following them you may fight the good fight, having faith and a good conscience. By rejecting conscience, certain persons have suffered shipwreck in the faith') is that those whom Paul referred to had once received 'the faith that purifies the heart, that produces a good conscience' (p. 288). Wesley argues that the passage implies that the faith of Hymeneus and Alexander became totally and finally lost just as a vessel that has been wrecked once 'can never be recovered' (ibid.).

Similarly, Wesley notes, those who 'willfully persist in sin after having received the knowledge of the truth' and thus 'spurned the Son of God, profaned the blood of the covenant by which they were sanctified, and outraged the Spirit of grace' (Heb10:26-29) cannot retain their salvation; they will be punished with death everlasting (p. 297). Wesley concludes that the child of God (a true believer) who continues to believe in God and remains a child of God 'cannot go to hell' (cf. John 8:51). On the other hand, a child of God who stops believing in God and becomes a child of the devil will therefore go to hell (p. 297). In view of Wesley's thoughts on the above passages, he would not state other than that Judas Iscariot, being one of the apostles whom the Father gave to Jesus, fell away and became the 'son of perdition' (John 17:12).

Wesley's contribution shows that he accepts the Reformed doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, but with the condition that the believer continues to believe. Otherwise, he/she might lose their faith and go to hell. I think Wesley's argument suggests compatibilism between God's will and action (to preserve his saints) and human free will (to fall from sainthood).

2.3.4 Molinism

Molinism is the theological belief named after the Spanish scholar Luis de Molina. He was a 16th-century Spanish scholastic Jesuit priest whose contribution to the debate regarding the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will exerted significant influence until recently. He introduced the doctrine of Middle Knowledge (*scientia media*) of God as his attempt to maintain a balance between divine foreknowledge and human free will. He distinguished the middle knowledge of God from God's natural knowledge and God's free knowledge (Beilby and Eddy

2001:122). God's natural knowledge is that which he possessed prior to his creation of the universe and its contents. It is part of God's nature; it is a factual knowledge and that which he knows does come to pass (Van Horn 2012:810). It enables God to figure out the events that are likely to occur, as well as events 'that could exist if he were to will them into being' (Campbell 2006:2; cf. Van Horn 2012:810, 811). Craig (Beilby and Eddy 2001:123) states that through this knowledge God 'knows the range of possible worlds'.

The free knowledge of God, on the other hand, enables him to understand everything that has happened, that is happening, at the present time and that will be happening (Campbell 2006:2). Craig (Beilby and Eddy 2001:123) states, God's free knowledge enables him to know 'the actual world'. God's natural knowledge and his free knowledge impinge on human free will vis-à-vis their freedom of choice. On the other hand, if humans were so free that they would choose to act or not to act (the use of libertarian freedom) then God would appear not to possess infallible, exhaustive knowledge or foreknowledge (Campbell 2006:1, 2; cf. Bryant 1992:93).

Molina's Middle Knowledge states, 'God comprehends everything that would happen if God had been willing to decree its occurrence' (Campbell 2006:3). Furthermore, by means of Middle Knowledge, 'God knows absolutely what men will freely do without having specifically decreed their actions, since [he] knows what any free creature would do in any situation, [and thus] can, by creating the appropriate situations, bring it about that creatures will achieve his ends and purposes and...will do so freely' (Reymond 1998:189; cf. Borchert 2006:114; Bryant 1992:93-103). In addition, this doctrine states that God also knows what 'humans would do under any hypothetical situation' (Sanders 2003:88).

In other words, God know what humans will do, and he creates the circumstances for those choices and actions; however, he does not ordain that humans will make the specific choice at that point. This implies that, regarding salvation, God in his providence foreknows whether his creatures will freely accept or reject it, and the times for their decisions, but without God himself initiating that salvation. Two important contributions concerning this doctrine (though not in total support of it) are Travis James Campbell's work (2006) and John Laing's work (2004). Their works will now be reviewed.

2.3.4.1 Travis James Campbell

Campbell's work (2006) is an analysis of 'the most prominent method of reconciling divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom', particularly with relationship to the doctrine of Middle Knowledge (p. 21). During his analysis, he argues that humans do not have libertarian freedom (pp. 21, 22). In addition, he concludes that middle knowledge appears 'to compromise' God's very nature, which the Bible describes (p. 22). He therefore encourages all faithful Christians, to renounce the doctrine of Middle Knowledge (ibid.).

What God does via his Middle Knowledge is that he offers to his creatures the grace that is necessarily sufficient to help them respond to his offer of salvation (p. 4). Furthermore, God's Middle Knowledge enables him to know 'all counterfactuals states-of-affairs', granted that he is omniscient (p. 3-6). In other words, assuming that God is omniscient, he foreknows about the probability of future events occurring or not occurring, along with the circumstances that would cause them to occur or not occur (p. 3). The human agents might not even know the pending results of their actions, but God will know them.

Campbell thinks the doctrine of Middle Knowledge 'seems to compromise the very nature of God described in the Bible' (p. 22). I would agree with him. Having reviewed Campbell's work, I understand his argument to say, the doctrine of Middle Knowledge does not ascribe to an exhaustive divine foreknowledge as it grants that God's foreknowledge is general, so that humans could choose to do different things within God's foreknowledge. Thus, Middle Knowledge does not lack the actual doctrine of divine foreknowledge, but that God does not decree what exactly humans should do.

2.3.4.2 John Laing

The work of Laing (2004) is his attempt to determine whether the compatibilist view of human freedom and the doctrine of Middle Knowledge are reconcilable. Laing does this through a couple of approaches. Firstly, he looks at the differences between libertarianism and compatibilism. Secondly, he examines the probability of incorporating the doctrine of Middle Knowledge into a Calvinistic model of divine providence (p. 455). He thinks libertarian freedom is perceived generally to include

the 'freedom of choice that is self-determined and not caused by events outside the control of the [human] agent' (pp. 455, 456; cf. Peckham 2014:195-198).

In this case, an agent's choice is 'free' only when it is made 'between competing alternatives' (ibid. cf. Tiessen 2007:347). However, concerning compatibilist freedom, Laing thinks that it is a freedom that is perceived generally to include 'a freedom of choice that is self-determined but may, in some instances (or all instances), be causally determined by events outside the control of the agent' (p. 455). In other words, an individual may choose to act willfully as he/she desires or wishes, but not without enough internal or external grounds for that action (ibid). Even if an individual does an act as a result of some kind of external influence, that individual is judged as acting willfully if that individual's will, desires, or wishes have not been coerced (pp. 455, 456; cf. Basinger 1993:55). It appears as if Laing supports Basinger's argument that Middle Knowledge constrains God 'by logical possibility *and* the true counterfactuals of freedom' (italics are Laing's), whereas compatibilism limits God 'only by logical possibility' (p. 458). Basinger (1993:63) himself explains his statement as follows:

It is important to emphasize that, even if a God with middle knowledge has brought about a world in which his ends and purposes are always achieved freely, such a being is not as powerful as is the God of the theological compatibilist or paradox indeterminist. The God of the theological compatibilist and paradox indeterminist is limited only by logical possibility. He could have created any possible world but chose to actualize this one—including those free choices involved—because it is the manifestation of his ideal creative. A God with middle knowledge, however, is not limited by logical possibility. With respect to those creative options that include significant freedom, God is limited by what he sees that those with freedom will in fact do with it.

To put it more directly, if God has middle knowledge and desires a world containing significant freedom, then his creative options are limited by something over which he has no control—namely, how individuals will use their freedom in any given situation in which they are allowed to do so. Thus even if this world is exactly what God wants, it

must be remembered that for a God with middle knowledge this is so only because God had the good fortune to see that he would be able to actualize a world in which all individuals would always freely choose to do exactly what he wants done.

Middle Knowledge therefore prevents God from making plans about how he desires his world to be and end; it also places God at the bargaining end with his free creatures (459; Basinger 1993:61, 62). Proponents of the doctrine of Middle Knowledge have thought to limit God's sovereign, providential control of his creation, in order that the creatures would exercise some level of freedom of choice (i.e. between alternatives). Nonetheless, by doing so they have compromised 'the very nature of God described in the Bible' (Campbell 2006: 22). I think that Laing is right to state that the advocates of the Middle Knowledge seem 'to be caught between the horns of a dilemma'. Thus, philosophers and theologians should 'reject it as an ultimately untenable position' (p. 467).

2.3.5 Open Theism

Open Theism is the theological belief 'that free will is such that God cannot know the future, simply because it has not yet happened' (Boyd 2001:13-37; Williams 2005:177), or God intentionally chooses 'to not know it, even though it can be known' (Pretorius 2013:4). This implies that God does not possess complete foreknowledge, except for his knowledge that comes about as the result of 'his determination and promises to act in certain ways or from his reading of past and present personalities and events'(Picirilli 2001:467).

2.3.5.1 Sanders

John Sanders' contribution (2003) addresses the similarities and differences between open theism and Arminianism in order to determine whether the former is 'a radical revision or a miniscule modification' (p. 69) of the latter. He argues that open theism and Arminianism (he qualifies this as 'establishment Arminianism') are two forms of free will theism (pp. 70, 74). This review, however, will focus on open theism. Sanders (p. 74) states that free will theism believes that God is the creator who created all things (excluding himself) freely, is immaterial and separate from the world, yet he sustains it and is involved in it repeatedly.

In addition, free will theism believes that God is all-powerful, all-knowing, eternal, self-existent, perfectly good and is a personal being who is worthy of worship (ibid). Concerning humans, free will theism holds that humans have libertarian freedom—the ability to choose between alternatives—that God is able to be affected by humans, and that he ‘enters into genuine give-and-take relations with us’ (pp. 74, 76). The basis for this human leverage is that God has decided not to determine everything that occurs in the world, in order that humans might respond freely to his love (p. 75). In fact, if God knows the future exhaustively, then humans would not possess the power of alternative choices (Wood 2010:41). Nonetheless, humans do some things that God would rather they not do (Sanders 2003:89). Free will theism holds also that God may decide to change his thoughts, his will and his emotions in response to human attitude toward him, in spite of the fact that his nature is immutable (p. 76).

Open theism (synonymous with ‘Openness Theology’, Pretorius 2013:5, 6) accentuates the belief that God does enter into a vibrant, reciprocal relationship with humans, to the extent that human actions affect him. It acknowledges the Arminian doctrines of libertarian freedom, conditional election and divine conditionality (p. 100), so that God does not foreordain human desires (Sanders 2012:142; cf. Carlson 2012:189-198; William 2005:177-178). In addition, open theism holds that God is all-knowing, and thus he knows every fact that exists and every truth that is knowable (pp. 71, 80, 81; cf. Barro 2009:183-193). God could know the future if he had created a world that he would rule with absolute sovereignty and determination (p. 81). On the contrary, he created a world in which he has given humans libertarian freedom to choose their actions (Sanders 2003:96; cf. Sanders 2012:147).

Therefore, unless people make decisions and carry them out, God cannot know with certainty what their future decisions and deeds will be like (Sanders 2003:79, 80; cf. Cudby 2005:14, 15; Rice 2013:30). As a result, he depends upon his creatures for many facets of life and history. However, Hall and Sanders (2001:40, 41) restore, in a limited way, God’s ability to foreknow the future. For example, they view God as knowing the future partly definitely and partly indefinitely. Open theism’s belief in divine temporality and its denial of divine exhaustive foreknowledge have been pointed out as its hallmarks (pp. 78, 79). God being temporal means he has always existed, that he continues to exist and he will continue to exist (p. 78; cf. Highfield

2002:281). God possesses exhaustive knowledge of all past and present events, and those future events, which he knows as 'possibilities and probabilities' (p. 83; cf. Boyd 2001:127-132). Thus, God foreordains only those events he knows with certainty will occur and those people that he knows will respond positively (Cudby 2005:13, 15; cf. Williams 2005). God's knowledge of probable future events supports the claim that God does not possess exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future events.

2.3.5.2 G A Boyd

Boyd (2009) thinks that the theological debate concerning God's foreknowledge is not about 'the scope or perfection of God's foreknowledge'. Instead, it is 'over the content of reality' vis-à-vis creation and its content (1). Boyd's contribution is a defense of the openness view of divine foreknowledge, which holds that creation is 'partly settled and partly opened' (p. 19), and that 'the future is partly open' (p. 37). He thinks that even though God's omniscience enables him to determine and foreknow the occurrence of a particular event he does not determine or foreknow every detail that relates to that event (p. 19). Boyd adds that God leaves some level of determinations with humans and that he narrows 'the parameters within which certain people act out of their freely chosen character' (pp. 19, 22).

Boyd (2009) defends his argument in favor of the openness view in three ways: (1) He demonstrates that 'the Bible does not warrant the conclusion that the future is exhaustively controlled or foreknown as settled by God', as classical theists claim; (2) he discusses 'the biblical basis of the openness view of the future'; and (3) he defends the openness view against five commonly known objections of classical theists (pp. 14, 37). Firstly, he cites several Bible passages that classical theists use as the basis for their position (15; e.g. Gen 15:13-15; 1 Kgs 13:1, 2; Job 42:2; Isa14:27;45:1; 46:9-11; 48:3-5; Ezek 26:7-21; Matt 26:34; John 13:18, 19; 19:28, 29, 34-37; Acts 2:23; 4:27, 28; Rom 8:28; Eph 1:11; 1 Pet 1:20). All of these passages speak either of God's foreknowledge of events, or his sovereign, providential control of his creatures, or of his predictions and their fulfillment, or of his predestination, predetermination and foreordination of certain events and individuals, including Jesus Christ. Isaiah 46:9-11 is especially noteworthy, regarding God's sovereign rule, foreknowledge, determination and decrees.

This passage portrays God as being sovereign, possessing foreknowledge, deterministic and issues unchangeable decrees. Boyd (p. 16) argues however, that it neither teaches nor implies that God 'will bring about *everything* about the future to pass and, thus, that [God] foreknows all that will come to pass' (italics are Boyd's, p. 16). There are other biblical passages, which portray God as Isaiah 46:9-11 does (e.g. Gen 15:13-15; 1 Kgs 13:1, 2; Isa 46:9-11; 48:3-5; Ezek 26:7-21; Matt 26:34; Acts 2:23; 4:27, 28; 1 Pet 1:20). Boyd argues that these passage too 'do not justify the conclusion that [God] desires to predetermine or foreknow the whole of the future' (p. 20), or 'warrant the conclusion that the future is exhaustively controlled or foreknown as settled by God' (pp. 15-17).

Secondly, Boyd discusses what he terms 'Scripture and the Openness of Creation' mean (p. 23). Boyd cites scriptural passages that depict God as speaking about the future 'in conditional terms (e.g. Exod 4:8, 9; 13:17; cf. Matt 26:39.), that he 'regrets the outcome of decisions he has made' (Gen 6:6; 1 Sam 13:13; 15:10, 11, 35) and that he 'changes his mind in response to changing situations' (Jer 18:4-10, 11; 26:2, 3; Joel 2:12, 13; Jonah 4:2; cf. 3:10). In addition, Boyd cites passages in which God is surprised occasionally by 'improbable' human behavior (Jer 3:6, 7; 7:31; cf. 19:5; 32:35), tests people to know their character (Gen 22:12; cf. vv. 1-21; Deut 8:2; 13:1-3; Judg 3:4; 2 Chr 32:31) and shows flexibility (Exod 32:10-14; 2 Kgs 20:1-6; 1 Chr 21:15). Finally, he cites a passage that depicts God as expressing frustration (e.g. Ezek 22:30, 31). In view of these passages, Boyd holds that, regarding creation, 'the future is partly open' rather than 'exhaustively settled' as claimed by the classical view (p. 37).

Thirdly, Boyd responds to the five most common objections with which classical theists charge the openness view of creation. The first objection is, 'The passages used to support the openness view are anthropomorphic and phenomenological' and should not be taken literally (p. 37). Boyd offers five responses to this objection. Firstly, he states that none of the passages that openness refers to 'suggests that they are either anthropomorphic or phenomenological'. Instead, the teachings of these passages are plain and forthright (p. 38). For instance, Yahweh was uncertain whether the inhabitants of Judah would listen to his word that Jeremiah would speak to them and 'turn from their evil way, that I may change my mind about the disaster that I intend to bring on them because of their evil doings' (Jer 26:1-3).

Secondly, he answers that the passages that Calvin regards as God changing his mind are God's way of representing himself to humans, 'not as he is in himself, but as he seems to us' (p. 38). Boyd states, while God appears to change his mind, 'neither [his] plan nor his will is reversed, nor his volition altered' (p. 38). Thirdly, Boyd states that the passages, which classical theists claim are anthropomorphic or phenomenological, are not used figuratively, or speak about things that can be seen. For example, God changing his mind or his willingness to do so is not the same as referring to God having hands or eyes. Boyd's fourth response is that classifying the openness passages as anthropomorphic or phenomenological is robbing Scripture of its fidelity (p. 39). Fifthly, Boyd answers that 'the classical view of God as 'above' time, change, disappointment, suffering, empathy, vulnerability and so on is itself anthropomorphic' (pp. 39, 40).

Boyd then devotes himself to answering some of the objections that classical theists raise against open theism. The first objection is that 'The passages used to support the openness view are anthropomorphic and phenomenological'. However, as argued above, Boyd asserts otherwise. Classical theists object to Boyd's openness view on the ground that 'The openness view contradicts Scripture'. For example, they argue that 1 Samuel 15:29 and Numbers 23:19 contradict the passages that depict God as changing his mind. These two passages describe God as non-human who does not lie or change his mind. Boyd argues that when these two passages are examined closely, they show no contradiction to the openness passages.

Concerning 1 Samuel 15:29, Boyd argues that the context of this passage reveals that God had promised earlier that he would allow Saul's family to reign continually and that he would bless Saul (1 Sam 13:13, 14). Nonetheless, when Saul disobeyed God, God regretted that he had made him king (1 Sam 15:11) and subsequently 'replaced his kingship with David's' (p. 41; cf. 1 Sam 15:28; 16:1-13). Boyd thinks that had Saul repented sincerely for his sin, 'God may have reversed his decision once again for all we know' and restored him (p. 41). Concerning Numbers 23:19, Boyd argues that God did not want to appear to Balaam like a mortal human or one of the people yielding to Balaam's cause. Furthermore, Boyd states that the mind of God 'is unchanging in every way in which it is virtuous to be unchanging, but it is open to change in every way in which it is virtuous to be open to change' (pp. 41, 42).

The second objection from the classical view is that 'The openness view undermines God's omniscience'. Boyd argues that openness theists do not question God's omniscience; in fact, they accept God's omniscience as other theologians (p. 43). What openness theists reject is classical theists' claim that 'God can eternally foreknow the future with exhaustive settledness while nevertheless preserving the morally responsible freedom of agents'. Boyd points out that openness theists see this as 'a logical contradiction'. The third objection by classical theists is, 'The openness view undermines God's sovereignty'. Classical theists' argument is that attributing open-endedness to creation infers that God is not in control of his creation; thus, it denies God of being God.

However, Boyd clarifies that what the openness view stresses is that free agents do play a certain influential role in world history. In other words, God does not control everything that humans do and neither does everything happen according to his will (p. 43). I think this argument makes sense, in view of the unnecessary wars that maim babies and children in many countries, and thus shorten their lives and usefulness. God allows humans to carry out freely these evil acts that he has not willed necessarily. God also allows humans to choose to love him. Boyd notes that when God does this, then he limits his own ability 'temporarily' so that he does not get his own unilateral way (p. 44). Boyd adds, 'God demonstrates his sovereignty by empowering others to enter into a loving relationship with him...and when he puts himself in a position where his heart might be grieved and frustrated'.

The final objection by classical theists is that 'The openness view is discomforting' and has pastoral disadvantages (p. 45). The ground for this objection is that denying God of foreknowledge of everything that occurs implies that he has nothing to do with them. Thus, believers have no guarantee that happenings in their lives, including sufferings, fit into God's plan and are meaningful (p. 45). Boyd offers four responses to this objection. Firstly, he advises that a distinction be made between 'objective and personal preferences' (p. 45), because people will believe what they want to believe.

Secondly, he points out that believing and accepting that a particular event has a specific purpose behind it is not always comforting. For example, he notes that believing and accepting the truth that one's child has disappeared is not comforting

(p. 45). Boyd's third response is that, even though God sometimes allows or ordains hardships to happen to peoples and nations in order to chastise them, Scripture does not say that every event that occurs has a divine reason (p. 46). For example, Boyd refers to instances of demonic and satanic attacks, which Jesus healed, but which did not come from God (e.g. Mark 5:1-20; 9:17-27; Acts 10:38). Fourthly, Boyd admits that the Openness view is unable to assure people that every event in their lives fits into the plan of God. Nevertheless, it is able to offer people 'the same kind of comfort that the New Testament offers' (p. 46).

Boyd's concluding argument is that the Openness view is more biblical than the classical view, and that 'the motivating force behind the Openness view is a desire to be faithful to the witness of Scripture' (p. 47). Like the classical view, the Openness view does affirm God's sovereign, providential control of the future and his foreknowledge of the future. However, unlike the classical view, Openness claims that the future, concerning creation, is 'partly settled and partly opened' (pp. 19, 37). Boyd states that this view is 'most consistent with the understanding of reality that is being developed in contemporary science', as well as that 'it motivates believers to assume an aggressive stance in combating evil in the world' (p. 47).

In addition, Boyd states that the Openness view best represents and presents the teaching of Scripture compared to other views and that it 'has a number of theological and practical advantages'. For example, unlike the other views, Openness provides a satisfactory response to the disturbing question 'of why God creates people who end up inflicting horrifying suffering on others and damning themselves' (p. 47).

Having reviewed Boyd's contribution on the Openness view, I would disagree with his concluding argument that the Openness view is more biblical than the classical view and that the Openness view is 'faithful to the witness of Scripture'. If Openness were a 'faithful...witness of Scripture', then it would bear witness to the scriptural teaching that 'God has complete, accurate and infallible knowledge of all events past, present and future, including all future decisions and actions of free moral agents' (Field 2003:2). Boyd himself admits that the Openness view is unable to assure people that every event in their lives fits into the plan of God.

I think that people who believe in God and follow him need assurance that his plans for their lives are still being fulfilled in their lives, despite their present circumstances (e.g. Rom 8:28, 29). There is certainly a distinction between events in people's lives fitting into God's plans and God causing those events to occur. I also think that the view of Classical Arminianism on God's sovereignty and events within his creation is better than the Openness view. It states, '*The Sovereignty of Divine Engagement* where God is active, or concurs, in every event within human history such that every event has divine purpose and meaning, though without divine decrees determining what will happen within human history' (Hicks 2012:16, 17, italics are Hicks').

2.3.5.3 Samuel Lamerson

The work of Samuel Lamerson (2008) is an examination of what he refers to as 'two sub-questions that may help clarify the answer to the question of Jesus' own view of the openness of God'. They are, (1) 'What did Jesus think of the nature and extent of his Father's foreknowledge?' and (2) 'What did Jesus think and teach about his own foreknowledge?' (p. 25). Lamerson uses the Gospels to answer these important questions. Concerning the first question, Lamerson refers to the Gospel of Matthew (6:8b; 10:26-33) to provide some answers. Matthew 6:8 is a continuation of Jesus' list of prohibitions for his disciples during their prayer. In verse 7, he commands them to stop heaping up 'empty phrases as the Gentiles do', in order for their prayers to be answered. In the first section of verse eight (v. 8a), he commands them not to be like them. In the second section of this verse (v. 8b), he tells them the reason as, οἶδεν γὰρ ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν ὃν χρεῖαν ἔχετε πρὸ τοῦ ὑμᾶς αἰτῆσαι αὐτόν ('for your Father knows what you need before you ask him' NIV).

Jesus' words in this passage, are unambiguous; they suggest strongly that the Father possesses foreknowledge of the future needs of his children. The use of 'before' (πρὸ) in this passage could mean nothing else but a 'marker of a point of time prior to another point of time' (BDAG 2000:864). When this is applied to God's knowledge of the needs of the disciples, then he would be perceived as already knowing the disciples' need at the time of their prayer, before they prayed for it. Lamerson thinks that first-century Jews who heard Jesus speak these words understood Jesus to be speaking about God's knowledge of the future (p. 28). This

passage appears to teach therefore, that, Jesus understood and accepted that his Father 'had knowledge of the future' (p. 29).

Regarding Jesus' own view of his knowledge of the future, the Gospels suggest that he possessed the ability to foreknow, and that he may have known it. For example, he predicted that Peter would deny him three times 'before the cock crows' (Matt 26:34; Mark 14:30; Luke 22:34; John 13:38). These Gospels show that Peter did deny Jesus (Matt 26:69-75; Mark 14:66-72; Luke 22:55-62; John 18:16-18, 25-27). Thus, it makes sense to assume that Jesus foreknew that Peter would deny him.

Another indication that Jesus possessed foreknowledge is shown by his prediction about Judas Iscariot's betrayal of him (Matt 26:20-25; Mark 14:17-21). Verses 24 and 25 clearly predict Judas as the betrayer and the consequence of his betrayal. This prediction was fulfilled just as his prediction of Peter's denial was (Matt 26:47-56; Mark 14:43-52; Luke 22:47-53; John 18:2-12). Matthew 10: 16-25 is the record of Jesus' prediction of the arrest and persecution of his disciples. I think it would be unfounded to view this prediction as other than foreknowledge.

2.3.6 Summary of the Approaches by Major Christian Traditions

This section has reviewed the approaches of five major Christian traditions concerning divine foreknowledge and human free will, namely, Reformed, Lutheran, Arminian, Molinism and Openness. The review of the Reformed Tradition shows that, even though they hold generally to incompatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will, and that divine foreknowledge annuls human freedom, they admit that humans have some level of free will. For example, this section has shown that Calvin accepted Jesus' words in John 3:18 that God will condemn people because of their unbelief in the name of his Son rather than because of predestination. In addition, the Westminster Confession teaches about sinners repenting and exercising faith for salvation, even though it teaches God predestining and foreordaining certain people unto eternal life or to eternal damnation. Reformed scholars such as Turrentin, Reymond and Grudem, admit that humans do exercise their 'willing choices', though in a limited way.

Concerning the Lutheran tradition, this section has shown that even though Luther opposed the doctrine of compatibilism on the grounds of the total depravity of

humanity and the 'bondage of [their] will' to God's sovereign, providential control, 'The Confessions of the Lutheran Church' and the 'Westminster Confession' accept faith and repentance as necessary for salvation. Furthermore, the Lutheran 'Confession' accepts the doctrine of human free will, even though humans use their will to do evil rather than good, and to worship idols rather than God. Finally, this section shows that Lutherans accept that those who have been saved should repent whenever they sin.

The Arminian approach holds to the compatibilism view, even though proponents accept the Reformed doctrine of the total depravity of the humanity and the perseverance of the saints. In their view, the saints of God must continue to believe. Otherwise, they lose their faith and go to hell. I think Wesley's argument suggests compatibilism between God's will and action (to preserve his saints) and human free will (to fall from sainthood).

The approach of Molinism has shown that the doctrine of Middle Knowledge has limited God's sovereign, providential control of his creation, in order that the creatures would exercise some level of freedom of choice (i.e. between alternatives). This section discussed that by doing so, Molinism has compromised 'the very nature of God described in the Bible' (Campbell 2006: 22). I think Molinism indicates some level of compatibilism.

Regarding Open Theism, this section has shown that Classical Theism accuses it of contradicting the Scriptures, undermining God's omniscience and undermining God's sovereignty (Boyd 2001:43). This section showed too that Openness does not bear witness to the scriptural teaching that 'God has complete, accurate and infallible knowledge of all events past, present and future, including all future decisions and actions of free moral agents' (Field 2003:2). Furthermore, the section showed that Boyd himself admitted that the openness view is unable to assure people that every event in their lives fits into the plan of God. Concerning Judas' role in the arrest and death of Jesus, Openness Theism's view would likely depict Jesus as being caught unaware of his action. Openness would accept that Judas Iscariot carried out his action freely (Boyd 2001:43). I think God has given humans the ability to think and to make decisions freely. Otherwise, he cannot hold them liable for their actions justly (cf. Matt 26:24; Helm 2010; Kim 2017). I do not think that the fall (and total depravity)

destroyed this ability (cf. Deut 28:1-68; Josh 24:15-27; John 1:10-12). Overall, except for Luther, the various Christian traditions that this section has reviewed wholly or partially accept compatibilism.

2.4 Specific Literature Related to Judas and Pertinent to Compatibilism

Having reviewed pertinent secondary literature, which generally attempts to find a solution for the problem posed by the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will, I now turn my attention to reviewing a few scholarly contributions on how this debate is reflected in the particular case of Judas Iscariot. As will become evident, the deciding factor in most of these contributions is whether Judas Iscariot's actions are understood as sinful or not. None, however, adequately analyzes how the New Testament consistently portrays Judas Iscariot in the light of the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will.

2.4.1 Klassen (1996)

Although the gospel writers seem to consistently portray Judas as a 'betraye', the investigation of Klassen on the original interpretation and usage of παραδίωμι is noteworthy for its attempt to restore the reputation of Judas from being a 'betraye' (a derogatory term) to being the one who 'handed over' (a neutral term) Jesus. Klassen argues that all of the citations of παραδίωμι within the New Testament have the concept of 'hand over' rather than 'betray' or 'treachery' (p. 47). Additionally, he asserts that first-century literature has no example of παραδίωμι meaning 'betray', 'disloyalty', or 'deceit'. Instead, the words they used for 'betray' were προδίωμι and προδότης respectively, with προδότης meaning 'betraye' or 'traitor' specifically (pp. 47-58; cf. BDAB 2000:867).

Several prominent English translations (except the NCV, BBE, and the Easy-to-Read Version) support the argument of Klassen and thereby render προδότης as 'traitor' (e.g. CEV, ESV, KJV, NIV, NASB, NRSV, WENT) or 'betray' / 'betraye' (e.g. NLT, YLT). In view of this understanding of προδίωμι at the time, Klassen argues that the action of Judas did not imply a betrayal to his contemporaries, but that later audiences pejoratively labeled him as a betraye when the gospel writers began to condemn him in their writings (pp. 62-74). Therefore, in Klassen's view, Judas

Iscairiot's betrayal of Jesus does not generate the problem of tensions between divine foreknowledge and human free will as some argue. Jesus needed one of his closest friends to hand him over to the authorities when the time came. Moreover, with his foreknowledge, he chose Judas to serve that purpose. Judas acted not so much out of his own free will. Instead, he acted in obedience to the will of God through Christ. Klassen's proposal has positively marshaled the evidence for the use of παραδίδωμι in first-century Greek literature. Secondly, his proposal has sought to situate the translation and interpretation of παραδίδωμι from the broader perspective of the socio-historical context of Judas Iscairiot's contemporaries.

Nonetheless, Klassen's proposal raises a number of questions. Firstly, he failed to see the probability of Judas Iscairiot acting by his own free will despite acting in accordance with God's will and foreknowledge through Jesus. Secondly, he failed to compare his findings with the literary, rhetorical, pastoral and theological contexts and intentions of the gospel writers themselves. Thirdly, he failed to see the high probability of the gospel writers intentionally using παραδίδωμι to call Judas Iscairiot a 'betraye' as they judged his character to be morally corrupt, and in any case the first eyewitnesses from whom the account was derived, having been with Judas Iscairiot for a number of years (cf. John 12:5, 6). In other words, and as will be argued in full in subsequent chapters, the characterization of Judas Iscairiot in the Gospels feeds an overall picture of negative connotation to their use of παραδίδωμι, even if it were translated as 'handed over', rather than 'betrayed'.

For instance, they witnessed Judas kissing Jesus as a means of identifying him. They might have realized that it was this 'kiss' that helped the religious authorities to know Christ and arrest him (Matt 26:48-50; Mark 14:44-46; Luke 22:47, 48), rather than Judas only taking a hold of Christ to deliver him. It is likely therefore that even if παραδίδωμι was used by their contemporaries in a neutral sense, they nevertheless intended to indicate in their use of the word that Judas Iscairiot handed Jesus over deceitfully, hence, as a 'betraye'.

Fourthly, the evidential basis and the hermeneutical validity for Klassen making the distinction between what actually happened in Jesus' ministry and what the evangelists have recorded is difficult to sustain. In other words, his assertion that the evangelists' accounts must be differentiated from what actually happened is

hermeneutically presumed and unsustainable. Fifthly, Klassen failed to consider critically Matthew's claim that Judas Iscariot approached the chief priests having already determined to betray Jesus to them. Matthew suggests Judas' claim through the question, *Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν;* ('What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto you?' YLT). Judas Iscariot's question has a number of implications.

The first implication is that Judas Iscariot had resolved to betray Jesus to the chief priests (*κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν*). Marshall (2008:1) is of the view that Judas made a conscious, calculated decision to visit the chief priests. The second implication of Judas' question is that he was eager to betray Jesus (*κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν;*) to the chief priests. Thirdly, it implies that Judas was willing to accept an offer of any amount from the chief priests (*Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι*). Fourthly, it implies that Judas was self-centered, greedy and treacherous and was determined to achieve his plan (*Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν;* cf. Adeyemo 2006:1165; Robertson 2011:90). Taken together, these considerations show that the overall characterization of Judas Iscariot's act of 'handing Jesus over', according to Matthew, was an act of betrayal. It could not have been seen in a positive or even in a neutral perspective.

Judas Iscariot's use of *κάγω ὑμῖν* with *παραδώσω αὐτόν* is also vital to understanding his predetermination to betray Jesus. *Κάγω* is a conjunction that means 'and I', 'I for my part', 'I in turn' and 'if I' (BDAG 2000:487). Thus, Judas could have meant, 'if I' in his question to the chief priests (as translated by the NRSV and the NIV for example). Alternatively, he could have meant 'and I will', as reflected by Darby, KJV, ASV and YLT.

Concerning Judas' question, it is unlikely he went to the chief priests without already having determined to betray Jesus to them. The translation by Darby, KJV, ASV and YLT suggests that they think Judas had planned to betray Jesus before approaching the chief priests. Their translation of *κάγω* as 'and I' therefore expresses inevitability. This means that even if Judas Iscariot had intended to neutrally 'hand Jesus over' to the chief priests as Klassen proposes, his contemporaries, particularly Matthew, might have perceived his words as betrayal.

Another problem with Klassen's argument is that he also failed to give credence to Judas' plain, uncoerced admission that he had 'sinned by betraying innocent blood' (Matt 27:4, Ἠμαρτον παραδοὺς αἷμα ἀθῶον). A mere handing over of Jesus would not have resulted in a self-indicted guilty verdict of sin necessarily, whereas betrayal or treachery would. If Klassen's theory were correct, he would be suggesting that such a statement from Judas was the evangelist's own interpretation, which has been pejoratively placed on the lips of Judas Iscariot.

This assumption lacks strong enough historical validity. Thus, in indicating Judas' expression of sin, it must be taken that he himself regarded his act of handing Jesus over in negative, treacherous terms. Thus, Klassen failed to give credence to Matthew's account: Τότε ἰδὼν Ἰούδας ὁ παραδιδούς αὐτὸν ὅτι κατεκρίθη, μεταμεληθεὶς ἔστρεψεν τὰ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσιν καὶ πρεσβυτέροις ('When Judas, his betrayer, saw that Jesus was condemned, he repented and brought back the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priest and the elders', Matt 27:3). Klassen also failed to give credence to Judas' confession: Ἠμαρτον παραδοὺς αἷμα ἀθῶον ('I have sinned by betraying innocent blood', Matt 27:4).

2.4.2 Carlson (2010)

Richard P. Carlson (2010:472) characterizes Judas Iscariot as 'an intriguing figure' concerning his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. For he was one of the choice disciples of Jesus who was divinely chosen to hand Jesus over to the Jewish authorities. Notwithstanding, he turned out to be 'an evil, treacherous character'. Like Klassen, Carlson (pp. 472-474) argues that Judas simply handed Jesus over to the Jewish authorities just as those authorities handed Jesus over to Pilate (John 18:28-35). Furthermore, he argues that Judas handed Jesus over just as Pilate 'handed him over to be crucified' (Matt 27:26, NIV).

Such a comparative statement guards the reputation of Judas and vindicates him from the negative inference of the word 'betrayal' just as the Jewish authorities and Pilate were not accused of betrayal. Like Klassen, Carlson (pp. 472-474) attempts to acquit Judas of betrayal. The basis for his attempt is that he thinks that Judas was merely fulfilling the divine plan and that παραδίωμι does not connote betrayal (cf. Aarflot 2012:27-32; Boettner 1965:43-46; Zwiép 2004:8). In other words, Carlson

presumes that divine foreknowledge somehow pacifies human liability as it naturally overpowers human free will.

Carlson cites several passages of the Gospel of Matthew (16:21-23; 26:21-25 45-46) in which Jesus foreknew that one of his disciples would hand him to the authorities. Furthermore, he thinks that Jesus authorized Judas to carry out 'the mission of the kingdom' that would lead to his arrest, public humiliation and death (p. 472). He thinks too that the forthright identification of Judas by Jesus as the one who would hand him over or betray him (Matt 26:25) highlights the foreknowledge of Jesus concerning the action of Judas. Secondly, the confirmation by Jesus that the action of Judas fulfilled the writings of the prophets (Matt 26:54-56) proves that he and the Father foreknew the role of Judas in his (Jesus') death.

Notwithstanding, unlike Klassen, Carlson (pp. 474-478) describes Judas as a 'villain' and holds him liable for treachery. In fact, Carlson (p. 474) cites examples why he labels Judas as 'villain', despite Jesus foreknowing him and choosing him. Firstly, Carlson shows that Judas, being one of Jesus' inner-circle disciples, went to join people who were 'plotting to arrest Jesus by deceitful means in order to kill him' (p. 474), rather than being with Jesus (Matt 26:3-5, 14a). Secondly, he shows that Judas made himself an employee of the religious leaders after he sought and received wages from them. As a result, Judas immediately sought 'an opportune time to accomplish his nefarious mission' to satisfy the religious leaders (p. 474).

Thirdly, Carlson shows that Judas perpetrated 'an evil work in the service of Jesus' opponents who [were] intent on sending him to his grave' (ibid.). Fifthly, Carlson shows that Judas used his status as a disciple 'to aid and abet Jesus' enemies' (ibid.). Carlson thinks that by abetting these enemies Judas 'also adopted their devious methods', such as plotting to entrap Jesus (Matt 22:15, 23, 34, 35; 26:4). Judas' alliance with Jesus' enemies caused Judas to forfeit his membership with the people of Jesus. Thus, he actually enacted 'the woe Jesus had spoken about him' (p. 478), irrespective of divine foreknowledge about his role (Matt 27:3, 4). Finally, Carlson (pp. 474, 475) describes Judas as a villain with an 'evil heart'; he bifurcated his position with Christ Jesus (p. 474; cf. Matt 12:30; 26:24, 25).

In view of the above characterization of Judas, Carlson reasons that the gospel writers might have labeled Judas a 'betrayor' after all, because of his negotiation with

the chief priests and elders (p. 474). Graver (1999:300-323) concurs with Carlson. He points out that by going to the chief priests Judas no longer contemplated in his mind what he would do, because his action was voluntary rather than involuntary.

The review of Klassen and Carlson shows that both of them agree on the role of divine foreknowledge in the choice of Judas Iscariot to fulfill the plan of handing Jesus over to be crucified. Both of them attempt to acquit Judas of betrayal, on the ground that Judas was merely fulfilling this divine plan, even though Carlson seems to hold Judas liable also. They do raise the important question of exegesis of the Gospels, and attempt to address how divine foreknowledge relates to the depicted actions of Judas. However, they do not adequately address the question of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will as exemplified in Judas.

For example, Klassen particularly does not address the question, whereas Carlson does address it but inadequately. Nonetheless, they have provided significant insights, which are helpful in achieving the objective of this study—to perform an exegetical-theological examination of biblical passages that refer to Judas in order to determine how the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will is exemplified in the particular case of Judas.

2.4.3 *Christine Hendriksen Aarflot*

Aarflot's contribution, *Coping with Judas: A Narrative Analysis of the Portrayal of Judas Iscariot in the New Testament* (2012) shows that the four Gospels and the book of Acts portray Judas' character negatively (pp. 17-66). For example, Matthew portrays him as greed-driven (26:15, p. 26, 64, 65) and deceitful (26:47-50, p. 31), while Mark portrays him as deceptive (14:45). She thinks Judas' deceit was heightened by Judas' greeting to Jesus ('Ραββί, 'Rabbi') and his subsequent kiss of Jesus (καὶ κατεφίλησεν αὐτόν, 'and he kissed him') in Mark 14:45 (p. 20).

Concerning Luke's portrayal of Judas, Aarflot thinks that Judas Iscariot began as a good disciple, but later 'became a traitor' (ἐγένετο προδότης) at a certain point in time (6:16, pp. 37-48, 64). As for John's portrayal of Judas, she points out that John portrays him as a 'devil' (διάβολός, 6:70) and a 'thief' (κλέπτης, 12:6) who, as the treasurer, 'used to steal what was put into it' (τὸ γλωσσόκομον ἔχων τὰ βαλλόμενα

ἐβάσταζεν, 12:6). Thus, Judas is 'a symbol of deception and evil' in the Gospel of John (p. 66).

Aarflot makes three thoughtful suggestions about Judas in John's gospel, which are worth mentioning. Firstly, she thinks that Judas might have already been 'thinking about acting against Jesus by the time of the meal', when Satan prompted him to betray Jesus (John 13:2, p. 55). Secondly, she thinks that Judas as a 'devil' (John 6:70) had a 'diabolic disposition' that prepared him for Satan to prompt him and enter into him (pp. 55, 61). The basis for Aarflot's thought could be Jesus' labeling of Judas as 'a devil' already (διάβολός ἐστιν). As a 'devil', it was inevitable that Judas possessed the necessary characteristics that caused Satan, the devil to prompt him. Thirdly, Aarflot thinks that after Satan entered into Judas, he took over Judas' mind to the extent that Judas' mind became inseparable from Satan's (p. 57).

Finally, regarding Judas' portrayal by the book of Acts, Aarflot shows that Acts (1:18) portrays Judas as receiving remuneration for his wickedness (ἀδικίας, p. 48). Aarflot's contribution is important for understanding Judas' negative character and its influence on his role in the arrest and death of Jesus as the gospels suggest. Furthermore, Aarflot's contribution implicitly alludes to Judas' use of his free will in betraying Jesus; she does not acquit him from liability for his action as Klassen does.

The review of Aarflot's analysis of Judas' character as depicted in the New Testament shows that the New Testament portrays Judas' character negatively, and that Judas' character was the key motivator for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. The review also shows that Jesus chose Judas as his disciple, having foreknown that Judas would betray him. Jesus' foreknowledge of Judas and his choice of Judas places Judas' betrayal 'within the realm of divine approval [and that it] was necessary to fulfill God's plan'. Aarflot's reference to the divine foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot and then choosing him to fulfill the divine plan on the one hand, and on the other hand holding Judas culpable for his action suggest compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Her contribution therefore provides the forum for investigating the extent of Judas' free will in his betrayal of Jesus.

2.4.4 Jesse E. Robertson

Like Aarflot, Robertson's (2011) work aims to portray Judas negatively and to hold him culpable for his action, even though Satan did enter Judas Iscariot and influenced him to betray Christ (p. 137). Robertson points out the treacherous character of Judas in a fourfold manner. Firstly, he shows that Judas was a 'traitor' (προδότης, p. 155). Secondly, he points out that Judas 'became a 'guide for those who arrested Jesus' (Ἰούδα τοῦ γενομένου ὁδηγοῦ). Thirdly, he reveals that Judas kissed Jesus deceitfully, knowing that he was using it as a sign to betray Jesus. Finally, he points out that Judas addressed Jesus as 'Rabbi' (Ραββί) deceitfully. When compared with Klassen, Robertson strongly charges Judas with the intentional betrayal of Jesus, whereas Klassen acquits him on grounds that Judas merely handed Jesus over in obedience to the divine plan.

Regarding the principal cause for Judas' betrayal of Jesus, Robertson thinks that it was Judas' greed rather than Satan's influence, which altered his character into becoming a wicked, treacherous person. This alteration of character caused Judas to collaborate with the chief priests and the temple guards to plot against his master. Robertson therefore holds Judas liable for his act of betrayal (pp. 23, 88, 90, 94, 116, 117, 133, 157, 183, 225). Additionally, Robertson reveals that just as traitors of the ancient world combined the roles of a traitor and a guide for the enemies of those whom they betrayed, so did Judas carry out both functions (p. 155).

Linking the similarity of the treachery of Judas to that of the traitors of the ancient world strengthens the argument that Judas betrayed Christ to the Jewish authorities. The question Jesus asked Judas, 'Judas, are you betraying the Son of Man with a kiss?' (Luke 22:48), implies that Jesus truly foreknew that Judas was a betrayer, despite Luke's use of παραδίδωμι instead of προδότης. It may be surmised then that Satan took advantage of the greed of Judas only and inflamed it when he entered into Judas (Luke 22:3; John 13:2, 27). If this assumption is correct, then Judas is responsible for his action and is guilty of betraying Jesus (p. 15; cf. John 19:11). Consequently, Judas deserved the 'woe' that Jesus pronounced upon the one who would betray 'the Son of Man' (Matt 26:24).

Robertson's handling of the character of Judas offers a helpful basis upon which to build the present study. He is correct in identifying Luke and John as the gospel

writers who emphasized the negative characterization of Judas. Like Robertson, I intend to analyze the character of Judas from the viewpoint of his being one of the twelve apostles whom Jesus chose and assigned to preach to the lost and heal the sick.

Two important differences, notwithstanding, exist between Robertson's dissertation and the present dissertation. Firstly, unlike Robertson who only highlights the negative character of Judas as being a major cause of his betrayal of Christ, this dissertation will emphasize the negative character of Judas as counterbalancing an overemphasis on Christ's foreknowledge. Secondly, unlike Robertson who restricts his study to the characterization of Judas, this dissertation will focus on investigating the possibility that Judas could have resisted betraying Jesus, notwithstanding Jesus' foreknowledge that Judas would betray him.

2.4.5 B.J. Oropeza

Oropeza's (2010) contribution, *Judas' Death and Final Destiny in the Gospels and Earliest Christian Writings* examines Judas' death and final destiny in the four Gospels, Acts, the earliest Christian writings and the *Gospel of Judas*. The goal is to determine whether Judas' exoneration by recent scholarship (e.g. Klassen 1996:47-58, 62-74; Klassen 2002:389-410; Caron 2003:223-245) for his act of betrayal to the Jewish authorities is justifiable. Oropeza examines 'Judas' death and Its Implications', 'Judas' Fate in the "Woe" Sayings of Jesus' as recorded by Matthew (26:24), Mark (14:21) and Luke (22:22), 'Judas' Final Destiny in the Synoptic Gospels' and Acts, John's description of Judas as the 'Son of Destruction' and 'Judas' destiny according to the Earliest Church Fathers and the Gospel of Judas'. Oropeza (345-348) observes that there are five different versions of the incident.

For example, the Gospel of Matthew (27:5) records that Judas hanged himself, while Acts (1:18) records that 'falling headlong [Judas] burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out'. Oropeza compares this with a number of post-canonical statements about Judas Iscariot's death. For example, Papias states, Judas did not die because of hanging. He lived and died sometime later 'after much agony and punishment' by swelling up or crushed by a wagon (pp. 346, 347; cf. Fragment of Papias 18 in Holmes 1999:583). Also, the Gospel of Judas claims that Judas was 'stoned in a vision' (p. 346; cf. *Gos. Jud.* 44:23-45.2, 11-12). Oropeza thinks that one

likely explanation for the different versions of Judas' death might be the embarrassment it caused the original community so that they were unwilling to speak about him (p. 347; cf. Zwiép 2004:47, 48, 53). This historical methodology is, however, unacceptable as he seems to be weighing sources, which date from centuries after the event with the same degree of authenticity as those which date from only decades after the event.

Matthew (26:24) and Mark (14:21) give the account of Jesus' 'woe' statement: οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ δι' οὗ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκείνος παραδίδοται ('woe to that one by whom the Son of Man is betrayed'). The first section of the passage indicates that Jesus' betrayal was divinely planned: ὁ μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπάγει καθὼς γέγραπται περὶ αὐτοῦ ('The Son of Man goes as it is written of him'). Oropeza argues that Jesus' pronouncement of 'woe' upon Judas (Matt 26:25), indicates that Judas was responsible for the betrayal, despite the fact that he was the instrument through whom God achieved His plan (p. 348; cf. Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22). This claim is supported by Jesus' statement, καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ('It would have been better for that one not to have been born', Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21). Oropeza notes that Jesus' combination of 'woe' and this latter statement implies a guilty verdict and a divine judgment against Judas, so that 'Whether we translate *παραδίδοται* here as "betrayed" or "handed over" makes relatively no difference in the context' (p. 348). The term 'woe' is used in several Bible passages to indicate divine judgment (e.g. Isa 5:8-22; 30:1, 2; Amos 6:1-7; Mic 2:1-3; Matt 11:21; 23:13-32; Luke 17:1, 2; p. 348).

Jesus uses 'woe' to describe the dreadful condition that pregnant women and nursing mothers would experience at the end of the age (Mark 13:17; cf. vv. 1-16, 18-37; Matt 24:1-51; Luke 21:5-36). Oropeza points out that Klassen takes the emotional tone of this end-time 'woe' and applies it to the 'woe' that Jesus pronounced upon Judas. In other words, Klassen argues that the 'woe' that Jesus pronounced upon Judas expresses 'sorrow rather than a curse or condemnation' (p. 349; cf. Klassen 1996:81-84). However, Oropeza argues that the 'woe' that Jesus pronounced upon Judas in Matthew (26:24), Mark (14:21) and Luke (22:22) suggests an 'impending judgment' rather than a mere expression of sorrow (p. 349). In addition, Oropeza states that the pending judgment that the Synoptic Gospels

address suggests Judas' 'final condemnation' rather than his mere physical death (pp. 349, 352).

The account of Judas' end in the book of Acts (1:15-26) supports this claim. For instance, Acts records that after Judas' apostasy, another person took his 'position of overseer' (v. 20). Oropeza thinks Judas' replacement has an eschatological implication, which is that he will not take part in God's future kingdom, wherein he would have sat on one of the twelve thrones in order to judge the twelve tribes of Israel (pp. 352, 353, 357; cf. Matt 19:28). Acts' mention of Judas turning aside 'to go to his own place' (1:25) and Matthias replacing him as apostle (1:26) also suggest that Judas' relationship with God's kingdom was severed.

Oropeza suggests that the statement, 'Judas turned aside to go to his own place' (παρέβη Ἰούδας πορευθῆναι εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν ἴδιον) 'most likely refers to a place of punishment after death' (p. 353; cf. Luke 16:19-28). In addition, John's description of Judas Iscariot makes it unlikely that Judas would be exonerated for Jesus' betrayal and eternal damnation. For example, John describes him as a 'devil' (6:70), a 'betrayal' (6:71) and a greed-driven 'thief' (12:4-6) in whom Satan entered (13:27). Furthermore, John describes him as 'the son of destruction' (ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας, 17:12) who was already lost (17:12).

The BDAG (2000:127; cf. EDNT (1988-2007:n.p.) defines ἀπωλείας as 'the destruction that one experiences, ruin' (cf. 2 Thess 2:3). Jesus did choose Judas Iscariot as one of his apostles, yet Judas defected and betrayed him. Judas Iscariot's betrayal was volitional and uncoerced (Oropeza 2010:354; cf. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:3-6; John 18:2-5). Oropeza (ibid. 357; cf. DeConick (2007:48-61, 110-113; 2009a:52-66) perceives him as demonic and that his betrayal of Jesus was wrongful, so that he was excluded from God's holy people and God's kingdom. Oropeza states that the earliest disciples of Jesus perceived Judas' betrayal as treacherous (p. 358). Judas himself may have seen his betrayal as treacherous and unforgiveable; thus, he admitted that he had sinned and then he hanged himself (Matt 27:3-5). Though Oropeza does not directly address how the account concerning Judas Iscariot illustrates the issues raised by the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will, by examining the eschatological significance of Judas Iscariot's death, his contribution frames Judas' behavior in the

sense of divine plans as well as human relation to it. In particular, Oropeza's output admits that though Judas Iscariot acted as a free agent, there were important forces at play in his action leading to the conclusion that human free will alone does not account for what happened.

2.5 Summary of Review and Conclusion

The review has shown that the philosophers (Aristotle, Boethius, Frankfurt, Ockham), Reformed theologians, Arminian theologians, Lutheran theologians, Open theists and Freewill theists that have been examined are either compatibilists or incompatibilists in their views. Thus, they disagree on how the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will generally interact with each other. Nonetheless, they do agree on some points. For example, The Westminster Confession states, 'Every promise and every warning of God is addressed to man as a free agent, and not as one who cannot be saved' (Shedd 1999:21). Similarly, The Articles of Religion of the Wesleyan Church declares that Wesleyans 'believe that humanity's creation in the image of God included ability to choose between right and wrong [and] individuals were made morally responsible for their choices' (*The Discipline of The Wesleyan Church*, paragraph 224).

Like the Westminster Confession and The Articles of Religion of the Wesleyan Church, Lutherans also state, 'We grant that all men have a free will, free, inasmuch as it has the judgment of reason; not that it is thereby capable, without God, either to begin, or, at least, to complete aught in things pertaining to God, but only in works of this life, whether good or evil' (Article XVIII). The three schools accept repentance as a necessity for forgiveness of sins and salvation (Westminster Confession, XV / i-v; Lutheran Confessions, XII.1; XVIII; XX.29; The Articles of the Wesleyan Church, paragraph 228; cf. Reymond 1998:440-449; 721-736; Coppedge 1987:131).

Furthermore, incompatibilists and compatibilists accept that divine foreknowledge plays an important role in human life. However, they differ on the extent of this foreknowledge. For example, incompatibilists argue that God's foreknowledge of human actions annuls all human freedom and causes some to believe (cf. Peterson 2007; Pike 1977; Reymond 1998; Roach 2008; Shedd 1999; Bird 2013), while compatibilists argue that God's foreknowledge does not annul human free will.

Coppedge (1987:131) points out that Wesley emphasized this by stating that humans have an intrinsic will as the result of being created in God's image. This 'image' comprises 'a capacity to understand, a will and liberty to exercise that will' (ibid.). The freedom to exercise the will is inherent in the nature of humans, so that 'without it a man would cease to be a moral agent' (ibid.). Openness Theology throws more weight on human freedom. For instance, it holds that God permits humans to accomplish their desires that he knows are probable, but which he does not foreordain (Sanders 2012:142; cf. Carlson 2012:189-198; William 2005:177, 178). Lutherans hold that God's foreknowledge enables him to know about 'all things before they happen' (Cooper 2015:22).

Another example of disagreement and agreement between the two schools relates to Frankfurt's argument against the 'Principles of Alternative Possibilities'. This review has shown that some compatibilists have resisted Frankfurt's argument (e.g. Campbell 1997; Smith 2003); while some incompatibilists have endorsed it (e.g. Hunt 2000; Pereboom 2001; Zagzebski 2000). Those incompatibilists who endorse Frankfurt's argument do so on the grounds that divine determinism 'undermines freedom and moral responsibility not because it precludes the freedom to do otherwise, but because a deterministic causal history corrupts the actual sources of agency' (p. 773).

This review therefore illustrates that the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilist is interminable. This debate may or may never end. At present, it has certainly not solved the tension between these two groups. Instead, it has run into an 'irresolvable tension', as McKenna has noted (p. 785). One main conclusion that should guide the succeeding investigation may therefore be drawn. It is that the incompatibilists' and compatibilists' points of view regarding the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will require a more thorough investigation grounded in a specific account such as the narratives of Judas Iscariot's involvement in Jesus' death. This will mean looking at passages that directly speak to these problems, and show how various commentaries deal with them. It will also mean looking at literature of Second Temple Judaism to see whether the literature recognized these problems and how the problems were addressed.

CHAPTER THREE

THE BIBLICAL BASES OF THE PROBLEMS POSED IN THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREE WILL

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted the debates among various philosophical traditions and among major Christian traditions regarding the likely relationships between the doctrines of God's foreknowledge and human free will, according to the opinions of incompatibilists and compatibilists theologians. The chapter also highlighted specific literature related to Judas Iscariot and pertinent to compatibilism. The main task of the present chapter is twofold. Firstly, it is to show that the Scriptures themselves give rise to these debates on the apparent contradiction between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Secondly, it is to show specifically how these traditions handle some key biblical passages on divine foreknowledge and human free will.

3.2 The Interface between Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free will in the Old Testament

Several passages of the Bible depict God (explicitly or implicitly) as possessing foreknowledge of humans and nations and electing them to accomplish particular missions for him or to fulfill certain prophecies. Similarly, some other passages depict humans as exercising their free will to reject their election or to accomplish their own desires, in spite of God's foreknowledge of them and electing them to serve him. These apparently conflicting passages indicated compatibility rather than incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Finally, some passages show God himself (as Divine Agent) acting intentionally to accomplish his divine purpose.

This study has used some key terminologies; they will now be defined. Firstly, 'divine foreknowledge' as used here refers to God's supernatural ability to foreknow all past, present and future events and peoples exhaustively. He elects individuals to

particular services within his foreknowledge, but without his foreknowledge being the necessary cause for him to elect people to eternal salvation or to eternal damnation arbitrarily (BDAG 2006:866; EDNT 1988-2007; Nartey 2016:135-155). Secondly, 'predestination' (Προορίζω) is used in this study to refer to the predetermined action of God whereby he sovereignly and graciously elects unto his service those whom he so desires, whether prior to or following their conception and birth. Thirdly, 'election' (ἐκλέγομαι) is used to refer to the action of God whereby he chooses individuals unto salvation and unto his service.

The fourth term employed in this study is 'human free will'. It is used to describe the innate capability of humans to freely and non-coercively accept or reject God's offer of salvation, his election to service, and to plan their course of action and execute those plans of action (cf. Ferguson and Wright 1998:722, 723; Reymond 1998:373; Franks 2015:108-119). Fifthly, 'compatibilism' is used to refer to human freedom being compatible with divine omniscience and divine foreknowledge (Helm 2011:184-205; Nartey 2016:135-155). Sixthly, 'incompatibilism' is used to refer to human freedom being incompatible with divine foreknowledge and divine determination (Nartey 2016:135-155; Mele 2015:297-309). Finally, 'Divine Agency' refers to God himself who acts intentionally to accomplish his divine purposes (Schwöbel 1987:225-244).

3.2.1 Divine Foreknowledge of, and Election of Old Testament Individuals

The Old Testament cites examples of individuals whom God foreknew and elected to carry out services for him. Some of them heard God's voice, while others did not. In addition, some of those who heard God's voice willfully objected to his call initially; he overruled them, and they eventually obeyed him.

3.2.1.1 Joseph (Gen 45:5, 7; 50:19, 20)

The context of these passages is that Joseph's brothers sold him to some Midianite merchants in order to get rid of him and destroy the fulfillment of his dreams (Gen 37:17-28). Afterward, the Midianites 'sold him in Egypt to Potiphar, one of Pharaoh's officials, the captain of the guard' (Gen 37:37 NIV). After some years, Pharaoh put Joseph 'in charge of the whole land of Egypt' (Gen 41:41-43, NIV). Subsequently,

ten of Joseph's brothers travelled to Egypt to buy grain, because their land had been stricken by severe famine (Gen 42:42, 43; 43:1, 2).

During their second trip to Egypt, Joseph identified himself to them (Gen 45:1-4). He also told his brothers that even though they had sold him to Egypt, God had sent him before them 'to preserve lives' (Gen 45:5, 7). In chapter 50:19, 20 (after the death of Jacob, their father), he alleviated their fear of his reprisal by speaking to them, 'Do not be afraid! Am I in the place of God? Even though you intended to do harm to me, God intended it for good, in order to preserve a numerous peoples, as he is doing today'. The words of Joseph to his brothers in these passages suggest that both the foreknowledge and foreordination of God are in view here. Granot (2011:263) states simply that the actions of Joseph's brothers to sell him and Joseph's rise to prominence in Egypt were divinely ordained.

Joseph's question in Genesis verse 19 seems to be rhetorical rather than an affirmative statement. This question, along with Joseph's statement in verse 20, implies that Joseph attributed his brothers' mistreatment of him, their subsequent selling of him to the Midianite merchants and his rise to prominence in Egypt, to God (v. 20; 45:5). Walvoord and Zuck (1985:n.p.; cf. Spring and Shapiro 2007:262, 267; Berthoud 2008:9; Kim 2013:236, 237) argue that everything that happened with Joseph, including his position in the government of Egypt, 'was a part of God's plan to bring about the fulfillment of the promised blessing'. They state further that Joseph's experience was the fulfillment of the prophecy that Yahweh had given earlier to Abraham that his offspring would be aliens and slaves in another nation for four hundred years (Gen15:13).

Their argument about the fulfillment of God's plan in the life of Israel makes sense. The next verse (Gen 15:14) records Yahweh's prediction to Abraham (then Abram) about the future ordeal of his descendants. However, he would judge the nation that would enslave them and bring them out 'with many possessions' (v.14; cf. Cox 2006:294). Similarly, Calvin opines that the statement of Joseph in Genesis 50:19, 20 refers to divine choice and 'the design of God's providence' (Calvin 1988-2007:n.p.; cf. Fox 2001:35; Guyette 2004:177, 188; MacArthur 2010:90). Keil and Delitzsch (1980:412) hold to this view also. They interpret the verse as, 'Am I in a

position to interfere of my own accord with the purpose of God, and not rather bound to submit to them myself?’

Yahweh informed Abraham earlier that his descendants ‘will be strangers in a country not their own, and they will be enslaved and mistreated four hundred years. But I will punish the nation they serve as slaves, and afterward they will come out with great possessions’ (Gen 15:13, 14 NIV). The ‘nation’ mentioned in this passage is Egypt, according to the account in Exodus (12:31-41). Inasmuch as Yahweh predicted Israel’s enslavement in Egypt and their subsequent departure from there, he must have foreknown the pending famine in Egypt. Thus, he may have gotten involved in Joseph’s affairs in order to conserve the descendants of Abraham.

Exodus shows that he brought Israel out of Egypt (Exod 3:7-15:21). Given the conceptual parallel between Genesis 50:19 (‘Am I in the place of God?’) and 50:20 (‘Even though you intended to do harm to me, God intended it for good’), it would appear that the view that divine foreknowledge may sometimes overrule human free will, and indeed did so in the particular experience of Joseph, has credence. The ‘good’ that resulted from the evil intent of Joseph’s brothers was because their deeds were within God’s plan (Jacobs 2003:313-317). Jacobs infers that the ‘evil’ of selling Joseph led to Joseph entering into Egypt and preserving lives. In other words, the action that Joseph’s brothers took was necessary. Thus, the evil that Joseph’s brothers did was ‘good’ (Jacobs 2003:318-321). Jacobs’ inference is logical, because had Joseph’s brothers not sold him he would not have been in Egypt in time to preserve the lives of multitudes of people.

Joseph’s earlier statement in Genesis 45:5, 8 buttresses this:

And now do not be distressed, or angry with yourselves, because you sold me here; for God sent me before you to preserve life. So it was not you who sent me here, but God; he has made me a father to Pharaoh, and lord of all his house and ruler over the land of Egypt.

Joseph’s words imply that God overruled the actions and intentions of his brothers and ensured that what he had intended might happen. This passage, however, does not answer the question whether this divine trumping of human free will occurs in all cases. Furthermore, in and of itself, it does not provide adequate criteria for

determining the particular contexts in which divine foreknowledge may conflict with human free will. Notwithstanding, it indicates that divine foreknowledge overruled human free will in order to fulfill the divine plan. Here, Joseph interprets his brothers' action as God's action. Jacobs (2003:310, 312) supports Joseph's claim. He states that Joseph's story acknowledges that God purposefully got involved in Joseph's story in order to fulfill his plans (Jacobs 2003:328-331). The story of Joseph therefore shows compatibility between divine foreknowledge (and divine providential involvement) and human free will.

3.2.1.2 Pharaoh

The story of the Pharaoh of Egypt in the book of Exodus (Exod 9:16) also depicts compatibility between the foreknowledge of God and human free will. Exodus shows Yahweh's involvement in the life of Pharaoh in order to achieve his divine plan. This 'divine plan' was to end the oppression and suffering of the Israelites by rescuing them 'from the hand of the Egyptians and to bring them up out of that land' through Moses (Exod 3:7-18). Furthermore, God intended to demonstrate his power to Pharaoh and proclaim his name throughout the earth (Exod 9:16; cf. 6:1). Nonetheless, Pharaoh withstood God to a certain extent.

The early chapters of Exodus present the ironic account of the interplay between God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart and Pharaoh hardening his own heart in order to accomplish the divine purpose of Yahweh (Gilbert 2001:76, 77, 80, 81). Thus the book reveals that Yahweh hardened the heart of Pharaoh ten times (Exod 9:12; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:8; cf. 4:21; 7:3; 14:4) and Pharaoh hardened his own heart ten times (Exod 7:13, 14, 22; 8:15, 19, 32; 9:7, 34, 35; 13:15). It is worth noting that both the hardening by Yahweh and Pharaoh are described with words which come from two main Hebrew verbs—*hāzaq* and *kābēd*. *Hāzaq* means, 'to stand firm', 'to fortify', 'to prevail', 'to hold one's own against' as in a military context (Gilbert 2001:80).

The primary meaning of *hāzaq* in the Old Testament is, 'to have power to accomplish a function', while secondarily, it means to have 'a strong desire which is prerequisite for accomplishing something' (Beale 1984:131; McAfee 2010:340-354). The term occurs first in Genesis 41:56 to describe the severity of the famine that the region was experiencing. Thus, the NRSV, along with other prominent English translations

(e.g. ESV, and NIV) describe the famine as being 'severe'. Yahweh used the adjective form (*hāzāq*) in Exodus 3:19 to state how he would break the strong will of Pharaoh so that he would let Israel leave Egypt: 'I know, however, that the king of Egypt will not let you go unless compelled by a mighty hand'. 'Mighty hand' is from *hāzāq*.

Judges 3:12 uses the term in the same sense. It states, Yahweh 'strengthened' King Eglon of Moab against the Israelites because of their (the Israelites') sin. Additionally, 2 Chronicles 16:9 uses it of the eyes of Yahweh ranging the entire earth in order to 'strengthen' everyone whose heart is sincere to him. The words, 'strengthened' and 'strengthen' are from *hāzāq*. The use of *hāzaq* appears to describe a positive addition of divine energy to a pre-existing state rather than a generation of new energy *ex nihilo*. In other words, it would appear that *hāzaq* does not describe a negation of pre-existing force, or even generation of a new one, but the augmentation of one.

The use of *hāzaq* in Exodus 4:21 relates to the prediction of Yahweh to harden the heart of Pharaoh so that Pharaoh would not let Israel leave Egypt. In view of the use of the future tense of the nature of *hāzaq* in Exodus 4:21, it may be reasonable to view this as playing a predictive function based on God's omniscience. It seems more likely that Pharaoh's refusal to let Israel go (9:35) refers to Yahweh's prediction in 4:21. It is logical therefore to point out that Yahweh's prediction is intertwined with and is an outcome of his foreknowledge.

It appears that the hardening of the heart of Pharaoh was a divine act that supplemented Pharaoh's stubbornness, so that he failed repeatedly to listen to Moses and Aaron (Exod 7:13, 22; 8:15; 9:12) or to his own magicians (8:19). As a result, he sinned against Yahweh, according to his own admission (9:27; 10:16; cf. 9:34; cf. Beale 1984:132; Cox 2006:305, 309). Gilbert is of the view that Yahweh did not annul or neutralize Pharaoh's freedom of choice during his interaction with Pharaoh (Gilbert 2001:86; cf. McAfee 2010:346-353).

This seems plausible, or else Yahweh's foreknowledge that the king of Egypt would 'not let [Israel] go unless compelled by a mighty hand' (Exod 3:19) and his ultimatum to plague the whole of Egypt with frogs if Pharaoh refused 'to let [Israel] go' (8:2; cf. 9:2; 10:4) would be unfounded. Exodus 3:19 makes a case for Pharaoh's willing

obstinacy and Yahweh's striking of the land of Egypt with his plagues (3:20; McAfee 20:352). The 'if' clause of 8:2 ('If you refuse to let them go') therefore indicates a future probability of the refusal of Pharaoh, which Yahweh foreknew would occur (cf. Chisholm 1996:420).

It is most likely that Deuteronomy 2:30 and Joshua 11:20 use *hāzaq* as moral stubbornness (cf. Gilbert 2001:80). In Deuteronomy 2:30, Moses reminded the Israelites that Yahweh 'hardened' the spirit of King Sihon of Heshbon 'and made his heart defiant in order to hand him over to' them. Because of the divine hardening of King Sihon, he was unwilling to let Israel pass through his country. Similarly, Joshua (Josh 11:20) records that it was Yahweh who had hardened the hearts of the enemies of Israel 'so that they would come against Israel in battle, in order that they might be utterly destroyed, and might receive no mercy, but be exterminated, just as the LORD had commanded Moses'.

Deuteronomy 2:30 and Joshua 11:20 reveal that Yahweh had a foreordained plan for hardening the hearts of these enemies of Israel: in order that he might hand them over to Israel for Israel to exterminate them (Deut 2:30; Josh 11:20). Isaiah 63:17 ('Why, O LORD, do you make us stray from your ways and harden our heart, so that we do not fear you?') suggests that it was Yahweh who hardened the hearts of the Israelites so that they might not fear him (cf. Chisholm 1996:410). This indicates that the divine hardening of human hearts is not restricted only to pagans/gentiles, but that it can also affect God's own people.

The summary of the argument regarding the use of *hāzaq* with the hardening of Pharaoh's heart by God is that Pharaoh hardened his own heart first, before God hardened it in response to Pharaoh's action. Augustine thinks that God hardened Pharaoh's heart in order that Pharaoh might not believe the signs that he (God) would display, so that he (God) might punish Pharaoh (in Roach 2008:132).

The second word, *kābēd*, has both a quantitative and a qualitative meaning. The quantitative usage refers to physical possessions, while the qualitative meaning refers to 'and intensification of the quality of actions or attitudes' (Beale 1984:132). The stubbornness of Pharaoh to release the Israelites that resulted in Yahweh killing the firstborn of humans and animals throughout the land of Egypt (Exod 13:15) demonstrates the qualitative usage of *kābēd*.

The discourse structure of Exodus 7:3, 4 implies that the 'signs and wonders' of Yahweh were the catalyst for the stubbornness of Pharaoh, even though Pharaoh was obstinate and dismissive of the commands of Yahweh (Exod 5:2-9). It also implies that Pharaoh was obstinate before Moses and Aaron performed the first two 'signs' of the staff becoming a snake and the staff-snake swallowing up the snakes of the magicians of Egypt (Exod 7:10-12). If the 'signs and wonders' of Yahweh had no part in the hardening of the heart of Pharaoh, then the words of Yahweh, 'When Pharaoh does not listen to you', would not have followed the mentioning of the 'signs and wonders' that would eventually force Pharaoh to release the Israelites (Exod 6:6; 12:29-32). The ESV renders 7:3-4a more clearly as, 'But I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and though I multiply my signs and wonders in the land of Egypt, Pharaoh will not listen to you'.

The LXX translates *hāzaq and kābēd* as σκληρύνω. Σκληρύνω means, 'to cause to be unyielding in resisting information, harden' (BDAG 2000:930) in the passage citing Yahweh hardening the heart of Pharaoh and Pharaoh hardening his own heart. This seems to indicate that the LXX does not distinguish between the two terms. Paul uses σκληρύνω when he tells the Christians in Rome, ἄρα οὖν ὃν θέλει ἔλει ὃν δέ θέλει σκληρύνει ('So then he has mercy on whomever he chooses, and he hardens the heart of whomever he chooses', Rom 9:18). The 'he' refers to God, according to the context of the passage (cf. 9:6-16). Massaquoi (2014:54) thinks Paul uses σκληρύνει in this passage to depict God as making people 'stubborn' or 'unyielding' (cf. Dunn: 554; Moo 1998:597; Schreiner 1998:511). Additionally, the book of Hebrews employs the term twice (μὴ σκληρύνητε) when it warns its audience not to 'harden your hearts as in the rebellion' (3:8, 15; cf. v. 13). In view of the definition of σκληρύνω above (BDAG 2000:930), it is likely that the use of the term with 'rebellion' in Hebrews 3:8, 15 would apply to moral stubbornness and rejection of the commands of Yahweh.

Pharaoh displayed the first act of his stubbornness and rejection of the commands of Yahweh when he asked Moses and Aaron about who the LORD was, that he should regard him and release the Israelites, as well as when he stated unequivocally that he did not know Yahweh and would not let Israel depart (Exod 5:2). It is likely therefore that Pharaoh opposed God first, and then God responded by hardening him more, in order to glorify himself in Egypt.

The second time that Pharaoh showed forth his stubbornness and rejected the commands of Yahweh was when his magicians replicated the plague of blood (7:20-23). Thirdly, Pharaoh hardened his heart again when Yahweh relieved his country from the plague of frogs (Exod 8:15). Perhaps he hardened his heart because his magicians had replicated the frogs earlier (Exod 8:7). From the third plague (of gnats) and following, the stubbornness of Pharaoh seemed to intensify. For instance, he refused to heed the acknowledgment of his magicians that the plague of gnats was sent by Yahweh himself (8:19). Furthermore, Pharaoh hardened his heart after he experienced the fourth plague ('swarms of flies', 8:24 and fifth plague (death of livestock, 9:6).

There are at least four other examples of Pharaoh hardening his own heart against the commands of Yahweh in Exodus. Firstly, he hardened his heart by giving a partial permission for Israel to go and sacrifice to their God (8:25). Secondly, he hardened his heart when he discovered that only his citizens experienced the plagues (8:21-23, 29; 9:7). Thirdly, he hardened his heart after he asked Moses to pray for him (8:32; 9:7). Lastly, he hardened his heart when Yahweh sent the seventh plague ('thunder and hail' [9:13-35]).

The seventh plague has one key distinguishing mark, which emphasizes the self-hardening of the heart of Pharaoh: Pharaoh admitted that he sinned against Yahweh and asked Moses to pray for him (vv. 27, 28; cf. vv. 34, 35). In 10:16, 17, Pharaoh also admitted to sinning against the LORD and asked Moses to pray for him. Pharaoh's admittance of sinning against Yahweh and his request for prayers, in my view, supports the argument in favor of humans exercising their free will in relationship to divine foreknowledge and determination.

Nonetheless, the Scripture says, Yahweh actually hardened Pharaoh's heart (Exod 9:12; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:8; cf. Chisholm 1996:414-419; McGinnis 2012:57, 58; cf. Exod 4:21; 7:3; 14:4, 17; 9:12; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:8). However, it appears as though Yahweh hardened Pharaoh's heart only after Pharaoh had begun hardening his own heart (3:19; 7:14, 22; 8:15; 9:34). What does it mean then for Yahweh to harden the heart of Pharaoh when Pharaoh hardened his own heart? There are two opposing views in answer to this question: Some theologians, such as Calvin, Gun and Origen held to the view that Yahweh hardened the heart of Pharaoh directly,

while others, such as Luther, Augustine and Driver, argue that Yahweh hardened the heart of Pharaoh indirectly (McGinnis 2012:52-55; Chisholm 1996:410-413; cf. Exod 7:13, 14, 22; 8:19; 9:7, 35).

Adeyemo (2006:93) has expressed the opinion that God only brought Pharaoh's 'ongoing disobedience to its logical conclusion' rather than being the ultimate cause for Pharaoh hardening of his heart (cf. Levering 2011:26). Erasmus, along with Augustine, Arminius and Driver, also argued in favor of Pharaoh hardening his own heart. Erasmus is, for example, of the view that Pharaoh 'first hardened his heart freely apart from divine influence' (Beale 1984:129; cf. Gilbert 2001:83, 84; McGinnis 2012:56; Okun 2012:30). Augustine similarly proposed that Pharaoh 'hardened his own heart by frequently resisting the grace and spirit of God' (Clark n.p.:312), but that Yahweh used the various signs and plagues to strengthen Pharaoh's own resolve to reject Yahweh's commands and determination, so that Yahweh might carry out his retribution (McGinnis 2012: 52-55; cf. Chisholm 1996:410-413; McAfee 2010:333-337).

Moo (1998:597) thinks God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart was only to maintain the sinful condition that had already characterized him. Gilbert (2001:76-83) argues that God did not make a victim of Pharaoh by hardening his heart, because Pharaoh remained in firm control of his stance before God. Gilbert notes that 'heart' in Hebrew refers to the 'center of rational thought' (Gilbert 2001:77-83; cf. 1 Kgs 5:9; Job 8:10; Prov 19:8; Hos 4:11), rather than to the center of mere emotions. Therefore, Gilbert concludes that Pharaoh was 'the architect of his own destiny' (ibid., 83).

A careful reading of Exodus 9:15, 16 portrays Pharaoh as being the ultimate cause for the hardening of his heart, but that Yahweh preserved his life. Translating *'āmad* as 'live' or 'preserve' is a preferred translation to 'raised...up' (as in the ESV and KJV), in view of verse 15 (Brown, Driver and Briggs 1988-2007:n.p.; cf. Chisholm 1996:424; Cox 2006:299). Thus here, Yahweh told Pharaoh that he (Yahweh) could have struck Pharaoh and his people up to the point of this encounter (v. 15) but that he had let him live, or better still, preserved him, in order to show Pharaoh his power and to make his name resonate through the whole earth (v. 16; cf. v. 14).

The LXX version of this section of the verse brings this out clearly: καὶ ἕνεκεν τούτου διετηρήθης ('But this is why I have let you live'). Ἔνεκα is used as a preposition with the genitive case τούτου. When the genitive case is used in this way, it denotes the 'cause of or reason for something' (BDAG 2000:334). This is the likely meaning of ἕνεκεν τούτου in Exodus 9:16, for Yahweh determined to cause Pharaoh to live to see the demonstration of his power. Matthew (19:5) uses Ἔνεκα τούτου in this manner: Ἔνεκα τούτου καταλείψει ἄνθρωπος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα ('For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother'). The word 'reason' is from Ἔνεκα τούτου.

Luke (6:22) also uses Ἔνεκα τούτου in the same way: μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν μισήσωσιν ὑμᾶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅταν ἀφορίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ ὀνειδίσωσιν καὶ ἐκβάλωσιν τὸ ὄνομα ὑμῶν πονηρὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ('Blessed are you when people hate you, and when they exclude you, revile you, and defame you on account of the Son of Man'). 'On account' is Ἔνεκα τούτου. Two other New Testament passages that use Ἔνεκα τούτου are Acts 26:21 and Acts 28:20b. Acts 26:21, reads, Ἔνεκα τούτων με Ἰουδαῖοι συλλαβόμενοι [ὄντα] ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἐπειρώωντο διαχειρίσασθαι ('For this reason the Jews seized me in the temple and tried to kill me'). Acts 28:20b has, ἕνεκεν γάρ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ τὴν ἄλυσιν ταύτην περικείμεαι ('It is because of the hope of Israel that I am bound with this chain' NIV). 'Reason' and 'because' translate Ἔνεκα τούτου in these passages respectively.

Paul's exposition of Exodus 9:16 is that Yahweh raised Pharaoh up so that he might show his power in Pharaoh (Rom 9:17). 'Raised...up' is from ἐξεγείρω, meaning 'to awaken', 'to raise up' (BDAG 2000:346). It is interesting to point out that the English translations that differ in their renderings of *āmad* above, do translate ἐξεγείρω uniformly as 'raised up'. Massaquoi (2014:49) supports this view. He thinks that Paul's use of the term refers to 'raising' someone from the dead (as in 1 Cor 6:14), or 'raising' someone from sickness (as in Jas 5:15). This indicates that Yahweh elected Pharaoh rather than merely let him live. Zerwick and Grosvenor (1993:480) interpret the term as God bringing Pharaoh 'into being'.

Keener (1988-2007:n.p.) thinks, 'God elevated (Pharaoh) to fight against him'. I think that Yahweh kept Pharaoh from dying so that Pharaoh could witness the manifestation of his power rather than bring Pharaoh 'into being' as Zerwick and

Grosvenor suggest, because their view appears to exempt Pharaoh from actively exercising his free will against Yahweh, which is what the rest of the passage appears to suggest. Furthermore, their view ignores Pharaoh's admittance of sinning against Yahweh by his repeated refusal to let Israel leave Egypt (Exod 9:27, 28; 10:16, 17). However, whether Yahweh actually raised Pharaoh up, or whether Yahweh kept him alive, the Scripture has shown that Pharaoh actively hardened his heart against Yahweh.

This section of the study has shown that God did harden Pharaoh's heart; however, he did so in response to Pharaoh hardening his own heart first. Rather than destroying Pharaoh for his obstinacy, God kept him alive in order to demonstrate his power and make his name resound throughout the whole earth. This is significant, for it provides pointers as to how to investigate whether Judas used his free will in the arrest and death of Jesus in spite of the fact that Jesus chose him to be his disciple.

3.2.1.3 Samson

The NRSV's translation of Judges 14:4 ('His father and mother did not know that this was from the LORD; for he was seeking a pretext to act against the Philistines') assigns the determination of Samson to marry the Philistine woman at Timnah to the direct influence of Yahweh. The basis for this is that the demonstrative pronoun 'this' in 'this was from the LORD' refers to Samson's request to his father to get the Philistine for him because she pleased him (v. 3). The phrase, 'that this was from the LORD', suggests two likely interpretations. The first implication is, Yahweh allowed Samson to break the Jewish religious law against marrying with foreigners (Deut 7:1-4; cf. Exod 34:15, 16; 1 Kgs 11:1-11), to accomplish his plan against the Philistines.

Secondly, it implies that Yahweh decreed that Samson marry the Philistine woman 'as a pretext to act against them' as the NRSV translates it. Exum (1983:31) accepts this implication. He thinks that all of Samson's actions (Judg 13-15) may have had Yahweh's hand in them. In fact, he states, 'The pivotal theological principle in the saga is that [Yahweh] is the guiding force behind events' (1983:36, 37- 45). The 'he' that 'was seeking a pretext' refers to Yahweh ('the LORD') who intended to go against the Philistines, rather than to Samson. Perhaps, this is why the CEV

translates 'this was from the LORD' as, 'That's [sic] why he made Samson desire that woman'. Keil and Delitzsch (1980:409) accept this observation and suggest that Samson acted 'under a higher impulse, whereas his parents did not know that it was from Jehovah, i.e. that Jehovah had so planned it' (cf. Willmington 1988-2007:n.p.).

However, Hindson and Kroll (1994:n.p.) take the former suggestion that Yahweh only used the defiant wish of Samson to go against the Philistine, instead of causing him to marry the Philistine woman (cf. Radmacher 1999:n.p; MacArthur 2010:352). Pfeiffer (1962:257) thinks Samson willfully chose to marry the Philistine woman, but that Yahweh used it only 'to act against the Philistines'. Thus similar to the situation with the hardening of the heart of Pharaoh, commentators have opposing views about the desire of Samson to marry the Philistine woman, that is, whether that desire came from Samson himself or whether Yahweh caused it. Whichever view is correct, Judges 14:1-4 appears to assume compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

3.2.1.4 Jeremiah

Jeremiah (1:4-7) suggests that (1) God foreknew Jeremiah before Jeremiah's conception, (2) God consecrated and appointed Jeremiah before the birth of Jeremiah, and (3) Jeremiah objected 'verbally' to his appointment by God (cf. Roshwalb 2010:351-376). These suggestions raise some important questions, such as, (1) why did God inform Jeremiah about God's foreknowledge of him before his conception? (2) Why did God inform Jeremiah about his appointment of Jeremiah before Jeremiah's birth? (3) Could God's foreknowledge of, consecration of and appointment of Jeremiah to serve him before the conception and birth of Jeremiah be applied to other human beings, or to Jeremiah alone? (4) Could Jeremiah have successfully resisted the appointment of God to service?

The passage does not provide explicit answers to these questions, particularly to questions one and two. Perhaps, Yahweh informed Jeremiah about knowing him and appointing him before Jeremiah's conception and birth respectively, so that Yahweh might establish his authority and credibility. By realizing the authority and credibility of Yahweh, Jeremiah would put his confidence in Yahweh for guidance and guardianship, despite the fact that Jeremiah expressed hurt and disappointment with

Yahweh's dealing with his assignment and protested his assignment (1:7; 20:7-10; cf. Duke 2005:184-186; Fox 2011:60, 77, 78; Lundbom 1991; Thompson 2008:66-68; Youngblood 1990:106). Yahweh's foreknowledge of and appointment of Jeremiah is not limited to Jeremiah. The Scriptures suggest that Yahweh foreknew and appointed other individuals to carry out certain tasks apart from Jeremiah. The following examples will serve to substantiate this claim.

Abraham (Gen 12:1-7): This passage records that Yahweh commanded Abram (later 'Abraham', 17:5) to leave his ancestral land and go to a land ('the land of Canaan') that Yahweh would show him and give to his posterity. Abram obeyed Yahweh unquestioningly. In fact, Yahweh reminded Abram that it was he who had brought Abram 'from Ur of the Chaldeans' to give him the new land to possess (Gen 15:7). Genesis 12:1-7 does not state explicitly that Yahweh foreknew and appointed Abraham to leave his ancestral land and settle in a new land before Abraham's conception and birth. However, the passage indicates that Yahweh had predetermined a 'land' for Abram. He may have foreknown that the land would ultimately belong to Abram and hence he set it apart for Abram.

Moses (Exod 3:4-12): This passage reveals that the angel of Yahweh appeared to Moses, introduced himself, revealed his redemptive plans, and appointed Moses to go to Pharaoh to deliver the people of Yahweh out of Egypt. Like the account of Abraham, Yahweh did not tell Moses about foreknowing him and appointing him before his conception and birth. However, the miraculous preservation of the infant Moses (Exod 1:15-2:4), the subsequent adoption of Moses by the daughter of Pharaoh (Exod 2:5-10) and his later appointment by Yahweh indicates the foreknowledge of Yahweh and his providential involvement in the life of Moses.

The exact nature of the involvement is not defined. However, it is highly unlikely that Yahweh did not foreknow Moses prior to meeting with Moses at Horeb (Exod 3:1, 2), for Yahweh was already the God of the father of Moses, of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob (3:6). The passage indicates that God already knew Moses' name before Moses encountered the burning bush (3:4).

Saul (1 Sam 9:15-10:24): In this passage, Yahweh disclosed to Samuel that he would send to Samuel 'a man from the land of Benjamin' whom Samuel must anoint

as ruler over his people, Israel (9:15-17). Afterward, Samuel poured oil on the head of Saul and told him that Yahweh had anointed him to rule over the people of Israel and deliver them from the hands of their enemies (9:27-10:1). During the coronation of Saul, Samuel told the Israelites that Yahweh had chosen Saul (10:24). The Scripture shows that Yahweh anointed Saul as king over Israel (10:1; 15:17).

The hand of Yahweh was upon Saul to the extent that Yahweh changed Saul's heart into a prophet's heart so that Saul prophesied with the prophets (1 Sam 10:6-13). Yahweh's foreknowledge of Saul and his selection of him to govern Israel as king was substantiated by Yahweh himself sending Saul to Samuel at a particular time, in order that Samuel might anoint him as king over his people (1 Sam 9:15-17). Secondly, it was confirmed by the casting of lots (10:17-24).

David (1 Sam 16:2-13; 2 Chr 6:6b): These passages show that Yahweh instructed Samuel explicitly to go to the house of Jesse to anoint for him (Yahweh) the person whom he (Yahweh) would name. When Samuel arrived at the house of Jesse, he mistook seven of the sons of Jesse for the person whom Yahweh intended, but Yahweh rejected all of them (1 Sam 16:6-11). Samuel told Jesse repeatedly that Yahweh had not chosen any of the seven sons (vv. 8-10). When David arrived at the scene, Yahweh commanded Samuel to anoint him, because he was the one (vv. 11, 12). Yahweh himself declared that he had chosen David to rule his people Israel (2 Chr 6:6b). As in the cases of Abraham, Moses and Saul, one may speculate that the appointment and anointing of David can be attributed to Yahweh's foreknowledge and choosing (cf. 1 Sam 13:14).

The accounts of Abraham, Moses, Saul and David surveyed above reveal that Yahweh appointed them to serve him in particular areas, just as he did with Jeremiah, even though he did not tell them explicitly that he foreknew them prior to their conception and birth as he had done in the case of Jeremiah. Yahweh not telling them about their prenatal existence does not suggest his lack of foreknowledge about their prenatal existence necessarily. Furthermore, like Jeremiah, four of these men (Moses, Gideon, Saul and Jonah) attempted unsuccessfully to reject the commissioning of Yahweh. The rejection by Saul is less obvious: he hid himself 'among the baggage' on the day of his coronation (1 Sam 10:20-22). It is worth noting that Yahweh overruled their choices and they accepted

their appointments. Concerning Moses (1) Yahweh became angry with him for his continual refusal to accept the appointment (Exod 4:10-14) and (2) Yahweh showed Moses alternative ways to carry out the appointment (Exod 4:15, 16).

In view of these findings, one would answer the question whether Jeremiah could have successfully resisted the appointment of God to service with a 'no'. The Bible has shown that neither he (Jeremiah), nor Moses, or Saul could have successfully resisted the appointment of Yahweh to his service. Lundberg's (2016:178) thought is that whilst humans have the freedom to choose, 'God retains the prerogative to act in the world, presumably on some occasions even overriding the freedom of creatures'.

The book of Job also reflects on the interface of divine foreknowledge with human free will. For example, Yahweh foreknew about Job's losses and terrible bodily affliction by Satan prior to their occurrence (Job 1:12-19; 2:6-8). When they occurred, Job chose to praise Yahweh who had taken away that which he had given to him (1:21) rather than 'sin or charge God with wrong wrongdoing' (1:22). Furthermore, Job rejected his wife's advice that he should 'Curse God, and die' (2:9, 10). There are two other passages in this book, which reflect this compatibilism also:

23:10-12: 'But he knows the way that I take; when he has tested me, I shall come out like gold. My foot has held fast to his steps; I have kept his ways and have not turned aside. I have not departed from the commandment of his lips; I have treasured in my bosom the words of his mouth'.

27:1-6: 'Job again took up his discourse and said: 'As God lives, who has taken away my right, and the Almighty, who has made my soul bitter, as long as my breath is in me and the spirit of God is in my nostrils, my lips will not speak falsehood, and my tongue will not utter deceit. Far be it from me to say that you are right; until I die I will not put away my integrity from me. I hold fast my righteousness, and will not let it go; my heart does not reproach me for any of my days'.

These passages of the book of Job show the resounding ways in which Job exercised his free will in matters of his righteousness, integrity and faithfulness to

God. Like Sirach, Job appears to resolve the tension between divine foreknowledge and human free will in favor of human free will.

The Psalms reflect on the interface of divine foreknowledge with human free will as well. Three of them (1; 37; 119) refer to this subject. Psalm 1:6 speaks of Yahweh watching 'over the way of the righteous' (his foreknowledge is implied), while the rest of the Psalm attributes the righteousness of the righteous to their willingness to do so. The thirty-seventh Psalm reflects on the foreknowledge of God and the use of human free will also. For example, it states that Yahweh 'sees' the day of the wicked coming (v.13).

This Psalm exhorts the righteous to stop fretting and envying the wicked and wrongdoers (Psa 1:1), to 'Take delight in the LORD' (v. 4), to commit their ways to the LORD (v. 5), to 'Refrain from anger, and forsake wrath' (v. 8) and to 'Depart from evil, and do good' (v. 27). Even the wicked are held liable for their wickedness. For instance, they willfully 'plot against the righteous' (v. 12) and 'draw the sword and bend their bows to bring down the poor and needy, to kill those who walk uprightly' (v. 14). It is clear that this Psalm reflects compatibilism, even though it focuses more on human will.

Psalm 119 almost exclusively focuses on the role of humans in staying in the will of Yahweh or straying from it. In order to stay in the will of Yahweh, the psalmist willingly obeys the words of Yahweh, which he refers to variously as commandments, decrees, judgments, law, ordinances, precepts, statutes, testimonies and word. The first two verses hold humans liable for receiving blessing from Yahweh: 'Blessed are they whose ways are blameless, who walk according to the law of the LORD. Blessed are they who keep his statutes and seek him with all their heart' (NIV). The last verse (v. 176a) shows that the psalmist holds himself liable for straying 'like a lost sheep'. The prayer of the psalmist to Yahweh to accept his offering stresses the use of human freedom of choice: 'Free will offerings of my mouth, Accept, I pray Thee, O Jehovah' (v. 108 YLT).

Like the Psalms, the book of Ecclesiastics reflects compatibilism of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Chapter 12:14 suggests that God has absolute knowledge. The passage states, 'For God will bring every deed into judgment,

including every secret thing, whether good or evil'. It is unlikely that God's absolute knowledge is apart from his foreknowledge. The rest of the book refers to the use of human choices, concerning one's desires and undertakings (e.g. 2:1-26), relationship to others (4:1-4; 11:1, 2) and relationship to God (5:1-7; 12:1-13). Similarly, Wisdom (11:25) teaches that God foreknows all happenings and he allows everything that happens; notwithstanding, he holds the wicked accountable for their unrighteous deeds and will punish them (5:15a, 16; 11:15, 16; 12:9, 10, 23).

It would appear therefore that at least concerning God's selection of agents for his service, the compatibility and sometimes conflict between divine foreknowledge and human free will is resolved in favor of divine foreknowledge. This, however, does not appear to be at the level of coercion but rather at the level of persuasion, sometimes miraculous persuasion. In other words, God's agents eventually change their minds and will through divine miracle, and willingly carry out the task. This raises the question whether a similar dynamic of compatibilism operated in Jesus' selection of Judas Iscariot to be his agent despite foreknowing that Judas Iscariot was 'a devil'.

The question will be directly addressed in subsequent chapters. For now, it is appropriate to conclude that within the Old Testament, a particular dynamic of the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will operates in which the two are held in compatible tension, each not annulled or fully trumped by the other. The next question is whether the same may be said of non-individual corporate agents of God. It is to that question that I now turn.

3.2.2 Divine Foreknowledge of, and Election of Nations

This study has shown that God foreknew certain individuals and elected them to fulfill his purposes. The study has also shown that those individuals whom God chose objected to their appointments to some degree. Similarly, God in his foreknowledge chose certain nations to serve him, regardless of their predisposition to do so or not. Two key nations will now be featured.

3.2.2.1 Israel (Deut 7:6; Isa 44:1)

Moses reminded the Israelites that Yahweh their God had 'chosen [them] out of all the peoples on the earth to be his people, his treasured possession' (Deut 7:6; cf.

4:37; 10:15, NRSV; cf. 2 Esdras 5:27). Yahweh himself affirmed to Israel that he had ‘chosen’ them (Isa 44:1, ‘But now hear, O Jacob my servant, Israel whom I have chosen’; cf. Ezek 20:5). Even though Yahweh owns the entire earth and its contents (Exod 19:5; cf. Psa 24:1), he promised to make Israel his ‘treasured possession’ from amongst the peoples of the earth and make them his ‘priestly kingdom and a holy nation’ (Exod 19:5, 6; cf. Chinitz 2010:255-2559). Tzoref (2011:74-89) describes God’s election of the nation of Israel as ‘covenantal election’.

It is worth noting, however, that even though the establishment and endorsement of this divine covenant was passive regarding human involvement, the fulfillment of the covenant depended on the active involvement of Abraham and his descendants. For example, Abram (Abraham), the primary recipient of this covenant had to willingly leave the land of his ancestors so that he might go into ‘the land’ that Yahweh had predetermined (Gen 12:1-7). Furthermore, he had to believe the word of Yahweh concerning the covenant (Gen 15:1-6) and to obey Yahweh’s commands (Gen 17:9-23; 26:4, 5). The nation had to obey the stipulations of the Sinaitic Covenant in order for God to preserve them as his people. The key stipulation of the covenant was ‘holiness’—Yahweh commanded them to ‘be holy’ because he was holy (Lev 11:44; 19:2). Yahweh promised to bless them in multiple ways if they obeyed him (Lev 26:3-13; cf. Harrison 1969:478, 479). Otherwise, he would judge them harshly (cf. Exod 24; Lev 26:14-39; Deut 28:15-68; Amos 4:2, 3; 6:7; 7:11, 17; 9:9).

The word translated as ‘chosen’ that Moses and Yahweh employed is *bāhar*. It speaks of a selection made after comparing a couple of persons or objects for a particular purpose (Orr 1943:612). The word appears first in Genesis 6:2, wherein Moses states, ‘The sons of God saw that the daughters of man were attractive. And they took as their wives any they chose’ (ESV). *Bāhar* is used in the same sense of both divine and human choices in several other passages. The following table will show this usage.

Table 3.2: Bāhar used in Divine and Human Choices

Divine choice	Human Choice
Yahweh chose Abraham from the land of Ur of the Chaldeans (Neh 9:7).	Lot chose the plan of the Jordan (Gen 13:11).

Yahweh chose the Temple and consecrated it so that his name might be there perpetually (2 Chr 7:16).	Moses told Joshua to choose some men from the Israeli army to go and fight the Amalekites (Exod 17:9).
Yahweh chose the Levitical Priests from amongst the tribes of Israel so that they might minister in his name (Deut 18:5; 21:5; cf. 1 Chr 15:2).	Joshua chose thirty thousand warriors (Josh 8:3).
Yahweh chose Jerusalem for his name (2 Chr 6:5, 6; cf. Zech 1:17; 3:2).	Joshua commanded the Israelites to choose for themselves whether they would serve Yahweh or idols (Josh 24:15).
Yahweh promised to choose harsh treatment for people who were taking pleasure in doing evil (Isa 66:4).	The children of Israel chose to serve Yahweh (Josh 24:22).
Yahweh chose Aaron (Psa 105:26; Exod 4:14-16).	Saul chose three thousand fighting men from the army of Israel (1 Sam 13:2).
Yahweh promised to 'choose to mock' people who would choose to do evil and displease him (Isa 66:4).	Joab chose some of his fighting men and organized them against the Arameans (2 Sam 10:9).
	Ahithophel asked for permission from Absalom so that he might choose twelve thousand fighting men (2 Sam 17:1).
	Yahweh spoke about evil people who chose to do evil and displeased him (Isa 66:3).

The LXX translates *bāhar* in Isaiah 66:3, 4 as ἐκλέγομαι. Thus, verse 3 reads, αὐτοὶ ἐξελέξαντο τὰς ὁδοὺς αὐτῶν ('These have chosen their own ways', v. 3) and verse 4 reads, κἀγὼ ἐκλέξομαι τὰ ἐμπαίγματα αὐτῶν ('I also will choose to mock them'). 'Εκλέγομαι means, 'To pick out someone or something, choose for oneself' (BDAG 2000:305; cf. Elwell 1984:870). In the New Testament, Luke uses the term to refer to Jesus choosing his disciples—καὶ ὅτε ἐγένετο ἡμέρα, προσεφώνησεν τοὺς μαθητὰς

αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ἀπ' αὐτῶν δώδεκα ('And when day came, he called his disciples and chose twelve of them', Luke 6:13).

Paul also uses it in Ephesians 1:4 to speak of God choosing believers in Christ in eternity past ('just as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world', NASB). Furthermore, Jesus used it of he himself choosing his disciples (John 6:70; 15:19). Another example is the use of the word in Acts 15:22 where Luke records, Τότε ἔδοξε τοῖς ἀποστόλοις καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκλεξαμένους ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν πέμψαι εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν ('Then it seemed good to the apostles and the elders, with the whole assembly, to send chosen men out of themselves to send to Antioch', YLT).

In view of the multiple examples of the use of *bāhar* and its Greek New Testament equivalent (ἐκλέγομαι), it could be surmised that Yahweh's choosing of Israel means the nation was a passive recipient of their selection by him; they did not exercise their free will regarding their becoming his chosen ones. Rather, Yahweh chose them out his love and compassion (cf. Deut 4:37; 7:6, 7; 14:2; Jer 31:3, 4; Rom 9:13-16; cf. Trimm 2012:521-536). This is not suggesting that God annulled Israel's free will, so that they could not rebel against him and abandon their place in him. It seems like this is the basis for Maston's (2009:134) argument that 'While the doctrine of predestination establishes divine action at the forefront of the divine-human relationship, this idea does not absolve the human agent of responsibility for one's actions'.

Actually, God warned them not to rebel against the angel that he was sending to guard them, otherwise the angel 'will not pardon [their] transgression' (Exod 23:21). Moses also warned them not to depart from observing God's command so that God might not destroy them (Deut 30:1-20; cf. 2 Macc. 2:2, 3). Israel's passivity in their selection therefore did not annul their freedom to choose to fall away from Yahweh.

The Scriptures indeed show that Israel did rebel against Yahweh many times, including choosing to make gods to replace Yahweh (Exod 32; cf. Num 14:1-4; 27:14; Isa 63:10; Jer 5:23; Acts 7:51; Heb 3:8). Yahweh promised to 'make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah' (Jer 31:31). This covenant will be internal rather than external, according to Yahweh: 'But this is the covenant

that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the LORD: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people' (Jer 31:33). Nonetheless, this 'new covenant' would not deter Israel from sinning against Yahweh. Thus, Yahweh declared that those who might sin would 'die for their own sins' (v. 30). Committing sins and dying for them indicates the exercising of their will, and therefore God would hold those Israelites who sin culpable for their sins (cf. Lim 2015:72-74).

Israel's covenantal election did not guarantee that God had saved them eternally. In other words, Yahweh did not save eternally every Israelite, including the Pharisees and teachers of the Law, who did not fear him, or who were wicked, or who were disobedient to his commands. The basis for their salvation would be their cleansing from their iniquity and justification by God (e.g. Ezra 10:3; Psa 73:27; Isa 53:66:5; Ezek 18; 33:8-20; Matt 7:21-23; 23:13-33; cf. Beck 2010:22; Thornhill 2015:10, 11). Otherwise, Jesus would not have stated categorically (though in a rhetorical question) that the scribes and Pharisees would not escape 'being sentenced to hell' (γέεννης, Matt 23:33). This implies that even though Yahweh elected Israel corporately, the salvation of individuals of Israel was conditional through their faith in Jesus Christ as their Messiah (Taylor 2013:40, 41).

Paul's argument in Romans 9 is that even though the Israelites were descendants of the patriarchs, not all of them were true Israelites, or Abraham's children, or children of God (Rom 9:6b-9; cf. Schreiner 1993:27, 28). The primary cause is that they did not put their faith in God's word or submit to God's righteousness that comes through faith in Jesus Christ (Rom 9-10).

Israel's failure to obey the stipulations of the Sinai Covenant caused God to expel them repeatedly from the 'Land flowing with milk and honey' by the agency of the Assyrians, the Babylonians (who desecrated their magnificent temple and destroyed it), the Persians and others and led to Antiochus IV Epiphanes persecuting them (cf. Helyer 2002:18-20, 27-32, 58). Paul's reference to Isaiah's prophecy that 'Though the number of the Israelites be like the sand by the sea, only the remnant will be saved' (Rom 9:27; cf. Isa 10:22) and his own 'heart's desire and prayer to God for them to saved' (Rom 10:1) give credence to the argument that God has not saved eternally every Israelite. This section has shown that Yahweh did choose Abraham

and Israel from amongst many other peoples and nations to be his special agents. Nonetheless, Abraham and Israel had to remain obedient to his commands in order to remain in good relationship with him.

3.2.2.2 Babylon/Chaldea

Yahweh informed the prophet Habakkuk that he was already ‘rousing the Chaldeans’ as a formidable, destructive army (Habakkuk 1:6-11). Other English versions (e.g. CEV, CJB, ESV, KJV, NIV, and YLT) use ‘raise up’ instead of ‘rouse’. The Hebrew word in question is *mêqîm*; it means ‘to set up’, ‘be raised up’, ‘to raise up against’, ‘rouse’, ‘stir up’(BDB 1988-2007:n.p.). ‘Rouse’ is preferable to ‘raised up’ in view of the fact that the Chaldeans already existed with a known character of ruthlessness (Hab 1:6, 8; cf. Bartholomew 2004:49). Thus the NRSV’s translation to ‘rouse’ (to incite, to stir) reflects this thought better than the ‘raise up’ used by the other translations.

It is interesting to note that the NRSV, along with Darby, ESV, KJV, NASB and YLT, translates *mêqîm* as ‘raising (‘raise’) up against’ in Amos 6:14 (cf. Jer 5:15). Floyd (1991:402-406) argues that God raised the Babylonians up against his people Israel to affirm his governance and ‘control over world history’. The LXX uses ἐξεγείρω, which Paul also used in relation to God ‘raising Pharaoh up’ (Rom 9:17). The BDAG (2000:347) defines the term as to ‘cause to appear, bring into being’, according to how Paul used it in Romans. God therefore divinely appointed the Babylonians/Chaldeans who existed already, as his instrument of judgment against Judah (Bartholomew 2004:50). In other words, God did not particularly bring Babylon into existence just for judging Israel. Instead, God instigated and enabled Babylon to fulfill his specific purposes at some point within their existence.

Yahweh’s selection of the Chaldeans who did not believe in him to serve as agents of his judgment and punishment against his own people, was incomprehensible to the prophet Habakkuk (Hab 1:12, 13; cf. Jer 5:14; Amos 6:14; cf. Floyd 1991; Bartholomew 2007). Why, therefore, did Yahweh rouse these Chaldeans to act in ways that would have adverse consequences for Israel? The passage does not provide an explicit answer to this question. However, it seems reasonable to surmise that Yahweh’s decision to rouse the Chaldeans against Israel may have been for one

main reason—to inflict the most severe punishment upon Israel in ways only the Chaldeans could inflict. God would use the Chaldeans to punish Israel because of Israel’s unending sins of destruction, violence, injustice, wickedness against the righteous and their refusal to repent, (Hab 1:2-4; cf. Deut 28:15-50; Jer 5:1-12).

It is in a similar sense that God allowed Antiochus Epiphanes to treat Israel harshly and disgracefully because of their persistent, intentional disobedience of his command (1 Macc. 1:11-61). The account of Yahweh’s response to Israel’s rebellion and their lack of repentance suggests, even though God foreknows and chooses those whom he wants to choose, he reserves the right to punish and discipline his chosen ones by agents he appears to have previously ‘rejected’ to perform such an act.

3.2.2.3 Summary of Divine Foreknowledge and Divine Election in the Old Testament

This section has revealed six key points on the Old Testament’s teaching on ‘the interactions between divine foreknowledge and human free will’. Firstly, Yahweh foreknew certain individuals and events. Secondly, Yahweh elected certain individuals and nations to serve him as he willed. Thirdly, some of the individuals whom Yahweh elected to serve him attempted unsuccessfully to object to their call to service. The manner in which they stated or portrayed their objections implies they did not aspire to their calling. Fourthly, Yahweh overruled the objections—even the most daring ones—sometimes in a forceful, dramatic way.

Fifthly, some individuals whom Yahweh elected exercised their free will in ways that significantly affected the events in their lives. For example, Saul’s disobedience of Yahweh’s command resulted in his dethronement (1 Sam 15:1-23), and Israel’s rejection of Yahweh resulted in Yahweh appointing the Chaldeans to treat them harshly (Amos 6:14). Finally, these six points show that the Old Testament does provide the bases for the complexity of the interactions between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

3.3 Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will in Second Temple Judaism

Before examining how the general conception of compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will is broached in the New Testament, it is appropriate to summarize how some of the Second Temple Jewish Literature addresses the issue. These are texts which played clear, prominent roles in shaping and defining belief and practice between Palestinian and Diasporan Jews especially, even though they are not considered as part of the biblical canon. In addition, some of these texts attempt to apply and operationalize the Old Testament in Jewish practice, the same communities from which the first Christians emerged. Therefore, there are three good reasons for examining these texts now. In the first place, current scholarship, and, as will be reiterated in subsequent chapters the New Testament, develops and at least shares a number of distinctive outlooks in some of the books in that canon. Understanding how Second Temple Jewish Literature handled compatibilism will serve as important contextual background for the study of the New Testament.

Secondly, and as will shortly be shown, it is clear that the literature develops and speculates on compatibilism to different degrees, some appearing to completely rule out any efficacy of human free will. On the hand, others, who evidently react to such extremes, also underline human agency and free will to significant degrees. In other words, while most of the books evidence some understanding of the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will, there was a significant diversity between the manner in which individual books and communities resolved the tension. Such differences are important to note as guide in addressing the question of how the New Testament characterizes Judas Iscariot.

Thirdly, it is apparent that the differences between various texts and sects in how they address the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will not only affect the theological and devotional outlook of the communities which own such texts, but also is reflective of key socio-cultural contextual factors in their backgrounds. These backgrounds are indispensable to understanding how the New Testament addresses the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free

will, vis-à-vis the interface between divine foreknowledge and Judas Iscariot exercising his free will in the betrayal of Jesus.

As will be clear, though most of the books take the view that divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible, overtly apocalyptic literature tended to resolve the interaction more in favor of divine foreknowledge, whereas wisdom sapiential books tended to resolve it more in favor of human free will. Though not always true, in general the former tended to be more aimed at popular, poorer and often oppressed communities, whereas the latter tended to be directed at elites and intellectually-minded worshippers. All these make for interesting background for examining how the New Testament texts also address the question. The present section will summarize how the theme of compatibilism is addressed in three categories of books, namely, Josephus' writings, Qumran Literature and Sapiential literature.

3.3.1 Compatibilism in Josephus' Books

Whiston (1999:7) introduces Josephus as a first-century Jew who became a diplomat, a military general and a historian. He states that the writings of Josephus have enabled scholars to gain much knowledge of the intertestamental era—they provide 'a vital political, topographical, economic, social, intellectual, and religious supplement to our biblical information' (ibid.). Josephus' writings therefore make some important contributions for understanding the socio-religious context of the New Testament as he sets out a number of historical accounts of events in Palestine and the Roman Empire during the first century. Of particular relevance is his typology of the differences between the three major sects of first-century Judaism—Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes. Josephus shows that a key dividing line between these three sects is exactly how they view the nature of the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

Josephus' account of the Pharisees concerning the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will is somewhat paradoxical. For example, on the one hand he states that the Pharisees ascribed every event and every occurrence 'to fate [or providence], and to God' (*War* 2.162), while on the other hand he points out that the Pharisees taught that it was only 'some actions, but not all, are the works of

fate' (*Ant.* 13.171). They taught also that some actions were carried out by the will and power of men (*ibid.*). Thus, the ability 'to do what is right, on the contrary, is mainly in the power of men' (*War* 2.163; *Ant.* 13.171). In other words, men, not fate (or providence) is liable for what happens to men (*Ant.* 13.171).

Furthermore, the Pharisees taught that some souls were corruptible and others were incorruptible. The corruptible souls belonged to bad men; the incorruptible to good men. Furthermore, they taught, 'the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies, but that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal punishment' (*War* 2:163). The Pharisees' reference to 'good men' and 'bad men', along with their final destinies, implicitly contradicts the doctrine of predestination/election to eternal salvation or to eternal damnation. It is unlikely that God would place people into these categories if he had already eternally determined the fate of all men providentially.

Concerning the sect of the Essenes, Josephus points out that they taught, 'Fate governs all things, and that nothing befalls men but what is according to its determination' (*Ant.* 13.172). The phrase, 'what is according to its determination' would most likely be a reference to divine determination rather than human determination. In this case, God determines every event, including human fate, and thus annuls the involvement of the human will in the act. The teaching of the Essenes concurs with the doctrine of predestination/election to eternal salvation and eternal damnation. Nonetheless, the Essenes believed in repentance as the necessary means to receive pardon from God and remain in good relationship with him. For example, the Dead Sea Scrolls (CD IV, 2; 4Q266 fr. 5 i in Vermes 2004:98) record, 'In the "age of wrath", while God was making ready to annihilate the wicked, their founders had repented [and] had become the "Converts of Israel"'. It is questionable then for them to attribute every event, including their eternal destiny, exclusively to predestination/election.

The Sadducees, on the other hand, rejected absolutely the Essenes' teaching on fate. They taught that all human actions are in their own power, so that humans are themselves 'the causes of what is good, and receive what is evil from [their] own folly' (*Ant.* 13.173; cf. Klawans 2009:47). They taught too that God was not concerned about humans doing or not doing evil, so that doing good or evil was the

result of human choice (*War* 2.163-165). In other words, the Sadducees rejected any claim to divine appointment, whether to fortune or to fate vis-à-vis eternal salvation and eternal damnation. Additionally, the Sadducees did not believe in 'the immortal duration of the soul, and the punishments and rewards in Hades (*War* 2.165). The teaching of the Sadducees shows that they dismissed the doctrine of divine foreknowledge, but welcomed the doctrine of human free will. They kept God out of human fate. This is interesting, as the Sadducees were more in the higher echelons of society such as the priestly leaders. It is important, however, to bear in mind that having described himself as a Pharisee, Josephus' account on the beliefs and attitudes of the Sadducees may well entail some elements of polemics. All the same, his account appears to be generally correct.

Josephus alludes in several other historical accounts to the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Apart from the helpful information that Josephus' examination of his typology of the Jewish sects offer, his own account is helpful, because he was a self-avowed Pharisee of the priestly stock. Thus, how he goes about resolving the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will is an example of a first-century Jewish writer's attempt at compatibilism. This examination therefore will serve as one of the bases of comparison with the Gospels' account on Judas Iscariot.

On the interaction between God and Adam (after Adam's fall) for example, Josephus quotes God as saying that Adam had 'abused this my goodwill, and [you] have disobeyed my commands; for your silence is not the sigh of your virtue, but of your evil conscience' (*Ant.* 1.4.46, 47). Josephus' account shows that God did not decreatively predestine or foreordain Adam to act as he did. Secondly, it shows that God held Adam liable for his action. I think that God could only hold Adam liable for his action if Adam had freely chosen to disobey him.

There are two clauses and a sentence in the above quotation that evince the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will. The two clauses are, 'I had before determined' and 'grow up by my providence'. The sentence is, 'but now you have abused this my goodwill, and have disobeyed my commands'. The two clauses state explicitly that God's plan was that Adam 'grow up by [God's] providence' without pain, old age and death. The sentence, on the contrary, states

that Adam willfully disobeyed God's 'goodwill' and 'commands'. Thus, the reference to God's plan and Adam's willful disobedience of that suggests interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

There are other historical accounts of Josephus in which he alludes to the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will. One of them is his account of God's appointment of Cyrus, the Persian King with regards to the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Temple (*Ant.* 11.1.1-18; cf. 2 Chr 36:22, 23; Ezra 1:1-11; 6:3-5). Accordingly, Josephus concurs with the biblical account that the king acknowledged that God had made him king and appointed him to assist the Jews in rebuilding Jerusalem and the Temple, in accordance with the prophecy of Isaiah, one hundred and forty years earlier (*Ant.* 11.1.1.5, 6). In this account, Josephus indicates that both God and Cyrus were involved in Cyrus' contribution to the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Temple. For instance, he records that Cyrus admitted that the God whom Israel worshipped had appointed him king. Secondly, Josephus records that God appointed Cyrus so that he 'should build him a house at Jerusalem, in the country of Judea (*Ant.* 2.1.1.3, 4).

Josephus states that Cyrus knew about his divine appointment when he read Isaiah's prophecy (cf. Isa 44:28; 45:1; Ezra 1:1-11). After reading the prophecy, Cyrus 'admired the divine power, and earnest desire and ambition seized upon him to fulfill what was so written' (*Ant.* 11.1.1.6). It is a fact that the acts of admiring, desiring and having ambition require the exercising of one's will, despite external influence. Thus, Cyrus' admiration of 'the divine power' and his 'earnest desire and ambition' to accomplish 'what was so written' suggest that he exercised his free will in accepting to assist Israel. An examination of Josephus' historical accounts of Adam, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Essenes and King Cyrus explicitly and implicitly, acknowledge compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will. The works of Josephus therefore play an important role in interpreting the New Testament.

3.3.2 Compatibilism in Qumran Literature

The Qumran Community was essentially an apocalyptic group of people who appeared to hold to the doctrines of predestination and human free will

simultaneously. They taught that the righteous God would judge humanity by its deeds. The Dead Sea Scrolls have enabled scholars to uncover this community and their literature. The Scrolls play a key contextual role for interpreting the New Testament. Like Josephus' writings, the Qumran Literature is replete with implicit and explicit references to compatibilism between divine foreknowledge (manifested in divine predestination and divine foreordination) and human free will. Firstly, they suggest this compatibilism within the Community Rule's instruction on the Qumran's Community, which the Community refers to as the 'Two Spirits' (1QS III, 13-IV, 26).

The 'Two Spirits' is a reference to how two human groups whom God has chosen or not chosen since creation, are controlled by two antithetical spirits. The first group comprises the children of justice and righteousness. The 'Prince of Light' rules them and they 'walk in the ways of light' ((Vermes 2004:104). The second group comprises all whom the Community describes as 'the children of injustice'. The 'Angel of Darkness' rules them and therefore they 'walk in the ways of darkness' (ibid.). God is sovereign and he has predestined and foreordained the course of his creation. The tract, 4Q255, III states that God 'has created man to govern the world, and has appointed for him two spirits in which to walk until the time of his visitation'.

These spirits are the spirit of truth and the spirit of injustice. The statement of 4Q255, III appears to attribute all humankind's actions to God. Moerschbacher (n.d:6) thinks that the passage also attributes humankind's actions to their own choices. He points out that God might have established the two 'spirits' (the spirits of truth and injustice) in order to give humankind the opportunity to choose between them. For example, 4Q473 (ibid.) states, '[God] has placed [before you] t[wo] ways one which is goo[d] and one which is evil. If you choose the good [way], He will bless you. But if you walk in the [evil] way, [He will curse you]' [sic]. This implies that God does not control or influence the choices or activities of his creation absolutely. It also implies that God has given humankind freedom to choose their preferred manner of life.

Rather than God influencing humans absolutely, it is the Angel of Darkness that influences them to go astray and do various kinds of evil (4Q255, III; Vermes 2004:132). Furthermore, it is not God, but the Angel of Darkness who determinedly seeks to lead the children of light or righteousness astray. He accomplishes this

through his spirits that he assigns to the children of light so that they might torment them. His goal is to overthrow them (ibid.).

The document, 1QS III, 15, 16 of the Dead Sea Scrolls emphasizes divine foreknowledge. For instance, this document indicates that God's foreknowledge is the principal cause for the existence of everything that has existed and will exist. During their existence and at the prearranged time, 'they will execute all their works according to [God's] glorious design without altering anything' (Moerschbacher n.d:1; Vermes 2004:104). The expression, 'Before they existed he established their entire design', implies predestination. If the words 'they' and 'their' include humans, then 1QS III, 15, 16 suggests that all human thoughts and actions, have been predestined, and are the direct outcome of how God has preprogrammed them. Humans therefore cannot be liable for their dispositions, their deeds and their eternal destiny (cf. Kyle 1984:53-77; Shedd 1999:17, 20).

Moerschbacher (n.d:1-10) does not think that 'they' and 'their' in 1QS III, 15, 16 refer to humankind. Instead, he argues that they 'refer to creation in general, as well as to the predetermined dispensational framework and events of human history' (p. 2). In other words, they refer to 'creational and historical predestination' rather than to 'human predestination' (p. 9). He bases his argument on the literary parallels that he thinks exist between 1QS III, 15, 16 and references in the Dead Sea Scrolls and other Jewish writings of the Second Temple period. According to him, these documents and 1QS III, 15, 16 'are clearly connected to the sectarian belief in an obedient, ordered creation' rather than to the deeds of human kind (pp. 2-6).

However, there are indications in the Dead Sea Scrolls that 'Covenant Members' within the Qumran Community exercised their free will about observing the precepts of God. For instance, the Community required every adult to deliberately and personally commit to the sect that God elected them (Vermes 2004:103, 104). They were to seek God whole-heartedly (1QS1, 1-2), separate themselves from 'the habitation of unjust men' (1QS VIII, 13) and devote themselves completely to what they believed to be the cause of God (Vermes 2004:121). I suppose therefore, that their acts of seeking God, separating themselves from 'unjust men' and wholly devoting themselves to God point toward the use of human free will.

It is interesting to note that the Community Rule (4Q255, 257) demanded that people who were admitted into the Community were those who had 'freely devoted themselves to the observance of God's precepts' and his truth (Vermes 2004:129). They therefore regarded themselves as the true and pure Israeli sect with whom God will renew his covenant at the second coming of Jesus (Klein et al. 1993:27). Their devotion enabled them to obey God's commandments even during the future dominion and affliction of Belial (also known as 'Satan'; Vermes 2004:129). Belial made wicked plots against the Community members in order to lead them astray (Brand 2016:81). He ruled those who had chosen to belong to him (4Q256 III). Notwithstanding, God held them, rather than Belial, responsible for their fate. For example, this passage states that everyone who continues to live in stubbornness, does so by the dictates of his/her own heart. Consequently, he/she will be denied a place among those who are upright. The reason for this denial is the individual's failure to persist 'in the conversion of his life' (cf. Vermes 2004:131).

The Community knew Belial's dominion as a time of terror, dread and persecution. Nonetheless, members of the Community were 'admonished not to turn away from God' (I.17-18; Brand 2016:80). In spite of Belial's dominion, some men of the Community 'freely pledged themselves to be converted from all evil and to cling to all [God's] commandments according to his will' (Vermes 2004:134). An excerpt of the pledge reads thus:

They shall practise truth and humility in common, and justice and uprightness and charity and modesty in all their ways. No man shall walk in the stubbornness of his heart so that he strays after his heart and eyes and evil inclination, but he shall circumcise in the Community the foreskin of evil inclination and of stiffness of neck that they may lay a foundation of truth for Israel for the Community of the everlasting Covenant.

They shall atone for all those in Aaron who have freely pledged themselves to the House of Truth and for those who join them to live in community and to take part in the trial and judgment and condemnation of all those who transgress the precepts. Whoever approaches the Council of the Community shall enter the Covenant of God in the

presence of all who have freely pledged themselves (Vermes 2004:135).

The clause, 'who have freely pledged themselves' appears twice, along with a couple of indications of the use of human free will within this community pledge. For example, the pledge makers were to 'practise truth and humility', avoid walking in the stubbornness of their hearts and refrain from 'evil inclination and of stiffness of neck' (ibid.). Brand (2016:79) agrees that Qumran theology recognizes the role of human choice, to the extent that the active presence of demonic forces does not diminish 'the very human choice that rests on the shoulders of the community member' (ibid.).

The accounts of the two groups of people (those whom God has chosen and those he has not chosen) are also discussed by the Enochic Literature (1 Enoch). Enoch describes those whom God has chosen as righteous. They hate and reject 'this world of iniquity'. As a result, God blesses and keeps them safe (1:8; 48:7). At the end of the ages, God will permit them to stand before him (62:8). The words 'hate' and 'reject' are active words rather than passive; they require the use of the will.

On the contrary, those whom God has not chosen are unrighteous. They lie, do evil and 'have stubborn hearts' (1 Enoch 98:6, 11, 15; 91:1), so that they do not listen to those who are wise (98:9). Furthermore, they 'love deeds of iniquity' (98:12). God has full knowledge of their sins (80:8; 81:8; 91:6); they are recorded in heaven daily until the day of his judgment (91:7, 8; 98:9). God holds them liable for their willful sins (80:2-4, 6, 7). He will punish them and destroy them because of their sins (98:9; 99:11).

The Qumran literature and the Book of Enoch show that in spite of the fact that God and Belial/Satan influenced people to follow them; some humans chose freely whether they would follow God or Belial. The Qumran literature particularly, shows that to those whom God predestined, he also gave them the right to choose their manner of life and ultimate destiny vis-à-vis choosing to obey his precepts, or choosing to obey Belial. In short the spirit realms influenced and directed their human agencies, but without annulling their freedom of choice.

3.3.3 Compatibilism in the Sapiental Literature of Second Temple Period

As with the Qumran literature, a number of the key passages in sapiental Jewish literature of the Second Temple Period reflect on the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will. In some of these passages, the argument of the text is evidently couched as an attempt to correct what the writer views to be inappropriate understanding of the relationship between the two. So for example, Sirach (15:11-20) seems to agree with the view expressed of the Sadducees in Josephus' typology. For example, it stresses human free will and liability for evil doing, notwithstanding God's sovereignty and foreknowledge of 'all things':

Say not thou, 'It is through the Lord that I fell away': for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, 'He hath caused me to err': for he hath no need of the sinful man. The Lord hateth all abomination; and they that fear God love it not. He himself made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his counsel; If thou wilt, to keep the commandments, and to perform acceptable faithfulness.

He hath set fire and water before thee: stretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death; and whether him liketh shall be given him. For the wisdom of the Lord is great, and he is mighty in power, and beholdeth all things: And his eyes are upon them that fear him, and he knoweth every work of man. He hath commanded no man to do wickedly, neither hath he given any man licence to sin (cf. Sir. 11:14-16).

The above passage underlines two facts. Firstly, it recognizes the conflict between divine foreknowledge and human free will. On the one hand (and briefly), it shows that God had absolute foreknowledge of all things and peoples prior to creating them, and that he commanded them to avoid doing wickedness. On the other hand (and extensively), the passage shows that God gave people the freedom of choice. Sirach (10:4, 5), however, acknowledges the sovereignty and foreknowledge of God. It seems as if the passage resolves the conflict in favor of human free will. Perhaps, this resolution is reflective of the socio-intellectual background and context of Sirach.

Ben Sira was a sage who taught that God created humans in his image and 'gave [them] the ability to deliberate and think...[He] filled them with the knowledge of

understanding...of good and evil....' (Wright 2011:247). He argued that God is the sovereign creator of all creatures; however, he has given humans 'the moral capacity to obey' him, or to not obey him. However, he would hold them liable for their disobedience during the time of his judgment (Sirach 15.11-20; 16:17-17.24; Maston 2009:23-35). This suggests the use of free will.

The Psalms of Solomon do claim divine foreknowledge and control over everything, as well as holding humans responsible for their actions: 'Since the generation of old they have not withdrawn from their path, unless God commanded them (so to do) by the command of his servant' (18.12-14). In 9.4, Solomon writes, 'God's order encompasses and foresees the exercise of human freedom on which God's judgment is based: "Our works are subject to our own choice and power. To do right or wrong (is) the works of our hands"'.

The doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will have featured a diversity of opinions and approaches, as the review of literature has reflected. Reflecting on this diversity, Barclay (2006:1-9) has categorized the various accounts of the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will in Second Temple Judaism into three approaches. One class of approach, which he labels as 'Competitive' regards divine foreknowledge as virtually incompatible with human free will. A second class, which he labels as 'Kinship' regards the two as synergistic and wholly compatible, even if the consistency with which this compatibility is asserted differs from one text to another, and within the same text from particular instances to others.

The third class labeled as 'Non-Contrastive Transcendence' paradoxically asserts the transcendence of both foreknowledge and human free will' in direct and not inverse proportion: the more the human agent is operative, the more (not the less) may be attributed to God' (Barclay 2006:7). In other words, both principles are asserted as compatible yet not competing in their interactions. It is interesting to see how such three classes find their counterparts in the Calvinistic-Wesleyan-Openness models of approaches analyzed in the previous chapter. This no doubt provides a helpful basis for examining how the New Testament approaches the subject in general terms, and in subsequent chapters, how the particular instance of Judas is addressed.

Barclay thinks that human freedom comes from God. However, God does not control that freedom. He argues that 'Even if God is regarded as the originator of the causal chain, the human respondents act from their own self-initiated will, since integrity of that will can be maintained only if it is in some respects or at some points independent of the direct creative will of God' (2006:6).

3.3.4 Summary of Compatibilism in Second Temple Jewish Literature

The above accounts have underlined a diversity of approaches to the subject of compatibilism in some of the key texts of Second Temple Judaism. One important observation from Josephus, the Qumran Literature and the Sapiential Literature, is that they explicitly and implicitly point out some level of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

3.4 Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free will in the New Testament

Similar to the situation of the Old Testament, the New Testament also shows the compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will explicitly or implicitly. For example, Paul (Gal 1:15, 16; Acts 9:15) claims that God foreknew him and set him apart from his birth, in order that he might preach God's Son among the Gentiles. Secondly, a number of NT passages (e.g. Matt 24:1-31; Mark 8:31; John 1:47-51; 3:14; 18:4; Acts 1:24; Rev 2:10) show that Jesus exhibited foreknowledge. The study will now examine these passages.

3.4.1 Paul the Apostle (Gal 1:15, 16; Acts 9:15)

Paul testifies in Galatians 1:15, 16, ὅτε δὲ εὐδόκησεν [ὁ θεὸς] ὁ ἀφορίσας με κοιλίας μητρὸς μου καὶ καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ...ἵνα εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ('But when God, who had set me apart before I was born and called me through his grace...so that I might proclaim him among the Gentiles'). The words of Paul parallel those of Jeremiah's account of his own calling (Jer 1:5). The word that Paul employed is ἀφορίζω. It means, 'To select one person out of a group for a purpose, set apart, appoint' (BDAG 2000:158).

Paul used the term in the same way in Romans 1:1 ('Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God'). Paul's statement implies

divine foreordination. It is unlikely that God would foreordain Paul without firstly foreknowing him. In Acts 26:16, Paul admits that Jesus appointed him (προχειρίζω) to bear witness of that which he had seen of Jesus and of what Jesus would show to him. Luke uses ἀφορίζω in the same way in Acts 13:2, wherein he reports that while the believers were worshiping, the Holy Spirit commanded them to ‘Set apart [ἀφορίσατε] for me Barnabas and Saul for the work to which I have called them’.

It is my view that Paul was here referring to the divine predestination of his apostleship in general rather than to every aspect of his life (Knox 1987:301, 304; Vos 1994:13, 14), otherwise, God would have been liable for his persecution of the Church. Jesus’ rebuke of Paul for persecuting him (Jesus) and calling Paul to serve him (Acts 9:3-19), as well as Paul’s own admission of being commissioned by the chief priests to persecute the believers (Acts 26:9-18), implies that Paul was indeed liable for persecuting the Church rather than God. Several other NT passages show that humans are given the right to freedom of choice to accept God or reject him, and to choose life or death. The following passages will serve as examples:

John 3:14-21; 5:24—These passages show that Jesus places the responsibility for eternal life or eternal damnation in the hands of humanity rather than in God’s hands. For instance, Jesus states explicitly that eternal life is the consequence of personal belief in God rather than the result of an arbitrary election. Similarly, eternal damnation is the consequence of not believing in God/the Son of God. Jesus uses ‘belief’ with regards to ‘eternal life’ and deliverance from eternal damnation five times in these passages (3:15, 16, 18; 5:24; Cf. Rev20:11, 12).

Hebrews 6:1a, 4-6—The author exhorts his audience to ‘go on to perfection’ (v. 1a) since they ‘have once been enlightened...have tasted the heavenly gift...have shared in the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the goodness of the word of God...’ (vv. 4, 5). Otherwise, they might fall away and be ‘crucifying again the Son of God’ (v. 6). To fall away (παραπίπτω) is tantamount to failing to follow through on a promise as well as committing apostasy (BDAG 2000:770). Apostatizing is a willful, deliberate act. In fact, this passage uses the term actively: καὶ παραπεσόντας (‘and having fallen away’ YLT).

The LXX uses the term (παραπείθειν) to refer to the 'persistent unfaithfulness' of a land (Ezek 14:13, NKJV. cf. Ezek 18:24; 20:27). The NRSV translates the term as 'dealing treacherously' in Ezekiel 20:27, thus indicating a willful, deliberate act. MacArthur (2010:1856) appears to agree that Hebrews 6:6 refers to individuals who will have 'rejected [Jesus] with full knowledge and conscious experience... [and thus would have] no hope of being saved'. His thought places the liability for salvation and damnation on humans instead of on God's subjective predestination/election of individuals.

Hebrews 10:26-31—This passage argues that individuals who continue to sin willfully, 'after having received the knowledge of the truth' have no more sacrifice for sins by which they might be saved (v. 26). Instead, they will face God's fiery judgment as all of God's enemies would (vv. 27-31). Such individuals are apostates and are therefore 'beyond salvation because [they have] rejected the only sacrifice that can cleanse [them] from sin and bring [them] into God's presence' (MacArthur 2010:1865). Judaism regarded apostates as people who 'knowingly rejected the authority of God's law' (Kenner 1988-2007:n.p.). Such people have no sacrifice that availed for them any longer (ibid.). They would forfeit their salvation and be damned eternally, on the ground that they will have chosen to apostatize, rather than having been divinely predestined to eternal damnation (cf. McKnight 1992:21-59; Peterson 2008:27-44).

The act of apostasy is the act of defection; and defection is the abandonment of one's allegiance to a cause, institution or person. Walvoord and Zuck (1988-2007:n.p.) think that God will judge these apostates on the ground that they have forfeited their shielding from the judgment of God that the sacrifice of Jesus provided for them. It is worth noting too that Judaism regarded apostasy as an evil act and put to death apostates and those who attempted to lure others into apostasy (Deut13:6-11; 17:2-7).

Hebrews 12:14—This passage is a command to its readers to 'pursue...holiness' or they will not 'see the Lord'. 'Pursue' (διώκετε) is active imperative. This implies that the author's audience had a role to play in being holy so that they might see the Lord; they were not predestined to be holy or predestined to see the Lord. MacArthur's commentary (2010:1870) on this passage indicates that humans are

liable for their salvation as well as for others losing their salvation. He understands the author of Hebrews to be exhorting his audience to draw near to God with full faith and a cleansed conscience (10:14, 22), and to accept Christ sincerely as the Savior and sacrifice for sin their sin. This passage is a wake-up call to Christians who hold to the doctrine of unlimited grace and predestination to eternal salvation (Peeler 2005:1-18); it is a call to remain faithful to the Christian walk with God (cf. Peterson 2008:27-44).

2 Peter 2:20, 21—The context of this passage is about greedy, false prophets and false teachers who will certainly face God's severe judgment just as the ancient world of Noah's time and the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah (vv. 1-14). The reason is that like those ancient people, the false prophets and false teacher had left the straight road and had gone astray and sinned insatiably. They were already accursed (vv. 14, 15), because they were already entrapped by the very defilements from which they formerly 'escaped the defilements of the world through the knowledge of...the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ' (v. 20). Through their act, they forsook God's commandment, which they had received (v. 21; cf. Desjardins 1987:89-102).

Peter compares such people to 'The dog that turns back to its vomit' (v. 22). MacArthur thinks that the false prophets and false teachers mentioned in this passage 'had never genuinely been converted to Christ', even though he charges them with apostasy (2010:1907). The question is, does MacArthur have another definition for 'apostate' apart from being 'A person who has defected' (Soukhanov 1988:47) or 'a person who renounces his or her former belief, principles, or party' (Hawkins, Weston and Swannell 1991:27), or people who 'had once been believers but had forsaken God's commandment' (Harper 1990:1888; cf. Dunham 1983:40-54)? Peter appears to warn the believing community against apostasy and encourage them to exhibit the life of virtue (Charles 2001:1-12).

Revelation 22:17—This passage shows that the evangelist climaxes this dramatic book with a call to his hearers to 'Come... [and] take the free gift of the water of life' (NIV). This call places the responsibility for taking hold of the gift that the evangelist mentions upon the head of the receiver. Thus, only those who know that they are

'thirsty' and wish to receive this 'water of life' should come for it. The act of coming to receive the 'water of life' is an active act of the will.

3.4.2 Jesus' Foreknowledge in the New Testament Not Directly Related to Judas Iscariot

A number of passages (Matt 24:1-31; Mark 8:31; John 1:47-51; 3:14; 18:4; Acts 1:24; Rev 2:10) reflect the foreknowledge of Jesus through his predictions of eschatological events; however, they do not directly relate to Judas Iscariot. Matthew 24:1-34 presents Jesus' foreknowledge in three ways (cf. Knox 1975:44-54; DeBruyn 2010:180-200; Graham 2015:170-175). Firstly, it presents Jesus foretelling his disciples about the sure destruction of the temple (vv.1, 2). Secondly, it presents Jesus naming and describing the inevitable signs of the end of the age (vv. 4-28). Thirdly, the passage presents Jesus naming the signs of his second coming (vv. 29-31).

Like Matthew, Mark 8:31 records that Jesus possessed foreknowledge during his earthly ministry among his disciples, so that he predicted his suffering, death and resurrection (cf. Proctor 2003:399-424; Larsen 2005:33-46). For instance, Mark records Jesus foretelling his forthcoming 'great suffering' and his rejection by the elders, the chief priests, and the scribes. Furthermore, Mark records Jesus foretelling the disciples that he will 'be killed, and after three days rise again'.

The Gospel of John cites instances where Jesus displays his foreknowledge as well (Keener 2003:485, 486). The first instance is in John 1:48, 51. In this passage, Nathaniel asked Jesus about where Jesus knew him from (v. 48). Jesus answered that he saw him 'under the fig tree before Philip called [him]' (v. 48). Afterwards, Jesus foretold Nathaniel that he 'will see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man' (v. 51). The second instance in which Jesus displays his foreknowledge is in John 3:14. This passage records Jesus foretelling his disciples about his imminent crucifixion. Finally, John 18:4 records that Jesus foreknew 'all that was to happen to him'. The reference here is to the moments just before the detachment of soldiers and the temple police arrested Jesus (v. 3).

Acts 1:24 contains the prayer of the disciples that Jesus should show them Judas' replacement that he foreknew and had chosen. Commentators, however, focus on Judas Iscariot's action, fate and divinely-guided replacement rather than on Jesus' foreknowledge (cf. Novick 2010:795-799; Whitlock 2015:87-106). Moreover, in Revelation 2:10 Jesus foretold the church in Smyrna that they were about to suffer—the devil was about to throw some of them into prison and they would be afflicted for ten days. In the face of their suffering and affliction, they were to nonetheless 'Be faithful until death' so that they might receive the 'the crown of life' from him. Revelation 2:10 suggests the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will. The passage reveals that Jesus foreknew that the Smyrna church would be persecuted for ten days; however, they must 'Be faithful, even to the point of death' (NIV). It is unlikely that a person would remain faithful without using his/her will. Muse (1986:147-161; cf. Thomas 1996:153-181) classifies the messages of this chapter and the third chapter as 'prophecies'.

3.5 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Yahweh had foreknowledge of people and nations and that he predestined and elected some of them to accomplish his plans and purposes. The chapter has shown also that individuals whom Yahweh elected to carry out specific tasks for him chose freely to object to and reject his specific commands. A third revelation that the chapter has made is that Yahweh overruled the willful objections and rejections of people he elected or predestined, in order that they should carry out their missions.

Another conclusion of the chapter is that Yahweh held Pharaoh liable for hardening his heart against him. Fifthly, the chapter examined the varieties of approaches to resolving the tensions between divine foreknowledge and human free will, according to literature of Second Temple Judaism. These approaches apparently reflected the different socio-historical and cultural contexts of the writers and communities the text represented. The conclusion was that they too evince compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

How might the disclosures in this chapter relate to the role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest and death of Jesus Christ? Firstly, they suggest the possibility that Jesus

could have foreknown about the role of Judas in his death. Secondly, they suggest that Jesus Christ might have chosen Judas to betray him. Lastly, they suggest that Judas was culpable for betraying Jesus in spite of the fact that Jesus had chosen him.

The next two chapters will examine key passages of the Synoptic Gospels, the Gospel of John, Acts, and Paul's Letter to the Romans on divine foreknowledge, human free will and Judas Iscariot from these suggested perspectives. Firstly, these chapters will show that Judas Iscariot was divinely foreknown. Secondly, they will show that Jesus chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his inner-circle disciples. Thirdly, they will show that the betrayal of Judas fulfilled the Scriptures. Lastly, the Synoptic Gospels will indicate that Jesus' foreknowledge of Judas' betrayal and his choosing of Judas did not annul Judas' choice to betray him (Matt 10:1-4; 26:14-16; Mark 3:16-19; 14:10, 11; Luke 6:14-16; 22:3-6). Chapter four of this study will examine the Synoptic Gospels, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans, while chapter five will examine the Gospel of John.

CHAPTER FOUR

EXAMINATION OF RELEVANT PASSAGES IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS, ACTS AND PAUL'S LETTER TO THE ROMANS ON JUDAS ISCARIOT

4.1 Introduction

Chapter three of this study achieved a twofold task. Firstly, the chapter showed that the Scriptures themselves give rise to debates between compatibilists and incompatibilists on the nature of interaction divine foreknowledge and human free will. Secondly, it showed specifically how these opposing traditions handled some of the key biblical passages on divine foreknowledge and human free will. The chapter concluded that Yahweh had foreknowledge of people and nations and that he predestined and elected some of them to accomplish his plans and purposes. The chapter concluded also that individuals whom Yahweh elected to carry out specific tasks for him chose freely to object to and reject his specific commands. Thirdly, the chapter concluded that Yahweh overruled the willful objections and rejections of people he elected or predestined, in order that they would carry out their missions.

Furthermore, the chapter concluded that that Yahweh held Pharaoh liable for hardening his heart against him. Finally, the chapter concluded that literature of Second Temple Judaism showed evidence that several traditions within Judaism held to the view of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will just as key biblical passages on the subject did. One important question which the chapter attempted to answer was how might its findings relate to the role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest and death of Jesus Christ? It offered three possible answers. Firstly, it suggested that Jesus could have foreknown about the role of Judas in his death. Secondly, it postulated that Jesus Christ might have chosen Judas to betray him. Lastly, it suggested that Judas was culpable for betraying Jesus in spite of the fact that Jesus had chosen him.

The present chapter will therefore analyze relevant passages of Matthew, Mark, Luke, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans on Judas Iscariot in order to explore how they reflect or do not reflect these suggested perspectives. The chapter will seek to establish whether these passages exhibit variations in how they characterize Judas

Iscariot in the light of the confluence between divine foreknowledge and human free will, and if so what may account for any differences identified. To put this another way, the goal of this analysis is to help test whether the ways in which these passages implicitly and explicitly portray Judas' betrayal of Christ might help explain the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Thus, they will help in determining how the use of παραδίδωμι to describe Judas' role in Christ's death—both active (e.g. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Acts 1:15-25) and passive (e.g. Luke 22:3, 4)—reflect their general theological understanding of Judas' character and choice within the context of God's foreknowledge.

An examination of the Synoptic Gospels, show that they narrate the life and ministry of Jesus Christ from a common perspective. However, they do have some differences in their records and insights. Concerning Judas Iscariot, they depict his character somehow differently too. These differences may have been due to the socio-historical contexts of their audiences. For example, the manner in which the author of Matthew writes about Jesus indicates that he wrote mostly to a Jewish audience. For instance, he presents Jesus to his audience as their long-awaited Messiah and King, whom the Jewish (Old Testament) Scripture promised.

Firstly, Matthew suggests this in his genealogical record of Jesus, which shows that Jesus descended from King David, Israel's greatest king (1:1-17). Jesus himself affirms that he is 'King of the Jews' (27:11). Secondly, Matthew suggests this by repeatedly referring to Jesus as 'the Son of David' (1:1; 9:27; 12:23; 15:22; 20:30; 21:9, 15; 22:42, 45).³ Thirdly, Matthew quotes several Old Testament passages to portray Jesus' life and ministry as the fulfillment of the Jewish Old Testament prophecies/promises (Keener: [1988-2007]; MacArthur 2010:1342, 1355, 1356; Harper 1990:1408). The following table will highlight this claim.

Table 4:1: Jesus Fulfilled OT Prophecies/Promises

OT Prophecies/Promises	Jesus as Fulfillment of OT Prophecies/Promises in Matthew
Isaiah 7:14, speaks of 'The virgin' being	1:22, 23, mentions that the virgin's

³ Mark (10:47) and Luke (18:38, 39) do refer to Jesus as the 'Son of David', but not as constantly as Matthew does.

with child, bearing a son and naming him 'Immanuel' (NIV).	conception of a child, bearing a son and naming him 'Immanuel' fulfilled prophecy.
Hosea 11:1b refers to Yahweh calling his Son out of Egypt.	2:13-15, mentions that Joseph's taking of the child Jesus into Egypt fulfilled prophecy.
Isaiah 9:1, 2, speaks of the inhabitants of Naphtali and Zebulun who were walking in darkness seeing 'a great light'.	4:13-16 records that Jesus fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah when he lived 'in Capernaum by the sea, in the territory of Zebulun and Naphtali'.
Isaiah 53:4 speaks of Yahweh's 'Suffering Servant' (cf. 52:13-53:3) bearing the infirmities of God's people and carrying their diseases.	8:16, 17, describes Jesus' healing of the demon-possessed and the sick as a fulfillment of Isaiah's prophecy.
Isaiah 42:1-4, refers to Yahweh's declaration of delight for his chosen servant.	12:17-21, affirms that Jesus was the person whom God delighted in.
Zachariah 9:9, prophesies about the King of Zion 'riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a donkey' to enter into Jerusalem.	21:1-5, records that as Jesus approached Jerusalem, he instructed two of his disciples to go into a certain village to bring to him a 'donkey tied, and a colt with her'.
Zechariah 11:12, 13 (cf. Jer 19:1-13) is the record of the prophet asking for 'thirty shekels of silver' as his wages, and, at the command of Yahweh, he throw silver 'into the treasury of the house of the LORD'.	27:5-9, is about Judas Iscariot throwing 'the thirty pieces of silver' that he had received for betraying Jesus into the temple'. Matthew's attribution of this prophecy to Jeremiah does not appear to have any tangible passage from Jeremiah. The two possible passages of Jeremiah (19:1-13; 32:6-9) that he may have alluded to do not represent this prophecy as Zachariah (11:12, 13) does.

Unlike Matthew whose primary audience appears to be Jewish believers, the Gospel of Mark indicates its primary recipients were most likely Gentiles—Roman believers (Harper 1990:1408; MacArthur 2010:1417). For example, the author translates for his readers Aramaic terms that he uses, which he might not have translated had he written to a Jewish audience. For instance, he translates ‘*Boanerges*’ (Mark 3:17), ‘*Talitha Koum*’ (5:41 NIV), ‘*Corban*’ (7:11), ‘*Ephphatha*’ (7:34), ‘*Bartimaeus*’ (10:46), ‘*Abba*’ (14:36), ‘*Golgotha*’ (15:22) and ‘*Eloi, Eloi, lema sabachthani*’ (15:34). Matthew uses and translates such terms as ‘*Golgotha*’ (Matt 27:33) and ‘*Eloi, Eloi, lema sabachthani*’ (27:46). Notwithstanding, Mark seems more compelled to translate the Aramaic terms for his readers than Matthew does.

Mark’s repeated use of Latin expressions—‘legion’ (5:9), ‘executioner’ (6:27) and ‘centurion’⁴ (15:39)—rather than their Hebrew equivalents suggests that he wrote to a Gentile audience. Mark presents Jesus as God’s suffering servant who came to serve rather than to be served (10:45), as compared to Israel’s Messiah and King, as Matthew indicates. Like Mark, the author of the Gospel of Luke wrote to a Gentile—Greek-speaking—audience (Luke 1:1-4; cf. 2014:185). Luke consistently depicts Jesus as the ‘Son of Man’ (5:25; 6:5, 22; 7:34; 9:22, 26, 44, 56, 58; 11:30; 12:8, 10, 40; 17:22, 24, 26, 30; 18:8, 31; 21:27, 36; 22:22, 48, 69; 24:7) who came ‘to seek and to save the lost’ (9:56; 19:10)⁵. Unlike Mark, Luke neither uses nor translates any of the Aramaic terms, which Mark uses.

Luke discloses his purpose for writing this gospel to Theophilus which is, ‘so that you may know the truth concerning the things about which you have been instructed’ (Luke 1:4). In light of Luke’s statement, Thompson (2010:326, 327) describes the purpose of this gospel as an ‘apologetic literature or...apologetic historiography’. As ‘an apologetic historiography’, Luke provides ‘justification, explanation, and defense for various aspects of the Christian movement...within the broader context of the Roman empire’ (ibid.). Esler (1987) on the other hand, argues that Luke wrote his gospels in order to reassure Roman officials who were within the Christian church that putting their faith in the Christ who had been crucified, was compatible with their allegiance to Rome. Furthermore, Jervell (1996) argues that Luke may have written

⁴ Matthew (27:54) and Luke (23:47) use the term ‘centurion’, but not the other terms.

⁵ John also portrays Jesus as ‘Son of Man’, but he does so some 12 times fewer than Luke.

his gospel and Acts in order that he might quiet the tension between Jewish and Gentile Christians.

Regarding the purpose of Matthew's gospel, Duling (2010:309) states, it is 'impossible to discern what the original author of Matthew intended'. However, Grene (2016:90-94) thinks the author of Matthew may have intended, through his account of Judas Iscariot especially, to warn the believers against the dangers of greed, pretentiousness and apostasy. As for the Gospel of Mark, the author may have written in order to exhort his audience to keep believing in Jesus' authenticity and authority and thus remain loyal to him, in spite of their imminent suffering (Schröter 2010:282, 283).

Regarding Judas Iscariot, the Synoptic Gospels agree that Jesus chose him as one of his twelve disciples (Matt 10:2-4; Mark 3:16-19; Luke 6:13-16). All three put Judas as the last on the list (Matt 10:4; Mark 3:19; Luke 6:16). Matthew (10:4) and Mark (3:19) use παραδίδωμι to describe Judas' role in Jesus arrest and death. Scholars disagree on the meaning of παραδίδωμι. For example, some of them (e.g. BDAG (2000:761, 762; Carlson 2010:472-474; Klassen 1996:47, 49) argue that the terms mean 'hand over', 'give up', 'delivered up', while others (e.g. Greenberg 2007:138-151; Robertson 2011:86, 87) argue that παραδίδωμι means 'betray' when it refers to Judas Iscariot. Luke (6:16) on the other hand, uses προδότης. It means, indisputably, 'traitor', 'betrayer' (BDAG 2000:867; cf. Thayer 1988-2007:n.p.; EDNT 1988-2007:n.p.). Concerning Judas Iscariot's character, Matthew and Luke portray him negatively. For instance, Matthew presents him as a greedy, determined, calculating betrayer of Jesus (26:15) and Luke describes him as a 'traitor' explicitly (Luke 6:16).

4.2 Characterization of Judas and the Genre of the Gospels

Generally, the term 'genre' means the literary type or literary category of the written documents. Grene (2016:38) defines the term as, 'a set of motifs and artistic style deemed appropriate to a certain subject matter or mode of expression'. These motifs may overlap, according to Grene, and the way in which authors use 'genre' may be based on the audience's anticipation (ibid.). The genre of the Gospels refers therefore to their literary type or category. This genre has been debated among

scholars for quite some time. The current debate has been whether the Gospels are 'biographies' or not. Schmidt (1981:66, 67) argues that the written Gospels did not 'conform to such ancient literary genres as biography or history'.

The basis for his argument is that none of the Gospels have preserved any real 'historical sequence of events in the life of Jesus' (ibid.). Nevertheless, they have features of ancient biography (Schröter 2010: 280). Aune (2010:5) states that scholars have had serious disputes over the genre of the gospels and have had difficulty to determine the genre of each gospel 'in the history of ancient literature'. He adds that the genre of the Gospel of Luke is still being debated (Aune 2010:7). Nonetheless, he points out that Luke wrote his gospel as 'apologetic historiography' to defend Christianity 'from its many detractors' (ibid. p. 8). The author's words to his primary recipient, Theophilus indicates this: 'Therefore, since I myself have carefully investigated everything from the beginning, it seemed good also to me to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the certainty of the things you have been taught' (Luke 1:3, 4 NIV).

Matthew and Mark do not make their purpose as easily visible as Luke does. Nevertheless, Matthew may have written to show that his 'Christian-Jewish' audience were faithful observers of the Jewish law (Trout 2016:1-6). Scholars have therefore determined their supposed purpose through their internal context. Like Luke, the author of John gives a clear indication of the purpose of his gospel: 'Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book. But these are written so that you may come to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through believing you may have life in his name' (John 20:30, 31; cf. Keener 2003:1215, 1216). The Gospel of John especially, will be important in studying Judas Iscariot's apparent unbelief in Jesus.

Generally, a 'biography' is a life history of an individual written chronologically. It includes events, influences and achievements about an individual's life. However, the Gospels are thematic rather than chronological. In other words, they focus on specific themes rather than on chronological accounts. Some commentators (e.g. Blomberg 1997:115, 116; MacArthur 2010:1341; Keener 2003:4, 11) argue that the authors of the Gospels arranged their documents according to their corresponding literary forms, rather than arranged them chronologically. Nonetheless, they are

'biographies in the ancient sense of the term', rather than in the modern sense of the word. The basis for their argument is that the Gospels do not present a complete life of Jesus (cf. John 20:30; 21:25).

Ancient biographies told stories about the significant deeds of the gods, the goddesses, the heroes and the heroines (Duling 2010:300). As for the gospels, their primary concern is about Jesus and his training of his disciples, who would continue with his mission. Other scholars (e.g. BurrIDGE 1992:109-127; Talbert 1993:714, 715; Grene 2016:40; Wansbrough 2015:40) classify the gospels as biographies in the truest sense of the word. The gospels and most Graeco-Roman biographies share a broad amount of characteristics (Grene 2016:40, 45). Greco-Roman biography focused on the characters and achievements of outstanding individuals who made significantly lasting contributions from their birth to their death (Aune 1988b: 107). Duling (2010:301) states that many scholars agree that, 'Matthew is a subgenre of the ancient Greco-Roman biography (cf. Aune 1988a, 1988b; BurrIDGE 2004:218-219; Neyrey 1998:91; Schuler 1982). Bultmann, on the other hand, objects to the Gospels' categorization as biographies (Keener 2003:11; cf. Stanton 1992:63; 1995:137; Grene 2016:39, 40). Keener (2003:140) states that the Gospels' contents indicate that they were 'foundation documents for [their] religious communities', as well as that they most probably addressed conflicts with their religious communities (cf. Talbert 1992: 63; BurrIDGE 1998:143).

Granted that the Gospels are biographies, they do not describe every event and every occurrence about an individual's life chronologically as do modern biographies. Thus, the Gospels' accounts of Jesus, Matthew and Luke give brief narrations about his genealogy, conception, birth and childhood (Matt 1-2; Luke 1-2). They remained silent until the start of Jesus' ministry, beginning with his baptism by John the Baptist (Matt 3; Luke 3). Mark starts with Jesus' baptism by John the Baptist (Mark 1). Concerning Judas Iscariot, they begin to mention his name at Jesus' calling and commissioning of his twelve disciples (Matt 10:1-4; Mark 3:16-19; Luke 6:14-16). Interestingly, the three gospels describe him as the one 'who betrayed' Jesus (Matt 10:4; Mark 3:19; John 6:71) and the one 'who became a traitor' (Luke 6:16), 'a devil' (John 6:70), 'a thief' (John 12:4-6) and 'the son of perdition' (John 17:12 KJV)

respectively. Even though these evangelists wrote to different audiences, they described Judas Iscariot's character negatively.

Two key implications for the purposes of the present project emerge when considering the characterization of Judas Iscariot in the light of the genre of the Gospels as biography of Jesus. Firstly, as they are a biography of Jesus, Judas Iscariot served as a secondary character, and hence his characterization can only be analyzed in relation to how Jesus is characterized. Judas Iscariot's actions and words, and the evangelists' commentaries will have to be interpreted within the larger scheme of the Christology of the particular evangelist. Secondly, as the biographies were meant to be pastoral documents for the building up of Christian readers, the characterization of the other characters such as Judas Iscariot were analyzed from the point of view of the author's pastoral purposes.

In other words, how exactly Judas Iscariot is characterized will have important indications of the particular social and pastoral concerns deemed appropriate by the authors. It is even possible that how Judas Iscariot was characterized by the evangelists was influenced by apologetic purposes as a means of explaining how it came to be that despite Jesus' claims to foreknowledge, one of his disciples nevertheless betrayed him. Thus, these implications of the manner in which the genre of the Gospels influences our understanding of the characterization of Judas Iscariot will inform the following analyses of the text.

4.3 Examination of Relevant Passages of Matthew (10:1-8; 26:14-16, 20-25, 47-50; 27:3-10)

4.3.1 The Socio-Pastoral Context of the First Audiences of Matthew's Gospel

It was stated above that the manner in which the author of Matthew writes about Jesus indicates that he wrote primarily to a Christian-Jewish audience. This audience may have been members of the Christian community—people over whom he had pastoral responsibilities. He may have intended, through his account of Judas Iscariot especially, to encourage his believing audience to remain faithful observers of the law, as well as warn them against the dangers of greed, pretentiousness and apostasy (cf. Grene 2016:90-94; Trout 2016:1-6).

The Matthean community consisted of people who believed in Jesus as Messiah and the Pharisees who opposed them, especially (Duling 2010:297; cf. Last 2012:173-198). The opposition of the Pharisees created repeated tension between them and Jesus (e.g. Matt 12:1-14, 22-37; 15:1-14; 23:13-39). Additionally, the various social groups encountered tensions among them. For example, there was tension between the few politically powerful and rich people and the more poor and marginalized people, and between the religious and irreligious. There were also political tensions between Matthean community members and Rome (Duling 2010:297). For instance, because Rome still exerted political control over Israel during the time of Matthew, the Matthean Community was required to pay taxes to Caesar (cf. Matt 22:17-21). Members of the Community who refused to pay their taxes faced the probability of arrest by the Herodians (Keener 1988-2007:n.p.).

4.3.2 Jesus' Foreknowledge in Matthew's Gospel

Matthew records certain statements and or predictions by Jesus, which suggest Jesus' foreknowledge of future events. For example, Jesus' statement, 'The days will come when the bridegroom is taken away from them, and they will fast' (9:15), implies his foreknowledge. Also, Matthew's portrayal of Jesus' foreknowledge is implied in Jesus' prediction to his disciples that people will hand them 'over to councils', who will flog them 'in their synagogues (10:17) and drag them before rulers because of him (10:18). Another example is Jesus' prediction that the Holy Spirit would give his disciples the exact words to speak during their arrest (10:19, 20). Moreover, Matthew shows that Jesus predicted that family members would betray one another, 'and the children will rise against parents and have them put to death' (10:21), as well as that everyone would hate the disciples because of his name (10:22).

Other passages in which Matthew suggests that Jesus possessed foreknowledge are 16:21, 20:17-19, 21:1-3, 24:4-31 and 26:24, 25, 31, 34. In 16:21, Jesus predicted his suffering, death and resurrection on the third day. In 21:1-3, Jesus sent his disciples into a village to go and untie a donkey that was tied there. Matthew's account of Jesus' revelations of the signs of his second coming and of the end of the age (24:4-31) and his betrayal by Judas Iscariot indicate foreknowledge (26:24, 25). Additionally, Jesus foretold his disciples that all of them would desert him and Peter

would deny him at nightfall on the day he spoke to them (26:31, 34). Furthermore, Matthew shows that Jesus foretold his betrayal moments before his betrayal (26:45, 46).

Apart from Matthew's portrayal of Jesus' foreknowledge in his gospel, he also portrays Judas Iscariot in a manner that gives Judas a prominent role in the arrest and death of Jesus. First, Matthew addresses Judas as 'Judas' and 'Judas Iscariot' respectively. In addition, he consistently qualifies 'Judas' and 'Judas Iscariot' with the παραδοὺς terminology. For example, he qualifies 'Judas Iscariot' with παραδοὺς and παραδῶ (10:4; 26:14, 16), and 'Judas' with παραδίδους (26:25; 27:3). Matthew records too that Judas qualifies himself with the παραδίδωμι terminology when he admitted that he had sinned 'by betraying an innocent blood' (λέγων, Ἡμαρτον παραδοὺς αἷμα ἀθῶον, 27:4). It appears that by using παραδίδωμι in the context of his remorse, Judas portrays his act negatively. Matthew therefore may have recorded Judas' use of παραδίδωμι of his action so that he (Matthew) might guide his readers into understanding that he negatively used παραδίδωμι.

Some scholars have argued that Matthew used the epithet 'Iscariot' in order to feature Judas' character and the influential role it played in betraying Jesus. For example, Schulthess (Taylor 2010:369) thinks the epithet 'Iscariot' derived from the Latin *sicarius*, which means 'robber' or 'assassin'. Hengstenberg (Taylor 2010:369; Metzger 1975:26, 27), on the other hand, proposes that it derived from the Aramaic and Hebrew root that means 'the liar', 'the false one', 'man of lies', 'bandit', 'assassin', or 'traitor'. Morin (Taylor 2010:369, 370) points out that, based on the LXX translation of Isaiah 19:4a (καὶ παραδώσω τὴν Αἴγυπτον εἰς χεῖρας ἀνθρώπων κυρίων σκληρῶν: 'and I will give over the Egyptians into the hand of a hard master') 'Iscariot' comes from two Aramaic roots, which together mean, 'to deliver' (Taylor 2010:369, 370).

It is possible that Matthew understood these negative characterizations connoted by the epithet 'Iscariot' and so used it to define Judas' character (cf. Taylor 2010:375, 376). It is also likely that Matthew used the epithet to distinguish Judas Iscariot from two other Judases—Judas son of James, also called Thaddaeus (Matt 10:3; Acts 1:13) in the apostolic band, and Judas the brother of Jesus (Matt 13:55). Another possible option concerning Matthew's use of the epithet is its use to refer to Judas'

place of birth. Taylor (2010:369, 371-374) prefers this option to the epithet drawing attention to the character of Judas ((Taylor 2010:371-374, 381).

Taylor suggests that 'Iscariot' was derived from the Hebrew *ishQarioth*, and means 'a man from Qarioth' (Taylor 2010:369) or 'a man from Kerioth' (Metzger 1975:26). His point of view makes sense, if Matthew's use of παραδίωμι with 'Judas' (ὁ καὶ παραδοῦς αὐτόν, Matt 10:4) was intended to distinguish him sufficiently from the other Judases during the time of Matthew, apart from using the epithet 'Iscariot'. For example, there were Judas son of James (Luke 6:16; Acts 1:13), Judas—called 'Barsabbas' (Acts 15:22; 27:32), Judas the Galilean (Acts 5:37), Judas, the brother of Jesus Christ (Matt 13:55; Mark 6:3) and Judas, the disciple who asked Jesus about intending to show himself to them rather than to the world (John 14:22).

Matthew mentions the name of 'Judas' during five significant occasions in his gospel account. Firstly, he mentions 'Judas' during the time Jesus summoned and commissioned his 'twelve disciples' (10:1-4). Secondly, he mentions 'Judas' when Judas went to arrange with the chief priests about betraying Jesus to them (26:14-16). Thirdly, he mentions 'Judas' during the Passover meal with Jesus and 'the twelve' (26:20-25). Fourthly, he mentions 'Judas' during the arrest of Jesus in Gethsemane (26:47-50). Lastly, he mentions 'Judas' after the sentencing of Jesus (27:3-10). For the purposes of the present study, these five occasions in the life of Judas are important and will now be investigated.

4.3.3 The Call and Commissioning on Judas Iscariot as Apostle (Matthew 10:1-8)

The first identification of Judas in Matthew's gospel is set within the context of Jesus' call and commissioning of his twelve Apostles. Matthew records, 'Jesus summoned his twelve disciples and gave them authority over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to cure every disease and every sickness' (Matt 10:1). Matthew names them as, 'Simon, also known as Peter, and his brother Andrew; James son of Zebedee, and his brother John; Philip and Bartholomew; Thomas and Matthew the tax collector; James son of Alphaeus, and Thaddaeus; Simon the Cananaean, and Judas Iscariot, the one who betrayed him'(Matt 10:2-4).

Jesus sent them out and instructed them to 'Go...to the lost sheep of Israel. As you go, preach this message: The kingdom of heaven is near' (Matt 10:6-7 NIV).

Furthermore, Jesus instructed them to ‘Cure the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers [and] cast out demons’ (Matt 10:8). Scholars such as Adeyemo (2006:1331), Clarke (n.d.:33), Derickson (2003:87-103), Henry ([1988-2007], Le Roux (2011:1), MacArthur (2010:1355) for example, adduce textual and intertextual pieces of evidence to accept Matthean authorship of the Gospel of Matthew. For instance, they argue that the author of this gospel explicitly calls himself ‘Matthew the tax collector’ during his naming of the twelve apostles whom Jesus summoned. Additionally, he records that ‘Jesus...saw a man called Matthew sitting at the tax booth’ and spoke to him to follow him (Matt 9:9). Finally, Mark (Mark 2:14-17) and Luke (Luke 5:27-32) mention a certain ‘tax collector’ whom Jesus called while he (the tax collector) was sitting at ‘the tax booth’. It is highly likely that this ‘tax collector’ and ‘Levi’ is the same person who wrote the Gospel of Matthew.

Matthew uses the term ‘the twelve’ recurrently (26:14, 20, 47) to refer to the twelve disciples whom Jesus chose and sent out rather than ‘the twelve disciples’ (20:17) and ‘the twelve apostles’ (10:2; cf. Meier 1997:639-642). ‘The twelve’ were most likely a part of a larger group of disciples (cf. Mark 3:13-19; Luke 6:13). They were with Jesus at certain significant moments, and enjoyed certain privileges that the rest of the disciples didn’t have. For example, while they were traveling with Jesus to Jerusalem he foretold of his pending betrayal to the chief priests and the elders who would condemn him to death in Jerusalem (Matt 20:17). In addition, they were the ones who ate the Passover meal with Jesus (Matt 26:20-20).

A comparison of Matthew’s account with those of the other Synoptic Gospels, Acts and Paul’s Letter to the Romans indicates that they confirm Matthew’s claim about the actual existence of ‘the twelve’ and mention the activities of some of them. For instance, Acts (1:13) mentions the same apostles, including Judas, that Matthew lists (1:15-22). Acts also records that Peter, along with John, healed a man who was crippled from birth (3:1-10), and Peter led the Church with authority and power (2:14-41; 3:1-26; 5:1-11, 14-16; 9:36-43; 10:1-46; 11:1-18; 15:7-14). The apostle Paul mentions encountering and opposing this Peter for Peter’s hypocrisy (Gal 2:11-14). The account about the existence of the eleven apostles in Acts and the other disciples indicates that the earliest believers who had gathered around Jesus had a

special component sub-group (the 'twelve' and now the 'eleven') closer to him and who led the community of believers after his ascension.

Matthew's use of the term 'twelve' for the disciples whom Jesus chose and sent out has a historical and theological significance. Firstly, Matthew records that Jesus chose them, gave them authority (ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν) and sent them exclusively 'to the lost sheep of the house of Israel' to preach the good news about the imminence of the kingdom of heaven, heal their various sicknesses, raise their dead and exorcise their demons (10:6-8). The BADG (2000:352, 353) defines ἐξουσία as 'the right to control or command, authority, absolute power'.

Matthew attributes the other use of ἐξουσία (authority) in his gospel to a centurion (8:9). In this passage, the centurion told Jesus, 'I myself am a man under authority, with soldiers under me. I tell this one, 'Go,' and he goes; and that one, 'Come,' and he comes. I say to my servant, 'Do this,' and he does it' (8:9 NIV). The centurion's statement presents a couple of implications. Firstly, it implies that he understood the standard of authority that Jesus was exercising. That is, Jesus truly had the authority to heal his servant. Secondly, it implies that he had complete faith in Jesus' authority.

Prior to authorizing and sending 'the twelve disciples' out, Jesus himself had used this 'authority' to proclaim 'the good news of the kingdom', cured many diseases and sicknesses, exorcised demons (Matt 4:23, 24; 8:2-17, 28-34; 9:1-8, 27-31) and raised the dead (9:18-26). In view of Matthew's use of ἐξουσίαν, it is highly likely that the authority that Jesus gave to his disciples to do ministry was the same authority that he himself possessed and used. He gave this authority to Judas Iscariot and the other apostles to do the very works that he called them to do, both during his time with them (Matt 10:6-8; Mark 6:13; Luke 9:6) and after his ascension (cf. Acts 3:1-10; 4:7-16).

The way in which Matthew lists the names of 'the twelve apostles' is worth noting. He names 'Simon' (also called 'Peter') first and ends it with 'and Judas Iscariot, the one who betrayed him' (10:2, 4; cf. Mark 3:16-19; Luke 6:14-16; Acts 1:13). Matthew does not indicate explicitly why he starts the list with Peter and ends it with Judas Iscariot. This does not necessarily suggest that Jesus chose Peter as the first disciple, or that Jesus chose Judas as the last recruit. It is likely that Matthew wrote

these two names in the order he wrote them in keeping with a traditional list that existed within the Christian communities.

For example, he shows that Peter denied Jesus vehemently after the arrest of Jesus (Matt 26:69-75), while Judas betrayed Jesus (10:4; 26:14-16, 24, 25, 47; 27:1-5; cf. Acts 1:15-25; 2:14-41; 9:36-42; Meier 1997:643-647, 664-672; Robertson 2011:84-95). Robertson is of the view that Matthew names Judas as the last on the list in order to portray him negatively (Robertson 2001:135). I think it is also possible that Matthew may not have had any particular reason for giving the list as he does. Nonetheless, whatever Matthew's intention was in listing Peter first and Judas last, the fact is that the other gospels agree with him that Jesus summoned 'the twelve' (they also begin the list with Peter and end with Judas).

The middle voice (προσκαλεσάμενος, 'having called'), which Matthew uses of Jesus summoning 'the twelve apostles' (Matt 10:1) implies that Jesus intentionally and thoughtfully summoned the twelve apostles to himself. For, a speaker usually used it when he intended to meet with the person or group of persons whom he was calling, as it is in this passage (cf. BDAG 2000:881). The YLT thus rightly renders the passage as 'And having called to himself his twelve disciples'. James (5:14) uses the aorist middle imperative (προσκαλεσάσθω) in the same sense (that the sick within the church 'should call for the elders of the church'). Matthew records also that Jesus used προσκαλεσάμενος when he spoke to the crowd about what defiles people (Matt 15:10 cf. v. 11).

Jesus' statement in Matthew 19:28, ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς, Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ὑμεῖς οἱ ἀκολουθήσαντές μοι, ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ, ὅταν καθίσῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ θρόνου δόξης αὐτοῦ, καθήσεσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ δώδεκα θρόνους κρίνοντες τὰς δώδεκα φυλὰς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, presents a dilemma. The dilemma is that at the time that he will sit on his throne to judge Israel, Judas Iscariot will have apostatized (cf. Acts 1:15-26), except that he foreknew that there was a probability that Judas might not apostatize. Otherwise, Jesus may not have been referring to the twelve disciples who were with him.

McCumber (1975:149) argues that Jesus' reference to his twelve disciples co-judging with him is symbolic rather than literal. He thinks that it refers to all of the

faithful saints of Jesus who will reign with him instead of to the twelve disciples. He bases his argument on 1 Corinthians 6:2 and 2 Timothy 2:11, 12, where Paul speaks of the saints judging the world and reigning with Jesus respectively (ibid.). Koch (2005:211-220) and Meier (1997:657, 658) also argue that the choosing of 'the twelve' by Jesus favors an eschatological purpose primarily. In other words, the choosing of 'the twelve' symbolized Jesus' fulfillment of the eschatological promise of restoring and saving Israel (Meier 1997:648; Geysers 1978:1-19). Like McCumber and the others, Howes (2014:1-11) argues in favor of Jesus' statement in this passage being symbolic of the restoration of the twelve tribes of Israel. On the contrary, Adeyemo (2006:1151) argues in favor of the twelve disciples literally 'sitting on twelve thrones beside [Jesus]', as their compensation for what they had given up for God (cf. Matt 19:29).

The subject of 'the twelve tribes of Israel' was important in the plan of God. Jesus admits that he 'was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel' (Matt 15:24). They were lost because their shepherds had turned them away from the way of Yahweh (Jer 50:6; cf. Scholtz 2014:1-8). The 'twelve tribes of Israel' derived from the twelve sons of Jacob (Gen 49:28). This passage parallels the listing of the 'twelve' sons of Jacob whom Jacob blessed (Gen 49:1-27; cf. Exod 28:21; 39:14; Rev 21:12).

The descendants of these 'twelve' sons are known variously as 'Hebrews' (Exod 1:15; 9:7; 10:3; 21:2), 'Israelites' (Lev 23:42), 'children of Israel' (Deut 33:1; Josh 13:6), and 'Israel' (Josh 13:6). God chose the 'children of Israel' from amongst 'all the peoples of the earth to be his people, his treasured possession' (Deut 7:6; 10:15; 14:2). At the end-time, the gates of the New Jerusalem will descend from heaven and will bear the inscribed names of 'the twelve tribes of Israel' (Rev 21:12; cf. Ezek 48:30-38; cf. Geysers 1978:1-19; Howes 2014:1-11).

Adeyemo (2006:1130) and Peterson (2007:36, 37) argue that Jesus consciously named 'the twelve' so that they might replace the twelve tribes of Israel symbolically. I think that such a view that assumes that Jesus was attempting to replace ethnic Israel with a new ethnic reality is a flaw. Matthew might not have perceived Jesus' mission as such. What Jesus is stating is that he, along with 'the twelve', would

judge these twelve tribes and rule them during the end time (Matt19:28; cf. Koch 2005:222).

Concerning Jesus choosing 'twelve disciples', the question is why did he not choose five, ten, or even seventy, to send particularly to the house of Israel? Was it to extend his mission as Pennington (2010:6) suggests? Alternatively, was it for an eschatological purpose, as the statement of Jesus in Matthew 19:28 ('you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve of Israel') suggests? I think that if Jesus' statement is literally that 'the twelve disciples' will judge 'the twelve tribes of Israel', then Judas Iscariot will not be a part. Assuming that Jesus' statement is literal, then the inclusion of Judas amongst 'the twelve disciples' who would judge Israel is significant. It implies that there was a probability of him judging with the other disciples (Matt 19:28). I think also that Jesus' statement implies that he had given to Judas Iscariot and the other apostles all the rights and privileges pertaining to ruling and judging with him. If so, then Judas, along with his colleagues, had a place of high status. Their primary qualification was that they follow Jesus faithfully (Matt 19:28). However, Judas lost these privileges when he apostatized (Acts 1:15-18).

It appears more appropriate to assume then that had Judas Iscariot not betrayed Jesus and lost his place (Matt 26:24; Acts 1:20, 21; cf. Robertson 2011:182) he would have remained part of 'the twelve' and at the end of time reign with Jesus and judge the twelve tribes of Israel. It is reasonable then, to assume that Judas removed himself from the list of 'the twelve' through his role in the death of Jesus rather than that he was divinely foreordained to do so.

The examination of Matthew 10:1-8 has shown that Judas became one of the choice, intimate disciples and apostles of Jesus because Jesus chose him intentionally. Jesus gave him, along with the other apostles, the privileges and rights to accomplish specific assignments. In view of the foregoing, it is highly likely that God foreknew Judas as a person and the role that he would play to achieve his plan and purposes, particularly in the arrest and death of Jesus (Matt 10:4).

4.3.4 Judas Iscariot Arranges with the Chief Priests to Betray Jesus (Matthew 26:14-16)

This section of Matthew's gospel describes Judas Iscariot going to the chief priest and the elders to arrange his betrayal of Jesus to them. Prior to his visit, Jesus told his disciples that within two days—during the Passover—he would be betrayed and crucified (Matt 26:1, 2). In addition, about the same time, the chief priests and the elders met with Caiaphas, the high priest and planned to arrest Jesus secretly after the festival in order to kill him (vv. 3, 4). In fact, the chief priests and the Pharisees had earlier desired to arrest Jesus because they had perceived that he had spoken about them in parables (Matt 21:45, 46). Sometime afterwards, Judas Iscariot, supposedly being with Jesus at Bethany in the home of Simon the leper, witnessed a woman anointing Jesus with an expensive ointment (Matt 26:6-8; cf. John 12:3-6). He and the other disciples were angry because they judged the action of the woman as an unnecessary, wasteful use of the expensive ointment (Matt 26:9).

Matthew indicates that after this incident Judas Iscariot, 'one of the twelve', went to the chief priests (Τότε πορευθεὶς εἰς τῶν δώδεκα...πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς) to arrange to betray Jesus to them (26:14, 15). Matthew's introduction of Judas being 'one of the twelve, who...went to the chief priests' at this moment raises at least two vital questions: (1) why did Matthew make this introduction at this particular moment in his narrative (v. 14)? (2) How did Judas know about the secret plan by Caiaphas the high priest, the chief priests and the elders of the people to arrest and kill Jesus (v. 3)?

Concerning the first question, Matthew may have introduced Judas in this manner for two possible reasons. Firstly, he may have introduced Judas as he did in order to show that Judas' closeness to Jesus gave the religious leaders confidence in Judas' promise to them. Secondly, Matthew may have introduced Judas in the manner he did in order to express the negative character of Judas (cf. Robertson 2011:89). In other words, Judas would not have gone to those leaders to conspire against his master for silver had he been honorable and faithful to Jesus. Regarding the proximity of the two events, Cane (2002:32) points out: 'Judas may have shared in the indignation of those who objected to the waste of expensive ointment'. This is likely correct. He was one of those who had objected to the woman's act of devotion, and so this negatively reflected on his character.

By mentioning Judas going to the chief priests following the anointing incident, Matthew may be intending to show that the use of the ointment on Jesus provoked Judas into his action. In other words, Matthew may be narratively juxtaposing Judas' action with that of the woman by immediately placing Judas' trip to the chief priests after Jesus' rebuke in Matthew 26:10-14. The phrase, Τότε πορευθείς ('Then he went') of Matthew 26:14a suggests that Judas Iscariot's going to the chief priests was directly provoked by what the woman did.

It appears as if in naming Judas Iscariot along with the unnamed woman, Matthew was deliberately contrasting the woman's perceptive spirituality with Judas Iscariot's perceptiveness. Furthermore, the woman demonstrated devotion to Jesus while Judas did not. This contrast significantly appraises Judas' character in a negative fashion. Robertson (2011:89; cf. Turner 2008:621, 622) describes Judas going to the religious leaders as a shifting 'from the circle around Jesus to the camp of [Jesus'] opponents'. Secondly, Judas' going to the chief priests indicates that he did so freely and deliberately (Matt 26:15), even though his action fulfilled Scripture (Matt 26:24a; cf. Zech 11:12, 13).

Judas Iscariot's visit to the chief priests centers around four important clauses:

1. Τότε πορευθείς εἷς τῶν δώδεκα ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώτης, πρὸς ἀρχιερεῖς (Matt 26:14abc)
2. Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κἀγὼ ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν;(Matt 26:15a)
3. οἱ δὲ ἔστησαν αὐτῷ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια (Matt 26:15b)
4. καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐζήτει εὐκαιρίαν ἵνα αὐτὸν παραδῶ(Matt 26:16)

These clauses will now be explored.

4.3.4.1 Τότε πορευθείς εἷς τῶν δώδεκα ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώτης, πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς (Matt 26:14a-c)

In identifying the disciple who visited the chief priests regarding the fate of Jesus, Matthew says, Τότε πορευθείς εἷς τῶν δώδεκα ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώτης, πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς('Then one of the twelve, who was called Judas Iscariot, went to the

chief priests', Matt 26:14abc). Matthew's choice of words is significant and requires some explanation of his intentions. Firstly, by identifying 'Judas Iscariot' as the one who went to the chief priests, Matthew may have intended to underline that the act of betrayal was by one member of the group rather than by the whole group. Matthew may have, more specifically, intended to exempt Judas the brother of Jesus (Matt 13:55), or Judas son of James, who was also called Thaddaeus (Matt 10:3; Acts 1:13; cf. Meier 1997:650-653).

Secondly, by identifying Judas as 'one of the twelve', Matthew may have been stressing that Judas was one of the intimate (belonging to the inner-circle) disciples of Jesus who went to the chief priests (cf. Walvoord and Zuck 1983:n.p.; McCumber 1975:197; Koch 2005:218; Robertson 2011:226). Another option, which Robertson (2011:88) suggests is that Matthew repeatedly refers to Judas as 'one of the twelve' rhetorically in order to 'arouse utmost contempt for (Judas as) traitor', without surmising his status among the disciples.

While the suggestion of Robertson does make sense and might have been the intention of Matthew, it is arguable too that Matthew might have described the status of Judas to show the importance of Judas among the disciples of Jesus, which caused the chief priests to accept Judas' offer to them unquestioningly and be convinced. A reading of the four Gospels shows that all of them employ the phrase 'one of the twelve' (εἷς τῶν δώδεκα) on a total of six occasions to qualify Judas Iscariot (Matt 26:14, 47; Mark 14:10, 20, 43; Luke 22:47). Luke 22:3 omits the εἷς and has ὄντα ἐκ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῶν δώδεκα ('being of the number of the twelve', Darby, YLT).

The Gospel of John (20:24) uses the phrase (but with the inclusion of ἐκ) also. John uses it with reference to Thomas (εἷς ἐκτῶν δώδεκα). The phrase, Τότε πορευθεῖς that Matthews uses with Judas Iscariot infers that Judas was the one who took the initiative to go to the chief priests to betray Jesus to them, rather than their seeking him out or coercing him to betray Jesus (cf. Carlson 2010:474, 475; McCumber 1975:197; Robertson 2011:227). This is the probable reason why Matthew chose to use πορευθεῖς as aorist middle participle (cf. Zerwick and Grosvenor 1993:85). The action of Judas marred his character and portrayed him as heartless and deceitful—an enemy from within—especially before his colleagues (cf. Carlson 2010:472-478).

Davies and Allison (Turner 2008:621) describe Judas Iscariot's action as pathetic 'and enigmatically evil, and his motivation in betraying Jesus is inscrutable'. The passage portrays Judas Iscariot as going to the chief priests to betray Jesus to them of his own free will (Carlson 2010:474). The next clause will demonstrate Judas' determination to betray Jesus even further.

4.3.4.2 Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν; (Matthew 26:15a)

The question that Judas asked the chief priests (Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν; verse 15 ('What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto you?' YLT) presents a number of implications. Firstly, it implies that Judas had resolved to betray Jesus to the chief priests before going to see them (κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν). Marshall (2008:1) is of the view that Judas made a conscious, calculated decision to visit the chief priests. Secondly, it implies that Judas was eager to betray Jesus (κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν) to the chief priests. Thirdly, it implies that Judas actually wanted money and was therefore willing to accept an offer of any amount from the chief priests (Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι).

Fourthly, it implies that it was the chief priests, rather than Judas, who determined the price for Jesus (Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι). Another implication is that Judas was self-centered, greedy and treacherous, and was determined to achieve his plan (Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κάγω ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν; cf. Adeyemo 2006:1165; Carlson 2010:474; Robertson 2011:90). The use of παραδώσω by Judas is worth examining now, in order to determine the intention behind his action. If his intention was to only 'hand Jesus over' (as some English Bibles suggest), then his action would not necessarily connote that he had a blemished character. On the other hand, he would have a negative character if his intention were to 'betray' Jesus (as other English Bibles suggest).

This is significant, because the meaning of παραδίδωμι, when used with Judas Iscariot, is debatable, as stated earlier in previous chapters. It was shown that scholars have expressed divergent views on the intended usage of παραδίδωμι by Judas in this passage vis-à-vis the usage of the word by Jesus and the gospel writers. For example, Klassen, employs a lexicographical analysis of παραδίδωμι to argue that all of the citations of παραδίδωμι within the New Testament have the

neutral concept of ‘hand over’ rather than ‘betray’ or ‘treachery’, and that first-century literature, has no example of παραδίδωμι meaning ‘betray’, ‘disloyalty’, or ‘deceit’ (Klassen 1996:47-74; cf. Carlson 2010:472-474). Instead, he asserts that the words they used for ‘betray’ and ‘traitor’ were προδίδωμι, and προδότης respectively (Klassen 1966:47-58). The BDAG (2000:761, 762) also defines παραδίδωμι with reference to persons, as ‘hand over, turn over, give up’.

Robertson (2011:86, 87) on the other hand argues that it is appropriate to translate παραδίδωμι as ‘betray’ in the passages dealing with Judas on the ground that the term also means ‘To give up to, or place in the power of an enemy, by treachery or disloyalty’ (Robertson 2011:86, 87). Furthermore, he thinks that this definition is ‘evident in the case of Judas’ throughout the gospels. He bases his assertion on the usage of παραδίδωμι in the LXX, which, according to him, ‘frequently refers to handing someone over to an enemy’ (2011:87). Additionally, he points out that, like the usage of the term in the LXX, Judas conveyed ‘Jesus from the circle of those who participate in the kingdom of God, into the hands of those who opposed God’s kingdom’ (ibid. ; cf. Janzen 2008:26). Several New Testament passages support Klassen’s view. That is, they use παραδίδωμι with reference to Jesus and other individuals without the negative connotation of ‘betrayal’. The following table will highlight this support.

Table 4.2: Uses of Παραδίδωμι without the Nuance of ‘Betrayal’ in the New Testament

Passage	Individual
Matthew 4:12	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to the arrest and imprisonment of John the Baptist
Matthew 5:25	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to an accuser handing the person he has accused to the judge
Matthew 10:19	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to the apostles being handed over
Matthew 18:34	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to an angry master delivering up an indebted,

	pitiless servant over to tormentors
Luke 24:20	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to the chief priests and leaders handing Jesus over ‘to be condemned to death and crucified’
John 19:30	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to Jesus giving up his Spirit
Acts 15:26	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to men, including Paul and Barnabas, who gave up their lives for Jesus’ name
Romans 1:24	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to God giving people over ‘in the sinful desires of their hearts to sexual impurity’ (NIV)
Romans 1:26	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to God giving people ‘over to shameful lusts’ (NIV)
Romans 1:28	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to God giving people ‘over to a depraved mind, to do what ought not to be done’ (NIV)
Romans 8:32	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to God giving up his Son Jesus for sinful humanity
1 Corinthians 5:5	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to the Church at Corinth handing a man ‘over to Satan for the destruction of the flesh’
Galatians 2:20	Παραδίδωμι is used with reference to Jesus giving himself up for Paul

It may be noted that neither of the two prominent English Bibles (NIV, NRSV) cited in this table translates παραδίδωμι in these passages as ‘betray’. Notwithstanding, I think the context in which Matthew uses παραδίδωμι in 24:10 (καὶ τότε

σκανδαλισθήσονται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλους παραδώσουσιν καὶ μισήσουσιν ἀλλήλους ('Then many will fall away, and they will betray one another and hate one another') connotes a 'betrayal'. Almost all the English translations featured in this study (except for ASV, Darby, NASB⁶ and YLT) take this view and translate παραδίδωμι in this passage as 'betray'.

In view of the above, it might be logical to apply this meaning of παραδίδωμι to Judas when he handed his master over to his enemies who opposed the kingdom of God (cf. Robertson 2011:87). Furthermore, Judas Iscariot's request for money places a negative connotation (of betrayal) on his action. In that case, this statement indicates that Judas Iscariot understood his act of handing Jesus over to the chief priests negatively, and not as a neutral or even positive act. There is little indication that he was naïve or thought of his act as contributing, in any positive way, to Jesus' mission.

Judas Iscariot's use of *καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν* with *παραδώσω αὐτόν* is vital to understanding his resolve to betray Jesus. *Καὶ γὰρ* is a conjunction that means 'and I', 'I for my part' and 'I in turn' (BDAG 2000:487). It expresses inevitability, contract and covenant. This use of the term is reflected by Darby, KJV, ASV and YLT translations: 'What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto you?' I think that the phrase 'and I will' best translates *καὶ γὰρ* than the 'if I' used by other translations, including the NRSV.

Jesus uses *καὶ γὰρ* in this sense several times. For example, he uses it with reference to reciprocating the recognition that people will have given to him before men, before his heavenly Father (Matt 10:32). The passage reads, *ὁμολογήσω καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν [τοῖς] οὐρανοῖς* (I also will acknowledge before my Father in heaven). Jesus will likewise deny before his heavenly Father whoever would deny him before other people (Matt10:33). This passage says, *ἀρνήσομαι καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν [τοῖς] οὐρανοῖς* (I also will deny before my Father in heaven). Jesus uses *καὶ γὰρ* to speak of the certainty of his plan. This is likely the sense in which Judas Iscariot used it in *καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν*.

⁶ The NASB updated Edition (1988-2007) translates παραδίδωμι as 'betray'.

In view of Matthew's juxtaposition of Judas Iscariot's action with the woman's anointing, it is likely that Matthew judged Judas Iscariot's action as morally wrong, regardless of his intention. In fact, Judas Iscariot's voluntary visit to the chief priests to negotiate with them about the price for betraying Jesus and his use of *κἀγὼ* exposed his intention.

4.3.4.3 Οἱ δὲ ἔστησαν αὐτῷ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια (Matthew 26:15b)

Οἱ δὲ ἔστησαν αὐτῷ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια has been translated in two main ways by key English translations. Darby and KJV, for example, render ἔστησαν as 'covenant', 'appointment'. Thus, they translate the statement indicating that the chief priests covenanted (or made appointment) with Judas about the price only. The CEV, CJB, ESV, NASB, NCV, NKJV, NRSV, WENT, YLT on the other hand render ἔστησαν as 'payment counted out' (or 'weighed out'). They translate the statement therefore as indicating that the chief priests counted out the thirty pieces of silver and paid Judas after he made the promise.

Hendriksen (1973:930) supports this translation on two grounds. Firstly, he states, the chief priests did not want 'their golden opportunity to pass by unheeded'. Secondly, he states, Matthew may have intended to highlight the fulfillment of Zechariah 11:12 regarding the thirty pieces of silver. Hagner (1995:760, 761) thinks that Matthew's use of ἔστησαν suggests that the chief priests paid Judas immediately (cf. Turner 2008:621, 622).

The BDAG (2000:482) defines ἴσθημι (the lexical form of ἔστησαν) in this passage as 'to specify contractually' by determining 'a monetary amount'. Soukhanov et al. (1988:212, 225) define the verbs to 'contract' and 'covenant' as 'to enter into a formal agreement' by 'a solemn promise'. This second clause of Matthew 26:15 indicates this specific, contractual determination—thirty pieces of silver. The chief priests were responding to the request of Judas regarding what they were willing to give to him.

The differences of translation among English Bibles regarding the financial arrangement between Judas Iscariot and the chief priests, make it difficult to determine at this point, whether the chief priests only 'covenanted with him for thirty pieces of silver' (as KJV puts it), or whether they paid him the thirty pieces of silver (according to CEV, CJB, ESV, NASB, NCV, NKJV, NRSV, WENT and YLT).

Nevertheless, what is certain is that the chief priests agreed to pay Judas thirty pieces of silver in the presence of Judas (Matt 26:15b). By receiving the thirty pieces of silver, either Judas agreed with the evaluation of these priests or he missed the significance of their action (cf. Robertson 2011:227, 228).

It may be reasonably argued that Matthew's statement, 'οἰδὲ ἔστησαν αὐτῷ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια', is paraphrased directly from the LXX version of Zechariah 11:12b: ἔστησαν τὸν μισθόν μου τριάκοντα ἀργυροῦς ('they weighed out as my wages thirty pieces of silver', ESV). If this is correct, then it can be said that Matthew saw the weighing of thirty pieces of silver to Judas as a fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy. This is significant because the theme of the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies is extremely prominent in Matthew. Examples include:

- Mary's conception and birth of Jesus (Matt 1:22, 23) fulfills Isaiah 7:14.
- The Son of God dwelling in Egypt (Matt 2:14, 15) fulfills Hosea 11:1.
- Rachel weeping for her children in Ramah (Matt 2:17) fulfills Jeremiah 31:15.
- Jesus dwelling in Nazareth so that he is called a 'Nazarene' (Matt 2:23) fulfills some Old Testament prophecy (Matthew does not cite any particular Old Testament passage).
- Jesus dwelling in Zebulun (Matt 4:14) fulfills Isaiah 9:1, 2.
- Jesus (the Servant of God) bearing the illnesses of many (Matt 8:16, 17) fulfills Isaiah 53:4.
- Jesus (the Servant of God) being the hope of the nations (Matt 12:17-21) fulfills Isaiah 42:1-4.
- Jesus speaking to the crowd in parables (Matt 13:35) fulfills Psalm 78:2.
- Jesus (the King of Zion and Jerusalem) riding on a donkey (Matt 21:1-5) fulfills Zechariah 9:9.

The theme of the fulfillment of Scripture in Jesus underlines the suffusion of the gospel with the concept of divine foreknowledge. Matthew chapter 26 is no exception in this regard. It consistently underscores the theme of divine foreknowledge, providence and control of the events surrounding Jesus' arrest and execution. This chapter quotes Jesus three times as saying that the events in his life occurred to fulfill the Scriptures or the writings of the prophets: (1) His betrayal and manner of departure (v. 24) and (2) His arrest (vv.31, 54, 56; cf. Zech 13:7).

In view of the flow of chapter 26, Matthew's account of the role of Judas Iscariot does present an apparent dichotomy.

On the one hand, he presents Judas as one who went to the ruling priests of his own volition and demanded a wage in exchange for betraying Jesus to them (Matt 26:14, 15). On the other hand, Matthew suggests that Judas' reception of the 'thirty pieces of silver' was divinely foreknown, according to the prophecy of Zechariah (26:15; cf. Zech 11:12b). This apparent dichotomy suggests strongly that Matthew, and likely his readers, did not view the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will in problematic terms.

While the fulfillment of the Scriptures by human actions implies the fulfillment of the purposes of God, the foreknowledge of God does not necessarily cause humans to act, as Baugh argues (McCall and Stanglin 2005:19-30). Molina (In Bryant 1992:95) argues, 'Foreknowledge is not a cause of that which is going to be, but rather that which is going to be is a cause of foreknowledge'. In other words, divine foreknowledge guarantees the certainty of that which is going to occur, so that what is going to occur cannot occur without divine foreknowledge. Furthermore, that which is going to occur does not cause divine foreknowledge to come into being.

Matthew chapter 26 does not indicate that divine foreknowledge annuls the ability of humans to act freely and be morally responsible for their actions (cf. Picirilli 2000:259-271). Turner (2008:621) argues that Matthew 26:15 alludes to Zechariah 11:12, 13 subtly and links Judas Iscariot's betrayal to biblical prophecy. This connection suggests that God is in control of Judas' betrayal of Jesus (Matt 26:18, 31, 54, 56). Thus, God's sovereign control and Judas' betrayal 'are ultimately complementary' (Turner 2008:621; cf. Acts 2:23; 4:27, 28).

Matthew does indicate that Judas Iscariot's action fulfilled scripture. He also indicates the deliberateness of Judas Iscariot in carrying out his act. Finally, Matthew suggests that human free will is somehow compatible with divine foreknowledge (Turner 2008:621, 625). In this case, it would appear that Matthew's view is consistent with the sub-category of texts in the Second Temple Jewish period labeled by Barclay (2006:1-9) as 'non-contrastive transcendence'. By 'non-contrastive transcendence', Barclay (2006:7) means God's foreknowledge and human free will operate together concurrently without one diminishing the other. In

other words, this view sees both divine foreknowledge and human free will co-existing side by side, without conflict or competition (Barclay 2006:1-9). The consistency of this view will need, however, to be tested with other passages in the gospel.

4.3.4.4. καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐζήτει εὐκαιρίαν ἵνα αὐτὸν παραδῶ (Matthew 26:16)

Matthew's use of καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐζήτει εὐκαιρίαν ἵνα αὐτὸν παραδῶ ('And from that moment he began to look for an opportunity to betray him') highlights the willpower and determination of Judas to betray Jesus to the chief priests. Judas repeatedly sought for a 'favorable opportunity (and) the right moment' (ἐζήτει εὐκαιρίαν) to accomplish his plan (cf. BDAG 2000:407; Zerwick and Grosvenor 1993:85, 86). By this disclosure, Matthew might have intended to portray Judas as acting freely and consciously. In addition, Matthew might have intended to portray Judas' character disapprovingly. Another disclosure of Matthew, which portrays the character of Judas disapprovingly, is the conversation between Jesus and Judas during the Passover meal (Matt 26:25). That conversation will now be examined.

4.3.4.5. Μήτι ἐγώ εἰμι, ῥαββί; (Matthew 26:25)

The proximity of the covenant that Judas made with the chief priests to the Passover meal is worth noting. Matthew shows that it was after that covenant that Jesus 'took his place with the twelve; and while they were eating', he announced that one of them would betray him (Matt 26:20, 21). Interestingly, each of them, including Judas, protested being the betrayer (Matt 26:21, 25). Their question to Jesus, 'Μήτι ἐγώ εἰμι;' ('I am not the one, am I?' v. 22) appears rhetorical.

They might have intended to elicit a negative response from Jesus (cf. Blomberg 1992:389). Thus, the translation by NLT ('I'm not the one, am I?'), reflects this well. Jesus' response to the other disciples vindicated them, while it indicted the one who 'dipped his hand in the bowl' with Jesus (Matt 26:23). Jesus' answer to Judas, 'You have said so' (26:25) implies he had foreknowledge of Judas' action. While Jesus' response to Judas may not have exposed him as a betrayer to the other disciples, Matthew's audience may have understood it so (Greene 2016:198).

The use of the rhetorical question by Judas Iscariot, especially, implies deceit at the highest level, knowing that he had already gone to the chief priests and made a

covenant with them about betraying Jesus to them (Matt 26:14-16; cf. Carlson 2010:475). The question now is why did he protest his innocence? He may have been merely pretending to be innocent, or else he was assuming that Jesus was unaware about his covenant with the chief priests. If the latter, then he may have forgotten that Jesus foreknew about this betrayal; Jesus had predicted it earlier to him and his colleagues (Matt 20:17, 18; 26:2, 21).

Judas Iscariot's addressing Jesus as ῥαββί ('teacher') in his question (Matt 26:25) in contrast to κύριε ('Lord') that his colleagues used (Matt 26:22), deserves attention. Matthew may have cited this contrast intentionally in order to unfavorably portray Judas' disloyal attitude toward Jesus (cf. Robertson 2011:91). Firstly, Judas used this address after he had already gone to the chief priests and had covenanted with them to betray Jesus (26:14-16). Secondly, he made this address after he had dipped his hand with Jesus in the bowl; his hand may have been in the bowl when he spoke up (26:23; cf. Aarflot 2012:27). Thirdly, Judas called Jesus 'Rabbi' after Jesus pronounced 'woe' upon the man who was betraying 'the Son of Man' (26:24). The question now is why did Judas address Jesus as 'Rabbi' after he had covenanted with the chief priests to betray Jesus.

Hendriksen (1973:906) sees Judas' use of the term in his question as 'a question of loathsome hypocrisy'. Robertson (2011:92) thinks that Judas' use of the term 'reinforces [his] affiliation with the chief priests rather than the disciples'. Wilkins (2004:836) thinks that the use of ῥαββί to address Jesus rather than κύριε suggests that Judas did not truly believe in Jesus as his Lord. The term ῥαββί was 'an honorary title for outstanding teachers of the law' (BDAG 2000:902). On the surface, it seems Judas uses it of Jesus in order to honor him.

Nonetheless, because he has already covenanted with Jesus' antagonists to betray Jesus to them (Matt 26:14-16), it is unlikely that he is honoring Jesus by it. It appears then that he uses the term in pretense just as he does with his question ('Μήτι ἐγώ εἰμι'). Matthew may have recorded this address in order to highlight both the negativity of Judas Iscariot's character and the intentionality of his act. Hence, Jesus responded to his question ('Μήτι ἐγώ εἰμι') candidly and indefatigably with 'Σὺ εἶπας' (26:25, 'You have said so'). Jesus' response indicates that he foreknew Judas Iscariot's action and held him accountable for that action. Jesus' response is in spite

of those scholars who argue that Judas Iscariot did not have a bad intention in handing Jesus over to the chief priests (e.g. Klassen 1996; Carlson 2010). Their argument implies that they vindicate Judas Iscariot from the guilt of intentional betrayer (cf. Klassen 1996:47, 49; Carlson 2010:472-474; Derrett 1980:3-4).

Judas Iscariot's own reaction after he realized that Jesus had been condemned (Matthew 27:3, 4) does invalidate his protestation of innocence. The passage reads, Τότε ἰδὼν Ἰούδας ὁ παραδίδους αὐτὸν ὅτι κατεκρίθη μεταμεληθεὶς ἔστρεψεν τὰ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσιν καὶ τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσιν καὶ πρεσβυτέροις λέγων, Ἠμαρτον παραδοῦς αἷμα ἀθῶον ('When Judas, his betrayer, saw that Jesus was condemned, he repented and brought back the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests and the elders. He said, 'I have sinned by betraying innocent blood'). These words of Judas suggest that he exercised his free will and accepted responsibility for his action.

The protest of Judas may therefore be compared to contemporary individuals who plead 'not guilty' in a court of competent jurisdiction, but who are proven guilty at the end of their trials. In view of this conversation, Matthew may have used παραδίδωμι with reference to Judas to mean 'betray' rather than 'deliver up'. Judas uses ῥαββί a second time to address Jesus. This time it immediately precedes his kiss of betrayal (Matt 26:49). This act also substantiates Judas' pretense rather than it being an act of honor, as well as showing his culpability. Matthew alludes earlier to the theme of culpability of Judas when he records Jesus pronouncing 'woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed' (26:24).

This verse is important because it places divine foreknowledge ('the Son of Man goes as it is written of him') in direct juxtaposition with human free will and accountability ('woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed'). Jesus' revelation in this passage offers one key implication—compatibility between divine foreknowledge ('the Son of Man goes as it is written of him') and human free will ('woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed'). Jesus' statement offered Judas an opportunity to rescind his intentions. However, Judas Iscariot failed to take up this opportunity and thus proved that he was culpable for his betrayal. This passage, as in the rest of Matthew 26, again underlines that God's sovereignty remained supreme in the death of Jesus in spite of Judas' willing participation.

On the surface, it does not appear that Judas Iscariot exercised his free will in his action, because his action was a necessary, unavoidable part of God's predetermined plan (cf. Turner 2008:625). However, it is also evident from the above that acting in order to fulfill the plan of God did not nullify the freedom and responsibility and culpability of Judas (Cane 2002:35-37). Jesus' pronouncement of 'woe' substantiates this. Jesus pronounces seven 'woes' upon the teachers of the law and Pharisees for their hypocrisy (Matt 23:13, 15, 16, 23, 25, 27, 29). As a matter of fact, they had already condemned themselves to hell (γέεννης) by their act (Matt 23:33).

Hendriksen (1973:907, 908) supports this argument and states that neither predestination nor prophecy cancels human responsibility. Therefore, Jesus' pronouncement of 'Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed', charges the betrayer with guilt. Additionally, Hendriksen thinks that the second part of the pronouncement, 'It would have been better for that one not to have been born' could be changed only 'if Judas, who remains fully responsible, still repents' (1973:108). In Blomberg's view (1992:389), the sovereign plan of God regarding the death of Jesus would have been fulfilled still, without the participation of Judas. Nonetheless, whoever else would have betrayed Jesus would have been damned as well. It appears therefore that there is accumulating evidence that in the particular case of Judas, Matthew regarded divine foreknowledge and human free will as being compatible.

4.3.4.6 Summary: Judas' Free will in Matthew 26:14-16, 24, 25 in the light of Jesus' Foreknowledge in Matthew's Gospel

The examination of Matthew 26:14-16, 24, 25 has made a couple of significant discoveries (implicit and explicit) about Judas Iscariot's free will in the light of Jesus' foreknowledge. Firstly, the passage reveals that Judas Iscariot was one of Jesus' twelve disciples (v. 14). This suggests that Jesus chose him to be his disciple. Secondly, the passage reveals that Judas voluntarily visited the chief priests to negotiate his reward for his betrayal of Jesus (v. 14). Carlson (2010:472) concludes that Judas Iscariot acted 'in his own right'.

Thirdly, the passage reveals that Judas freely and consistently sought for the convenient moment to betray Jesus to the chief priests after he received his pay of

'thirty pieces of silver' from them (Matt 26:15, 16). Fourthly, the passage indicates that Jesus identified Judas Iscariot as the betrayer (v. 25). Fifthly, the passage reveals that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would betray him (v. 24) to the extent that he told it to Judas Iscariot himself (v. 25). This passage therefore indicates compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will (cf. Robertson 2011:70; Turner 2008:621).

4.3.5 Judas Iscariot and the Betrayal and Arrest of Jesus (Matthew 26:47-50)

This study has shown thus far that Matthew has mentioned the name of Judas during three significant occasions: (1) When Jesus summoned and commissioned his 'twelve disciples' (10:1-4); (2) when Judas went to arrange with the chief priests about betraying Jesus to them (26:14-16) and (3) during the Passover meal (26:20-25). Matthew 26:47-50 shows another significant occasion during which he mentions Judas: the arrest of Jesus in Gethsemane. Judas Iscariot's kissing of Jesus in Gethsemane is his final, decisive, devastating blow, which climaxed his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. In Gethsemane, Jesus prayed intensely three times requesting the Father to prevent his death if it were possible; nonetheless, he would go through with it in accordance with the Father's will (26:39-44; cf. Huizenga 2009:507-526).

Matthew (26:47) says a large crowd accompanied Judas Iscariot to Gethsemane. In the first place, the large arresting crowd led by Judas (Matt 26:47) is interesting. It is uncertain why 'a large crowd' accompanied Judas, since the chief priests and the elders of the people intended to avoid a scene as the crowd regarded Jesus as a prophet (Matt 21:46; cf. Matt 26:4, 5). A possible answer could be that this might not have been the general crowd that the priests feared, which accompanied Judas (Matt 21:46; cf. Matt 26:4, 5). For it is unlikely they would regard Jesus as 'a prophet' and then come to arrest him with the 'swords and clubs'.

Perhaps Judas Iscariot had asked for this crowd particularly, and had instructed them not to let Jesus escape (cf. John 18:3). Matthew (26:47-50) suggests that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would betray him. The passage suggests also that Judas exercised his free will in betraying Jesus (cf. Johnson 2018:252-254). This encounter in Gethsemane will now be examined.

4.3.5.1 Jesus' foreknowledge in Gethsemane (Matthew 26:45, 46, 50)

The prayers of Jesus in Gethsemane (Matthew 26:39, 42) demonstrate the interactions between God's foreknowledge and his sovereignty and human free will. In the first prayer (26:39), Jesus explicitly requests that the Father let 'this cup pass' from him, whereas in the second (26:42) he submits to the Father's will. The importance of this is that Jesus prays here as human. The two prayers show that Jesus freely relinquishes his will to the his Father's will and makes his will to be in tandem with the will of the Father.

Immediately following Jesus' prayer, he disclosed his imminent betrayal and the arrival of his betrayer to the disciples who were with him (vv. 45, 46). The passage says, 'While (Jesus) was still speaking, Judas, one of the twelve, arrived; with him was a large crowd with swords and clubs' (Matt 26:47; cf. Robertson 2011:83). Judas greeted Jesus and kissed him. Jesus' response to Judas' kiss (Ἐταῖρε, ἐφ' ὃ πάρει) is translated variously as 'Friend, do what you came for' (NIV cf. CEV; ESV; NASB; NRSV), 'Friend, why have you come?' (NKJV cf. Darby; YLT). Jesus' response as a question could have been rhetorical. In other words, Jesus already knew what the 'friend' had come to do. Perhaps, Jesus asked the question in order to prick Judas Iscariot's conscience just as God asked Cain for the whereabouts of Abel his brother (Gen 4:9;). Johnson (2018:254, 255) states, Ἐταῖρε was an 'endearing name' that Jesus used on Judas Iscariot, even though he knew that Judas was betraying him. Brown (1984:101) notes that Jesus' use of Ἐταῖρε emphasizes the intimacy between Judas Iscariot and him.

Considering Matthew's repeated depiction of Jesus as possessing foreknowledge (e.g. 16:18; 24:1-35; 26:25), it is unlikely that he would present Jesus here as lacking foreknowledge. In any case, Matthew 26:25 indicates that Jesus indeed knew what Judas Iscariot was about to do. Perhaps, this is why the NIV and its companions have translated Jesus' response as, 'Friend, do what you came for'. Jesus' response therefore indicates his foreknowledge. Another instance of Jesus' foreknowledge is his awareness that Judas Iscariot's kiss was not affectionate, but treacherous (Matt 26:49, 50).

4.3.5.2 Judas Iscariot's Free will in Jesus' Betrayal (Matthew 26:48-50)

This passage says Judas Iscariot prearranged with the crowd that accompanied him to arrest Jesus based on the 'sign' he would use to identify Jesus. Furthermore, he commanded them to 'lay hold on him' (κρατήσατε αὐτόν, Matt 26:48). The 'crowd' may have included the temple police (cf. Luke 22:52) and a detachment of Roman soldiers (cf. John 18:3). The chief priests may have sent them to accompany Judas to prevent Jesus from escaping. Their possession of swords and clubs may have been intended to fight off any resistance by Jesus and his disciples and the multitude of people who had come to Jerusalem for the Passover feast (cf. Walvoord and Zuck 1988-2007:n.p.; Huizenga 2009:507-526).

Secondly, the sign that Judas Iscariot arranged reflects on his character and culpability (Matt 26:48). This passage reveals that he had earlier told the crowd that he would identify Jesus by kissing him. At that time, he commanded them and said, 'Whomsoever I will kiss, it is he; lay hold on him' (YLT). There are three Greek words that Judas Iscariot used in this passage that require attention namely, σημεῖον, φιλήσω and κρατήσατε. The BDAG (2000:564, 920, 1056) defines them according to how they are used in this passage as follows: σημεῖον ('a sign or distinguishing mark whereby something is known'), φιλήσω ('to kiss as a special indication of affection') and κρατήσατε ('to arrest', 'to seize', and 'to apprehend').

Judas Iscariot's pledge to kiss Jesus as a 'sign' was a sort of assurance to the chief priests about the certainty of his betrayal of Jesus. Robertson (1988-2007:n.p.) states, a 'kiss was a common mode of greeting'. The Bible shows that family members kissed one another out of affection (Gen 27:26, 27; 29:11, 13; 31:28, 55; 33:4; 45:15; 48:10; Exod 4:27; 18:7; Ruth 1:9; 1 Sam 20:41; 2 Sam 14:33). Furthermore, friends and relatives kissed as a farewell to one another (Gen 31:28, 55; Ruth 1:14; 1 Kgs 19:20; Acts 20:37). At other times, people kissed at the approach of death (Gen 50:1), as a prelude to a blessing (Gen 27:26, 27; 31:55; 2 Sam 19:39), and to show respect for idols (1 Kgs 19:18; Job 31:26, 27).

Disciples of rabbis greeted them with a kiss (Walvoord and Zuck 1988-2007:n.p.). Perhaps this is why Judas addressed Jesus as ῥαββί before kissing him (Matt 26:49). The word ῥαββί means 'my master' (Kittel and Friedrich 1988-2007:n.p.; BDAG

2000:902) and 'my great one', 'my honorable sir' (Thayer 1988-2007:n.p.). The use of ῥαββί for teachers by their students extends to the second century BC (BDAG: 2000:902). The use of the term by Judas Iscariot to address Jesus before kissing him signifies that Judas was fully aware that he was actually betraying his teacher and master with a kiss, which portrayed affection. Judas Iscariot's action demonstrates a high-level of hypocrisy and treachery (cf. Carlson 2010:476).

The Old Testament (2 Sam 20:9, 10) records another incident where a 'kiss' was used treacherously. This passage reveals that Joab addressed Amasa as his 'brother' and inquired about his well-being (v. 9). Afterwards, he grabbed Amasa by his beard and, while pretending to kiss him, killed him with his sword (v. 10). Joab's use of 'my brother' towards Amasa before killing him was treacherous, because his address caused Amasa to welcome him without a hint of suspicion or rejection. The kiss of Joab was therefore treacherous rather than affectionate. Like Joab, Judas Iscariot's address of Jesus as 'rabbi' before kissing him was treacherous rather than affectionate. Even though he himself did not kill Jesus during his kiss, Judas identified Jesus by it so that the arresting officers might arrest him. Like Joab, Judas Iscariot is culpable for the fate of Jesus, irrespective of Jesus' foreknowledge that he would betray him (Matt 20:18; 26:2, 21).

Matthew seems to depict this thought via his account of Judas' encounter with Jesus moments before Jesus' arrest (Matt 26:49). This passage reveals that Judas approached Jesus, greeted him 'and kissed him' (καὶ κατεφίλησεν αὐτόν). Καταφιλέω is a kiss done as a form of greeting, honor, penitence, reconciliation and gratitude (BDAG 2000:529; Kittel and Friedrich 1988-2007:n.p.). Judas promised he would 'kiss' Jesus (φιλήσω) and he did it (κατεφίλησεν) when the opportune moment arrived. Robertson (1988-2007:n.p.) argues that καταφιλέω refers to a fervent, profuse kiss such as done by the sinful woman to the feet of Jesus (Luke 7:38), by the father on his returning 'Prodigal Son' (Luke 15:20) and by the elders of the Church of Ephesus to Paul following his farewell address (Acts 20:37). This suggests that the kiss of Judas was not a casual kiss. Ordinarily, it would have portrayed a deep sense of affection. Nonetheless, it was a 'misuse of the sign of affection' (Kittel and Friedrich 1988-2007:n.p.).

Considering how Judas planned to identify Jesus and then implemented the plan does indicate therefore that his plan and action were volitional. Additionally, the way in which Jesus responded to Judas Iscariot's kiss supports the view that Judas Iscariot's action was volitional: 'Ἐταῖρε, ἐφ' ὃ πάρει ('Friend, do what you are here to do', Matt 26:50). It is unclear why Jesus addressed Judas as 'ἑταῖρος' instead of 'φίλος'. It is worth noting that Jesus addressed the eleven disciples after Judas departed from the group as φίλων (John 15:13), φίλοι (John 15:14) and φίλους (John 15:15).

In view of the definitions of 'ἑταῖρος' ('a companion', 'a partisan', 'a partner') and 'φίλος' ('loving, kindly disposed, devoted (and) on intimate terms or in close association with another' (BDAG 2000:1058, 1059; cf. Thayer 1988-2007:n.p.), it is likely that Jesus addressed Judas as he did, as a way of acknowledging that he knew already why Judas had come. This implies that Jesus' foreknowledge did not annul the involvement of Judas' will and responsibility for his action.

Another indication that Judas' betrayal of Jesus was volitional is seen by Judas' use of κρατήσατε ('arrest', 'seize', 'hold fast'); it is aorist active imperative. By using this tense and mood, Judas might have intended for the crowd to seize Jesus at the moment that he (Judas) would kiss Jesus (cf. Janzen 2008:43). The question now is why did Judas command the crowd to arrest Jesus? Was it a sign of desperation? Alternatively, was it meant for him to ensure that Jesus would not escape, in order that he might fulfill his covenant with the chief priests?

In answer to these questions, it is helpful to consider the implications of Matthew's choice of words to describe Judas Iscariot's actions. The three words (σημεῖον, φιλήσω and κρατήσατε), which describe the role of Judas in Matthew 26:47-50 portray the character of Judas negatively. These terms indicate Judas Iscariot's determination to betray Jesus. They indicate also that Judas ensured that the arresting officers would seize Jesus when he identified him. Judas Iscariot's involvement with the crowd of armed men whom Jesus' antagonists sent also portrays his character negatively. Additionally, his kiss-action strongly suggests he had defected from Jesus. Robertson (2011:95) supports this view; he views the action of Judas as shifting his loyalty from his master to the chief priests.

Matthew's narrative depictions of Judas Iscariot thus far depict Judas as greedy, self-seeking and treacherous. Greenberg (2007:153) supports this view. He admits that 'it still remains...to explain what it was that Judas did that could be considered in a non-negative manner by the early disciples and...the gospel writers'. Matthew chapter 26 has presented Judas in ways that have indicted Judas for resolutely betraying Jesus. This chapter of Matthew shows that Judas Iscariot displayed his resoluteness by commanding the crowd to arrest Jesus. I think the way in which Judas planned to identify Jesus and then implemented his plan, as well as his command to the crowd to seize Jesus does indicate that his betrayal of Jesus was both volitional and calculative.

4.3.5.3 Summary of the Interface of Divine foreknowledge and Human Free will in Gethsemane

Whereas in the case of Judas' actions the nature of the compatibilism was that Judas pursued his will in spite of divine foreknowledge, Jesus' prayer demonstrates that his will is synergistic with the Father's will. The attitude and action of Jesus are in contrast to those of Judas Iscariot, who was bent on achieving his own will (Matt 26:14-16). In this sense, this interaction appears to belong to a different category of compatibilism from what has been adduced so far in Matthew's account of Jesus' passion. For instance, Matthew showed repeatedly that Judas Iscariot made every effort to satisfy his own heart's desire, whereas Jesus submitted his will to his Father's will.

4.3.6 *Judas Iscariot Confesses His Sin (Matthew 27:3-10)*

Klassen (1996:47-58), Carlson (2010:472-474) and Counet (2011:1-7), for example, have attempted to exonerate Judas Iscariot from the guilt of betraying his Lord and Master on the lexical ground that the Gospels employ παραδίδωμι ('to hand over', 'to deliver up') to describe his action rather than προδότης ('traitor', 'betrayed'). Nonetheless, Matthew portrays him (Matt 27:3-10) consistently as a guilty and inexcusable betrayer of Jesus. Judas himself makes an explicit guilty plea before the chief priests and the elders (Matthew 27:3, 4). The passage reads, Τότε ἰδὼν Ἰουδᾶς ὁ παραδίδους αὐτὸν ὅτι κατεκρίθη μεταμεληθεὶς ἔστρεψεν τὰ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσιν καὶ πρεσβυτέροις λέγων, Ἥμαρτον παραδοῦς αἷμα ἁθῶν (Then Judas, his betrayal, seeing that he had been condemned, was remorseful and

brought back the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests and elders, saying, 'I have sinned by betraying innocent blood', Matt27:3, 4, NKJV).

In order to validate this confession, he threw the entire thirty pieces of silver in the temple and left (Matt 27:5). This confession indicates that Judas was attempting to undo his sinful deed, but he failed. Consequently, he hanged himself (v. 5). By hanging himself, he most probably judged himself guilty and unforgivable (Robertson 2011:101, 114). It makes sense to conclude that Judas Iscariot's free confession is tantamount to his free betrayal of Jesus. I now more closely examine this passage.

4.3.6.1 Judas Iscariot's Remorse and Human Free will (Matthew 27:3-5)

This passage follows the guilty verdict that the chief priests, the high priest, the entire Sanhedrin and the elders of the people passed on Jesus (Matt 26:57-67) and their decision to put him to death (Matt 27:1-2). The present passage records that, when Judas realized that the chief priests and elders had condemned Jesus, 'he repented (μεταμεληθεις) and brought back the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests and the elders'(v. 3). The word translated 'repented' is μεταμεληθεις. Μεταμέλομαι 'expresses a change not so much in consciousness as in one's feelings in relation to a thing or a deed' (EDNT 1988-2007:n.p.).

In the New Testament, the term appears not to be used in relation to expressing deep repentance unto God for one's sin. For instance, Matthew (21:29) uses it of a son who refused to work for his father, 'but later he changed his mind and went'. Paul uses the term twice in telling the Corinthians that he did not 'regret' the sorrow that his letter had caused them, even though he regretted at first (2 Cor 7:8a). Hebrews (7:21) uses it of the Lord not changing his mind after he had sworn.

The action of Judas (of returning the thirty pieces of silver) reflects the meaning of μεταμέλομαι. His admission that he had 'sinned by betraying innocent blood' (λέγων, ἡμαρτον παραδούς αίμα άθώον, Matt27:3, 4), implies that he indicted himself and accepted responsibility for betraying Jesus. Matthew's use of μεταμέλομαι with Judas' action (of returning the thirty pieces of silver) instead of μετανοέω may have been intentional.

The two terms mean, 'to change one's mind...feel remorse, regret' (BDAG 2000:639, 640). However, the changing of mind, or having remorse or regret in μετανοέω leads to repentance unto conversion (ibid. 640). Matthew may have perceived that Judas was merely remorseful and had a change of mind (about keeping the thirty pieces of silver) rather than having a change of mind for repentance.

Notwithstanding, Judas acknowledged that he had sinned. In order to validate this confession, he threw the entire thirty pieces of silver in the temple and left (Matt 27:5). This confession indicates that Judas was attempting to undo his sinful deed, but he failed. Consequently, he hanged himself (v. 5). By hanging himself, Judas most probably judged himself guilty and unforgivable (Robertson 2011:101, 114). Additionally, Judas' gruesome death implies that his death was a result of divine judgment. There are biblical and extra-biblical accounts of gruesome deaths that give the perception of divine judgment. Some of these deaths were sudden and others were delayed. The following examples will reflect this.

Biblical Examples:

Kings 9:30-37—This passage is the account of Jezebel's horrific death. It states that at the command of Jehu 'Two or three eunuchs' threw her down from her window. She fell so hard that 'some of her blood spattered on the wall and on the horses and they trampled on her' (2 Kgs 9:33 ESV). Moreover, dogs ate her up, except for her skull, her feet and the palms of her hands (2 Kgs 9:35).

Jehu recounted that the manner of Jezebel's demise was a fulfillment of the word of Yahweh, who earlier told Elijah the prophet that 'In the territory of Jezreel the dogs shall eat the flesh of Jezebel' (2 Kgs 9:36; cf. 1 Kgs 21:23). 1 Kings 21:1-23 gives the background of Jezebel's fatal outcome. The passage shows that she forcibly seized Naboth's vineyard and subsequently ordered his death by stoning (1 Kgs 21:7-16), and Yahweh send word to Ahab, her husband that dogs would eat her up 'at the city wall' of Jezreel (1 Kgs 21:23 NLT).

Acts 5:1-11—This passage is about Ananias and Sapphira selling their land so that they might bring the proceeds to the apostles. However, after the sale they agreed to keep some of the proceeds for themselves and to lie to the apostles that they had

brought the whole amount (Acts 5:3, 4, 8, 9). They died suddenly—in the presence of the congregation—as a result of their lies (Acts 5:4, 5, 8-10).

Acts 12:20-23—This passage concerns Herod's sudden, public death. The passage states that 'an angel of the Lord struck him down, and he was eaten by worms and died' while he was delivering a public address to the people of Tyre and Sidon. The reason the angel struck him was that he 'had not given the glory to God' (Acts 12:23) when the people hailed him as having 'The voice of a god, and not of a mortal!' (Acts 12:22).

Extra-Biblical Examples:

Jdt. 13:3-9—This passage is the account of Judith decapitating Holofernes. Holofernes was a confidant of Nabuchodonosor, king of Assyria and 'the chief captain' of the Assyrian army. The king commanded him to 'destroy all flesh that did not obey the commandment of his mouth' (Jdt. 2:2-13). Holofernes executed the king's commandment fully, so that when the children of Israel who lived in Judea heard about his widespread massacre of their neighbors, 'they were exceedingly afraid of him (Jdt 4:1, 2; cf. 7:4, 19).

Holofernes heard that they were powerless against him and his army and planned to slay them too (Jdt 5:1-7:3). It was then that Judith dressed very beautifully and went to Holofernes under the pretext of guiding him in how he might overcome her people (the Israelites) and protect the lives of his soldiers (Jdt. 10:3-13; 11:5-23). Holofernes believed her words and invited her to his feast (Jdt. 12:10-20). When he had drunk much wine and fell at sleep, Judith smote him and decapitated him, according to Jdt. 13:6-9.

1 Macc. 2:22-24—This passage is the account of Mattathias, a devout Jewish priest (vv. 1-21) who killed an apostate Jewish man upon the pagan altar on which the man was making his sacrifice.

2 Macc. 4:38—This passage gives the account of Antiochus' killing of Andronicus, his deputy (v. 30), in the same place where he (Andronicus) had killed Onias the high priest. This passage indicates that this was a well-deserved punishment from the Lord.

1 Macc. 9:5-12—This passage is about the God of Israel attacking Antiochus ‘with an incurable and invisible plague’, which caused worms to come out of his body, gave him severe bodily pain and caused his flesh to smell intolerably. The background to this is that he had previously ‘tormented other men’s bowels with many and strange torments’ (2 Macc. 9:6) and had proudly spoken to overthrow Jerusalem ‘and make it a common burying place of the Jews’ (v. 4).

The gruesome fate of Judas Iscariot bears more direct similarity to that of Ahithophel, an influential, God-inspired advisor to King David (2 Sam 15:12; 16:23; cf. 1 Chr 27:33, 34). Matthew records further that after Judas departed from the temple, the chief priests picked up the thirty pieces of silver and bought ‘the potter’s field as a place to bury foreigners’ (Matt 27:8). The buying of this field fulfilled the prophecy of Jeremiah (Matt 27:9; cf. Jer 19:1-13; 32:6-9), even though the words are almost exactly those of Zechariah (11:12, 13). The chief priests and elders’ response to Judas Iscariot, *τί πρὸς ἡμᾶς; σὺ ὄψῃ* (‘What is that to us? See to it yourself’, Matt 27:4), indicates that they too held Judas responsible for his action. In spite of their rebuttal, however, they picked up the pieces of silver that Judas threw in the temple and agreed unanimously ‘to buy the potter’s field’ (Matt 27:6-8). Luke refers to the thirty pieces of silver as ‘the reward of wickedness’ (Acts 1:18a).

4.3.6.2 Divine foreknowledge and prophecy in Matthew 27:6-10

Matthew 27:6-10 records that the chief priests and the elders picked up the pieces of silver that Judas threw in the temple and bought ‘the potter’s field’ as a place to bury foreigners. Matthew links the actions of Judas and the religious leaders to the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy (Matt 27:9, 10; cf. Jer 19:1-13; 32:6-9). This is significant, because, even though Matthew indicates repeatedly that Judas Iscariot is liable for his action, the fulfillment of prophecy by both his action and his fate suggest the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

4.3.6.3 Summary of the Interface of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free will in Matthew 27:3-10

Now, it is important to note that Matthew’s intertextual linkage of several actions, including that of Judas Iscariot, with prophecy fulfillment in many passages suggests the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will. None of the fulfilled

Old Testament prophecies list any human agent that God foreordained to fulfill them, even though he foreknew that they would occur, by virtue of his omniscience. Baugh (McCall and Stanglin 2005:19-30) and Molina (Bryant 1992:95) are therefore right in their arguments that the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of human actions necessarily.

For example, the foreknowledge of Jesus that all of his disciples would desert him (Matt 26:31) did not cause them to desert him. Moreover, God's foreknowledge does not appoint people to carry out acts against their free will. As a result, God did not vindicate people from moral responsibility for their actions (cf. Picirilli 2000:259-271). In the same way, God's foreknowledge of the actions of Judas is not the same as God appointing him to act. Therefore, Judas Iscariot is morally liable for his actions as Matthew indicates.

4.3.7 Summary of Examination of Relevant Passages of Matthew

The account of Matthew leaves the reader with no doubt about the identity of Judas Iscariot as being a privileged disciple—'one of the twelve' apostles—whom Jesus chose and gave authority to preach about the nearness of the kingdom of heaven, heal the sick, exorcise demons and raise the dead (Matt 10:1-8). Matthew reveals that it was Judas Iscariot who initiated contact with the chief priests, requested a reward to betray Jesus to them (26:14, 15) and actually betrayed Jesus to them through an identifying 'kiss' (26:47-50). By citing the introductory words of Judas Iscariot as being, 'What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto you?' (Matt 26:15, YLT), Matthew implies that Judas Iscariot's motive for betraying Jesus was to obtain a financial reward.

Moreover, Matthew reveals repeatedly that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would betray him (20:18; 26:2, 21), and that that betrayal would be a fulfillment of scriptural prophecies (26:24, 54). Matthew portrays Judas as one who willingly offered himself to betray Jesus, instead of doing his act by divine appointment. Matthew substantiates this claim in at least eight ways. Firstly, Matthew shows that Judas Iscariot initiated the agreement between the chief priests and himself to betray Jesus (26:14, 15). Secondly, he shows that Judas kept seeking for an opportunity to betray Jesus (26:16). Thirdly, he shows that Judas used a kiss-sign to identify Jesus to

those whom the chief priests and the elders sent to arrest Jesus (26:49; cf. Robertson 1988-2007:n.p.).

Fourthly, Matthew shows that Judas Iscariot willingly offered himself to betray Jesus, rather than doing this act by divine appointment, by showing that Judas displayed remorse for betraying Jesus (27:3). Fifthly, he shows that Judas returned to the chief priests the thirty pieces of silver that he had received from them to betray Jesus (27:3). Sixthly, he shows that Judas confessed that he had 'sinned by betraying innocent blood' (27:4). Seventhly, he shows that Judas threw the thirty pieces of silver in the temple (27:5). Lastly, he shows that Judas 'went and hanged himself' (Matt 27:5).

Judas Iscariot's protestation of innocence during the Passover meal with Jesus and the other disciples (Matt 26:25), did not absolve him from the charge of betrayal. The fact is that he had already made a covenant with the chief priests to betray Jesus (26:14, 15). In addition, he might have commanded the crowd to seize Jesus when he would kiss him before the Passover meal (26:48). The account of Matthew suggests that Jesus' foreknowledge that Judas would betray him, as well as his choosing of Judas to be his disciple, did not override Judas' free will to betray him (cf. Ham 2000:55, 67; Huizenga 2009:507-528; Johnson 2018:250-262; Turner 2008:621, 622).

Matthew has faithfully presented the account of Judas' betrayal. His characterization of Judas Iscariot presents his reader with no other choice but to conclude, that Judas Iscariot was culpable for his action and thus deserved his fate. The early church's congregation realized too that the antagonism of Herod, Pontius Pilate and the other Jewish leaders was not without God's foreknowledge (Acts 4:1-28). Notwithstanding, those leaders were culpable for their actions (Acts 5:18-41).

The subsequent Markan narrative will further investigate these elements. The question, however, is whether Mark presents a similar picture of Judas?

4.4 Examination of Relevant Passages of Mark (3:13-19; 14:10, 11; 14:18-21; 14:42-50)

4.4.1 *The Socio-Pastoral Context of the First Audiences of Mark's Gospel*

Scholars seem to agree that Mark wrote his gospel to Gentiles—most probably Christians in Rome (Harper 1990:1408; MacArthur 2010:1417; cf. Moloney 2002:12-14). It was mentioned above that Mark gives indications in support of this claim in his translation of Aramaic terms that he uses, which suggests that he might not have translated them had he written to a Jewish audience—'Boanerges' (Mark 3:17), 'Talitha Koum' (5:41 NIV), 'Corban' (7:11), 'Ephphatha' (7:34), 'Bartimaeus' (10:46), 'Abba' (14:36), 'Golgotha' (15:22) and 'Eloi, Eloi, lema sabachthani' (15:34). Moreover, his repeated use of expressions associated with the Roman military—'legion' (5:9), 'executioner' (6:27) and 'centurion' (15:39, 45; cf. Moloney 2002:13). It was mentioned earlier also that Mark presents Jesus as God's suffering servant who came to serve (10:45), rather than Israel's Messiah and King, as Matthew indicates. Assuming that Mark's audience was living in Rome in the late 60s, then they would have lived at the height of Nero's persecution.

Mark shows that Jesus was human (Mark 1:41; 3:5; 6:34; 8:12; 9:36; 10:13-16). Mark may have written his biography as he did so that his audience might follow Jesus' life of humility rather than crave to be bosses (10:35-45). Secondly, he may have written to prepare them for the life of suffering during their walk with Jesus rather than hunger for power (10:35-45). Concerning Judas Iscariot, Mark mentions him, along with the other eleven disciples, casting 'out many demons, and anointed with oil many who were sick and cured them' (Mark 6:13; cf. Luke 9:6). Mark does not name Judas Iscariot explicitly as performing miracles and casting out demons and curing the sick. Nonetheless, he does so implicitly by referring to Jesus sending 'the twelve' out with 'authority over unclean spirits' (Mark 6:7-13).

4.4.2 *Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism in Mark 3:13-19*

The author of the Gospel of Mark begins his narrative about Jesus' commissioning of the disciples by stating that Jesus 'went up the mountain and called to himself those whom he wanted, and they came to him' (Mark 3:13). The clause 'He...called to him those whom he wanted' (προσκαλείται οὓς ἠθέληεν αὐτός) indicates that the action of

Jesus was personal, intentional and selective. Mark records also that after Jesus had called ‘those whom he wanted and they came to him’, he ‘appointed twelve, whom he also named apostles, to be with him’ (Mark 3:14, ἐποίησεν δώδεκα, [οὓς καὶ ἀποστόλους ὠνόμασεν,] ἵνα ᾤσιν μετ’ αὐτοῦ). This appointment heightened the personal, intentional selectivity of Jesus. Jesus selected these ‘twelve’ and named them as ‘apostles’ purposefully, which was so that they might go out ‘to preach and to have authority to drive out demons’ (Mark 3:14, 15, NIV). Stein (2008:168) notes that Mark’s use of the intensive pronoun (αὐτός) does imply that Jesus alone had the prerogative to select the disciples.

The account of Mark regarding the calling and commissioning of the ‘twelve apostles’ in this passage bears some similarities with the account of Matthew. This section of the study will therefore identify these similarities. Firstly, both evangelists name Judas as being one of the disciples whom Jesus named ‘apostles’ (Mark 3:14-19; Matt 10:1-4). Secondly, the two evangelists name Judas Iscariot as the last on the list of the twelve apostles (Mark 3:19; Matt 10:4). Thirdly, they identify Judas Iscariot as the person who betrayed Jesus (καὶ Ἰούδαν Ἰσκαριώθ, ὃς καὶ παρέδωκεν αὐτόν, Mark 3:19; Matt 10:4). Fourthly, both evangelists use παραδίδωμι to refer to the action of Judas to betray Jesus. It is worth noting, however, that Matthew uses the aorist active participle (παραδούς) while Mark uses the aorist active indicative (παρέδωκεν). It may be that Matthew used the participle form in order to allude to the character of Judas (for instance, as a ‘betraying person’), while Mark only emphasizes the action of Judas.

Immediately following his list of the apostles whom Jesus summoned and commissioned, Mark concludes that Judas Iscariot would be the one from among them who would betray Jesus (3:19). Mark’s account calls the attention of his audience to the fact that Judas Iscariot was divinely chosen to be one of the twelve apostles (3:13-19). Mark’s statement, καὶ Ἰούδαν Ἰσκαριώθ, ὃς καὶ παρέδωκεν αὐτόν (‘and Judas Iscariot, who also betrayed him’, NKJV) leaves no doubt in the minds of his audience that Judas Iscariot was culpable for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus as he voluntarily responded to Jesus’ call. Judas Iscariot’s divine selection and his free will in responding to that call show compatibilism.

4.4.3 Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism in Mark 14:10, 11

Two important incidents precede Mark 14:10, 11. The first incident is the covert plan of the chief priests and the scribes to arrest and kill Jesus (Mark 14:1). The passage says, ‘They were looking for some sly way to arrest Jesus and kill him’ (NIV). The second incident is the indignant response of some of those who were present regarding the woman’s anointing of Jesus’ head (Mark 14:3-9). The woman’s loving, worshipful and honoring action contradicts the indignant response of his inner-circle disciples; they should have rejoiced with her (cf. Stein 2008:635).

Following these two incidents, Mark (14:10) says, Καὶ Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώθ ὁ εἷς τῶν δώδεκα ἀπῆλθεν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς ἵνα αὐτὸν παραδοῖ αὐτοῖς (‘And Judas Iscariot, who was one of the twelve, went off to the chief priests, in order to betray him to them’, NASB). The next verse states, the chief priests were ‘greatly pleased, and promised to give him money’ (οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἐχάρησαν καὶ ἐπηγγείλαντο αὐτῷ ἀργύριον δοῦναι). The chief priests were pleased at Judas Iscariot’s promise, to the extent that they made a financial promise to him. Stein (2008:637) suggests that what Judas Iscariot betrayed to the chief priests and the elders was ‘how Jesus could be seized by stealth while away from his support base’.

France (2002:556), like Klassen (1996:47-74), argues against Judas Iscariot’s description as a betrayer on the ground that παραδίδωμι means, ‘hand over’ rather than ‘betray’. He thinks Judas’ action was simply an act of ‘an honest broker arranging a meeting between Jesus and the authorities with a view to promoting a constructive dialogue—a move which in the event went badly wrong, to Judas’ dismay’ (ibid.). I think that even if Judas Iscariot’s intentions were innocent, as France suggests, then Judas miscalculated the authorities’ intention and plan, so that there was no ‘dialogue’ between them and Jesus. Furthermore, I think that if Judas Iscariot’s intention was innocent as France suggests, then Judas would not have pursued the arrest of Jesus in Gethsemane and made sure that the crowd arrest Jesus (Mark 14:43-46). Finally, I think that if Judas Iscariot had had an innocent intention, then he would not have ‘watched for an opportunity to hand [Jesus] over’ (Matt 14:11 NIV). I therefore disagree with France’s suggestions.

A number of possibilities arise from Judas Iscariot’s visit to the chief priests and scribes. One possibility is that Judas Iscariot knew about the subtle plan of the chief

priests. Another possibility is that one of them may have approached him secretly. A third possibility could be that Judas Iscariot had been planning to sell Jesus to the chief priests secretly, and that the time of his visit was appropriate. Any of these possibilities or all of them may have applied. Nonetheless, the fact is that Judas voluntarily went to the chief priests and scribes to betray Jesus.

4.4.3.1 Similarities between Mark 14:10, 11 and Matthew 26:14, 16

Mark 14:10 reads as, Καὶ Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώθ ὁ εἷς τῶν δώδεκα ἀπῆλθεν πρὸς τοὺς ἵνα ἀρχιερεῖς παραδοῖ αὐτοῖς ('And Judas Iscariot, who was one of the twelve, went off to the chief priests, in order to betray him to them', NASB). Matthew 26:14 says, Τότε πορευθεὶς εἷς τῶν δώδεκα, ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώτης, πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς ('Then one of the twelve, named Judas Iscariot, went to the chief priests', NASB). An examination of these two passages shows some similarities. The first similarity is that the two evangelists identify Judas Iscariot as 'one of the twelve' (ὁ εἷς τῶν δώδεκα). Secondly, the two evangelists—in spite of the fact that Matthew uses a participle (πορευθεὶς) and Mark uses an aorist (ἀπῆλθεν)—agree that Judas Iscariot voluntarily went to the chief priests (πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς), rather than the chief priests coming to him. The evangelists' claim indicates that Judas Iscariot's visit to the chief priests was purely volitional and thus he was liable for his action.

Both evangelists record that Judas sought an opportune time to betray Jesus (Mark 14:11; Matt 26:16). However, Mark uses the adverbial form (εὐκαιρῶς, meaning 'opportune') instead of the noun (εὐκαιρίαν, meaning 'opportunity, the right moment') which Matthew uses. Perhaps Mark employed this form in order to emphasize 'how' (the manner in which) Judas was seeking to betray Jesus rather than Judas only anxiously waiting for 'the right moment' to carry out his act (cf. Danove 1998:22). Thus Darby and YLT rightly translate this section of the verse as 'And he sought how he could opportunely deliver him up' (Darby) and 'and he was seeking how, conveniently, he might deliver him up' (YLT).

4.4.3.2 Dissimilarities between Mark 14:11 and Matthew 26:15

Matthew suggests only that the chief priests paid Judas for offering to betray Jesus to them himself (26:15), while Mark records their emotional reaction of being 'greatly pleased' when they heard his offer (14:11). Mark's addition of the chief priests' great

pleasure indicates that they were pleased that their plans were now being fulfilled through one of Jesus' closest disciples. Matthew uses the ambiguous word, ἔστησαν, regarding the chief priests' financial response to Judas. Various English translations render this term differently as 'weighed out', 'paid', 'covenanted with' and 'counted out'. Mark on the other hand, uses ἐπηγγείλαντο.

This term means that they obligated themselves to carry out what they promised to offer to Judas (BDAG 2000:356). Peter uses the term for human promises and offers (2 Pet 2:19). Additionally, the term is used in other passages with reference to divine promises (cf. Rom 4:21; Titus 1:2; Heb 6:13; Jas 1:12; 1 John 2:25). Mark's choice of words offers key relevance for appreciating his take on Judas' action, as expressed in the chief priests' emotional expression. It appears that Mark's words heightened the covenantal or contractual nature of the Judas-chief priest encounter more than what is expressed by Matthew. Nonetheless, it appears as if Matthew intended to highlight the prominent role of the chief priests in aiding and abetting the betrayal which Mark underlines.

4.4.3.3 Contrasting Compatibilism between Mark and Matthew

The similarities and dissimilarities of the two evangelists suggest that Judas went to the chief priests freely to negotiate his betrayal of Jesus. Their featuring of financial remuneration for Judas Iscariot suggests the fulfillment of prophecy (Zech 11:12), and thus an indication of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will in the process. Mark appears to heighten this sense of compatibility with his choice of specific contractual terminology. Both evangelists speak of a financial gift to Judas as an important element in his betrayal of Jesus (Matt 26:15; Mark 14:11), even though they provide different details in the account. For instance, Matthew records that it was Judas who asked for a financial reward as a precondition for betraying Jesus over to the chief priests (Matt 26:15), while Mark indicates that it was the chief priests who promised to pay Judas after Judas made the offer to betray Jesus to them (Mark 14:11).

The issue of receiving financial reward is significant—perhaps it was the driving force behind Judas Iscariot's action. However, I think that his resolve to betray Jesus is more significant, seeing that he would receive whatever the chief priests would

determine (Matt 26:14, 15; Mark 14:10). In spite of the similarities between these two passages as shown above, they also have one key dissimilarity: Mark mentions the reason why Judas Iscariot went off to the chief priests: ἵνα ἀρχιερεῖς παραδοῖ αὐτοῖς ('in order to betray him to them'), whereas Matthew omits it. It is uncertain why Matthew omits this vital information, since his gospel depicts Judas Iscariot more negatively than does Mark. Perhaps this difference is due to Matthew focusing on Judas Iscariot and the chief priests together, while Mark focuses on Judas Iscariot only.

For example, Matthew depicts Judas Iscariot as being greedy and self-seeking (Matt 26:15), while Mark does not. Secondly, when Jesus disclosed, during the Passover Meal, that one of the disciples would betray him, Matthew states Judas Iscariot, along with the other apostles, protested his innocence (26:25), whereas Mark only mentions that each of them protested 'one after another' (Mark 14:19). Thirdly, Matthew mentions Judas Iscariot's admission of guilt for betraying Jesus (27:4) and hanging himself (27:5), whereas Mark omits them. Matthew suggests only that the chief priests paid Judas for offering himself to betray Jesus to them (26:15), while Mark records their emotional reaction of being 'greatly pleased' when they heard his offer (Mark 14:11). Mark's addition of the chief priests' great pleasure indicates that they were pleased that their plans were now being fulfilled through one of Jesus' closest disciples. As the result of Judas' offer, they would not have to arrest Jesus openly during the feast and thereby cause a riot.

4.4.4 Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism in Mark 14:18-21

This section of Mark narrates the series of events that occurred during the observance of the Passover meal by Jesus and his disciples. Mark records that when Jesus and the disciples 'had taken their places and were eating', Jesus informed them that one from among them who was eating with him would betray him (Mark 14:18, Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι εἷς ἐξ ὑμῶν παραδώσει με, ὁ ἐσθίων μετ' ἐμοῦ). Afterwards, Mark shows that Jesus identified his betrayer. He records that Jesus identified his betrayer as ὁ ἐμβαπτόμενος μετ' ἐμοῦ εἰς τὸ τρίβλιον ('the one dipping into the bowl with me', my translation). Jesus' identification of his betrayer charges the betrayer with liability. Jesus' identification of his would-be betrayer indicates his foreknowledge.

In addition, Jesus' identification of his would-be betrayer indicates that this would-be betrayer would act voluntarily. Knowing then that Judas Iscariot is this betrayer, this passage suggests compatibilism of his free act of betrayal and Jesus' foreknowledge. Donahue and Harrington (2005:389) point out that Judas Iscariot may not have participated in the Passover Meal with Jesus and the other disciples. Their argument is that 'Mark does not recount Judas Iscariot's return until the arrest in 14:43'. Whilst Donahue and Harrington's argument is possible, they have not taken into consideration the disciple who was 'dipping into the bowl with [Jesus]' whom Jesus identified as his betrayer (Mark 14:18-21).

4.4.5 Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism in Mark 14:42-50

This passage follows the prayer of Jesus in Gethsemane where, being 'deeply grieved, even unto death', he prayed that the Father might prevent his imminent suffering and death (Mark 14:32-39). Nonetheless, after relinquishing his will to the will of the Father concerning this death, Jesus informed Peter, James and John that this betrayer was 'at hand' (Mark 14:42). This passage says, ἐγείρεσθε ἄγωμεν: ἰδοὺ ὁ παραδιδούς με ἤγγικεν ('Get up, let us be going. See, my betrayer is at hand'). This 'betrayer' is 'Judas, one of the twelve' (Mark 14:43). He arrived with a crowd bearing swords and clubs that the chief priests, the scribes and the elders had given to them (Mark 14:43).

Prior to Judas' arrival at Gethsemane, he told the crowd that he would 'kiss' Jesus as a 'signal' of identification (δεδώκει δὲ ὁ παραδιδούς αὐτὸν σύσσημον αὐτοῖς, 'he who was betraying him had given them a signal', NASB). 'Signal' in this passage is σύσσημον. According to BDAG (2000:978), this term refers to 'an action or gesture previously agreed upon as a signal, sign'. Interestingly, Matthew employs σημεῖον instead of σύσσημον. The BDAG (2000:920, 978; cf. EDNT 1988-2007:n.p.) defines σημεῖον as 'a sign or distinguishing mark whereby something is known, sign, token, indication' and σύσσημον as 'an action or gesture previously agreed upon as a signal'. Most prominent English translations render both words as 'sign' and 'signal' respectively.

Nonetheless, in view of the definitions of these terms, they do have a noticeable distinction—σημεῖον emphasizes the 'signal' itself, while σύσσημον emphasizes the

action, which corresponds to that 'signal'. Mark ends the command with 'arrest him and lead him away under guard' (κρατήσατε αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπάγετε ἀσφαλῶς, 14:44). The account of Mark shifts the final authority for arresting Jesus from the chief priests to Judas. Mark thus strengthens the argument in favor of Judas' culpability in the arrest and death of Jesus. Furthermore, Mark suggests here that Judas was determined not to let Jesus escape.

Moreover, Mark records that the arrest of Jesus was to fulfill the Scriptures (Mark 14:49). Since all prophecies of the Scriptures were divinely guided (cf. 2 Pet 1:20, 21), then God foreknew about the arrest of Jesus just as he did regarding the betrayal by Judas Iscariot. In addition, just as divine foreknowledge of the betrayal by Judas did not annul his free will, so neither did divine foreknowledge annul the free will of the crowd in arresting Jesus. Divine foreknowledge is distinct from divine foreordination, even though there are occasions where God has applied both simultaneously as shown in chapter three of this study.

4.4.6 Summary of the Examination of Relevant Passages of Mark

The examinations of the selected passages of Mark have shown, explicitly and implicitly, compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will. For instance, Jesus appointed and commissioned Judas Iscariot among his twelve disciples/apostles (Mark 3:14-19). Secondly, Judas Iscariot went voluntarily to the chief priests to betray Jesus to them (14:10). Thirdly, Judas Iscariot kept watching out for the opportune time to betray Jesus to the chief priests (14:11). Fourthly, Jesus pronounced 'woe' upon 'that man who betrays the Son of Man' (14:21). The contexts of Mark and Matthew show that 'that man' is Judas Iscariot (14:19, 20; Matt 26:25).

Fifthly, Judas Iscariot freely led 'a crowd armed with swords and clubs' whom the chief priests, the teachers of the law and the elders had appointed, to arrest Jesus (Mark 14:43). Sixthly, Judas Iscariot freely chose a kiss-sign by which he betrayed Jesus (14:44-46). Seventhly, Judas Iscariot instructed the crowd to 'arrest [Jesus] and lead him away under guard' (14:44). Thus, Mark holds Judas Iscariot liable for his betrayal of Jesus, in spite of the fact that Jesus chose him as his disciple.

Mark appears to have written his gospel to teach his audience about humble service and warn them about imminent suffering for following Jesus (Mark 10:35-45). However, the manner in which he portrays Judas Iscariot's character does not concur with his message. Moreover, the manner in which he portrays Judas Iscariot's character and actions appears as if he was drawing his audience's attention to Judas Iscariot's disloyalty. He may have also intended to inform his audience that divine foreknowledge and divine sovereignty did not cancel their own free will, and thus they, like Judas Iscariot, would be liable for their actions.

4.5 Examination of Relevant Passages of Luke (Luke 6:12-16; 22:1-6; 22:13-23; 22:47, 48)

4.5.1 The Socio-Pastoral Contexts of Luke's First Audience

Keener (2014:185; cf. Garland 2011:32) identifies Luke's audience as 'well-to-do and literarily sophisticated', Greek-speaking people, including Theophilus, who lived in upper-class Rome. Creamer and Spencer (2014:1) identify Theophilus as 'a Gentile who had received some introductory teachings about Christ and who needed factual verification of the events surrounding the emergence of Christianity'.

Some other scholars, including Bruce (1990:98), Bock (1994:15, 65), Green (1997:39), Garland (2011:55, 56), Garrison (2004:26, 97), Hengel (2012:536) and Thompson (2011:428), argue that Theophilus was a real person. Creamer, Spencer and Vijoer (2014:2; cf. Bock 1994:63) think Luke's address of Theophilus as 'most excellent Theophilus' suggests that Theophilus was most likely a Roman official. The ground for his suggestion is that people addressed other Roman officials in this way. For example, Claudius Lysias used it to address Governor Felix (Acts 23:26), Tertullus used it to address Governor Felix (Acts 24:3), Paul used it to address Festus (Acts 26:25).

Luke's audience, despite their socio-political status, may have needed help to confirm their faith or needed arguments they could use to defend their faith (ibid.). Thompson (2010:326, 327) thinks this gospel is an apologetic document. Thus, he calls it 'apologetic historiography'. As an 'apologetic historiography' document, Luke intended it 'to provide justification, explanation, and defense for various aspects of

the Christian movement' (ibid. ; cf. Luke 1:4). Luke wrote also in order to help the Gentile believers deal with issues and tensions concerning 'their identity and place within the will and purposes of the God of Israel' (Thompson 2010:326).

Thompson (2010:327) states that non-believing Jews who rejected God's inclusion of Gentiles in his salvific purposes caused these tensions. The tensions affected Jewish believers also. The book of Acts identifies the key perpetrators of these tensions as the Jewish religious leaders (e.g. Acts 4:1-31; 5:17-42; 7:54-9:19) and Roman officials (e.g. Acts 16:35-39; 18:14-16; 26:30-32). Luke's account of Judas Iscariot is significant. On the one hand, he shows that Judas Iscariot is one of Jesus' disciples who were victims of these anti-Jesus perpetrators. On the other hand, he was a key agent for these perpetrators (Luke 6:16; 22:1-6, 21, 22).

4.5.2 Selection of Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism (Luke 6:12-16)

Luke's narrative in this passage focuses on Jesus choosing his twelve apostles from amongst his group of disciples. Unlike Matthew and Mark, Luke precedes the choosing of the apostles with Jesus praying throughout the night (Luke 6:12). It is not stated why Luke brings in the account of the selection of the twelve apostles immediately following this prayer. Perhaps Luke is showing a connection between this prayer and the choosing of the twelve. An examination of this gospel will reveal that Luke often shows Jesus praying during or prior to significant moments (e.g. Luke 3:21; 9:18, 28-30; 11:1; 22:32, 41-44).

There are at least seven such moments: (1) While he was praying (after his baptism), the Holy Spirit descended upon Jesus from heaven in bodily form like a dove and a heavenly voice announced that he was the beloved 'Son' and well pleasing (Luke 3:21). (2) In Luke 9:18, while he was praying, Jesus asked about the people's opinion about his identity (Luke 9:18). (3) While he was praying (in the presence of Peter, James and John), he became transfigured—his face changed and his clothes 'became dazzling white'—and Moses and Elijah appeared in glorious form and talked with him (Luke 9:28-30). (4) After praying at a certain place one day, his disciples asked him to teach them to pray (Luke 11:1). (5) He prayed for Simon Peter so that his faith might not fail when Satan sifts Peter and the other disciples like wheat (Luke 22:32). (6) He prayed earnestly that if the Father were willing he would take the pending cup from him (Luke 22:41-44). The prayer of Jesus in Luke

6:12, precedes his choosing of the twelve disciples whom he named 'apostles'. He gave them power and authority to exorcise demons, cure diseases, heal various illnesses and preach the kingdom of God (Luke 9:1, 2).

As with the accounts of Matthew and Mark, Luke mentions Judas Iscariot last on the listing of the apostles (Luke 6:14-16). Perhaps he too intended to portray Judas negatively as Matthew and Mark. However, Luke's version about the choosing of the twelve apostles (Luke 6:13-16) shows a clearer, intentional selectivity of the twelve than those of Matthew and Mark. For instance, he shows that Jesus chose the twelve from amongst several of his disciples: προσεφώνησεν τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ἀπ' αὐτῶν δώδεκα, οὓς καὶ ἀποστόλους ὠνόμασεν (6:13, 'he called his disciples and chose twelve of them, whom he also named apostles'). Luke substantiates this by stating that Jesus later 'stood...with a great crowd of his disciples' (6:17).

Unlike Matthew and Mark who qualify Judas with παραδίδωμι after their naming of the twelve apostles, thus prompting Klassen and others to argue that Judas only handed Jesus over rather than betray him (Klassen 1996:47-58; Carlson 2010:472-474), Luke uses προδότης. Hence he writes, καὶ Ἰούδαν Ἰακώβου καὶ Ἰούδαν Ἰσκαριώθ, ὃς ἐγένετο προδότης ('and Judas Iscariot, who became a traitor', Luke 6:16). Προδότης actually means 'traitor', 'betrayer' (BDAG 2000:867; cf. Thayer 1988-2007:n.p.; EDNT 1988-2007:n.p.). Luke uses the term in Acts (7:52) of Stephen charging the Sanhedrin with betraying and murdering Jesus (ὕμεῖς προδότες καὶ φονεῖς ἐγένεσθε ('You have become his betrayers and murderers').

It is interesting to note that all the prominent English Bibles (except the NCV that translates προδότης as 'turned over'), which disagree on the translation of παραδίδωμι, translate προδότης variously as 'betray', 'betrayer', 'traitors', 'traitorous', 'treacherous', 'turn against' respectively. Paul used προδότης to describe the treacherous action of people living within 'the last days' (2 Tim 3:4). Maccabees (2 Macc. 5:15) describes Menelaus as a 'traitor to the laws, and to his country' because he gave away the holy vessels that the kings had dedicated to glorify and honor the palace.

The BDAG (2000:198) points out that the use of ἐγένετο (from γίνομαι) in Luke 6:16 means ‘to experience a change in nature and so indicate entry into a new condition’. The first occurrence of this use of γίνομαι is in Matthew 4:3. There the tempter told Jesus to ‘command...stones to become (γίνωνται) loaves of bread’. The stones would become loaves of bread only when they change in their nature and enter into a new condition. The same is true of those to whom Jesus gives ‘the right to become (γενέσθαι) children of God’ for believing in him and receiving him’ (John 1:12), and of the λόγος becoming flesh (John 1:14).

Every occurrence of γίνομαι indicates that those that it refers to were not always in their present or expected states. Matthew and Mark do not bother to mention the possibility that Judas Iscariot was someone other than a ‘traitor’. Luke may be suggesting therefore that Judas Iscariot might not have betrayed Jesus had he not become a traitor. By contrast, Matthew and Mark may have been concerned about reporting the fact that Judas Iscariot betrayed Jesus, without thinking about the probable cause for his action.

Γίνομαι is used in this sense also in other passages, including, Matthew 4:3; 5:45; Mark 1:17; Luke 23:12; Acts 26:29; Romans 2:25; 4:18; 1 Corinthians 3:18; 4:9; 13:11; Galatians 3:13; Colossians 1:23; Hebrews 5:5; Revelation 8:11. Thus, γίνομαι being used with Judas indicates that he had not been ‘a traitor’ from the beginning. He may have become ‘a traitor’ either before or after ‘Satan entered into’ him (Luke 22:3; cf. Robertson 2011:136; Zwiép 2004:139). Luke does not indicate that Jesus who chose Judas made him a ‘traitor’. According to Luke’s account, Jesus divinely selected Judas Iscariot from among many other disciples, but that Judas Iscariot ‘became a traitor’. Judas’ free will may have been involved in his becoming a ‘traitor’. This passage therefore suggests compatibilism between divine selection and the exercise of human free will to satisfy human desires.

4.5.3 Satan Enters into Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism (Luke 22:1-6)

Luke starts this section of his narrative with the nearness of the Passover (v. 1), and the chief priests and the scribes’ desire to kill Jesus (v. 2). Furthermore, he mentions, ‘Satan entered into Judas called Iscariot’ (Εἰσῆλθεν δὲ Σατανᾶς εἰς Ἰούδαν τὸν καλούμενον Ἰσκαριώτην, v. 3). After Satan entered into Judas Iscariot, ‘he went

away and conferred with the chief priests and officers of the temple police about how he might betray (Jesus) to them' (καὶ ἀπελθὼν συνελάλησεν τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσιν καὶ στρατηγοῖς τὸ πῶς αὐτοῖς παραδῶ αὐτόν, v. 4). It appears, that Luke links the religious leaders' plan to kill Jesus with Satan entering into Judas Iscariot, and Judas Iscariot going to them to negotiate his betrayal of Jesus to them. Furthermore, Luke seems to portray Judas Iscariot as sharing the mindset of the chief priests and officers of the temple police during his conference with them (Robertson 2011:139, 140).

Luke does not indicate the point at which Judas Iscariot made himself vulnerable to Satan. What he indicates is that Satan entered into Judas Iscariot and afterward Judas Iscariot went to the chief priests and officers. Luke's description of the events portrays Satan as the controlling agent who guided Judas Iscariot and stirred him into going to the chief priests and officers of the temple police (Luke 22:3, 4; cf. Adeyemo 2006:1282; Carter 2000:21; Kelley 1995:38-40; Pennington 2010:11, 12); Butterick, Bowie et al. 1980:689; Carpenter and McCown 1988-2007:n.p.). Notwithstanding, Kelly (1995:2-4) holds Judas culpable for his action rather than attributing it to Satan.

The basis for his indictment is that he thinks that Judas had the freedom and choice to resist Satan. I would agree with Kelly, in view of Matthew's, Mark's, John's and Luke's portrayals of Judas' character and actions (e.g. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11). Moreover, I agree with Kelly in view of James' command to his audience to 'Resist the devil, and he will flee from you' (Jas 4:7) and God holding Adam liable for his disobedience, even though it was him who gave Adam the fruit to eat (Gen 3:6, 17).

Matthew (12:22-28, 43—45) and Luke 11:26 speak about demons and unclean spirits dwelling within people and making them sick. Matthew (12:28) records Jesus referring to Satan casting out Satan in the context of curing the demoniac that he cured (Matt 12:22). However, Luke 22:3 is the first mention in the New Testament of Satan himself entering into a person. Prior to this entering into Judas, Satan had disguised as a serpent and deceived Eve and Adam, without entering them (Gen 3:1-15). Revelation (12:7-9; 20:2) also identifies Satan as a dragon, ancient serpent, devil, Satan and deceiver of the whole world. Also prior to his encounter with Judas,

Satan 'incited David to count the people of Israel', without entering into him (1 Chr 21:1; cf. Malone 2009:15).

Matthew (4:5) records another encounter that Satan had with a person. In this passage Matthew records that 'the devil took (Jesus) to the holy city and placed him on the pinnacle of the temple'. Like the previous encounters, Satan did not enter Jesus. Furthermore, Satan influenced Ananias to withhold a portion of the proceeds he got from selling his land (Acts 5:1-3). This passage too does not indicate that Satan entered into Ananias.

The entering of Satan into Judas Iscariot was, however, not peculiar. Keener states that the Mediterranean world was aware of spirits entering into people to empower them to do good or evil works (Keener 2003:919). Even though Luke (22:3) states explicitly, 'Then Satan entered into Judas called Iscariot, who was one of the twelve', Kelly (1995:40) argues that Satan may have entered into Judas only by the willingness and permission of Judas. The point at which Judas became susceptible to Satan is unknown. What is known, is that Satan actually entered into Judas, and afterwards Judas, not Satan, 'went and conferred with the chief priests and officers of the temple police' (Luke 22:3, 4).

The Bible has accounts of demons and evil spirits possessing people and influencing their behavior and activities. For example, a certain slave girl who was possessed by 'a spirit of divination...brought her owners a great deal of money by fortune-telling' (Acts 16:16). Secondly, a certain man whom 'evil spirits' possessed jumped on the seven sons of Sceva, who were attempting to exorcise the spirits, overpowered them, beat them, wounded them and stripped them naked (Acts 19:14-16). Sometimes evil spirits exerted their influences upon humans without entering into them. For example, David commanded Joab and the other commanders of his army to take a census of Israel because 'Satan...incited David to count the people of Israel' (1 Chr 21:1-6). Carter (2000:19-31) argues that demons or evil spirits cannot enter into born-again Christians or possess those Christians who walk in good relationship with God. He bases his argument on scriptural indications that God's Holy Spirit dwells in Christians, and that God's Spirit cannot cohabitate simultaneously with demons and evil spirits. Carter's argument does make sense.

Notwithstanding, it could be argued that if Christians stop walking with God and start gratifying the desires of the flesh, they may give a foothold to demons, evil spirits and Satan himself (Eph 4:27; 1 Tim 3:7; 2 Tim 2:26; 1 Pet 5:8; cf. Asumang 2008:1-19). These passages indicate two significant ways by which Christians can avoid giving evil spirits, demons and Satan a foothold. Firstly, devoted Christians can avoid giving any kind of advantage to evil spiritual forces by getting rid of ungodly attitude and actions (Eph 4:27; 1 Tim 3:7; 2 Tim 2:26; 1 Pet 5:8). Secondly, devoted Christians can avoid them by putting on 'the whole armor of God' (Eph 6:10-17; cf. Jas 4:7, 8).

It seems David gave a foothold to Satan when he put his own interest ahead of God's interest and Israel's interest. For instance, Scripture says, David commanded Joab to 'Go and number Israel...and bring me report, so that I may know their number' (1 Chr 21:2b, NRSV). Afterwards, David held himself liable for his action (1 Chr 21:17). He confessed to God that he had sinned (1 Chr 21:8, 17). He could have avoided giving Satan the opportunity to use him. David's confession implies he accepted liability for his action. In the same way, Judas Iscariot's confession of his sin (Matt 27:4, 5) implies liability for his betrayal of Jesus.

Morris (2016:290-301) points out that both the Jewish and Qumran communities accepted the possibility of evil spirits possessing people. He suggests that those Jews who did not want evil spirits to possess them had to resist those spirits by committing themselves to the study of and observance of the Torah. Concerning members of the Qumran community, they could repel evil spirits by faithful keeping their membership. Concerning Judas Iscariot, Morris' point of view suggests that Judas could have repelled Satan, obeyed the teachings of Jesus and remained a faithful disciple of Jesus. Garland (2011:843) argues that Satan will certainly take control of Christ's disciples 'who let down their guard and open themselves up to temptation, even those who are closest to Jesus, to lead them to commit unthinkable acts of betrayal'.

It is worth mentioning that African Traditional Religion (ATR) also has accounts of evil spiritual forces possessing humans. Many Africans tap into spiritual forces and allow supernatural agents to possess them, which influence their activities (cf. Mashau 2007:639-653). In many West African countries, people whom these

spiritual forces or agents sometimes go into a trance and speak with voices that are not theirs. They also have the ability to disclose the deeds of people and even predict immediate or future events, which occur. Thus, this phenomenon has a widespread documentary occurrence in various cultures (Stoller 2013:17-48; Ekeke 2011:1-18; O'Byrne 2015:1-50; Schmidt and Huskinson 2010:35-204).

Generally, there are two key causes for these demonic or evil spiritual invasions of people in Africa. One cause is by personally invoking them for spiritual power or for their favor. The other cause is by external-covenantal-transmission. That is, some family members willfully invoke these demons or evil spirits and make a perpetual generational covenant with them. Consequently, their descendants become automatic targets for these demons or evil spirits. Thus, these family members put themselves and their descendants in the position to become agents or mediums of these demons or evil spirits.

It is worth mentioning that some of these agents are 'good' and bring benefits to their communities. In Liberia, for example, such agents expose marital unfaithfulness and mysterious crimes⁷. In addition, these agents grab, and sometimes, kill witches and people who transform into animals to destroy farms belonging to the community or belonging to individuals (cf. O'Byrne 2015:20, 22). Unlike these 'good' agents and mediums, other people possess spirits or demons that control them to do evil acts. The truth is, these spirits or demons do not invade their bodies unless people permit them knowingly or make themselves vulnerable to them (cf. Stoller 2013:17-48; Ekeke 2011:1-18; O'Byrne 2015:1-50). Evil spirits or demons are available and are ready to enter into people who make themselves vulnerable to them—people who do not make themselves available to the Spirit of God (cf. Maston 2009:116-151). The community does hold evil agents or mediums liable for their actions rather than the evil spirits or demons (cf. Brand 2016:81, 78-92; O'Byrne 2015:20, 22).

The above discussions imply that God has not created a world in which he predetermined every thought and deed of humans to the extent that they respond to

⁷ They apply what is known as 'Sasawoo'. The agent smears some traditional chalk on the leg of the accused and lays a very hot machete to the spot. If the accused is innocent, the machete does not burn him or her. On the contrary, if the accused is guilty, the machete burns the leg; the person does not heal quickly. Sometimes, the *Sasawoo* is cane. The agent rubs some of the chalk on the cane, speaks a few words, and the cane automatically whips the guilty person. The Government of Liberia employs some of these agents to help investigate mysterious crimes.

his will automatically and robotically. Thus, he has given humans the freedom to exercise their will, according to their desires, in spite of the fact that he is in sovereign, providential control of his creation (1QS III, 15-16:1-10; Brand 2013:78-82; Maston 2009:21-187).

It appears that Judas also put himself in apposition to become an agent of Satan, as indicated by the Gospel of Luke. Like the people referred to above, Judas too is culpable for Satan's invasion of his life. Satan entering into Judas did not disrupt the exercise of his free will. Garland (2011:485) agrees, and states, even though when Satan entered into Judas Iscariot he controlled his action, yet 'there is no hint that Judas [was] like a demoniac, unable to control his own actions'. Luke's description of Judas Iscariot as the one 'who became a traitor' (6:16) rather than the one 'who was made a traitor', implies that Satan did not make him a traitor. Judas Iscariot therefore was responsible for his action, despite also acting under the influence of Satan.

Luke mentions that Judas 'conferred with the chief priests and officers of the temple police about how (πῶς) he might betray (Jesus) to them' (Luke 22:4). This implies that Judas sought advice on the way in which he should betray Jesus. Perhaps, it was at this time that they agreed to Judas' conspiracy to kiss Jesus as a mark of identification (Luke 22:47, 48). In addition, Luke mentions that Judas continually sought for an opportunity to betray Jesus (Luke 22:6). Luke's account of Judas Iscariot indicates strongly that he held Judas liable for his betrayal of Jesus, regardless of the fact that Jesus chose him to be his disciple.

4.5.4 Judas Iscariot in Luke 22:13-23 and Compatibilism

The key event of this passage is the observance of the Passover Meal by Jesus and his disciples. The passage shows that Judas Iscariot partook of this Passover Meal after Satan had entered into him (22:3, 14-21). Perhaps this is why Jesus revealed that the person who was betraying him was eating with him at the table (πληνίδου ἡ χεῖρτοῦ παραδιδόντος με μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιτῆς τραπέζης, 'But see, the one who betrays me is with me, and his hand is on the table' Luke 22:21).

The passage shows too that in addition to Luke using προδότης earlier with Judas (Luke 6:16), he uses παραδίδωμι with him during the meal (Luke 22:21). This may suggest that Luke did not see any significant difference in meaning between the two

words. Interestingly, in spite of Jesus' foreknowledge that Judas would betray him to his enemies, Jesus still looked forward to having the meal with his disciples, including Judas (Luke 22:15). During the meal, Jesus announced that his betrayal had been determined (Luke 22:22). This statement agrees with Matthew's (Matt 26:24) and Mark's (Mark 14:21) reporting that the betrayal was a fulfillment of the Scriptures. Also like Matthew (26:22, 25) and Mark (14:19), Luke records that all of the disciples protested their innocence of betrayal (Luke 22:23).

However, unlike Matthew and Mark, Luke shows that the disciples protested their innocence to one another instead of to Jesus (22:23). This may well be additional information that Luke intended to add to indicate the reality of what happened at the table. However, it could indicate Luke's intention to highlight Judas Iscariot's hypocrisy in denying his intention not only to Jesus but also to the community of disciples. Jesus' pronouncement of 'woe' to his betrayer implies Judas Iscariot's culpability and non-divine coercion. Jesus chose Judas Iscariot to be his disciple, but Judas Iscariot chose to become a traitor.

4.5.5 Judas Iscariot's Betrayal in Luke 22:47, 48 and Compatibilism

The setting of this passage is the Mount of Olives where Jesus had gone to pray (Luke 22:39). On this day he prayed that the Father might let his pending 'cup' of shame, suffering and death pass from him (Luke 22:40-46). He also asked his disciples who were with him to pray too, so that they might not enter into temptation (Luke 22:46). Luke states that while Jesus was still speaking to his disciples, Judas, 'one of the twelve', arrived with a crowd that he was leading (Luke 22:47). Matthew and Mark do not say explicitly that Judas Iscariot led the crowd, as Luke does.

Luke's account about what occurred next differs slightly from those of Matthew and Mark. That is, while Matthew (26:49) and Mark (14:45) record that Judas kissed Jesus upon his arrival with the crowd, Luke records that Judas 'approached Jesus to kiss him'

(Ἰούδας εἰς τῶν δώδεκα προήρχετο αὐτούς, καὶ ἤγγισεν τῷ Ἰησοῦ φιλησάμενόν, 'Judas, one of the twelve, was leading them. He approached Jesus to kiss him', Luke 22:47). This may suggest that while Judas was moving toward Jesus to kiss him Jesus foreknew his intention to betray him with a kiss (Luke 22:47, 48).

Thus, Luke presents Jesus asking Judas a direct question, 'Ιούδα, φιλήματιπὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδωσ; ('Judas, is it with a kiss that you are betraying the Son of Man?' (Luke 22:48). Matthew's account (Matt 26:50) is that Jesus reminded Judas Iscariot to do what he had come to do ('Ἐταῖρε, ἐφ' ὃ πάρει). Jesus' direct question in Luke's account mostly likely indicated to Judas Iscariot that Jesus foreknew his intention. Jesus' question also implies Judas Iscariot's use of human free will. Particularly, Jesus' rhetorical question was, perhaps meant to warn and dissuade Judas Iscariot from proceeding with his betrayal. Luke records that Jesus employed παραδίδωμι with Judas Iscariot in this passage (22:48). Thus, despite the different influences in his action, Judas Iscariot could have resisted not betraying Jesus.

Earlier, Luke employed προδότης with Judas Iscariot (6:16). It is uncertain why Luke uses both terms. It is likely that Luke uses the terms interchangeably, but with the meaning of 'betray' or 'traitor'. For it would be illogical and ironic for him to describe Judas as προδότης earlier and then use παραδίδωμι to vindicate Judas from the charge of 'betrayal' to a mere 'handing over', as Klassen(1996:47-74) has argued. The action of Judas indicates treachery and disloyalty. Luke uses προδότης also of the Sanhedrin whom Stephen accused of betraying and murdering Jesus (Acts 7:52). I agree with Robertson's (2011:86, 87) point of view that it is appropriate to translate παραδίδωμι as 'betray' in this passage (and the other Gospels) with reference to Judas.

4.5.6 Summary of the Examination of Relevant Passages of Luke

The examination of the Gospel of Luke has shown that Jesus personally chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his twelve choice disciples/apostles. The examination has shown also that Luke uses παραδίδωμι with Judas Iscariot during the Passover Meal (22:21, 22) and during the time Judas Iscariot approached Jesus to kiss him (22:48). Furthermore, Luke uses προδότης to describe Judas Iscariot as 'treacherous' (6:16). Luke's use of προδότης with Judas Iscariot is significant, in that it portrays Judas Iscariot as the one who handed Jesus over treacherously.

The examination has also revealed that Jesus reacted when Judas 'approached Jesus to kiss him' (Luke 22:47, 48). Luke's account states explicitly that Satan entered into Judas (22:3). In addition, Luke states that Judas Iscariot went to the

chief priests and officers of the temple after Satan entered into him (22:4). This implies that Satan caused Judas Iscariot to go to confer with the chief priests, in spite of the fact that he describes Judas as a ‘traitor’ (προδότης). The question now is who bears the responsibility for betraying Jesus—Satan or Judas? It would be of interest to see whether Luke holds Judas responsible for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus or not, in the book of Acts.

4.6 Examination of Relevant Passages of Acts (1:15-17; 1:18-20; 1:21-26)

4.6.1 Genre of Acts and Interface of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free will

The introductions of the Gospel of Luke (1:1-4) and Acts (1:1-3) indicate that Luke authored both books. Acts appears to be a narrative extension of the Gospel of Luke (1:1-3). Acts is a historical book, which shifts from Jesus’ earthly ministry to the ministry of the apostles. The book also gives the history of the birth and expansion of the Church through the Holy Spirit (1:1-28:31; cf. Bock 2007:23, 23; Harper 1990:1620; MacArthur 2010:1588). Acts indicates the composition of the Church as being both Jews and Gentiles (2:1-28:29; cf. Bock 2007:22-26; Huggins 2014). The book of Acts is therefore not biographical like the gospels.

As a historian, Luke informs Theophilus (the primary recipient of Acts, 1:1) that Jesus resurrected, appeared to his apostles whom he had chosen and continued to teach them until he ascended into heaven (Acts 1:1-9). Creamer, Spencer and Vijoen (2014:1-3) identify Theophilus as probably a Roman government official who may have already ‘received some teaching about Christianity’. During one of the days that Jesus was with them, he commanded them to remain in Jerusalem until they were ‘baptized by the Holy Spirit’ a few days later, (Acts 1:5) so that they would be his witnesses from Jerusalem ‘to the ends of the earth’ (Acts 1:8). After Jesus finished speaking these words, he ascended to heaven while they looked on (Acts 1:9-11). The apostles who received the teachings and the assurance that they would be baptized in the Holy Spirit were eleven of the twelve apostles whom Jesus had chosen; Judas was now missing (Acts 1:12, 13).

In the present passage, Peter tells his colleagues (the other ten apostles) and the other disciples about Judas Iscariot’s fate. He tells them also that Judas’ fate fulfilled

Scripture (v. 16). The book shows that Peter makes at least three significant disclosures regarding Judas. Firstly, Peter discloses that Judas Iscariot had shared in the apostolic ministry with them: ὅτι κατηριθμημένος ἦν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἔλαχεν τὸν κληρονομίαν διακονίας ταύτης, ('for he was numbered among us and was allotted his share in this ministry', v. 17). Secondly, he discloses, 'Judas became a guide for those who arrested Jesus' (Ἰούδα τοῦ γενομένου ὁδηγοῦ τοῖς συλλαβοῦσιν Ἰησοῦν, v. 16).

Thirdly, Peter discloses that Judas Iscariot's action was necessary to fulfill Scripture: ἔδει πληρωθῆναι τὴν γραφὴν ἣν προεῖπεν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον διὰ στόματος Δαυὶδ περὶ Ἰούδα ('the scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit through David foretold concerning Judas', v. 16). The BDAG (2000:214) gives two important definitions of 'δει': (1) 'to be under necessity of happening, it is necessary, one must, one has to' and (2) 'to be something that should happen because of being fitting'. Luke most likely uses 'δει' in these two senses in Acts 1:16. Several New Testament passages employ the term also during various occasions, including the following:

Matthew 23:23: Jesus tells the Pharisees and scribes that they 'ought [δει] to have practiced...justice and mercy and faith...'

Luke 2:49: The young Jesus asked his parents whether they did not know that he 'must [δει] be in (his) Father's house?'

John 3:14: Jesus told Nicodemus, 'And just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must [δει] the Son of Man be lifted up'.

John 4:4: John writes that Jesus 'had to [δει] go through Samaria'. The KJV translates 'δει' more emphatically here: 'And he must needs [δει] go through Samaria'.

Acts 4:12: Peter told Annas the high priest, Caiaphas and others that all mortals 'must [δει] be saved' only through the name of Jesus.

The action of Judas was therefore necessary to fulfill the Scripture (Acts 1:16). Zwiep (2004:8, 177-179; cf. Novick 2010:795-799) argues that because Judas' action was necessary to fulfill Scripture, Judas could not have acted freely and thus should not

be held liable. Notwithstanding, the immediate context of the first chapter of Acts suggests that Judas Iscariot was responsible for his betrayal (1:18-20). Clearly, Luke understood that Judas Iscariot's actions were compatible with divine foreknowledge without relinquishing his culpability as Peter proceeds to indicate in this passage.

4.6.2 Judas Iscariot's Betrayal in Acts 1:15-17 and Compatibilism

Zwiep's acquittal of Judas Iscariot above is untenable, in view of the accounts of Matthew and Luke that Judas was liable for his action (cf. Estrada 2001:207). These accounts indicate that Judas 'became a traitor' (Luke 6:16), confessed that he had sinned by means of his betrayal (Matt 27:3, 4), was wicked (Acts 1:16-18) and he indicted himself by returning the thirty pieces of silver (in order to undo his sinful action) and hanging himself (Matt 27:5; cf. Adeyemo 2006:1167). Additionally, Judas' action severed his relationship his colleagues (Acts 1:17). As a result, it was necessary to replace him (Acts 1:21-26). The severing of relationship with community members because of wrongdoing was practiced also by the Qumran Community (Brand 2016:77-92; Hempel 2003:59-81).

Like the Synoptic Gospels, the Book of Acts has shown that Judas was one of Jesus' disciples who served with his contemporaries (Acts 1:17, 25). In addition, like the Synoptic Gospels, Acts records that Judas' role in the arrest and death of Jesus was a fulfillment of Scripture (1:16). Peter told his fellow apostles and disciples, Ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί, ἔδει πληρωθῆναι τὴν γραφὴν ἣν προεῖπεν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον διὰ στόματος Δαυὶδ περὶ Ἰούδα τοῦ γενομένου ὁδηγοῦ τοῖς συλλαβοῦσιν Ἰησοῦν ('Men and brethren, this Scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke before by the mouth of David concerning Judas, who became a guide to those who arrested Jesus' NKJV). This passage comprises compatibility of both divine predetermination (ἔδει πληρωθῆναι τὴν γραφὴν ἣν προεῖπεν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον διὰ στόματος Δαυὶδ περὶ Ἰούδα) and free human action (Ἰούδα τοῦ γενομένου ὁδηγοῦ τοῖς συλλαβοῦσιν Ἰησοῦν). Peter's use of ἔδει implies that Judas' action was not apart from divine foreknowledge and divine providence (cf. Huggins 2014:4-9); however, Peter holds Judas liable for his action (1:16-20; cf. Walton 2008:296). Acts therefore suggests compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will, as do the Synoptic Gospels.

4.6.3 Judas Iscariot is Liable for His Betrayal (Acts 1:18-20)

Peter holds Judas liable for his action of betrayal, according to this passage. In fact, he charged Judas with receiving a reward based on his wickedness (Acts 1:18). The mention of 'reward' indicates that Judas' love of money motivated him to betray Jesus (Robertson 2011:158). Luke records that Judas bought a field with this 'reward of his wickedness' (Acts 1:18). It was in this 'field' that Judas died horribly. Peter's statement about Judas buying a field appears to contradict the earlier account of Matthew that it was the chief priests who bought the field instead of Judas (Matt 27:7).

One probable explanation of this apparent contradiction is that when Judas threw the thirty pieces of silver in the temple the chief priests picked up the silver pieces and bought the field in Judas' name as suggested by Matthew (Matt 27:5-10). Buying the field in the name of Judas may have been understood by Peter to show that it was Judas who bought it, as recorded in Acts (Acts 1:18). Bock (2007:83) supports this view by stating, 'Judas's money led to the purchase of the field. Thus it may well be that in a "causative" sense he purchased the field'.

Afterwards, Peter states, the death of Judas out in the field was the fulfillment of the book of Psalms (Psa 69:25 and 109:8). The context of Psalm 69:25 is that David asks God for his favor and deliverance from his human and non-human foes (Psa 69:1-21). In verses 22-28, he asks that God judge all of the wicked people who have troubled him. Part of their judgment is the desolation of their camp (v. 25). Peter speaks of the desolation of Judas' place in verse 25. This place is most likely the 'field of blood' wherein Judas died horribly (Acts 1:20); (cf. Matt 27:5-10). Acts therefore indicates that the first Christians consistently framed the actions of Judas in the context of the fulfillment of Scripture and yet were under no illusion that Judas acted out of his own free will.

Peter also alludes to divine and human involvement in the death of Jesus during his post-Pentecost discourse: 'this man, handed over to you according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of those outside the law' (Acts 2:23). 'Handed over' is from ἔκδοτον (to deliver to an enemy, BDAG 2000:301) rather than παραδίωμι. Whether it was Judas or Pilate that

delivered Jesus over to his enemies, Peter declares that God both foreknew about the act, and planned it. Nevertheless, Peter holds the Jewish leaders liable for crucifying and killing Jesus by 'the hands of those outside the law'. Concerning Judas Iscariot, Peter states explicitly that he 'acquired a field with the reward of his wickedness' (Acts 1:18).

4.6.4 Judas Iscariot Deserves His Fate (Acts 1:21-26)

This passage indicates that Peter clearly charges Judas Iscariot with apostasy (1:25): ἀφ' ἧς παρέβη Ἰούδας πορευθῆναι εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν ἴδιον ('from which Judas turned aside to go to his own place'). The question now is what does Peter mean by Judas going 'to his own place'? Commentators have proposed several meanings, including the following: (1) Judas Iscariot's own house, (2) Judas Iscariot's former occupation (cf. Bock 2007:89), (3) the field that Judas Iscariot purchased and died in, (4) the state of the dead, in general and (5) hell (cf. Robertson 2011:154).

In view of the place and manner of Judas' death, and the fact that other humans will be sent to hell at the end time (cf. Rev 20:11-15; Matt 25:31-46), the most likely meaning of Judas turning aside 'to go to his own place', might be going to the place that he deserved. Peter says, he bought this place with his wickedness. It is where he died his gruesome death (Acts 1:18-25). The mentioning of Judas' wickedness places liability on him. Whatever meaning interpreters give to Peter's statement, it is therefore suggestive.

What is of much clarity, according to the context of this passage (and the Synoptic Gospels), is that Judas became an apostate by his own free will. He subsequently lost his place of ministry amongst his colleagues (Acts 1:17-25) and 'lost his opportunity to sit on one of the twelve thrones' (Robertson 2011:182; cf. Luke 22:30). Peter's charge therefore offers one significant implication: that Judas is liable for his actions. Peter told the brethren also that because Judas Iscariot had turned aside from the apostolic ministry, it was necessary (δεῖ) for someone else to take his place of leadership. (Acts 1:21, 22; cf. Psa 109:8; Novick 2010:795-799). Peter's quotation of Psalm 109:8 strengthens his argument for the immediate and necessary replacement of Judas. After praying and seeking the face of God, God chose Matthias to replace Judas through the casting of lots by the apostles (Acts 1:26).

This suggests that God approved of Judas Iscariot's replacement (cf. Lev 16:8-10; Josh 18:6, 8; Neh 10:34; Prov 16:33).

4.6.5 Summary of Examination of Acts 1:15-17; 1:18-20; 1:21-26

The examination of Acts 1:15-17; 1:18-20; 1:21-26 has shown that the account of Acts has both similarities and dissimilarities with those of the Synoptic Gospels.

Similarities

Like the Synoptic Gospels (Matt 10:1-5; Mark 3:13-19; Luke 6:13-16), Acts (1:17, 25) shows that Judas was one of the apostolic ministers just like Peter and the other apostles.

Like the Synoptic Gospels (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22), Acts (1:15-21) shows that the actions of Judas Iscariot had been predicted and thus fulfilled Scripture.

Like the Synoptic Gospels (Matt 26:15; Mark 14:10; Luke 22:5), Acts (1:18) records that Judas Iscariot received remuneration for his action.

Like the Synoptic Gospels (Matt 26:48-50; Mark 14:44-46; Luke 22:47, 48), Acts (1:16) records that Judas Iscariot guided the people who arrested Jesus.

As Matthew (27:5), Acts (1:18) reports that Judas Iscariot hanged himself.

Dissimilarities

Matthew and Acts differ in their reports regarding Judas Iscariot's response after he realized that Jesus had been condemned. Matthew reports that Judas 'returned the thirty silver coins to the chief priests and the elders' (27:3, NIV), while Acts states that he 'bought a field with the reward he had received from the chief priests for betraying Jesus to them (Acts 1:18).

- Unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts reports that the remuneration that Judas Iscariot received was a result of his wicked action (1:18).
- Unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts reports the replacement of Judas Iscariot by another person whom it names as 'Matthias' (1:20-26).

While the Gospel of Luke indicates that Satan influenced the role that Judas played in betraying Jesus (Luke 22:3, 4), Acts (1:15-20) appears to hold Judas completely responsible for his act of betrayal.

- Unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts does not use παραδίδωμι or προδότης with reference to the role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest of Jesus.
- Unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts (1:18) describes the betrayal of Judas Iscariot as wickedness.

The accounts of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts have shown compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Firstly, they show that Jesus chose Judas as one of his choice disciples and apostles whom he authorized to carry out various ministries (Matt 10:1-8; Mark 3:13-19; Luke 6:13-16; Acts 1:17). Secondly, they reveal that the betrayal of Jesus by Judas was a fulfillment of scriptural prophecy (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Acts 1:16). Thirdly, they indicate that Judas Iscariot willfully betrayed Jesus for remuneration (Matt 10:4; 26:14; Mark 3:19; 14:10; Luke 6:16; 22:4; Acts 1:16, 18). In fact, Acts (Acts 1:18) describes this remuneration as the result of the wickedness of Judas.

We are once again faced with evidence that the Synoptic Gospels framed the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will in a non-contrastive transcendent manner. The book of Acts reflects this further. In fact, Acts appears to emphasize Judas' apostasy, the forfeiture of his apostleship and ministry more than the Gospels (Acts 1:16-18, 25). Whereas, Luke in his gospel adds the element of the role of Satan in influencing Judas' will, he puts the responsibility for Judas' action upon his own head. Paul does mention Judas concerning the death of Jesus also. However, the question is whether he too shows this interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

4.7 Examination of Romans 4:25a and Compatibilism

Paul's statement in this passage follows his lengthy discourse concerning Abraham's faith in the words of God and God crediting that faith as righteousness (Rom 4:1-22). Afterwards, Paul applies the faith of Abraham and the righteousness that God credits because of it to those who believe in God who raised Jesus from the dead (Rom

4:23, 24). The death of Jesus was necessary 'for our trespasses' (Rom 4:25a). The passive statement, ὃς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν ('who was handed over to death for our trespasses', Rom 4:25a) indicates that someone handed Jesus over in order to fulfill a particular plan ('for our trespasses', διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν).

This 'someone' is likely Judas Iscariot, according to the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, even though it is also possible that Paul had the Jewish leaders in mind. Paul may even have had God the Father in mind, knowing that the Father 'gave his only Son' (John 3:16). The fulfillment of the divine plan 'for our trespasses', and the role of the human agent to 'hand Jesus over' to effect this plan, demonstrate the compatibility of human free will and divine foreknowledge and purpose. Paul's statement is limited and does not provide an adequate basis for full comparison with the depiction of Judas Iscariot in the gospels. Even so, there is enough indication that he shares the same outlook as the gospels with regard to the nature of this interaction.

4.8 Summary and Conclusion of the Examination of Relevant Passages of the Synoptic Gospels, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans

The examinations of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts have shown that they all agree on Judas Iscariot being a prominent disciple and an apostle of Jesus (Matt 10:1-5; Mark 3:13-19; Luke 6:13-16; Acts 1:17, 25). They also agree that Judas Iscariot's action had been predicted, as well as it had fulfilled Scripture (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Acts 1:15-20). This fulfillment of scriptures by the action of Judas Iscariot suggests that God had foreknowledge of his action; yet, it does not infer that God's foreknowledge annulled Judas' action. The passages also show that Judas Iscariot received remuneration for his action (Matt 26:15; Mark 14:10; Luke 22:5; Acts 1:18) and that Judas guided those who arrested Jesus (Matt 26:48-50; Mark 14:44-46; Luke 22:47, 48; Acts 1:16).

Matthew and Acts report that Judas hanged himself (Matt 27:5; Acts 1:18). Furthermore, the Synoptic Gospels record that Judas initiated the bargaining with the chief priests about betraying Jesus to them (Matt 26:14; Mark 14:10; Luke 22:4) and that Judas determinedly sought to betray Jesus (Matt 26:16; Mark 14:11; Luke 22:6). This determination indicates Judas Iscariot's willfulness to achieve his own objective.

It is worth noting that these books differ on certain minor details regarding Judas Iscariot. For example, Luke indicates in his gospel that Satan influenced the role that Judas played in betraying Jesus (22:3, 4); however, he indicates in Acts that Judas was completely responsible (Acts 1:15-20).

Additionally, Matthew and Acts differ in their reports regarding Judas Iscariot's response after he realized that the religious leaders had condemned Jesus. Matthew's account is that Judas 'returned the thirty silver coins to the chief priests and the elders' (27:3, NIV), while Acts states that he 'bought a field with the reward he had received from the chief priests for betraying Jesus to them (Acts 1:18). Also unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts reports that the remuneration that Judas Iscariot received was the result of his wicked action (1:18). Moreover, Acts records that another person would replace Judas Iscariot (1:20). The mentioning of Judas Iscariot receiving a reward for his wickedness makes him liable for his action.

Mark and Luke indicate that the chief priests promised to pay Judas if he betrayed Jesus to them (Mark 14:11; Luke 22:5, 6), while Matthew indicates that they paid Judas Iscariot before he began to seek for an opportune time to betray Jesus (Matt 26:15, 16). Matthew and Mark use παραδίδωμι to describe the action of Judas Iscariot and thus do not call him a 'betrayed' explicitly. Luke uses προδότης notwithstanding, and portrays Judas Iscariot as a traitor (Luke 6:16). Finally, unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts does not use παραδίδωμι or προδότης with reference to the role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest of Jesus. Paul's Letter to the Romans (Rom 4:25a) uses παραδίδωμι but with allusion to Judas only; it does not mention the name of Judas Iscariot explicitly or suggest anything about his character.

This chapter has analyzed the character of Judas and has shown that the various passages which have been examined do portray his character negatively. He is a greedy traitor who, by his own free will, betrayed his master to the Jewish authorities, even though Luke suggests a satanic influence. Furthermore, the chapter has shown that Judas Iscariot is guilty of betraying Jesus in spite of Jesus' foreknowledge that he would betray him, and in spite of Jesus choosing Judas Iscariot as a choice disciple/apostle. The findings in this chapter have shown too that Judas Iscariot regretted his action and subsequently hanged himself. These actions show his culpability.

Finally, this chapter has shown the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in the betrayal and arrest of Jesus. The evangelist John writes of Jesus, ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Οὐκ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς δώδεκα ἐξελεξάμην, καὶ ἐξ ὑμῶν εἷς διάβολός ἐστιν; ('Did I not choose you, the twelve, and one of you is a devil?' ASV). Overall, these evangelists may have intended to teach their audiences about the probability of any of them whose character was like that of Judas Iscariot's, apostatizing. Moreover, they may have intended to teach their audiences that God would hold them culpable for their actions, irrespective of any demonic or satanic influence.

CHAPTER FIVE

EXAMINATION OF RELEVANT PASSAGES RELATED TO JUDAS ISCARIOT IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

5.1 Introduction

This study has so far attempted to evaluate the hypothesis that there is compatibility between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. In order to carry out this evaluation, the study has been focusing on Judas Iscariot's role in Christ's betrayal as a test case. Thus, the study has examined major philosophical and traditional Christian views concerning compatibility between these doctrines. In addition, this study has looked at passages that speak directly to these problems, as well as having examined various commentaries which deal with these problems. Thirdly, it has looked at literature of Second Temple Judaism in order to see whether the literature recognized these problems and how it addressed them. These investigations derived one main conclusion—that the compatibilists' and incompatibilists' points of view regarding the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will required further investigation.

Therefore, the study also examined relevant passages of the Old and New Testaments in order to determine what light they shed on this subject. They revealed that Yahweh foreknew certain individuals and nations and appointed them to accomplish his plans and purposes. They revealed also that some of the individuals, whom Yahweh chose to serve him, willfully rejected their assignments. He overruled the objections of some of them (e.g. Moses and Jeremiah), but left others (e.g. Pharaoh, Saul and Judas Iscariot) to their will and held them liable for their actions. Pharaoh (Exod 9:27, 28; 10:16, 17), Saul (1 Sam 15:24, 25) and Judas Iscariot (Matt 27:3-5) admitted liability for their actions.

The conclusion from the various examinations was that they showed evidence of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Regarding the role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest and death of Jesus Christ, the New Testament suggests that Jesus foreknew about it. Secondly, the New Testament indicates that Judas Iscariot remained unbelieving in Jesus even though he was one of Jesus'

'twelve disciples' whom Jesus had empowered to preach the good news about the kingdom of God, heal the sick, and exorcise demons. Thirdly, the New Testament shows that Judas Iscariot apostatized and lost his apostleship and ministry. Lastly, the New Testament points out that Judas Iscariot acknowledged his culpability for betraying Jesus, in spite of the fact that Jesus had chosen him and Satan influenced him in some manner.

The objective of the present chapter is twofold. Firstly, it is to examine relevant passages of the Gospel of John in order to explore how John characterizes Judas Iscariot, especially with respect to its comparison with the Synoptic Gospels. Secondly, it aims to explore how John configures the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in relation to Judas Iscariot. The goal of this examination is to help test whether the manner in which John characterizes Judas Iscariot's personality, betrayal and fate might also help more precisely explain the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will.

This study has chosen to treat the Gospel of John separately from the Synoptic Gospels particularly because their narratives about Jesus, Jesus' ministry and their theological contents are not completely similar. It is safe therefore to investigate John separately and seek to explain whether its unique characterizations relate to any specific socio-pastoral contexts. John differs from the Synoptic Gospels in several ways. For example, unlike the Synoptic Gospels, John's gospel much more emphasizes Jesus' deity (1:1-18; 8:12-19, 48-58; 10:27-30; 14:1-11, 16, 17, 26; cf. Michaels 2010:39). Secondly, John portrays Jesus' mission differently (1:29, 30, 36; 3:14-18; 10:7-18). Thirdly, John portrays Jesus' choosing of his disciples differently (1:36-51). Fourthly, John depicts Jesus' relationship with his disciples differently (15:1-11). Fifthly, it depicts Jesus' relationship with the Father much more frequently (1:1, 2, 18, 33, 34; 5:16-30; 14:10, 11; 17:1-19). Sixthly, unlike the Synoptic Gospels, John more extensively stresses the mission of the Holy Spirit (3:5-8; 14:15-26; 16:7-15). John speaks of Jesus' followers having the need to 'be born again' from above through the Holy Spirit, otherwise they will not enter into heaven (3:3-8).

The seventh example of the differences between John and the Synoptic Gospels is that John narrates Jesus' miraculous signs differently (2:1-11; 5:1-15; 6:1-15; 9:1-12). The eighth example is that John portrays faith/belief as a sine qua non to

obtaining eternal life (3:14-8; 5:24; 20:30, 31). Whereas the Synoptic Gospels show miracles taking place because of faith (e.g. Matt 8:5-13; 9:18-26; Mark 5:22-43; Luke 7:1-10; 8:41-56), John shows that the miraculous signs of Jesus leads to faith (John 20:30, 31). Lastly, John portrays the characterization and role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest and death of Jesus, and the fate of Judas Iscariot differently (6:70, 71; 12:1-6; 17:12). For instance, John presents Judas Iscariot explicitly and implicitly in at least nine noteworthy ways in which the Synoptic Gospels do not present him.

This chapter will now explore these nine depictions. Firstly, John depicts Judas Iscariot as a 'devil' who used his free will to betray Jesus (John 6:60-71). Secondly, John depicts Judas Iscariot as a 'thief' even though Jesus had foreknowledge of him (John 12:4-6). Thirdly, John depicts Judas Iscariot as having the devil put into his heart to betray Jesus (John 13:2). A fourth depiction John gives of Judas Iscariot is that Judas Iscariot 'Lifted His Heel' against Jesus (John 13:18, 19). Fifthly, John depicts Judas Iscariot as being culpable for his betrayal of Jesus (John 13:21-26). The sixth way John depicts Judas Iscariot is that Satan entered into Judas Iscariot, but that he was still culpable for his betrayal of Jesus (John 13:26b, 27). The seventh depiction John makes of Judas Iscariot is that Judas Iscariot apostatized, but that Jesus had foreknowledge it (John 13:20). The eighth depiction John makes of Judas Iscariot is that Judas Iscariot is 'the Son of Destruction' (John 17:6-12). Lastly, John depicts Judas Iscariot as leading soldiers and police to arrest Jesus (John 18:1-5). Before examining these distinct episodes, it is appropriate to summarize how the Johannine characterization in general fitted with the likely socio-pastoral context of the Gospel of John.

5.2 Characterization in John and Socio-Pastoral Context of the First Readers

Like the Synoptic Gospels, the Gospel of John is an ancient biography of Jesus (Keener 2003:140). The author of this gospel identifies himself as 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' (John 21:20-24). However, scholars debate the identity of this 'beloved disciple'. Some scholars hold to the early church's tradition that John, 'the beloved disciple' and 'son of Zebedee' authored this gospel (e.g. Harper 1990:1573; Thompson 2001:334, 335; MacArthur 2010:1529; Painter (2010:344). On the other hand, other scholars oppose this view (e.g. Kashow 2012:229; Moloney 2003:4).

Justino (1998) and de Boer (2000) argue that Mary Magdalene is both ‘the beloved disciple’ and author of the Gospel of John. Nonetheless, the author testifies that he is ‘the disciple whom Jesus loved’ and that he is ‘the disciple who is testifying to these things and has written them, and know that his testimony is true’ (John 21:20-24; cf. Bartlett 2006:52; Tasmuth 2007:26-36). This testimony is significant.

Regarding the social context of John, Keener (2003:149-53) thinks John addressed his gospel, ‘in its present form to Jewish-Christian communities in Smyrna and Philadelphia, during his tenure of ministry in Roman Asia’, or better still, to ‘Jewish Christianity in the eastern Mediterranean world’ (Keener 2003:171-232). Reinhartz (2009:382-385) says this gospel is strictly Jewish and that the author wrote it from the Jewish context. For example, the gospel mentions several Jewish practices (e.g. 2:6, 13; 5:9; 6:4, 11; 7:2; 10:22; 12:1), showing that Jesus used Hebrew Scripture when arguing his points (e.g. 7:38), and that Jesus’ disciples were Jewish. Notwithstanding, it appears as if the recipients of the gospel included Gentiles—Samaritans and ‘some Greeks’—and ‘the broader Christian community’ (Keener 2003:142-159).

This ‘Community’ consisted of Christians, who encountered hostility from the Jews (John 9:22-34) and would encounter hostility from the world (John 15:18-25), who were expected to be ‘one’ but became disunited (John 17:11; cf. Moloney 2003:4-19), and who were expected to be different in this world (John 17:14; Thompson 2001:339). Jesus’ prayer for oneness for his disciples indicates he prioritizes community relationship rather than individualism (cf. Bennema 2013:10; Malina 2001:60-67), even though Jesus may have related to his twelve disciples (and probably to the rest of his disciples) on a ‘one-on-one’ interaction (Asumang 2010:260, 269). Pastorally, the evangelist may have written to his audience, who at some point in time had ‘faced a large number of defectors’, to warn them against ‘the danger of apostasy’ (Keener 2003:698).

Like the Synoptic Gospels, John describes many characters that Jesus encountered. Key among them, were Jesus’ disciples. The disciples responded differently to Jesus’ words and his personality. Some of them continued believing in him, while others stopped believing (John 6:66-71). The disciples, like other humans, had

characters that were unique to each one. One disciple worth studying is Judas Iscariot, whose character John portrays negatively.

Bennema (2013:1-19; cf. Culpepper 1983:99-148 in Aune 2010:131) gives three approaches he employs in order to understand the Johannine characterization. The first approach is to study John's character within the text and context of his gospels (Bennema 2013:6-9). This approach requires consideration of the speech and actions of John's character, as well as the views of other characters within the gospel. The second approach is to study the character traits of John's characters. He identifies two main character traits—'flat character' and 'round characters'.

Those with the flat character traits have a single, consistent trait, whereas those with round characters have 'complex characters that have multiple traits and can develop in the course of action' (Bennema 2013:9-13). The third approach is to evaluate John's characters in terms of their belief-responses to Jesus all through the narrative and plot in the gospel (Bennema 2013:13-19). This third approach is important, because 'belief' in Jesus and in his word is cardinal to salvation and eternal life, according to John (e.g. 1:10-12; 3:16-18; 5:24; 6:28, 29, 35, 47, 62-71; 20:30, 31; cf. Thompson: 2001:335-338). Furthermore, Jesus told them that those who were not believing God's word through him and were attempting to kill him were children of the devil (John 8:42-47; cf. Hakola 2009:453-455).

5.3 Compatibilism in John's Gospel

The Gospel of John gives indications of compatibilism between divine foreknowledge/divine providential rule and human free will in several passages. For example, the evangelist John states, while the world came into existence through Jesus (The 'true light' and 'Word', 1:9, 10), the world did not recognize him (1:10) and his own people to whom he came did not accept him (1:11). These verses indicate that both the world and Jesus' own people willfully rejected him. Thompson (2001:335; cf. Keener 2003:395-399) states, 'Jesus' work and word drew forth both unbelief and belief'. The following verse (1:12) indicates the use of human free will too: 'Yet to all received him, to those who believed in his name, he gave the right to become children of God' (NIV).

John chapter 4 is about Jesus' necessary visit with a Samaritan woman and subsequently with the entire Samaritan city. His visit resulted in 'Many Samaritans from that city' believing in him (4:39-42). Their invitation to Jesus and their belief in him contrast with the unbelief of Jesus' own people, who rejected him (1:10). The Samaritans acted freely even though Jesus was the one who chose to visit them. Jesus could not achieve the salvation for which he came down from heaven unless those who heard his word willingly believed him and accepted him, according to John chapter 4. Nonetheless, the passage suggests that some of the Samaritans chose not to believe him (4:39). The two responses of the two groups of Samaritans suggest the use by them of their free will.

Another instance in which John indicates the use of human free will is Jesus' disciples' response after he revealed himself to them as 'the bread from heaven' and 'the bread of life', which God the Father sent to give life to the world (6:32, 33, 48, 50, 58). They must eat this 'bread' (his flesh) and drink his blood (6:53-56), so that he might give them eternal life (6:53-58). Jesus' utterance was offensive to the Jews, who interpreted his declaration literally (i.e. as cannibalism) and thus could not bear the thought of eating his 'flesh' (6:52; Burkert 1985:291; Vermes 1993:16; Rives 1995:65-85; Ashby 2002:57-61; Harrill 2008:133-158). This was a difficult teaching; it offended many of his disciples. They rejected him and stopped following him as a result (6:60, 61, 66). Nonetheless, Jesus' employed this style of speech to catch their attention and teach them the real meaning and fundamental nature of his mission from the Father (cf. Rowe 1997:127).

This rejection of the words of Jesus was a manifestation of their unbelief (6:64), which may have been the result of God the Father not sovereignly drawing them to Jesus (6:44). Those whom God the Father draws or selects believe in Jesus and are thus saved and preserved—never apostatizing (6:37, 44b; cf. Barrett 1978:68, 69; Carson 1991:290; Whitacre 1999:36; Keener 2003:683, 684; MacArthur 2010:1551). John reports that many of Jesus' disciples who did not believe 'turned back and no longer went about with him' after they heard Jesus' words (6:64, 66). Judas Iscariot, whom he had chosen, not only disbelieved, but would betray him, having become 'a devil' (6:64, 70, 71).

On the one hand, it was a divine act by Jesus to choose Judas Iscariot. On the other hand, Judas Iscariot making himself 'a devil' was his own action. Judas Iscariot was free to choose to preserve his relationship with Jesus or sever it. He chose the latter (cf. Tovey 2009:1-10). Evangelist John repeatedly indicates that free, willing belief in Jesus puts people in a good relationship with God the Father (e.g. 5:16-47; 6:25-40; 10:30-38; 14:1-14; cf. Thompson 2001:334-338). Despite these passages, there are other passages, which stress the use of human free will in the Gospel of John.

5.4 Judas Iscariot as 'a Devil' and His Free will (John 6:60-71)

Prior to the scene described in this passage, Jesus miraculously fed 'about five thousand in all' (John 6:10) with 'five barley loaves and two fish' satisfactorily, so that they attempted to 'take him by force to make him king' (6:9-15). As a result, the crowd followed him the next day to Capernaum in order that he might feed them again (6:22-27). However, Jesus rebuked them sternly for seeking for the temporal, perishable food (6:26, 27a) rather than 'for the food that endures for eternal life' (6:27b). This 'food' is 'the true bread from heaven'—Jesus himself, his flesh (6:32, 33; cf. Anderson 1996:87-89; Anderson 1999:170; 2000:33). Jesus taught them that any of them who ate his flesh would live eternally (6:32-35, 41, 48-50). Furthermore, Jesus told them that they had to drink his blood in order to obtain this eternal life (6:52-59). Jesus' demand implies that those who were following him should pledge their total allegiance to him only.

Those who did not believe and who eventually departed from him (6:64), followed after Jesus because of the miraculous provision of the considerable amount of food with which Jesus fed them earlier (6:1-15, 22-26), rather than the Father having drawn them to Jesus (cf. Keener 2003:695; Richards 1988-2007:n.p; Wiersbe 1988-2007:n.p.). John's statement, ἦδει γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ Ἰησοῦς τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ μὴ πιστεύοντες καὶ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ παραδώσων αὐτόν ('Jesus had known from the beginning which of them did not believe and who would betray him', 6:64, NIV), identifies those who had refused to believe, as well as Jesus' betrayer. This is indicated by John's use of the conjunction 'καὶ' ('and') with 'τίς ἐστὶν ὁ παραδώσων αὐτόν' ('who would betray him'). John later on identifies the betrayer as Judas (6:71).

The statements of Jesus and the evangelist John in this passage (6:64) do imply that humans are capable of willfully disbelieving and rejecting the words of Jesus. Firstly, Jesus declares, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν ἐξ ὑμῶν τινες οἳ οὐ πιστεύουσιν ('But among you there are some who do not believe'). Οὐ πιστεύουσιν ('do not believe') is most likely an aoristic present. This use of the present tense 'presents the action as a simple event or as a present fact without any reference to its progress' (Brooks and Winbery 1979:89). Their unbelief was therefore not preplanned; Jesus' reference to their eating of his 'flesh' and drinking of his 'blood' provoked their action.

It is interesting to note that οὐ πιστεύουσιν is in the active voice. This places the responsibility of their unbelief upon them. The evangelist concurs with Jesus and states that these people 'did not believe' (μὴ πιστεύοντες). Μὴ πιστεύοντες is also in the active voice. The use of the active voice by Jesus and the evangelist indicates that the unbelieving, indignant followers who stopped following Jesus did so of their own will and were thus responsible for their action. Secondly, the evangelist states, ἦδει γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ Ἰησοῦς τινες εἰσὶν οἳ μὴ πιστεύοντες ('for Jesus had known from the beginning who they are who are not believing', YLT). The pluperfect, ἦδει ('had known'), along with ἐξ ἀρχῆς ('from the beginning') alludes to the foreknowledge of Jesus, whereas the unbelief of the people was due to their own volition. By this statement, it is also evident that Jesus' foreknowledge extended beyond events around his imminent passion. Thus, John portrays a perfect degree of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

Paradoxically, the context of the passage suggests that the people's action of unbelief was the result of the Father not having granted them the ability to believe and come to Jesus. Jesus interprets their unbelief in two key ways: (1) They disbelieved his words because they had not come to him (6:65) and (2) they had not come to him because the Father had not granted to them the ability to do so (6:65). Jesus seems to present the role of the Father in people coming to him (Jesus) as the sine qua non for believing in his words (6:64, 65). In other words, except the Father grants the ability to people to come to Jesus they are unable to do so (6:65). This inability is reflected in Jesus' use of ἐὰν μὴ in this passage (οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρὸς με ἐὰν μὴ ἢ δεδομένον αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, 'no one can come to me unless it is granted by the Father'). Ἐὰν μὴ emphasizes an impossibility and inability for anyone

to come to Jesus without the Father having granted the ability. Thus, God is the necessary cause for people to come to Jesus in belief (6:44-65; cf. BADG 2000:644-646; Keener 2003:684-687; Whitacre 1999:36).

The question now is whether by God granting people the ability for them to come to Jesus overrides their free will and responsibility in coming to Jesus. Another question is whether those whom the Father enables to come to Jesus can disbelieve and apostatize in any manner or form, voluntarily. Jesus made the statement, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν ἐξ ὑμῶν τινες οἳ οὐ πιστεύουσιν ('But among you there are some who do not believe', John 6:64) after he had already chosen 'the twelve', including Judas Iscariot (6:67, 70). However, Judas Iscariot would choose to betray him freely and eventually apostatize (6:64, 71; 13:18; 18:2, 3). The example of Judas Iscariot indicates that those whom the Father calls do retain the ability and freedom to come to Jesus or reject him. Pike (1977:209-216; cf. Reynaud 2013:102, 103) thinks that the foreknowledge of God that a person will do a certain act does not exempt that person from culpability if he or she does it. He thinks too that when God enables someone to come to belief in Jesus that person cannot disbelieve or apostatize. Pike appears to get his thought from John 6:37, 44-47. Nonetheless, his statement that the person whom God enables to believe in Jesus cannot apostatize is arguable, according to the New Testament.

For example, the author of Hebrews (6:6) says, to the believing community, καὶ παραπεσόντας, πάλιν ἀνακαινίζειν εἰς μετένοιαν, ἀνασταυροῦντας ἑαυτοῖς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ παραδειγματίζοντας ('and then have fallen away, since on their own they are crucifying again the Son of God and are holding him up to contempt' NRSV). Παραπεσόντας is from παραπίπτω; it means, 'to fail to follow through on a commitment, fall away, commit apostasy' (BDAG 2000:770). In chapter 10:19-31, the author of Hebrews exhorts the believing community to 'hold unswervingly to the hope we profess' (v. 23) and not to 'deliberately keep on sinning after we have received the knowledge of the truth' (v. 26). The ground for the author's exhortation is that those who keep on sinning deliberately will lose the effect of Jesus' sacrifice for their sins (v. 26). Moreover, they will become 'enemies of God' (vv. 27-31).

The question that Jesus asked 'the twelve' (Μὴ καὶ ὑμεῖς θέλετε ὑπάγειν; 'you are not wishing to go away also, are you?' 6:67, my translation) and Peter's response

(Κύριε, πρὸς τίνα ἀπελευσόμεθα; ‘Lord, to whom shall we go?’ 6:68, NIV), suggest the possibility of the person whom God the Father enables to come to Jesus in belief apostatizing. The grammatical construction of Jesus’ question indicates that he expected a ‘no’ answer from ‘the twelve’, including Judas, even though he knew that Judas would go away later and betray him (cf. 13:18, 21, 27, 30). Jesus’ question to ‘the twelve’ and their decision to remain with him do point to the use of their will. It appears that Pike did not carefully consider this passage or Hebrews 6:6 and 10:19-31 in his argument.

The interplay between divine involvement in human action and human response to divine involvement in verses 64 and 65 presents a theological dilemma. For on the one hand the unbelieving followers who stopped following Jesus did not believe, because the Father had not enabled them to come to Jesus in belief. Yet, on the other hand, their unbelief was a matter of their active resolve. Put another way, Jesus’ foreknowledge about their unbelief did not nullify their personal responsibility for their action. There must therefore be a point of reconciliation between divine involvement in the way humans should respond and how humans actually respond to that involvement. MacArthur (2010:1552) sees divine sovereignty and human free will interplaying in this passage. He argues that God is involved in the faith of humans, and at the same time, God expects humans to exercise their faith. He further concludes that ‘genuine faith is never exclusively a matter of human decision’, yet humans are ‘commanded to believe and will be held accountable for unbelief’ (ibid. cf. Whitacre 1999:36).

John 6:70, 71 raises five important questions namely, (1) What does Jesus mean by calling Judas ‘a devil’? (2) Why did Jesus call Judas, whom he had chosen, a ‘devil’? (3) Why did Jesus choose ‘a devil’ to be one of ‘the twelve’? (4) Why did John explain that Judas, ‘one of the twelve’, was the one Jesus referred to as ‘a devil’ who was going to betray Jesus? (5) How does John use παραδίδωμι with Judas? I will now attempt to address these questions in that order.

Firstly, John’s use of παραδίδωμι with Judas (6:71) within the context of Judas being ‘a devil’ (6:70) suggests a betrayal rather than a mere act of handing over as Klassen (1996:47-74; cf. Carlson 2010:472-474) argues. The term that Jesus uses of choosing ‘the twelve’ is ἐκλέγομαι. It signifies choosing someone or something ‘in

accordance with significant preference' (BDAG 2000:305). This suggests that Jesus intentionally chose Judas as member of 'the twelve' instead of another person, in order to fulfill the divine purpose (Cane 2002:29).

The statement of Jesus choosing 'the twelve' (6:70a) indicates that he did so in his capacity as 'God' in whom God the Father lived and worked (John 1:1, 2, 18; 10:30; 14:7-11). These passages indicate that Jesus' authority to choose those whom he desired was as though God the Father himself was using that authority. John substantiates this by his use of ἐκλέγομαι. John uses the term elsewhere of Jesus telling his disciples that he himself had chosen them (13:18; 15:16). John 13:18 and 15:16 evince the intentionality of Jesus choosing people, according to his will. Nonetheless, he does not annul their freedom to choose to accept him and obey his commands or reject him and disobey him, as the contexts of these passages indicate (13:21-26; 15:10, 14).

The second part of Jesus' statement, καὶ ἐξ ὑμῶν εἷς διάβολός ἐστιν ('and one of you is a devil', NKJV) is indicative of the foreknowledge that Jesus had of Judas Iscariot, even though he does not name Judas Iscariot explicitly. John interprets Jesus' 'one of you' as Judas Iscariot who would betray Jesus (6:71; cf. Wright 2009:553). Jesus' use of the present tense, ἐστιν ('is') with διάβολός ('a devil') ἐστιν as used, as present tense expresses 'a state or condition which perpetually exists' (Brooks and Winbery 1979:86, 87). Jesus' pronouncement therefore suggests that Judas Iscariot was 'a devil' already when Jesus was addressing them.

In other words, Judas did not become 'a devil' at some point in time (after Jesus chose him) as in the case of him becoming a traitor (Luke 6:16, Ἰουδᾶν Ἰσκαριώθ, ὃς ἐγένετο προδότης). Jesus does not explain why Judas is 'a devil'. However, since he calls Judas a 'devil' prior to Satan prompting the heart of Judas (John 13:2) and entering into him (John 13:27), Jesus could mean Judas was evil, or bad, or that he possessed the characteristic of the 'devil', or that he was under the influence of the 'devil'. Perhaps, Jesus addressed Judas Iscariot as 'a devil' because he had not believed him or his word (6:64-71; cf. 8:43-47).

Secondly, Jesus uses a rhetorical question instead of a declarative statement. This implies that he intended to emphasize that his knowledge about the spiritual state of Judas Iscariot was true. Jesus' statement in this passage implies that he had

foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot. This foreknowledge of Jesus may have been attributed to him being God (John 1:1; cf. Heb 1:8; Rom 9:5; Asumang 2010:83).

Jesus' choice of Judas Iscariot, who was already 'a devil' (and would soon betray him), to be his disciple is ironic, knowing that he had earlier refused to entrust himself to those who had believed in his name because he knew what was in them (2:23-25). Jesus knew therefore what was in Judas Iscariot, yet he chose him. Choosing 'a devil' was therefore purposeful. It seems to be incriminating also. That is, as 'a devil', Judas Iscariot would carry out the act of betrayal and be liable for it (6:70, 71; cf. 13:18).

The evangelist John uses *διάβολός* two other times: (1) when Jesus told the Jews that they came from their 'father the devil' and were doing his desires (8:44), and (2) when John himself reports about 'the devil' inducing 'Judas son of Simon Iscariot' to betray Jesus (13:2). John describes the 'devil' negatively as a 'murderer' and 'liar' elsewhere (8:44) who has already been condemned (16:11). In 6:70, 71, 'John associates Judas with the devil in his role as the betrayer' rather than Judas being the devil himself (Wright 2009:553). In other words, Jesus may have called Judas 'a devil' in the sense that Judas was under the influence of the devil. Regarding the question why John identified Judas as 'a devil' whom Jesus spoke about, John may have done so in order to portray the character of Judas negatively (cf. Wright 2009:551-153).

It appears that this is the sense in which Jesus used 'Satan' with Peter (Matt 16:23). In this passage, Jesus told Peter, 'Get behind me, Satan! You are a stumbling block to me; for you are setting your mind not on divine things but on human things'. The occasion was when Peter attempted to stop Jesus from suffering and dying when he entered Jerusalem (16:21, 22). Jesus interpreted this as being against the divine plan (16:23). Calvin (1988-2007:n.p.) thinks that Peter 'acted the part of Satan' through an inconsiderate zeal'. Peter could have therefore acted under the control of Satan or represented him temporarily. Card (2013:152) thinks Peter became 'Jesus' adversary' when he rebuked Jesus. Nonetheless, he would not remain an adversary of Jesus or remain under the control of Satan, because Jesus had earlier blessed him and given him 'the keys of the kingdom of heaven...' to bind and loose on the earth whatever he chose (16:17-19; cf. Barber 2013:935-953; Card 2013:151, 152).

Unlike Peter, the Synoptic Gospels and John seem to portray Judas Iscariot as not only acting under the control of the devil (Luke 22:3-6; John 13:2, 27), or representing the devil (Luke 22:2-6; John 6:70; 13:27), but having devilish characteristics (Matt 26:25, 26; John 13:18; 12:4-6). John goes further than Luke in identifying the degree to which Satan was involved in the disruption of the complex interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will. In other words, whereas in Luke Satan enabled Judas, in John it seems Satan plays a more prominent role, without at the same time nullifying the free will of Judas.

The revelation by Jesus that one of 'the twelve' was 'a devil' was his response to Peter who may have assumed that all of them knew who Jesus really was, still believed in him and would remain with him (6:68, 69). Jesus' revelation may have been to tell Peter that he could not count on their joint, whole-hearted commitment. With regards to the question of Jesus choosing 'a devil' to be one of his disciples, he may have done so in order to stress the shameful infidelity of Judas (Wright 2009:552) and the heinousness of Judas' betrayal and 'increase [a] sense of warning' to the other disciples (Keener 2003:698; cf. Cane 2002:30, 31).

Additionally, Jesus may have chosen Judas as an inner-circle disciple in order that he might fulfill the Scripture, which says, 'The one who ate my bread has lifted his heel against me' (John 13:18). Jesus may have called him 'a devil' because he had the characteristics of 'a devil' (i.e. hypocrisy, stealing) or would soon be taken over by the devil himself to act as 'a devil' (cf. John 13:2, 27). By being 'a devil' and a betrayer, Judas Iscariot cut himself off from Jesus (Tovey 2009:6). Concerning John's probable reason for explaining that Judas, 'one of the twelve', was the one Jesus referred to as 'a devil' who was going to betray Jesus, it could be assumed that he wrote this in order to emphasize Judas Iscariot's treachery. John may have intended to warn the community of believers against vulnerability to Satan.

The Gospel of John so far implies that there is compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will in the particular instance of Judas Iscariot, in at least five ways. Firstly, it implies that Jesus foreknew about the negative character of Judas, yet he chose him (v. 70). Secondly, John implies that Jesus foreknew that some of his disciples did not believe in him (v. 64). Thirdly, John implies that the Father is the one who grants people the ability to come to Jesus in belief (vv. 37, 65).

Fourthly, John implies that some of Jesus' disciples chose to disbelieve Jesus and thus apostatized freely and willingly (v. 66). Fifthly, John implies that Judas Iscariot was going to betray Jesus willingly (vv. 64, 71).

5.5 Judas Iscariot is a 'Thief' and Jesus' Foreknowledge (John 12:4-6)

John's description of Judas as 'a thief' (κλέπτης) occurs six days prior to the observance of the Passover and the death of Jesus (12:1, 7). It also occurs during a significantly joyful moment for Lazarus (whom Jesus had raised from the dead) and his sisters, Mary and Martha (John 12:1, 2). They had just hosted a dinner for Jesus and Mary had anointed Jesus' feet with 'a pound of costly perfume made of pure nard' and its fragrance had filled the house (12:3; cf. Kurek-Chromycz 2010:337, 345; Thatcher 1996:441).

John identifies Judas as being indignant by asking, 'Why was [the] perfume not sold for three hundred denarii and the money given to poor?' (12:4, 5). What Judas (and even Mary) did not know was that this anointing fitted within the divine plan vis-à-vis the death and burial of Jesus (12:7). The command of Jesus, Ἄφες αὐτήν, ἵνα εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν τοῦ ἐν ταφιασμοῦ μου τηρήσῃ αὐτό: ('Leave her alone. She bought it so that she might keep it for the day of my burial' (12:7; cf. NKJV; YLT) agrees with this point of view.

Jesus' use of the subjunctive mood (ἵνα...τηρήσῃ) rather than the indicative makes it unlikely that Mary understood the full implication of her action. The ESV reflects the intention of the subjunctive used here better ('so that she may keep it'). The command of Jesus implies that he had foreknowledge of the action of Mary, whereas Mary's action depicts her free, willful action, even though she did not understand the full implication of her action (cf. Thatcher 1996:442). Adeyemo (2006:1277) thinks that Mary's anointing of Jesus was intended to bring special honor to Jesus, though without her full understanding.

John is silent about Mary's motive for anointing Jesus, even though Cane (2002:30) thinks she did so in order to express her 'costly devotion to Jesus' (cf. Thatcher 1996:442). Nonetheless, she performed an act that was commonplace in the Middle East concerning the treatment of corpses. Relatives and friends used perfumes to anoint the corpses of loved ones during the time of Jesus, except the corpses of

those who were executed as criminals (as Jesus was considered to be by the authorities; cf. Keener 2003:865). Mary's anointing of Jesus preceded Jesus' 'triumphal entry' into Jerusalem where he would die. Jesus' command, 'Leave her alone. She bought it so that she might keep it for the day of my burial' (12:7), suggests that Mary was actually observing the Middle Eastern practice of anointing their dead, even though she might not have understood the implications of her action.

John identifies Judas as the one who objected to Mary's anointing of Jesus (12:4, 5). Judas may have spoken loudly enough for Jesus to hear him and command him to 'Leave her alone' (12:7). The account of John concerning this anointing differs from those of Matthew and Mark. For example, John identifies Judas as the objector, whereas Matthew accuses all of the disciples (Matt 26:7, 8) and Mark, some of those present (Mark 14:4, 5). Furthermore, John states that Mary anointed the feet of Jesus (12:3), whereas Matthew (26:6-13) and Mark (14:3-9) speak of Mary anointing the head of Jesus.

The apparent contradiction between the fourth Gospel and the Synoptic Gospels about which part of Jesus Mary anointed, and why she anointed that part, has been a matter of scholarly discussion. For example, Keener (2003:863, 864) thinks that John's account of Mary's anointing of the feet of Jesus and wiping his feet with her hair portrays her 'humble servitude'. He thinks too that Mary's action demonstrates her deep affection for Jesus (*ibid.*). John's account is unlike Matthew's (26:7) and Mark's (14:3) accounts that portray Mary as honoring her guest. In fact, an examination of the statement of Jesus in Matthew 26:12 and Mark 14:8 concerning Mary anointing his body may have included his head and his feet. However, Matthew and Mark reported the royal significance in the anointing (the anointing of the head of Jesus), while John saw the death factor as significant by anointing his feet (cf. Keener 2003:865). Mary therefore gave reverence to Jesus via her anointing of his feet (Coakley 1988:241-256).

Thirdly, unlike Matthew and Mark, John identifies Judas' position as the keeper of 'the common purse' (12:6c). It was a common practice for teachers to appoint one of their disciples as treasurer for their group (Keener 2003:864, 865). Notwithstanding, it was scandalous for that disciple to misappropriate the funds entrusted to him

(Keener 2003:865). Thatcher (1996:440) notes that Judas was given this position of trust, yet he betrayed this trust and repeatedly took for himself what was put into the bag (12:6c). John calls Judas a ‘thief’ (κλέπτης) because of his action (12:6b). Pennington (2006:14) qualifies Judas as a ‘greedy thief’, while Keener (2003:864) describes him as having an ‘evil character’.

The first occurrence of ‘κλέπτης’ in this gospel is in chapter 10. There, Jesus uses it three times to refer to (1) the person who enters the sheepfold through unrecognized, illegal doors (10:1), (2) shepherds who came before him whom the sheep did not listen to (10:8) and (3) the person whose exclusive mission is to steal, kill and destroy the sheep (10:10). By calling Judas a ‘thief’, John may be associating Judas with the ‘thieves’ Jesus speaks of in John 10:8, 10, who come ‘only to steal and kill and destroy’ (cf. Lewis 1983:77, 141; Wright 2009:555).

Jesus seems to use ‘thieves’ in the sense of self-centered hypocrites and destroyers who cared only about themselves rather than about those (the sheep) they pretended to serve. They were therefore contrary to who Jesus was—‘the Good Shepherd’—who came to give his life for the sheep (10:1-11; cf. Wright 2009:554). John uses ‘thief’ explicitly for Judas in association with Judas’ hypocrisy, self-centeredness and habitual stealing from their money bag (12:5, 6; cf. Thatcher 1996:448; Wright 2009:554, 555).

It is interesting to note that the character and action of Judas contrast with those of Mary. Unlike Judas, who expressed indignation about Mary using the expensive perfume on Jesus, Mary poured it unreservedly upon the feet of Jesus and wiped his feet with her hair instead of with cloth (12:3). Her action indicates sincere love and total submission to the will of Jesus. It appears as though she acted freely and willingly. Jesus’ response to her action (‘She bought it so that she might keep it for the day of my burial’ (12:7) suggests that her action was divinely foreknown and determined.

In this passage John states that Judas’ proposal to sell the costly perfume that Mary anointed Jesus with and for the proceeds be ‘given to the poor’ was a mere pretense; he did not care about the poor at all (12:6). Keener (2003:864) points out that Judas Iscariot not showing concern for the poor, ‘underlines Judas’s evil character’. This ‘evil character’ is implied in John’s statement that Judas intended to

steal the proceeds from the sale of the perfume as he had been doing with the other monies (12:6; cf. Wright 2009:554). Moreover, while the woman prepares Jesus for his death through her loving, humble devotion, Judas is a prime instigator of Jesus' death through his treachery.

The description of Judas as a 'thief', particularly with reference to this costly perfume, portrays him as being greedy and obsessed for money (cf. Robertson 2011:90-93, 117, 157, 158, 173, 183 184). In addition to the descriptions that John gives of Judas in this passage, he refers to him also as the 'betrayer' (12:4). This description emphasizes the negativity of the character of Judas. Luke rightly therefore describes him as a traitor (Luke 6:16). As a traitor and a greedy person, Judas could have been capable of betraying Jesus freely.

This passage (John 12:4-6; cf. vv. 7, 8) also underlines the biblical compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. The passage shows this compatibility in three ways. Firstly, it shows that Mary freely and willingly anointed Jesus' feet and wiped them with her hair publicly to express her love and reverence for Jesus (v. 3). Secondly, it shows that Jesus had foreknowledge of the good purpose and effect of Mary's action and implicitly rebuked Judas for his resentment (vv. 7, 8). Thirdly, it shows that Judas willfully reacted selfishly and resentfully to Mary's action because of his thieving character (vv. 5, 6). Whilst John does not indicate that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot was a thief, John's repeated references to Jesus' foreknowledge makes it likely that Jesus knew in advance that Judas was a thief also (e.g. 6:64; 11:3-15; 12:31-33; 13:3; 18:32).

The subject of Jesus' foreknowledge of events and people is unquestionable in John. For instance, Jesus displays his foreknowledge during his encounter with Nathaniel (John 1:48, 51; cf. Stafford 2013:204-209). In this passage, Nathaniel asked Jesus about where Jesus knew him from (v. 48), and Jesus answered that he saw him 'under the fig tree before Philip called [him]' (v. 48). Afterwards, Jesus foretold to Nathaniel that he 'will see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man' (v. 51). The second instance in which Jesus displays his foreknowledge is in John 3:14. This passage records Jesus foretelling his disciples about his imminent crucifixion. Finally, John 18:4 records that Jesus

foreknew 'all that was to happen to him'. The reference here is to the moments just before the detachment of soldiers and the temple police arrested Jesus (v. 3).

5.6 'The Devil Put into the Heart of Judas' to Betray Jesus (John 13:2)

John has already described Judas negatively as a 'devil' (6:70) and a 'thief' (12:6). Now he magnifies this negativity by presenting Judas as a conduit for the devil: 'The devil had already put it into the heart of Judas...to betray [Jesus]' (13:2). In other words, the devil suggested, convincingly, to the mind of Judas to betray Jesus (cf. Wright 2009:555; Harper 1990:1603). Perhaps, this is what Satan did with David and caused him to take a census of the children of Israel (1 Chr 21:1), or with Ananias and Sapphira so that they 'kept back some of the proceeds' they got from the sale of their property (Acts 5:1-11).

With reference to Judas Iscariot, John mentions the devil inducing Judas Iscariot to betray Jesus, together with his statement about Jesus truly loving his disciples to the end and of Jesus' imminent departure (13:1). The question is whether John is insinuating that Judas Iscariot is not included amongst the disciples whom Jesus loved to the end. I do not think so. The passage shows that Jesus washed the feet of Judas Iscariot just as he did for the other disciples. He must have loved Judas too, notwithstanding his foreknowledge that Judas would betray him.

Therefore, John may have mentioned the love of Jesus, his imminent departure and the certainty of Judas Iscariot's pending betrayal in proximity to one another for two possible reasons. Firstly, he may have mentioned them so that he might contrast Jesus' character and his loyal relationship with God the Father (13:1, 3) with Judas' character and his disloyalty to Jesus (13:2; cf. Wright 2009:551, 556, 557; Pennington 2010:14). Secondly, John may have mentioned them in order to stress the certainty of Jesus' betrayal by Judas Iscariot (13:1, 2, 27-30).

It appears that the imminent betrayal by Judas Iscariot was a result of his uncleanness. John's linking of the two events together indicates this: 'And you are clean, though not all of you. For he knew who was to betray him; for this reason he said, 'Not all of you are clean'' (13:10 11). Before the act of betrayal, Judas Iscariot was already a 'devil' and a sinner (Pennington 2010:14); he had lost his inheritance with Jesus (Thatcher 1996:443). MacArthur (2010:1569) argues that the devil put

into the heart of Judas what Judas himself desired—the death of Jesus. The views of Thatcher and MacArthur place the liability for Judas Iscariot's action upon himself, even though Jesus knew in advance that Judas Iscariot was a 'devil' and was unclean.

This passage also indicates the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will. On the one hand it underlines that Judas was a free agent culpable for his actions (cf. 13:10, 11). On the other hand, it underlines that external forces influenced Judas' actions (13:2). The fact that Judas was unclean (13:10, 11) made him vulnerable to the prompting of the devil (13:2), so that he could not be excused for betraying Jesus later on (cf. Pennington 2010:14; Thatcher 1996:443; MacArthur (2010:1569). In this manner, John shares more characteristics with Luke in portraying a degree of compatibility, which allows for the operation also of Satan, even though John goes a step further than Luke to underline a more advanced role for Satan than described by Luke (cf. Grayston 1984:81, 82; Keener 2003:899, 900).

5.7 Judas Iscariot 'Lifted His Heel' against Jesus (John 13:18, 19)

The event in this passage follows Jesus washing the feet of the disciples, including Judas Iscariot's feet (13:4-17). Through this action, Jesus demonstrated before the disciples the lesson of humble service, and commanded them to do likewise (13:12-17). This event also follows both Jesus' statement that not all of the disciples were clean and John's application of that statement to the person 'who was to betray' Jesus (13:11). Weisheipl et al. (2010:16) argue that Jesus' statement to his disciples suggests that he foreknew 'the uncleanness of Judas the betrayer'.

Jesus makes three striking statements in verse 18: (1) 'I am not speaking of all of you'; (2) 'I know whom I have chosen'; and (3) 'But it is to fulfill the scripture, "The one who ate my bread has lifted his heel against me"'. The first statement appears to set a restriction about which of the disciples could emulate Jesus' example of foot washing (13:12-17). The second statement authenticates the earlier statement by Jesus that he had chosen 'the twelve', including Judas Iscariot (6:70). In the present passage, Jesus states that he knew absolutely those whom he had chosen. He may have been insinuating that he knew Judas also, even though he had become a prey of the devil (13:2; cf. 6:70). The 'but' of the third statement does link the third

statement to the second statement; however, the third statement focuses on the divine purpose for choosing the disciples, which was to fulfill Scripture.

This fulfillment is about a trusted friend who, having eaten the bread of Jesus, would lift his heel against him (13:18). John, like the Synoptic Gospels, indicates that divine foreknowledge and human free will are interplaying here. This passage suggests that Judas Iscariot's act made him 'a servant of sin' and a willful adversary of Jesus, in spite of the fact that Jesus had chosen him (Maxwell and Elowsky 2015:124).

Jesus' statement in John 13:18 is likely a reference to Psalm 41:9. In this Psalm, David says, 'Even my bosom friend in whom I trusted, who ate of my bread, has lifted the heel against me'. David may have referred to his trusted counselor, Ahithophel who later joined the conspiracy of Absalom and became his counselor (2 Sam 15:12, 34; 17:14, 13; 16:23; 1 Chr 27:33, 34). Ahithophel had previously belonged to David's inner-circle prior to his apostasy. He and Judas Iscariot betrayed their leaders. The response of David indicates that he held Ahithophel culpable for his action. Jesus may have held Judas culpable too, because he compared the action of Judas with Ahithophel's action.

Keener (2003:912, 913) points out that citizens of the ancient Mediterranean society 'considered betrayal by a friend [as] far more heinous than any insult by an enemy'. It is not surprising therefore for David to speak of Ahithophel as a 'bosom friend in whom I trusted...has lifted the heel against me' (Psa 41:9). David was so hurt that he prayed to repay those who troubled him (Psa 41:10). Like David and Jesus, leaders of the Qumran Community also encountered grievous internal estrangements, infractions and betrayals from trusted community members (Zola 2010:407-419). The Community considered every form of betrayal as the 'breaking of trust' (ibid. 415, 416). Those who broke the 'trust' of the Community were subsequently expelled from the Community:

Where a man had been a member of the Council for at least ten years and had then defected to 'walk in the stubbornness of his', not only was he to be expelled, but the same judgement was extended to any of his former colleagues who might take pity on him and share with him their food or money (IQS VIII, 22-23).

The stance of the Community against betrayers suggests that they held those betrayers liable for their betrayals. In the case of Judas, Jesus links his betrayal to the fulfillment of Scripture (Psa 41:9). Since this is so, then Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would betray him just as Ahithophel betrayed David. Yet, he does not exonerate Judas from responsibility. The Synoptic Gospels do not cite Psalm 41:9 as their point of reference for the fulfillment of Scripture by Judas' act of betrayal. They mention, however, that the betrayal of the 'Son of Man' was to fulfill Scripture (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22). Like John, they indicate that the betrayer is liable for his action (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22).

John 13:18, 19 show the interaction between divine foreknowledge and human free will. For instance, Jesus foreknew which of the disciples he had chosen would lift up his heel against him. Furthermore, Jesus foreknew that the lifting up of the heel by that disciple would fulfill Scripture. In other words, the fulfillment of Scripture implies divine foreknowledge, while the disciple's lifting up of his heel against Jesus indicates free human action.

5.8 Judas Iscariot as the Betrayer and His Culpability (John 13:21-26)

The setting for this identification of Judas Iscariot as the betrayer is the observance of the Passover meal. Jesus repeats his 'one of you' assertion to the twelve. He told them earlier, 'one of you is a devil' (6:70). Now, he tells them 'one of you will betray me' (13:21). Like the first assertion, this assertion suggests interplay between divine foreknowledge and free human action. In other words, Jesus foreknows about the betrayal by Judas and about Judas betraying him willingly (cf. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:3-6; Acts 1:15-18).

Up to this point, John has been referring to Judas as the person who would betray Jesus (6:64, 71; 12:4; 13:2). In this passage, however, Jesus announces that one of them will betray him (13:21). After hearing this, they asked Jesus to identify the betrayer (13:22). Jesus promised to identify the betrayer by means of a 'piece of bread' that he would dip into the bowl from which he was eating (13:26). Jesus dipped the piece of bread into his bowl and gave it to Judas, perhaps in full view of Peter, 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' (who asked Jesus who the betrayal was) and

the other disciples; they may have anticipated Jesus revealing the betrayer (13:22-26).

Jesus giving the piece of bread to Judas after he had dipped it in the dish suggests Judas was sitting close to Jesus during the meal, so that Jesus himself, not another disciple, gave the bread to Judas (13:26; cf. Keener 2003:915, 916). Keener (ibid. 915, 916) thinks Judas Iscariot and 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' (13:23, NIV) may have been reclining close to Jesus—one at Jesus' left and the other at his right. Judas' position would have made it easier for Jesus to hand him the piece of bread without having to stretch his arm over the other disciples. Giving Judas the piece of bread not only identified him as the betrayer; it portrayed him as a 'friend' and an honored guest (MacArthur 2010:1570; cf. Ferguson and Wright 1998:196, 197; Harper 1990:1604; Walvoord and Zuck 1988-2007:n.p.; Keener 2003:917-919). John, like Luke, reports that Satan entered into Judas 'After he received the piece of bread' (13:27; cf. Luke 22:23; Painter 2010:363).

This passage also shows the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will. For instance, Jesus foreknew that Judas would betray him (13:21) and he identified him in the presence of the other disciples (13:26). Jesus' statement that 'one of you will betray me' (13:21) also suggests that the disciple who would betray him would choose to do so freely. John provides no intimation about Jesus' reason for identifying his would-be betrayer. It could be that Jesus was giving a last chance to Judas to repent, or he was challenging him to do what he had determined to do.

The first possibility is unlikely, in view of the fact that Judas was a 'devil' (6:70), a 'son of destruction' and 'lost' already (17:12). Furthermore, 'The devil had already put it into the heart of Judas, son of Iscariot, to betray' Jesus (13:2); he was waiting for the opportune moment to enter into him (13:27; cf. Wright 2009:556). The second probability is likely, therefore—that Jesus was teasing or challenging Judas to do his worst. Jesus' statement to Judas Iscariot 'What you are about to do, do quickly' (NIV) implies Jesus had foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot's mission. Judas Iscariot was going on his mission, having given himself up to Satan. Oropeza (2010:354) argues, 'Even though Judas' betrayal seems inevitable, there is no indication that he was coerced to do it'.

5.9 Satan Entered into Judas Iscariot and Judas Iscariot's Culpability (John 13:26b, 27)

It is unclear why Satan waited for Judas to receive (not even eat) the piece of bread at the Passover meal before entering into him (13:27). It is unlikely that the piece of bread caused this entrance, since he had already induced Judas to betray Jesus (13:2). Perhaps, John mentioned this timing to stress Satan's endorsement of Judas Iscariot. Keener (2003:219) suggests that Satan entered Judas after Judas received the piece of bread because Judas was now ready to accomplish his mission. This is similar to evil spirits entering into people in the Mediterranean world to empower them to accomplish certain tasks (Keener 2003:919).

This mission was within the divine pericopae—the 'Son of man' was about to be glorified in order that God might be glorified in him (13:31; cf. Culpepper 1988:423-425). In relation to the proximity of the two events, Adeyemo (2006:1282, 1283) thinks John may have intended to stress the brevity of the time span between the two events. Perhaps, John viewed the giving of the piece of bread to Judas as a sign of judgment rather than blessing by Jesus, because Judas had allowed Satan to take total control of him (cf. 1 Cor 11:27-31; Boring et al. 1995:296; Duke 1985:99; Fenton 1970:146). Satan therefore led Judas into the darkness and from then, the act of betrayal became inevitable.

The incident of Satan himself entering into Judas in order to work through him is significant. The gospels do give accounts of demons or evil spirits possessing people. For example, Mark (5:2-13) and Luke (8:26-37) tell the story of Jesus exorcising a 'legion' of evil spirits from a man. Those evil spirits controlled him, kept him naked, drove him into lonely places and gave him such strength that he broke the irons that were fastened to his feet and tore the chains with which he was chained (Mark 5:3, 4; Luke 8:29).

The two evangelists also report Jesus exorcising other evil spirits (Mark 1:21-28; Luke 4:31-37). Acts (19:13-16; cf. 8:7) shows that an evil spirit possessed and controlled a certain man. Many cultures around the world, including the Mediterranean world and Africa, have accounts of people being possessed and

acting under the influence of evil spirits (Keener 2003:919; cf. Craffert 2005:1-9; Mashau 2007:637-653; Malone 2009:14-25).

Scripture presents Satan as adversary, accuser and inciter of the followers of God without necessarily entering them (cf. 1 Chr 21:1; Job 1-2; Zech 3:1, 2). Judas Iscariot is therefore the first recorded case of Satan himself entering into a person in Scripture. Interestingly, this entering occurred while he was still in the very presence of Jesus (13:26, 27). Myers (2012:291, 292) thinks that Satan may have entered into Judas because Judas might not have been 'a legitimate disciple of Jesus'. Myers does not offer any clear explanation about his conclusion regarding Satan entering into Judas.

While the thought of Myers has some logic, in view of Judas being a 'devil', particularly (John 6:70), it is logical too, to think that because Jesus himself chose Judas, Judas was a 'legitimate disciple' with all the socio-spiritual rights and privileges that Jesus conferred upon the other disciples (cf. Matt 10:1-14; Mark 3:13-19; Luke 6:14-16; Acts 1:17). For example, the chief priests and leaders of the Jews may have reckoned that he was legitimate, so they believed him and trusted him to betray Jesus to them. In fact, Ehrman (2006:153-169) argues that it was Judas who informed the chief priests (who in turn informed the Romans) that Jesus referred to himself as 'King of the Jews'. Even though Jesus' reference was eschatological, the Roman leaders 'saw [it] as political insurgency' (ibid. 165). Thus, they crucified Jesus.

Satan entering into Judas and influencing his action might have been caused by Judas' character and desire (cf. John 6:70; 12:6). Therefore, Satan's entry into Judas and his likely control of Judas did not exonerate Judas from liability for betraying Jesus (cf. Robertson 2011:137-140). This is another evidence of the model of compatibilism evident in John's gospel. In it, divine foreknowledge and human free will relate and interplay in a non-contrastive transcendent manner with Satan or evil forces playing a role in influencing human free will without trumping it.

Keener (2003:919) notes that Satan entered into Judas Iscariot to enable him carry out the mission that he (Judas Iscariot) had already prepared to execute. Eslinger (2000:49, 58-62, 67) points out that after Satan entered into Judas Iscariot, Judas played the adversarial role to Jesus, rather than Satan. This implies that Judas

Iscairiot was culpable for his Satan-influenced action. Members of the Qumran Community whom 'Belial the demon' entered, were culpable for their actions and thus were the objects of curse rather than Belial; the Community did not forgive them of their sins (Brand 2016:79-83).

5.10 Judas Iscairiot Apostatized and Jesus' Foreknowledge (John 13:20)

When Judas 'received the piece of bread, Satan entered into him' (13:27), and Judas went out from Jesus immediately after receiving the piece of bread (13:30). The two incidents might not have occurred as simultaneously as they appear to have done. There might have been a short time interval between them. For instance, Judas left only after Jesus commanded him to 'Do quickly what you are going to do' (13:27). The time of Judas' departure was also at night (13:30). Judas would betray Jesus that night and it would lead to the glorification (death) of Jesus and the glorification of the Father in Jesus (13:31, 32; cf. Keener 2003:920, 921). However, because Satan entered into Judas only after Judas received the piece of bread from Jesus, it makes sense to argue that the two events are causatively linked.

After Judas departed from Jesus, Jesus announced that the 'the son of man [was now] glorified' (13:31). This glorification refers to the forthcoming suffering and death of Jesus (Adeyemo 2006:1283; cf. Culpepper 1988:425). This passage indicates strongly that had Judas not left, Jesus would not have suffered and died. This harmonizes with John's (implicit and explicit) repeated reference to Judas Iscairiot as the betrayer of Jesus (6:71; 13:2, 10, 11, 21-30).

Jesus' command to Judas ('Do quickly what you are going to do', 13:27) agrees with John's earlier statement that Jesus foreknew everyone who would betray him (6:64). Jesus himself shows that he has foreknowledge of his betrayer (13:21-26; cf. v. 18). At some point, Judas left Jesus after he received the piece of bread from Jesus to go to fulfill what Jesus already knew (13:30). His leaving Jesus in order to accomplish his betrayal of Jesus was an act of apostasy indeed. The act of apostasy is the act of defection, and defection is the abandonment of one's allegiance to a cause, a former belief, institution, person, or principles (Soukhanov 1988:47; Hawkins, Weston and Swannell 1991:27). In view of this, it is reasonable to conclude that John's gospel

envisages a comfortable interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

5.11 Judas Iscariot is ‘the Son of Destruction’ (John 17:6-12)

John chapter 17 comprises three categories of prayers by Jesus (cf. Attridge 2013:1-14). Firstly, he prayed for himself that the Father would reinstate him to his former glory with the Father (17:1-5). Secondly, he prayed for his disciples (1) that the Father keep them as one people (17:11); (2) that the Father protect them from the evil one (17:11, 12, 15); and (3) that the Father sanctify them (17:6-11, 13-19). Thirdly, he prayed for future believers (1) that they be one (17:21-23); (2) that he be in them (17:20, 21); (3) that the love the Father has for him be in them (17:26); (4) that he himself be in them (17:26); (5) that they be with him wherever he is (17:24); and (6) that they be in the Father (17:21).

Jesus stated that he had protected and guarded all of the disciples from being lost, except one (17:12). He described this one ‘lost’ disciple as *οὐῖος τῆς ἀπωλείας* (‘the son of destruction’, ESV). The BDAG (2000:127; cf. EDNT 1988-2007:n.p. defines *ἀπωλείας* as ‘the destruction that one experiences, ruin’. Some other English Bibles render *ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας* as ‘the one destined to be lost’(NRSV), ‘the one doomed to destruction’ (NIV) and ‘the son of perdition’ (ASV, Darby, NKJV) respectively. Since Judas is the disciple whom Satan entered and left the company of Jesus, he is likely to be the disciple who is ‘the son of destruction’. Jesus’ description of Judas Iscariot as being ‘lost’ and being ‘the son of destruction’ indicated that both the role and the fate of Judas were divinely foreknown (cf. Keener 2003:1058-1064), though he was not necessarily coerced to do what he did. Jesus’ foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot’s fate is indicated in Jesus’ statement, ‘so that Scripture would be fulfilled’ (17:12 NIV; cf. Tabb 2011:495-505).

The question now is whether Jesus’ statement (‘the one destined to be lost, that the Scripture might be fulfilled’) pre-empts the final demise of Judas, or whether it means that he was already acting as one who was destroyed, judged, or condemned. I think it is likely that Jesus meant that Judas was already destroyed or judged or condemned, on the grounds of his portrayal by John: (1) he is a ‘devil’ (6:70); (2) the devil incited him (13:2); and (3) Satan entered into him (13:27). In other words, he

had passed the point of no return at some point in time. Judas bore the punishment that he deserved (cf. Wisdom 3:10; 5:15a, 16; 19:13). It could be that this passage acknowledges that Judas Iscariot's actions fulfilled God's foreknown plan. If so, then the passage underscores the evangelist's model of compatibility (cf. Oropeza 2010:253, 354; Scott 2009:97; Rowe 1997:128; Anderson 2000:23; Keener 1999:573-575).

The subject of Scripture fulfillment by the actions of Jesus and others is a repeated theme in John. For example, John records that the manner in which Jesus entered into Jerusalem and the response of the crowd fulfilled Scripture (12:12-16; cf. Zech 9:9). Secondly, John records that the unbelief of the crowd in spite of the many signs that Jesus performed in their presence fulfilled Scripture (12:37-41; cf. Isa 53:1). Thirdly, John says, the world's hatred of Jesus was a fulfillment of Scripture (15:18-25; cf. Psa 35:19; 69:4). Fourthly, John says, the action of the soldiers dividing and casting lots for Jesus' garments fulfilled Scripture (19:23, 24; cf. Psa 22:18). Fifthly, records that Jesus' thirst on the cross and his drinking of sour wine fulfilled Scripture (19:28; cf. Psa 69:21).

A sixth fulfillment of Scripture, which John mentions is Jesus' quick death and the fact that his crucifiers did not break his bones (19:33-36; cf. Psa 34:20). Finally, John says, when those who had pierced Jesus looked at him, they fulfilled Scripture (19:37; cf. Zech 12:10). The passages just cited indicate that there was divine foreknowledge of the human actions they report, as well as the free actions of the people who carried out those acts. Likewise, Judas Iscariot carried out his role in the arrest and death of Jesus freely and willingly. The commonality of these fulfillments is that divine foreknowledge did not cause them to occur.

The Gospel of John shows that Jesus made four statements, which preceded his disclosure that Judas Iscariot was lost. Firstly, Jesus stated that he gives eternal life to those who follow him (John 10:28). Secondly, he stated that those who follow him will never perish (10:28). Thirdly, he stated that no one is able to snatch from his hands those who follow him (10:28). Fourthly, he stated that no one is able to snatch his followers from the hands of the Father (10:29). It appears ironic, therefore, that Satan appears to have snatched Judas away from the Father's and from Jesus' hands. Perhaps, the Father and Jesus let Judas leave their hands because they

knew that Judas had already given himself to Satan, since he was already 'a devil' before Jesus chose him (6:70, 71).

I think this point of view would support Jesus' claim that Judas Iscariot was already a 'son of destruction' (17:12). It would also support John's earlier portrayals of Judas Iscariot. For instance, he had portrayed Judas Iscariot as a 'devil' (6:70). Secondly, he had portrayed Judas as a 'thief' who rejected an honorable treatment of Jesus (12:6). Thirdly, he had portrayed Judas as being unclean (13:10, 11). Finally, he had portrayed Judas as an instrument and agent of Satan the devil (13:2, 27). Even though John does not mention the point at which Judas became 'lost' or became 'the son of destruction', each of the portrayals he makes of Judas subtly suggests that Judas was already 'lost'.

In view of these negative portrayals of Judas, it is highly probable that Judas had not believed in Jesus or belonged to him. Otherwise, the Father would have kept him (John 17:12; cf. Kelly 1995:37-40). Actually, before the prayers of Jesus for his disciples, Judas had already left the group (13:27-30), so that it was unnecessary for Jesus to include him in his prayer. Robertson (2011:154) thinks that Judas Iscariot's apostasy indicated his perdition. Judas Iscariot's status and relationship to Jesus made it easier for him to take the crowd into the garden where Jesus and the other disciples had gone (18:1-5). It is worth noting that no prominent English Bible has translated *οὐῖος τῆς ἀπωλείας* as 'The son predestined to destruction'. Therefore, Judas Iscariot, rather than God is culpable for Judas' fate (cf. Glasson 1963:109; Freed 1965:97; Best 1977:285; Porter 1997:579).

5.12 Judas Iscariot Leads Soldiers and Police to Arrest Jesus (John 18:1-5)

The events in this passage follow Jesus' 'pastoral' prayer for his disciples who were still with him (17:6-26). John records that after that prayer, Jesus and those disciples entered into 'a garden' across the Kidron valley (18:1). Matthew and Mark call this place 'Gethsemane' (Matt 26:36; Mark 14:32), while Luke calls it 'the Mount of Olives' (Luke 22:39). There is nonetheless no contradiction in these accounts, because 'the name, Gethsemane, suggests an olive press' (Keener2003:1077).

Perhaps, this is why the NIV and the NLT translate John's 'garden' (κήπος) as 'olive grove' and 'a grove of olive trees' respectively.

Judas Iscariot knew this garden because he, along with the other disciples, had entered there with Jesus often (John 18:2). Therefore, he 'brought a detachment of soldiers together with police from the chief priests and the Pharisees' (18:3). Prior to this incident, Jesus commanded Judas Iscariot to 'do quickly' what he was about to do ('Ὁ ποιεῖς ποιήσον τάχιον, 'what you do, do quickly', 13:27). This command of Jesus implies that he foreknew that Judas would arrive with the detachment of soldiers and the temple police (responsible for keeping guard by night) in the garden. Notwithstanding, Judas Iscariot's action of bringing the soldiers and the police depicts a willful act.

Judas' action was tantamount to betrayal in the strongest terms (Keener 2003:1077, 1078). Before Jesus allowed himself to be arrested, he asked that his disciples be permitted to leave (18:8). John interprets the action of Jesus as a fulfillment of the promise that Jesus made earlier of not losing any of those whom the Father gave him (John 6:39). Earlier, Jesus stated that he lost one disciple because that disciple was already 'the son of destruction'. The NRSV describes this disciple as 'the one destined to be lost' (17:12).

5.13 Comparison of the Gospel of John, Synoptic Gospels and Acts on Judas Iscariot

A comparison of the Gospel of John with the Synoptic Gospels and Acts shows (implicitly and explicitly) that they concur significantly on Judas Iscariot's character and his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. For example, they agree that Jesus chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his twelve apostles (Matt 10:2-4; Mark 3:16-19; Luke 6:14-16; Acts 1:13-17; John 6:70). Secondly, they agree that Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus fulfilled Scripture (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Acts 1:15, 16; John 13:18). Furthermore, they agree that Judas Iscariot was culpable for betraying Jesus (Matt 26:14-16, 25, 47-56; 27:3-5; Mark 14:10, 11, 43-50; Luke 22:3-6, 47-53; Acts 1:17, 18; John 6:70, 71; 13:18; 17; 18:2, 3). Fourthly, John and the Synoptic Gospels agree that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would betray him (Matt 26:24, 25; Mark 14:17-21; Luke 22:21, 22).

According to the preceding passages, none of the evangelists suggest that divine foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot's betrayal trumped his free will. On the contrary, they hold Judas Iscariot liable for his action in spite of the fact that Jesus foreknew his character and his imminent action. Instead, John and Luke indicate that it is Satan, rather than God, who seems to cancel out Judas' free will and even cooperatively operate with him (Luke 22:3, 4; John 13:2, 27). Finally, these books hold Judas Iscariot responsible for his fate (Matt 26:24; 27:3-5; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Acts 1:16-20; John 17:12; cf. Oropeza 2010:347-358).

Regarding the Gospel of John's portrayal of Judas Iscariot, John portrays him as an unbelieving, unrepentant disciple of Jesus (John 6:64-13:18-30). John also portrays Judas Iscariot as a disciple of Jesus who had been lost, despite the fact that Jesus had chosen him (John 17:12). Judas Iscariot's resolve to betray Jesus to his enemies may have caused Crossan (1995:71) to describe Judas as 'the incarnation of early Christians' anti-Judaism'. In addition, Eslinger (2000:49) argues that Judas, instead of Satan, played 'the adversary role'.

John's description of Judas leading 'a detachment of soldiers together with police' (18:3) to arrest Jesus depicted hostility. It may have reminded the Johannine Community about the hostility they had encountered from the Jews and others. Moreover, Judas' action portrayed him as a defector. His action may have refreshed the memories of the Community members about past defectors from the Community (cf. Keener 2003:698).

5.14 Summary and Conclusion

The Gospel of John has presented Judas Iscariot, explicitly and implicitly, in at least nine noteworthy ways: (1) John has presented Judas as an unbelieving disciple and 'a devil' who, being 'one of the twelve', would later betray Jesus (6:70, 71; cf. Wright 2009:544-559). (2) John has presented Judas Iscariot as 'a thief' who would betray Jesus (12:4-6). (3) John has presented Judas Iscariot as the disciple whose heart 'the devil' induced to betray Jesus (13:2). (4) John has presented Judas Iscariot as the disciple to whom Jesus gave a piece of bread to in order to identify him as his betrayer (13:21-26). (5) John presented Judas Iscariot as the disciple whom Satan entered into 'after he received the piece of bread' (13:26b, 27). (6) John has

presented Judas Iscariot as the disciple who apostatized after he received the piece of bread from Jesus (13:30). (7) John has presented Judas Iscariot as the disciple who 'lifted his heel' against Jesus (13:18, 19). (8) John presented Judas Iscariot as 'the son of destruction' (17:6-12). (9) John has presented Judas Iscariot as the one who took a detachment of soldiers and police into the garden to arrest Jesus (18:1-5).

The Gospel of John appears to compare Judas Iscariot's betrayal with that of David's trusted counselor, Ahithophel (John 13:18; cf. Psa 41:9; 2 Sam 15:12). John states that Judas fulfilled Scripture by this action (13:18). Additionally, John indicates that Jesus did not protect and keep Judas from becoming lost, because Judas was already lost and that this fate was in fulfillment of Scripture (17:12). The mention of scriptural fulfillment implies divine foreknowledge, whereas the ways in which John portrays the character of Judas and his act of betrayal suggest that he holds Judas liable for his character and his action (cf. Kelly 1995:38-40). John's dual presentation of these issues therefore indicates the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will (cf. Oropeza 2010:345-349).

In a pastoral context, John might have featured Judas Iscariot as he did in order to challenge his past and present audiences about their standing with Jesus—whether they would respond to him positively or negatively whenever he encountered them (Bennema 2013:19). Jesus assured his believing Jewish audience that they were his disciples only by continuing in his word, rather than because they were Abraham's children (John 8:31-40).

CHAPTER SIX

SYNTHESIS AND THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapters of this study have attempted to evaluate the hypothesis, which claims that there is compatibility between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will in relation to Judas Iscariot. The chapters have examined major philosophical and traditional Christian views concerning compatibility between these doctrines. In addition, they have examined relevant passages of the Old Testament, the four gospels, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans, which explicitly or implicitly speak to this subject. Moreover, they reviewed literature of Second Temple Judaism in order to establish whether the literature recognized the general problem of compatibilism, and how it was variously addressed by the literature. These investigations derived one main conclusion—that there is compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will generally, even though there are differences in expression of the degree and in some cases in relation to the socio-pastoral context of the texts.

For example, examination of the relevant Old Testament passages indicated that Yahweh foreknew the future actions and destinies of individuals and nations before they occurred. Secondly, the Old Testament indicated that individuals whom Yahweh elected to carry out specific tasks for him chose freely to object to and reject his specific commands. Thirdly, the Old Testament indicated that Yahweh overruled the willful objections and rejections of those he elected or predestined and caused them to reverse their decisions. Fourthly, the Old Testament indicated that Yahweh did not acquit from personal responsibility those whom he commissioned, and who freely objected to their commissioning. Similarly, the examination of the literature of Second Temple Judaism showed evidence of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will, and that the evidence indicated that humans are culpable for their actions despite their assertion of divine providence and foreknowledge. For example, the Qumran Community expelled traitors.

With specific regard to Judas Iscariot, the examination of the gospels and Acts showed that Jesus chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his twelve inner-circle disciples. John, particularly, underscores that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot was ‘a devil’, but he chose him anyway. Furthermore, the preceding chapters of this dissertation have shown that the gospels’ use of παραδίδωμι instead of προδίδωμι or προδότης to refer to Judas’ role in the arrest and death of Jesus (cf. Matt 10:4; 26:16, 21-24; Mark 14:10, 11, 42, 44; Luke 22:21, 22, 48; John 6:64, 71; 12:4; 13:21) served as the source of scholarly differences of opinion. For example, Klassen (1996:47, 49), Derret (1980) and Counet (2011:1-7) have acquitted Judas of the charge of betrayal on the ground that παραδίδωμι literally and lexically means, ‘to hand over’ rather than ‘betray’ as προδότης suggests. On the other hand, Adeyemo (2006), BDAG (2000:761, 762), Evans (2010), Keener (2003), Martin (2006), Wright (2009), Zerwick and Grosvenor (1993) and Zola (2010) have charged Judas with betrayal because παραδίδωμι also means ‘betrayal’. Notwithstanding, the Gospels and Acts appear to hold Judas Iscariot liable for his action (Matt 27:3, 4; cf. Luke 6:16; Acts 1:15-18).

Briefly, this study has shown that the Gospels are in agreement with sections of literature of Second Temple Judaism about compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will. In the case of Luke’s and John’s gospels, this is further complicated by emphasizing a disruptive role of Satan, which does not in any case annul Judas Iscariot’s free will. When put together these issues raised the fundamental question as to how the New Testament envisaged the degree of compatibility, if any, between divine foreknowledge and human freedom in the specific case of Judas Iscariot.

The objective of the present chapter is to synthesize the insights gained from the examination of the preceding chapters, and theologically argue the hypothesis of this dissertation, namely, that the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible in the specific test case of Judas Iscariot. Specifically, it asserts that when it comes to Judas Iscariot, the New Testament holds divine foreknowledge in tension with human freedom to the extent that there is no conflict between them, apparent though that might seem. The chapter will summarize the philosophical approaches, the approaches of major Christian traditions, and the views of specific

literature that relate to Judas Iscariot, which are pertinent to compatibilism, with the view of synthesizing the arguments that have been made.

6.2 The Relationship between Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free will in Christian Theology and the Case of Judas Iscariot

Compatibilists generally understand the Scriptures to teach that God foreknows absolutely and completely all peoples and events in their past, their present and their future state. Additionally, they understand the Scriptures to teach that God does predestine or elect some people—a limited number—to eternal salvation and the rest of humanity to eternal damnation (e.g. Calvin 1988-2007; Umansky 2005; De Boer 2012; Barro 2009; Kyle 1984; Link 2009; Muller 2005; Newman 1996; Picirilli 2000:265, 266; Reymond 1998:1125-1132; Shedd 1999:72-73; Wellum 2002:262; Morris 1991:87, 89). This view emphasizes God's sovereignty to the point that the Scriptures appear to assert that he arbitrarily determines whom to elect for salvation and damnation, but without the involvement of human will (James 1960:9). Because God cannot predestine anyone without firstly foreknowing that person, the incompatibilists' view suggests that God predestines those who he foreknows.

Compatibilists also teach generally that the foreknowledge of God enables him to know about the certainty of everything that happens. Albeit, they contend that foreknowledge does not cause God to arbitrarily predestine or foreordain some people to eternal salvation or to eternal damnation. Moreover, it does not cause him to predestine or foreordain every event and every human action, necessarily (e.g. Picirilli 2000:259-271; Senor 1999:268-270; cf. Coppedge 1987:137-138; Marshall 1987:65-80; Walls 2009:618-632).

6.2.1 Philosophical Solutions to Divine Foreknowledge and Judas Iscariot

Chapter two of this study examined the solutions put forward by veritable philosophers such as Aristotle, Boethius, Ockham and Frankfurt regarding divine foreknowledge and human free will. The examination indicated that with the exception of Boethius, who argued against compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will (cf. Marenbon 2003; Wood 2010:41, 47), the other philosophers argued in favor. For example, the Aristotelian Solution argued that humans are rational beings who have the capability to evaluate various factors

and take necessary decisions. Thus, they have the ability to choose their actions freely, in spite of the fact that God gave them the power to think rationally (cf. Fieser 1998:47-50; Shedd 1999:21). Additionally, the Ockhamist Solution indicated that divine foreknowledge of what would occur out of necessity does not annul human liability (cf. Wood 1999:72-84). Finally, the Frankfurtian Solution argued that humans are liable for their moral actions with or without divine alternatives, because ‘the absence of alternative possibilities has no bearing on moral responsibility’ (McKenna 2008:770-789; Hunt 2000; Pereboom 2001).

Examination of relevant passages of the Synoptic Gospels, the Gospel of John and Acts indicated that Jesus did foreknow Judas Iscariot, yet he chose him to be one of his apostles. They indicated too that Judas Iscariot was culpable for his betrayal of Jesus. Even though these philosophers do not specifically discuss Judas Iscariot, I think that they, apart from Boethius, would hold Judas Iscariot liable for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus.

6.2.2 Approaches of Major Christian Traditions to Divine Foreknowledge and Judas Iscariot

6.2.2.1 Reformed Tradition and Judas Iscariot

Reformed theologians (e.g. Grudem 2009; Reymond 1998; Turrentin in Helm 2010; are generally Calvinists and incompatibilists. Within the incompatibilist tradition, divine foreknowledge automatically equates to divine election and predestination. Several scriptural passages have shaped the approach of Calvinist Theology regarding the relationship between divine foreknowledge and divine predestination/election. Chief among them appear to be Romans 8:29, 30. In verse 29, Paul declared to the Christians in Rome, ὅτι οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνας τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (‘For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son’, Rom 8:29).

Προέγνω is aorist active indicative of προγινώσκω. Προγινώσκω means to ‘know beforehand’ (BDAG 2000:866; EDNT 1988-2007:n.p.), ‘to have foreknowledge of, beforehand’ (Thayer’s 1988-2007:n.p.). The EDNT states that the New Testament uses this term ‘in relation to which the idea of election is always present’. Paul uses Προγινώσκω in Romans 8:29 in relationship to προορίζω (v. 30). Προορίζω means,

‘to decide upon beforehand, predetermine, to foreordain’ (BADG 2000:866; cf. Thayer (1988-2007); EDNT (1988-2007)). The person who does the choosing in this passage is God the Father.

Paul’s use of προορίζω in Romans 8:30 (cf. 1 Cor 2:7; Eph 1:11) speaks of the spiritual blessings which God has already accomplished for his children, according to his determination and apart from any human involvement. This is indicative of his absolute sovereign rule. Similarly, Luke (Acts 4:28) uses the term with reference to God foreknowing and foreordaining what the adversaries of Jesus would do to him and that without God’s predetermined plan they would not act.

The use of Προορίζω in the New Testament (e.g. Acts 4:28; 1 Cor 2:7; Rom 8:30; Eph 1:11) refers to God predestining or decreeing peoples and events before their existence or actual occurrence. Romans 8:30, particularly, indicates that Προορίζω and Προορίζω are used concomitantly. Two other New Testament passages that speak of the relationship between divine foreknowledge and predestination are Acts 2:23 and 1 Peter 1:2. Acts 2:23 contains part of Peter’s address that he delivered on the day of Pentecost. In it, he affirmed to his audience, τοῦτον τῇ ὠρισμένῃ βουλή καὶ προορίσει τοῦ θεοῦ ἔκδοτον (‘Him, being delivered by the determined purpose and foreknowledge of God’ (NKJV)).

Βουλή is ‘that which one thinks about as possibility for action, plan, purpose, intention, decision, will’, while πρόγνωσις is both ‘foreknowledge and predetermination’ (BDAG 2000:181, 182, 866, 867; cf. EDNT (1988-2007:n.p.)). In 1 Peter 1:2, Peter uses πρόγνωσις, although without βουλή. There, he addresses his audience as God’s elect (ἐκλεκτοῖς): κατὰ πρόγνωσιν θεοῦ πατρὸς, ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος, εἰς ὑπακοὴν καὶ ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (‘according to a foreknowledge of God the Father, in sanctification of the Spirit, to obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ’, YLT).

The disciples used βουλή and προορίζω jointly in their prayer to remind God that King Herod and Pontius Pilate succeeded in conspiring against Jesus because the ‘will’ of God had ‘decided beforehand [that it] should happen’ (Acts 4:28, NIV). Paul also used the two terms to assure the Ephesians (Eph 1:11) of Christ’s salvation: ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐκληρώθημεν προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος κατὰ τὴν βουλήν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ (‘In Christ we have also obtained an inheritance,

having been destined according to the purpose of him who accomplishes all things according to his counsel and will'). This passage implies that the divine will and divine foreknowledge are interdependent.

One Old Testament passage that shows explicitly that divine foreknowledge works in tandem with divine predestination is Jeremiah 1:4, 5. Firstly, this passage reveals explicitly that God informed Jeremiah that he foreknew him before he formed him in his mother's womb. Secondly, it reveals that God consecrated and appointed Jeremiah 'a prophet to the nations' before the birth of Jeremiah.

The story of Joseph suggests that there is relationship between the two terms also. For example Joseph said to his brothers, 'Even though you intended to do harm to me, God intended it for good, in order to preserve a numerous people, as he is doing today' (Gen 50:20). The statement of Joseph indicates that God foreknew that the action of the brothers in selling Joseph to Midianite/Ishmaelite traders who took him to Egypt and sold him to Potiphar (Gen 37:25-36) was by God's ordination. Moreover, God's purpose for ordaining this was so that Joseph might 'preserve...a remnant on earth, and to keep alive...many survivors' (Gen 45:5, 7, 8).

Walvoord and Zuck (1985:n.p; cf. Spring and Shapiro 2007:262, 267; Berthoud 2008:9; Kim 2013:236, 237; Carson 1981:24-35) argue that everything that happened with Joseph, including his position in the government of Egypt, 'was a part of God's plan to bring about the fulfillment of the promised blessing'. Similarly, Calvin (Calvin 1988-2007:n.p.; cf. Fox 2001:35; Guyette 2004:177, 188; MacArthur 2010:80) states that Joseph's words to his brothers refer to divine selection and to 'the design of God's providence'. Joseph's testimony to his brothers suggests that God preserved his life and carried him to Egypt in order to accomplish his predetermined purpose in and through his life (Gen 45:7, 8; 50:19, 20; cf. 37:20).

It is worth noting that God revealing his plan and purpose to Joseph in dreams was not peculiar. There are other instances recorded in Scripture where God revealed his plans/intentions to his prophets through dreams/visions and those plans were accomplished. For example, he appeared to Abraham in a vision and revealed his plans to him for his descendants (Gen15:13-16). In this passage, God predicted that Abraham's descendants would serve as slaves in another nation and they would 'be

oppressed for four hundred years'. Afterwards, he himself would bring them out into the land he had promised to Abraham. Genesis 46-Exodus 15 fulfilled this prediction.

Secondly, God appeared to Abimelech in a dream and rebuked him for taking Sarah from Abraham (Gen 20:3-7). Furthermore, God appeared to Jacob in a dream and promised to give him and his descendants the land on which he was lying, as well as to increase Jacob's descendants (Gen 28:12-16; cf. 46:2). Fourthly, he appeared to Solomon in a dream and commanded him to make his request of any kind and he would do it (1 Kgs 3:5-15). God told Aaron and Miriam that he used dreams and visions to speak to his prophets and reveal himself to them (Num 12:6; cf. Heb1:1).

Other biblical passages convey the idea of divine providence without referring to dreams/visions as the means used to convey the providence of God. For example, the psalmist declares that God 'gives food to all flesh' (Psa 135:25; cf. Acts 14:17) and upholds and sustains all flesh (Psa 104:10-30; 145:9, 13, 15-17). Additionally, Nehemiah (9:6) declares that God gives life to all creatures. Luke (Acts 17:28) adds that in God 'we live and move and have our being'.

Finally, Matthew (5:45) states that God 'makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous'. These passages, along with others, show that God is aware of present and future happenings, as well as showing that he is in absolute control of them. Incompatibilist theologians therefore have a point in equating divine foreknowledge with divine predestination.

What this section has shown is that divine foreknowledge and divine predestination occur simultaneously, and that the latter does not occur apart from the former. Additionally, it has shown that the providential rule and activities of God are likened to his foreknowledge and its upshot (cf. Reymond 1998:398-404; Huggins 2014:1-10). It makes sense then to see Jesus' statement about choosing Judas Iscariot to be his disciple, even though he knew that Judas was already 'a devil' (John 6:70; cf. Matt 26:23-25), as a display of divine foreknowledge and divine predestination. Jesus does not imply in this passage that his election of Judas Iscariot was a consequence of his foreknowledge, or that it nullified Judas Iscariot's free will.

What Jesus does imply is that he elected Judas Iscariot, having been fully aware of his character. Candidly and logically, it is unlikely that divine election can occur

without divine foreknowledge, for God foreknows the future with absolute certainty (Studebaker 2004:471; cf. Reymond 1998:398-404; Huggins 2014:1-10). Moreover, this section has shown that God is omniscient and unlimited in his foreknowledge and in his providential rule over his creation.

It is important to point out that this section has in no way abrogated human free will with relationship to God's foreknowledge and his providential election unto salvation and service. Incompatibilists do accept repentance to a certain extent as important and necessary for salvation. The Westminster Confession for example, states that 'Repentance unto life is an evangelical grace, the doctrine whereof is to be preached in season and out of season by every minister of the gospel, as well as that of faith in Christ' (Confession XV.1).

The Confession also states, 'It is every man's duty to endeavor to repent of his particular sins particularly. Every man is bound to make private confession of his sins to God, praying for the pardon thereof, upon which, and the forsaking of them, he shall find mercy'. Reference to man repenting of 'his particular sins' and 'forsaking...them' offers one probable conclusion—'Man' is responsible for preserving his salvific relationship with God, granted that God has already predestined him.

Calvin appears to question predestination to eternal salvation without human involvement. He states,

But if it is plainly owing to the mere pleasure of God that salvation is spontaneously offered to some, while others have no access to it, great and difficult questions immediately arise, questions which are inexplicable, when just views are not entertained concerning election and predestination. To many this seems a perplexing subject, because they deem it most incongruous that of the great body of mankind some should be predestinated to salvation, and others to destruction (*Institutes* 3.21.1).

Whilst incompatibilists generally teach that predestination/election is incompatible with human free will, Calvin's statement suggests otherwise. His statement implies

he holds to some level of compatibility between predestination/election and human free will. Moreover, his statement appears to question the double predestination.

Concerning Jesus choosing Judas to be one of his disciples, the gospels indicate that Jesus did not annul his free will. For example, it was after Jesus chose him that he went to the chief priests to negotiate the arrest of Jesus (Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:3-6). John's gospel may have described Judas as 'a devil' (6:70) and a 'thief' (12:6) in order to emphasize his ability to use his free will. Thieves are rational beings; they decide to steal and they steal. Similarly, 'a devil' has a will that it uses independently. The Westminster Confession's reference to repentance from sin as necessary for salvation and Calvin's statement questioning predestination unto salvation without human involvement indicate the use of free will. This suggests therefore that the incompatibilist approach does not hold strong valence for addressing the case of Judas Iscariot.

6.2.2.2 Lutheran Tradition and Judas Iscariot

Like Reformed theologians, Lutheran theologians accept Paul's exposition of God's foreknowledge and predestination/election as given in Romans 8:29, 30. Like Reformed theologians also, Lutherans teach that sinners cannot, by themselves, have faith to accept God's gracious offer of salvation apart from God's enabling grace. Additionally, like Reformed theologians, Lutherans generally accept faith and repentance as necessary for salvation, even though God's grace enables them to respond positively. Luther himself held to the doctrine of predestination, to the extent that he believed it annulled all human participation. To him, human will is in 'bondage' to the divine will, so that it cannot respond to God's offer of salvation or even repent without God's enabling grace (Cole 1823:5-375).

However, unlike Reformed theologians, Lutherans do not generally attribute eternal damnation to God's decree or predestination. For instance, The Formula of Concord states that predestination refers only to the salvation of the lost, whereas 'damnation and evil actions are not eternally decreed by God, but simply foreknown' (Cooper 2015:22). Lutherans also accept that God has foreknowledge of 'all things before they happen' (ibid.). Thus, when Lutherans speak of predestination/election, they refer to salvation only, rather than to include eternal damnation of the lost (ibid. 13).

The Lutheran 'Confession' does not treat the subject of Judas Iscariot's election by Jesus, nor Judas Iscariot's apostasy and fate. Nonetheless, their view of God's foreknowledge and his election of the godly unto salvation would suggest that God had complete foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot prior to Jesus choosing him. Furthermore, their point of view would suggest that Jesus did elect Judas Iscariot to do the good works of God's kingdom only (cf. Matt 10:5-8), rather than to betray Jesus to his opponents and murderers. Finally, the Lutheran view that God does not predestine anyone to eternal damnation indicates that he did not predestine Judas Iscariot to be lost or to become 'the son of perdition'. Rather Judas was 'lost' and became 'the son of perdition' because of his own choice (cf. John 17:12; Cooper 2015:21).

6.2.2.3 Arminian Tradition and Judas Iscariot

Arminians are generally compatibilists. They do not dispute the foreknowledge of God working concomitantly with his predestining/electing of people (unto service). Nonetheless, they object to the Reformed teaching that divine foreknowledge automatically equates to divine election and predestination. Arminian theologians affirm divine foreknowledge of the future choices of humans and the actions that those humans will take. They also affirm the events that will occur (cf. Studebaker 2004:471, 472; Coppedge 1987:133, 134). This suggests that God foreknows actual future occurrences rather than waiting for contingencies to occur.

Furthermore, Arminians argue that God foreordains peoples and events for particular tasks, knowing exactly what their actions and reactions would be, as well as the results of those tasks. Notwithstanding, God allows humans to exercise their free will on how they respond to him. This response could be positive as was in the case of Abraham (Gen 15; 22), or negative as was the case of Moses (Exod 3; 4), Saul (1 Sam 15), Jeremiah (Jer 1:6), and Jonah (Jonah 1; cf. Walls 2009:620-625). This point of view is not the same as the view of Reformed Theology, which generally states that the free actions of humans have been determined by God and cannot be thwarted or interfered with (cf. Sanders 2003:71-73).

The account of Adam's response to God's command does not agree with the Reformed Theology's claim. For instance, God predicted to Adam that if he ate the fruit of the forbidden tree he would die (Gen 2:17). Scripture shows that Adam ate

that fruit wilfully and died (Gen 3:6; 5:5). God's prediction and Adam's fulfilment of it illustrate the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human free will (Gen 2:17; 3:6; Pinnock 2007:157). In the same way, Jesus foretold his disciples repeatedly that one of them would betray him (Matt 26:25; John 13:18-27), and that the betrayer would face grave consequences (Matt 26:24). Judas Iscariot ignored the words of Jesus and chose to betray Jesus (Matt 26:47-50), just as Adam ignored the command of God and wilfully ate the forbidden fruit (Gen 3:6).

The Gospels and the Book of Acts have indicated that Judas Iscariot's role in the arrest and death of Jesus were foreknown by God and Jesus, by the fact that his action fulfilled Scripture (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Acts 1:16). The Gospels show that Jesus himself chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his apostles (Matt 10:1-4; Mark 3:16-9; Luke 6:13-16; John 6:70). Yet at the same time, the Gospels and Acts implicitly and explicitly indicate that Judas' act of betrayal was a result of his negative character, and therefore he was liable for his action (Matt 26:14-16; 27:3, 4; Mark 14:10, 11; John 12:4-6; Acts 1:18; cf. Kelly 1995:38-40). The Gospels' and Acts' presentation of Judas Iscariot's action therefore suggests compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will (cf. Oropeza 2010:345-349) in a non-contrastive transcendent relationship. By 'non-contrastive transcendence relationship', it means that God's foreknowledge and human free will both act independently but at different levels in such a way that they do not oppose each other. In other words, God works sovereignly, but he does not annul or interfere with the freedom of the human agent (Barclay 2006:6). Barclay (ibid. p. 7) states, 'God's sovereignty does not limit or reduce human freedom, but is precisely what grounds and enables it. The two agencies thus stand in direct and not inverse proportion: the more the human agent is operative, the more (not less) may be attributed to God' (2006:7).

Arminians will agree with the gospels' and Acts' portrayal of Judas, as well as their conclusion that he is liable for Jesus' arrest and death. Moreover, Arminians will also hold Judas Iscariot responsible for his fate as does Scripture (Matt 27:3-5; Acts 1:18). Arminians believe that people who will be saved eternally or be damned eternally will be so by their own choices. Wesleyans form part of the Arminian Tradition. They hold to this view as well. For instance, The Discipline of the Wesleyan Church (paragraph 250) states,

We believe that the Scriptures clearly teach that there is a conscious personal existence after death. The final destiny of each person is determined by God's grace and that person's response, evidenced inevitably by a moral character, which results from that individual's personal and volitional choices and not from any arbitrary decree of God.

The ability of humans to think and act freely, in relationship to the foreknowledge and election of God, is both scriptural and innate. This innateness is based on the fact that God created humans in his own image (*imago Dei*). The Scriptures indicate that fundamental nature of the *imago Dei* remained fully functional after the fall. For example, Yahweh admitted that 'the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, he might reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever' (Gen 3:22). This passage implies that Adam retained Yahweh's attribute of knowing the difference between 'good' and 'evil' after his fall. Secondly, the passage implies that Adam retained Yahweh's attribute of making a choice. Adam's knowledge of 'good' and 'evil' was the channel through which he and his descendants would exercise their free will.

Grenz (Sexton 2010:193) thinks that the reference to man as *imago Dei* is more teleological than ontological. That is, *imago Dei* focuses primarily on the purpose of humans rather than on their nature. I think *imago Dei* focuses on both man's purpose and nature, because man also has a spirit, with which God's Spirit communicates (cf. Rom 8:16).

Unlike Grenz, Taylor (1985:31) argues that *imago Dei* is ontological, being 'the interface of the divine image in man'. He thinks this divine image caused man to possess 'personhood' and 'moral image' (pp. 31-33). In relation to the 'personhood', man possesses the 'power to act' (p. 32), while concerning the 'moral image' God expects man to be as holy as he is (p. 33). Generally, humans have the inner prompting to actively resist evil and act well, in spite of the fact that because of the fall humans do more evil than good, generally.

I think this is why James asked his audience to 'Submit yourselves, then, to God. Resist the devil, and he will flee from you. Come near to God and he will come near to you. Wash your hand, you sinners, and purify your heart, you double-minded' (Jas

4:7, 8 NIV). The Old Testament shows that Enoch (Gen 5:22, 24), Noah (Gen 6:8, 9), Joseph (Gen 39:7-13), Job (Job 1:1, 8; 2:3) and Daniel (1:8) refused to do evil. This agrees with Taylor's argument that God created man with the ability to be holy rather than merely have the capacity for holiness (1985:34). Taylor's contribution implies that man has the innate ability to shun evil, do good, shun selfishness and put the interests of others before his own, apart from being 'born again' and being 'filled with the Holy Spirit'. The stories of Joseph (Gen 39:7-13) and Job (Job 1:1-8; 2:3) attest to this claim (cf. Rom 1:18-21).

Furthermore, *Imago Dei* gives humanity the ability to exercise their free will. When applied to Adam, it is unlikely that God expected him to carry out the assignments that God gave to him without exercising his free will. Wesley (1998:328) taught that fallen humanity still possesses 'the noble principles of reason and understanding...whereby they may be trained up in a good way'. Humans therefore, have the power to choose freely to do that which they have the power to do, without divine coercion necessarily.

God's request, 'Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness' (Gen 1:26) and his accomplishment of that request ('So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them', Gen 1:27) present a couple of significant implications. Firstly, they imply that God created man with a spirit comparable to his own Spirit (cf. Job 10:12; Psa 31:5; Eccl 3:21; 12:7; Zech 12:1; Luke 23:46; 1 Thess 5:23; Heb 4:12; 12:23), even though he 'formed man from the dust of the ground' (Gen 2:7).

The second significant implication of God creating humankind in his own image is that humankind has the freedom of the will commensurate with God's free will. Oden (1987:90-91) argues that God possesses and exercises freedom of the will, and that by that will 'God is able to do all things consistent with the divine nature', such as determining his own intentions and executing those actions, which would achieve their intended ends. Human choices and their subsequent actions and results show that humans do possess and exercise their free will. For instance, humans do plan and execute various actions—some are noble and others are ignoble. Oden (1987:91) points out that humankind's capacity to think freely and to act freely, is

'definitive of personal existence'. This freedom to choose, though finite, and often self-centered, 'shares in [the] divine freedom' (ibid.).

However, Adam chose to do 'evil' rather than 'good'—he disobeyed Yahweh (Gen 2:16, 17; 3:6). His descendants have also persistently used their free will to do more evil than good (cf. Franks 2015:108; Kim 2017:35). Theologians attribute this to the total depravity of humanity. Reformed theologians and Arminian theologians agree that as the result of Adam's fall, human nature is absolutely morally and spiritually corrupt in disposition and character' to the extent that the human mind, will, emotions, affections and conscience are 'wholly bent to indulge our natural corruption' (Reymond 1998:450; Coppedge 1987:135, 147, 227).

Several passages of the Old and New Testaments address this moral and spiritual corruption of Adam's descendants (e.g. Gen 6:5; 8:21; Psa 51:5; 58:3-5; Eccl 9:3; Jer 17:9; Rom 7:15-21; 1 John 5:19). These passages refer to the negative effect of the evil disposition of Adam's descendants. They are under the power of sin (cf. Rom 3:1-23). Furthermore, these passages suggest that prior to the fall Adam might have been morally and spiritually uncorrupt in his disposition and character. What is scripturally true of Adam and his descendants is that just as God held Adam liable for his choice, so does God continuously hold humans responsible for their choices in the present age.

The idea of human freedom to choose is even implied in God's command to Adam in Genesis 2:16, 17. The passage says, 'And the LORD God commanded the man, "You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day you eat of it you shall die"'. God's mention of 'freely' is indicative of Adam's free will. God's instruction includes alternatives: 'every tree of the garden' and 'the tree of the knowledge of good and evil'.

Wiersbe (1988-2007:n.p.) thinks that God planted the tree of life in the garden and mentioned it to Adam in order to test whether Adam would obey him of his 'own free will'. Jamieson et al. (1988-2007:n.p.) ascribe God's purpose for having this tree in the garden and calling Adam's attention to it was to test and expose Adam's fidelity to him. I think that this action by God suggests too that God knew absolutely that Adam had the ability to obey him or disobey him.

Several Old and New Testament passages indicate that humans have the ability to choose between alternatives. They also show evidence of humans who were given the opportunity to choose between alternatives, and that they chose their preferences. For example, Moses (Deut30:15-20) offered Israel the choice of choosing life rather than death for themselves and their descendants (vv.19, 20). They would choose life by obeying 'the commandments of the LORD [their] God' that he had commanded them (vv. 15, 16). On the other hand, they had the choice of choosing death by turning away from their God and worshiping other gods and serving them (vv. 15-17).

Joshua (24:15a) also gave the Israelites the opportunity to choose between serving Yahweh their God and the gods of other nations. This passage states, 'Now if you are unwilling to serve the LORD, choose this day that you will serve, whether the gods your ancestors served in the region beyond the River or the gods of the Amorites in whose land you are living'. He himself, along with his family, had chosen to 'serve the LORD' (v. 15b). Matthew gives another example of humans having the ability to choose between alternatives (6:24). In this passage, Jesus told his disciples, 'No one can serve two masters; for a slave will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and wealth.'

Cave (2016:70-71) argues that human behaviour, whether for 'good' or 'evil' is the result of an individual's perception/acceptance rather than his/her genetic composition or environmental influence. Furthermore, he states, 'The conscious experience of deciding to act, which we usually associate with free will, appears to be an add-on, a post hoc reconstruction of events that occur *after* the brain has already set the act motion' (italics are Cave's). Cave's statement clearly holds humans culpable for their actions.

Mancuso (2012:405-414) expands Cave's statement, stating that an individual is considered to use his/her free will when he/she has the power to do 'otherwise'. I think that Mancuso's use of 'otherwise' indicates a choice between alternatives. Alternatives require that individuals choose to carry out actions, other than original actions. The original actions may or may not have begun with them, but which may have seemed appropriate to them at the time.

Frederick (2013:60, 62) argues that an action is considered to be free when it is 'under the agent's control'. Such an action, he thinks, occurs in tandem with the will, rather than by chance. Thus, it is unlikely that God held Adam liable for disobeying his command without knowing that Adam willfully chose to eat the fruit. Vilhauer (2015:776-786) agrees, and argues that God rebuked Adam and Eve because he was convinced that they were guilty and accountable for their action. I think that these findings help address the issue of Judas Iscariot's free will regarding his role in Jesus' arrest and death. Like Adam, Cain, Moses, Saul and Jonah who exercised their freedom of choice in their responses to God, Judas Iscariot exercised his free will in choosing to remain a follower of Jesus or not.

The analyses of the Gospels and Acts have shown that Judas Iscariot freely visited the chief priests to negotiate the price for betraying Jesus over to them (Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; cf. Yong 2002:244-249; Williams 2005:177, 178). They showed also that after Judas negotiated with chief priests, he kept seeking for the opportune moment to betray Jesus to them (Matt 26:16; Mark 14:11; Luke 22:6). His actions imply the use of his free will. Acts depicts him as using his free will also in his betrayal of Jesus. For instance, it describes the price that he received for betraying Jesus as 'the reward of his wickedness' (1:18). The Lutheran point of view (Confession XVIII.1-7, 31; cf. Meehl et al. 1958:30-58) that humans do use their free will to do various acts other than obey God and worship him would therefore apply to Judas Iscariot. He freely chose to apostatize and betray Jesus rather than remain with him and follow him.

It is of interest to note that Arminians generally hold that God's foreknowledge does not determine and foreordain in advance the choices that people make (cf. Coppedge 1987:133). Otherwise, God should not hold them liable as he did with Adam (Gen 3:9-12, 17-19), Cain (Gen 4:9-14), Saul (1 Sam 15:1-24) Jonah (Jonah 1:1-17) and Judas Iscariot (Matt 26:24, 25; 27:3-5). The scriptural belief in the free will of humans appears to place Arminians near the Openness pedestal, generally (Sanders 2003:69-103; 2012:141-149). This is not surprising, as most early Openness theologians were from the Arminian persuasion.

However, Arminians differ from Openness theologians with regard to their views on exhaustive definite foreknowledge by which God foreknows with certainty future

happenings—the former accept it while the latter reject it generally (Studebaker 2004:469-680). Arminians generally hold that God's foreknowledge does not predetermine and foreordain the choices that people make (cf. Coppedge 1987:133). Otherwise, God should not hold them liable as he did with Adam (Gen 3:9-12, 17-19), Cain (Gen 4:9-14), Saul (1 Sam 15:1-24) Jonah (Jonah 1:1-17) and Judas Iscariot (Matt 26:24, 25; 27:3-5).

The Arminian approach to the foreknowledge of God and its relationship to predestination/election suggests that Judas Iscariot could have resisted being Jesus' betrayer, notwithstanding Jesus' foreknowledge that he would betray him. I think that the Arminian approach upholds both divine foreknowledge and human free will without diminishing either. I think too that this approach represents the non-contrastive transcendent model of compatibility that the gospels have shown. Moreover, I think that the Arminian approach will still hold Judas Iscariot liable for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus, in spite of the fact that 'the devil...prompted [him]...to betray Jesus' (John 13:2, NIV), and Satan entering into him (Luke 22:3; John 13:27).

6.2.2.4 Middle Knowledge and Judas Iscariot

Luis de Molina named this doctrine God's 'Middle Knowledge' because it lies between God's natural knowledge and his free knowledge (Beilby and Eddy 2001:122). God's natural knowledge is that which he possessed prior to his creation of the universe and its contents. It is part of God's nature; it is a factual knowledge and that which he knows does come to pass (Van Horn 2012:810). It enables God to figure out the events that are likely to occur, as well as events 'that could exist if he were to will them into being' (Campbell 2006:2; cf. Van Horn 2012:810, 811).

The free knowledge of God, on the other hand, enables him to understand everything that has happened, that is happening, at the present time and that will happen (Campbell 2006:2). Craig (2001:123) states, God's free knowledge enables him to know 'the actual world'. God's natural knowledge and his free knowledge impinge on human free will vis-à-vis their freedom of choice. On the other hand, if humans were so free that they would choose to act or not to act (the use of libertarian freedom) then God would appear not to possess infallible, exhaustive knowledge or foreknowledge (Campbell 2006:1, 2; cf. Bryant 1992:93).

The doctrine of 'Middle Knowledge' was Molina's attempt to maintain a balance between divine foreknowledge and human free will. In doing so, he taught that God knows about the future actions of humans and creates the circumstances for the human choices and actions, but that God does not ordain the specific choices that humans will make at particular points in time (Borchert 2006:114; Reymond 1998:189; Sanders 2003:88). The Middle Knowledge of God enables him to foreknow what any of his creatures would do or not do at various times. However, he himself does not cause any of his creatures to act (Campbell 2006:3, 4; cf. Bryant 1992:95). What God does via his Middle Knowledge is that he offers to his creatures the grace that is necessarily sufficient to help them respond to his offer of salvation (Campbell 2006:4).

Concerning Judas Iscariot's character and his role in the arrest and death of Jesus, Middle Knowledge seems to be very theoretical and thus open to too much speculation. One speculation is that Jesus foreknew that Judas would visit the chief priests and negotiate his betrayal to them and the time of that visit. Another speculation is that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would lead the detachment of soldiers and police to the garden and the time at which they would arrive. A third speculation is that Jesus offered Judas Iscariot some kind of enabling ability for him to refrain from betraying him. A fourth speculation is that Jesus did not influence Judas Iscariot's will to betray him.

6.2.2.5 Open Theism and Judas Iscariot

As argued in chapter 2, Openness Theology (synonymous with 'Open Theism', Pretorius 2013:5, 6) is a theological approach that holds to 'a belief in an open, largely undetermined future' whereby 'the only things which God knows for sure will happen are those which he has foreordained' (Cudby 2005:13, 15; cf. Williams 2005). Positively, Openness Theology, like Classical Theology, embraces the omniscience of God, as demanded by his nature, so that God has knowledge of 'all of reality' (Boyd 2001:13; Sanders 2003:71, 80, 81; cf. 2 *Esdras* 6:18-7:35). Negatively, and unlike Classical Theology, Openness Theology teaches that God does not know with certainty what the future decisions and deeds of people will be like, since those decisions have not yet occurred or been formed (Boyd 2001:16-37; Sanders 2003:79, 80; cf. Cudby 2005:14, 15; Rice 2013:30). Thus, God's knowledge

of the future, regarding his creation, is only 'partly definite...and partly indefinite' (Hall and Sanders 2001:40, 41).

The definiteness of God's knowledge of the future, according to Classical Theology, pertains to that which he, in his sovereignty and providence, has determined to accomplish unilaterally, and which human will or human actions cannot alter. This is the basis for God's sovereign, providential rule of the universe and his unconditional, irresistible election of some humans to eternal salvation and others to eternal damnation (cf. Sanders 2003:70-73; MacArthur 2010:1941). Openness Theology does not ascribe to this view of God's knowledge of his creation, because the indefiniteness of God's knowledge refers to events that he has not arranged beforehand to occur, but which he knows are probable, in accordance with the desires of people (Sanders 2012:142; cf. Carlson 2012:189-198; William 2005:177, 178). That is, he takes note of the desires of humans and then interlaces those desires 'into the tapestry of his plans' (Cudby 2005:16; cf. Sanders 2012:142).

Boyd (2001:24-37) presents six scriptural claims that God's foreknowledge of the future is open, instead of exhaustively known by him. The first claim is, 'God confronts the unexpected' (ibid. pp. 24, 25). He cites Isaiah 5:1-5. This passage shows that God's vineyard failed to produce grapes as he expected (v.4). Thus, he declared that he would destroy it (v. 5). The second claim is, 'God experiences regrets' (ibid. pp. 26-28). Boyd cites Genesis 6:6, which states, 'The LORD was grieved that he had made man on the earth, and his heart was filled with pain' (NIV). Thirdly, Boyd shows that Scripture claims, 'God speaks in conditional terms' (ibid. pp. 30, 31). The Scripture he cites is Exodus 4:1-9. In this passage, the LORD instructed Moses to perform three vital signs before the elders of Israel who were in Egypt.

The purpose of the three signs was to cause the leaders to believe that the LORD had sent Moses to them. However, 'If they will not believe...or heed the first sign, they may believe the second sign. If they will not believe even these two signs or heed...you shall take some water from the Nile and pour it on the dry ground...and the water shall...become blood on the dry ground'. The fourth scriptural claim that Boyd mentions is, 'God tests people 'to know' their character' (ibid. pp.31-33). The scriptural passage he cites is Genesis 22:12. This passage shows that the LORD

prevented Abraham from killing his son and offering him as a burnt offering. Then the LORD said to Abraham, 'Do not lay your hand on the boy or do anything to him; for now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me'.

Boyd's fifth scriptural claim is, 'God changes his mind' (ibid. pp. 33, 34). One Scripture he cites in support of this claim is Jeremiah 26:2, 3. In this passage, the LORD commanded Jeremiah to deliver his words to the citizens of Judah who come into the LORD'S house to worship him (v. 2). Afterwards, the LORD said to Jeremiah, 'It may be that they will listen, all of them, and will turn from their evil way, that I may change my mind about the disaster that I intend to bring on them because of their evil doings' (v. 3). Boyd's sixth scriptural claim that God's foreknowledge about his creation is open rather than exhaustive and settled is, God shows 'divine flexibility' (ibid. pp. 35, 36). God's 'flexibility' corresponds to his changing his mind. One scriptural passage that Boyd cites is 1 Kings 20:1-6. This passage is about God telling King Hezekiah that he would die from his sickness. However, after the king prayed and reminded God about how he had served him faithfully, God added fifteen years to his life.

Notwithstanding the scriptural claims that Boyd has presented in favor of the Openness view, there are times when God appears to possess absolute knowledge of past, present and future events. For example, he told Jeremiah that he knew him 'before' he formed him in his mother's womb (Jer 1:4, 5). Secondly, he knew that Sarah laughed when he told Abraham that she would bear a son (Gen 18:9-15). Thirdly, God told Abraham that his descendants would be enslaved in a foreign land, be mistreated for 'four hundred years'. However, they would return to the land that he had promised to Abraham 'in the fourth generation' (Gen 15:13-16).

These passages may present apparent conflicts about God. They do make it difficult to define or describe God (Dunning 1998:186). Another area of apparent conflict about God is his portrayal of immutability and his frequent act of changing his mind. For example, Malachi 3:6 quotes him as saying, 'For I the LORD do not change', yet Moses (Exod 32:9-14) and Jonah (Jonah 3:10) show that he changed his mind. Dunning (1988:202) thinks that God changing his mind actually displays his attribute of love, which never changes when it interacts with good, free human response to

his will. Dunning's view agrees with Cudby's (2005:16) that God takes note of human desires and then interlaces those desires 'into the tapestry of his plans'.

In the Openness approach, God's foreknowledge of events, whether they will occur or not, and human actions without divine command or divine involvement, indicate compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Incompatibility between God's foreknowledge and human free will, will exist only if God is unaware of future events, including the actions of people—whether freely done or coerced. In this case, God would not be omniscient. On the other hand, if God is omniscient, then he must possess foreknowledge of all future events, including Judas' role in the arrest and death of Jesus (Westphal 2012:746-748). This is what omniscience means. Picirilla (2000:260; cf. Helyer 2002:100) presents a couple implications of God's omniscience, including: (1) that God foreknew all possible contingencies before creation, and (2) that God foreknew all future events absolutely, 'including the free, moral choices of human beings'.

Hubmaier (in MacGregor 2006:282) argues that God predestines those whom, 'upon [his] foreknowledge of their free response to the gospel...' rather than annulling their will. Sanders (in Caneday 1999:132) states that 'God has sovereignly [sic] decided not to control everything that happens' or decided to provide a 'blueprint by which all things happen exactly as [he] desires'. Furthermore, 'God has surrendered some of his sovereignty' to humanity (Thomas 2001:179).

Regarding the special case of Judas Iscariot, Openness Theology would argue that God foreknew that Judas would betray Jesus, because God had foreordained that Jesus should die (cf. Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Cudby 2005:13, 15; cf. Williams 2005). However, Openness Theology would also argue that God did not have complete, definite knowledge that Judas Iscariot would actually betray Jesus, since Judas had not yet carried out his act of betrayal (Boyd 2001:16-37; Sanders 2003:79, 80; cf. Cudby 2005:14, 15; Rice 2013:30). The problem with the latter argument is that it would be in conflict with Jesus' foreknowledge that one of the twelve would betray him (cf. Matt 26:21-23; Mark 14:18-20; John 6:64; 13:21). It would also be in conflict with Jesus' confirmation to Judas that he was the betrayer (cf. Matt 26:25). Finally, it would be in conflict with Jesus' command to Judas to 'do quickly' what he was intending to do (John 13:27).

6.3 Specific Literature Related to Judas Iscariot and Pertinent to Compatibilism

The few scholarly contributions on how the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will is reflected in the particular case of Judas Iscariot have shown that none of them adequately analyzes how the New Testament persistently portrays Judas regarding this interface. In this section, I bring to bear the insights gained in the prior chapters to examine the merits of their cases.

6.3.1 Klassen's (1996) Account of Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism

Klassen (1996) persistently acquits Judas Iscariot of betrayal on the ground that the Gospels use παραδίωμι with Judas rather than προδίωμι or προδότης (pp. 47-58), but he failed to consider their negative portrayal of Judas. For instance, they portray Judas as a greedy 'thief' and 'devil' who was determined to sell Jesus (Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:4-6; John 6:70). Matthew especially, records Judas' admission of sin and culpability for his action (Matt 27:3, 4). I think Matthew's considerations show that the overall characterization of Judas' act of 'handing Jesus over' was an act of betrayal. It could not have been seen as a positive or even neutral manner. As stated in chapter 2, there is some merit in Klassen's argument from a lexicographical view. Moreover, if Klassen could be deemed to be correct from an incompatibilist point of view, then Judas would be acquitted of the charge of betrayal. Assuming that Judas Iscariot 'handed Jesus over' instead of betraying him, Judas' action still did not go against God's foreknowledge as Klassen's argument served to enhance.

However, Klassen's argument falls short in several areas. In the first place, and as has been demonstrated, he failed to consider the gospels' negative characterization of Judas Iscariot as reflecting the underlying defining context for translating and interpreting παραδίωμι. For instance, they portray Judas Iscariot as a greedy 'thief' and 'devil' who was determined to sell Jesus (Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:4-6; John 6:70). Matthew especially, records Judas' admission of sin and culpability for his action (Matt 27:3, 4). I think Matthew's considerations show that the overall characterization of Judas' act of 'handing Jesus over' was an act of betrayal. It could not have been seen in a positive or even neutral manner.

Chapter 2 argued that Klassen's argument failed to see the probability of Judas Iscariot acting of his own free will despite acting in accordance with God's will and foreknowledge through Jesus. Secondly, he failed to compare his findings with the literary, rhetorical, pastoral and theological contexts and intentions of the gospel writers themselves. Thirdly, he failed to see the high probability of the gospel writers intentionally using παραδίδωμι to call Judas Iscariot a 'betraye' as they judge his character to be morally corrupt, and in any case the first eyewitnesses from whom the account was derived, having been with Judas Iscariot for some years (cf. John 12:5, 6).

6.3.2 Carlson's (2010) Account of Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism

Carlson (2010) supports Klassen's argument on the Gospels' use of παραδίδωμι with Judas Iscariot and attempts to acquit him of the charge of betrayal. Notwithstanding, Carlson concedes that Judas Iscariot was evil (pp. 474, 475) and that his action of going to chief priests and elders to negotiate Jesus' betrayal portrayed him as a betrayer (p. 474; cf. Graver 1999:300-323).

Chapter 2 shows that Carlson states that Judas Iscariot's role in the arrest and death of Jesus fulfilled the divine plan. Carlson's argument is in essence in support of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. For instance, Carlson cites Scripture to argue that Judas Iscariot's action fulfilled the writings of the prophets (e.g. Matt 26:54-56). Despite divine foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot's action, Carlson (2010:474-478) holds Judas culpable for his betrayal of Jesus.

6.3.3 Aarflot's (2012) Account of Judas and Compatibilism

Aarflot's (2012) contribution depicts Judas Iscariot's negative character and its influence on his role in Jesus' arrest and death. She believes Judas' character motivated him to betray Jesus, rather than divine foreknowledge of him and choosing him. She holds him liable therefore for his action. Like Aarflot, Robertson (2011) appears to portray Judas Iscariot negatively and holds him culpable for his actions, in spite of the fact that Satan entered into him and influenced him (Robertson 2011:137).

Aarflot argues that the four Gospels and the book of Acts depict Judas Iscariot's character negatively (pp. 17-66). For instance, she shows that Matthew depicts him

as greed-driven (Matt26:15, p. 26, 64, 65) and deceitful (Matt 26:47-50, p. 31), and Mark depicts him as deceiving (Mark 14:45). She thinks Judas Iscariot aggravated his deceit by greeting Jesus as 'Ραββί ('Rabbi') and subsequently kissing him to identify him (καὶ κατεφίλησεν αὐτόν, 'and he kissed him'), according to Mark 14:45 (Aarflot 2012:20). Moreover, she categorizes Judas Iscariot as a wicked person (ἀδικίας, p. 48) and 'a symbol of deception and evil' (p. 66), having a 'diabolic disposition' (pp. 55, 61). The ground for her categorization is John's portrayal of Judas Iscariot as 'a devil' (διάβολός, John 6:70) and a 'thief' (κλέπτης, John 12:6). Aarflot's argument about Judas Iscariot does depict him as being culpable for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus, despite the fact that Jesus knew him in advance, chose him and that he fulfilled the divine plan. Aarflot's reference to the divine foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot and then choosing him to fulfill the divine plan on the one hand, and on the other hand holding Judas Iscariot culpable for his action suggest compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

6.3.4 Oropeza's (2010) Account of Judas Iscariot and Compatibilism

The work of Oropeza (2010) frames Judas Iscariot's action of divine plans as well as human relation to it. In particular, Oropeza's output admits that though Judas Iscariot acted as a free agent, there were important forces at play in his action leading to the conclusion that human free will alone does not account for what happened. A key reason for Oropeza's point of view is Jesus' two-part statement about his presumed betrayer: οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ δι' οὗ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκεῖνος παραδίδοται ('The Son of Man goes as it is written of him, but woe to that one by whom the Son of Man is betrayed', Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22). The first section of this passage shows that Jesus' betrayal was divinely planned: ὁ μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπάγει καθὼς γέγραπται περὶ αὐτοῦ ('The Son of Man goes as it is written of him', Matt 26:24a; Mark 14:21a; Luke 22:22a).

The second section of the passage shows that Jesus' betrayal was humanly orchestrated: οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ δι' οὗ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκεῖνος παραδίδοται ('woe to that one by whom the Son of Man is betrayed', Matt 26:24b; Mark 14:21b; Luke 22:22b). Oropeza states that the earliest disciples of Jesus perceived Judas Iscariot's betrayal as treacherous (p. 358). The action of treachery implies that he acted willfully. Judas himself may have seen his betrayal as

treacherous and unforgiveable. As a result, he admitted that he had sinned and then he hanged himself (Matt 27:3-5). Even though Oropeza does not directly address how the account on Judas Iscariot illustrates the issues raised by the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will, by examining the eschatological significance of Judas Iscariot's death, his contribution frames Judas Iscariot's behavior in the sense of divine plans as well as human relation to it.

6.4 Compatibilism and the Socio-pastoral Context of the First-Century Christians

Scripture indicates that some members of the Israelite community apostatized. Thus, Judas Iscariot's apostasy was not unique. For example, God spoke to the prophet Jeremiah concerning the 'house of Jacob' straying from their former devotion to him and eventually apostatizing (Jer 2:1-19). The apostasies of God's people were great to the extent that 'they refused to take correction... [and] refused to turn back' to God (Jer5:3).

During the earthly ministry of Jesus, 'many of his disciples turned back and no longer went about with him' (John 6:66). After Jesus' earthly ministry, his followers still had the inclination to apostatize. For instance, Paul told Timothy, 'The Spirit clearly says that in later times some will abandon the faith and follow deceiving spirits and things taught by demons'(1 Tim 4:1 NIV). The author of the epistle of Hebrews speaks about the impossibility of restoring again to repentance apostates (Heb 6:4-6). Instead, God will judge them and punish them severely (Heb 10:26-31). Scripture presents apostasy as an irrevocable act (John 15:6; Heb 6:4-6; 10:26-31). Jesus stated categorically, 'Whoever does not abide in me is thrown away like a branch and withers; such branches are gathered, thrown into the fire, and burned' (John 15:6).

The Gospel of Matthew especially, shows that the Pharisees who were teachers of and interpreters of God's Law to God's people (Israel) consistently opposed Jesus, the Son of God, led many people away from God and subsequently condemned themselves to hell (e.g. Matt 23:1-33). Judas Iscariot's apostasy was therefore not the only one recorded in the Scriptures. His apostasy, nonetheless, appears to be unique because he, being an inner-circle disciple of Jesus, joined the religious

leaders and staunch opponents against his teacher and Lord to betray him to them. The gospels and the book of Acts show that Judas acted as he did because of his character. The views of the Old Testament and the New Testaments imply that apostates were culpable for their act, despite divine foreknowledge of such apostasies.

It makes sense to argue, therefore, that the act of apostasy and divine foreknowledge exist in a non-contrastive relationship. That is, they are compatible. In other words, God's foreknowledge of an apostate's desire to apostatize, as well as the actualization of that desire, does not annul both the desire and actualization. The term 'apostasy'— 'to fail to follow through on a commitment, fall away' (BDAG 2000:770) suggests it is a willful act. Thus, Judas Iscariot's apostasy and Jesus' foreknowledge that he would apostatize did not have a semblance of incompatibility.

From the review of Second Temple Judaism Literature, it would appear that the literature would hold Judas Iscariot liable for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. It was shown earlier, that God held members of the Qumran Community whom Belial (Satan) led astray liable for their apostasy (4Q256; cf. Brand in Dochhorn 2016:81). The ground for this liability was that they 'had chosen to belong to' Belial (4Q256, III; Vermes 2004:131-135).

6.5 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has synthesized the theological argument of the hypothesis of this dissertation that there is compatibility between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. The examples of God's interaction with Adam, Cain, Moses, Saul, Jeremiah and Jonah revealed that God foreknew them and elected them to carry out particular responsibilities. The examples show too that these people freely disobeyed God's word (e.g. Adam and Saul) or freely objected to their election (e.g. Moses, Jeremiah, and Jonah). In the cases of Moses, Jeremiah and Jonah, God overruled their objections to their election so that they could carry out his assignments. For Adam and Saul, God allowed their will to stand and they bore the consequences of their willful actions. I think Adam could have resisted Eve's offer of the forbidden fruit, retained his relationship with God, and lived. Likewise, Saul could

have obeyed the words of God, retained his relationship with God, and remained king.

Regarding Judas Iscariot, it may be concluded that he willfully chose not to believe in Jesus (cf. John 6:64), as well as that he chose willfully to betray him (cf. Matt 26:14-16; 27:3, 4; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:3-6). Additionally, it may be concluded, that even though God may have had a hand in Judas' role, Judas used his free disposition to betray Jesus. In other words, Judas Iscariot's bad character caused him to betray Jesus (John 12:4-6; 6:70). I think Judas Iscariot's determination to betray Jesus, to the extent that he disregarded Jesus' prediction that one of the twelve would betray him (Matt 26:21, 23; Luke 22:21-23; John 13:18), may have been due to Judas' character of greed (cf. Matt 26:15; John 12:6) or because he was already lost (John 17:12).

Thus, Judas Iscariot's act of betrayal may not have been the result of divine foreknowledge or of Jesus choosing him, or of Satan entering him and influencing him. All the New Testament passages in relation to Judas Iscariot underline the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in a non-contrastive transcendent manner, even though some place different emphases on the degree of this compatibility, and others underline a complicated role for even Satan himself.

Overall, the chapter has argued the compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Chapter 7 will give the summary and conclusion and the pastoral implications of the study for the pastors of the Wesleyan Church in Liberia.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND PASTORAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

The objective of this dissertation has been to perform a theological examination of how the interactions between divine foreknowledge and human free will are exemplified in how the Bible portrays the particular case of Judas Iscariot. It took one basic hypothesis as its starting point, namely, that the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible. Based on this hypothesis, the dissertation investigated the biblical bases of the problems posed by the interactions between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Afterwards, the dissertation analyzed relevant passages related to Judas Iscariot in the Synoptic Gospels, the Gospel of John, the book of Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans and synthesized them, and theologically argued the hypothesis. The following are the summaries of the findings.

7.1 Summary of Chapter One

Chapter 1, which also served as the introduction to the dissertation, gave a background to the task, as well as the hypothesis, the rationale and the methodology of the study. The interface between God's foreknowledge and human free will has been the main thrust for the endless debate between compatibilist and incompatibilist theologians, particularly. It is evident that the correct formulation of this important theological problem depends largely on our understanding of the contours of this interface.

Concerning divine foreknowledge, the gospels showed (1) that Jesus foreknew Judas Iscariot's bad character, (2) that Jesus foreknew that Judas Iscariot would betray him, (3) that Jesus chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his twelve disciples/apostles and (4) that Judas Iscariot's betrayal fulfilled Scripture. Regarding the use of human free will, the gospels showed that it was Judas Iscariot, rather than the Jewish religious leaders, who negotiated the betrayal of Jesus. In addition, the gospels showed that Judas Iscariot intentionally betrayed Jesus to the chief priest for money: *Τί θέλετέ μοι δοῦναι κἀγὼ ὑμῖν παραδώσω αὐτόν;* ('What are you willing to

give me, and I will deliver him up to you?’ Matt 26:15 YLT). Moreover, the Gospels showed that Judas Iscariot relentlessly pursued his plan to betray Jesus over to the chief priest: καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐζήτει εὐκαιρίαν ἵνα αὐτὸν παραδῶ (‘And from that moment he began to look for an opportunity to betray him’, Matt 26:16; Mark 14:11; Luke 22:6). Matthew particularly, showed that Judas Iscariot took responsibility for betraying Jesus: Ἠμαρτον παραδοῦς αἷμα ἀθῶον (‘I have sinned by betraying innocent blood’, Matt 27:4).

Judas Iscariot’s admission of his sin is significant in establishing the fact that he freely and willfully betrayed Jesus, notwithstanding Jesus’ foreknowledge of him, of his character and of his imminent betrayal. Therefore, it would appear that the gospels conceptualized Judas Iscariot’s willful betrayal of Christ as compatible with their parallel emphasis on divine foreknowledge. The issue of the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will has been well discussed in systematic theological literature, nevertheless, without studying Judas Iscariot as a test case.

The Gospels’ use of παραδίδωμι with Judas Iscariot’s action rather than προδίδωμι or προδότης created a biblical and theological question as to whether Judas should be labeled a betrayer or one who merely handed Jesus over. For instance, the lexical and historical study of παραδίδωμι showed that the term means, ‘to hand over, deliver’ instead of ‘to betray’ (BDAG 2000:761, 762; cf. Klassen 1996:47-74). On the contrary, προδίδωμι, and προδότης mean ‘betray’ and ‘traitor’ respectively (BDAG 2000:867). Therefore, calling Judas Iscariot a ‘betrayer’ was a cause of disagreement amongst biblical interpreters, which might or might not be resolved satisfactorily.

A key to the study is the analysis of relevant New Testament passages in which Judas Iscariot is identified implicitly and explicitly, in order to determine whether he chose freely to carry out his act, and whether his act was related to God’s choice and foreknowledge of him. The definitions of ‘predestination’, ‘election’, ‘divine foreknowledge’, ‘human free will’, ‘compatibilism’, ‘incompatibilism’ and ‘divine agency’ were significant for understanding Judas Iscariot’s liability for his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. ‘Predestination’ (προορίζω) was defined as the predetermined action of God whereby he sovereignly and graciously elects unto his

service those whom he so desires, whether prior to or following their conception and birth(BDAG 2000:873; Thayer 1988-2007:n.p).

‘Election’(ἐκλέγομαι) was defined as the action of God whereby he chooses individuals unto salvation and unto his service(BDAG 2000:305). ‘Divine foreknowledge’ (προγινώσκω) was defined as God’s supernatural ability to foreknow all past, present and future events and peoples exhaustively, which enables him to elect individuals to particular services, but which does not necessarily cause him to elect them to eternal salvation or to eternal damnation arbitrarily (BDAG 2006:866; EDNT 1988-2007; Nartey 2016:135-155).‘Human free will’ was defined as the innate capability of humans to freely and non-coercively choose to accept or reject God’s offer of salvation, his election to service and to plan their course of action (cf. Wright and Ferguson 1998:722, 723; Reymond 1998:373; Franks 2015:108-119).

‘Compatibilism’ was used to refer to the compatibility between human freedom and divine omniscience, divine determination and divine foreknowledge (Helm 2011:184-205; Nartey 2016:135-155). ‘Incompatibilism’ was used to mean, human freedom that is incompatible with divine foreknowledge and divine determination (Nartey 2016:135-155; Mele 2015:297-309). Finally, ‘divine agency’ was used to refer to God himself acting intentionally to accomplish his divine purposes (Schwöbel 1987:225-244). The implication of these definitions was that, even though Jesus foreknew Judas Iscariot and elected him to be his disciple, Judas Iscariot had the ability to exercise his free will regarding his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. Finally, this chapter gave an overview of the chapters of this dissertation.

7.2 Summary of Chapter Two

Chapter 2 of the thesis was a review of selected studies that focused on the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will, with Judas Iscariot’s role in the arrest and death of Jesus being used as a test case. It was observed that writers were divided in their positions on the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human free will from two general positions—the compatibilism position and the incompatibilism position. The chapter examined a variety of contributions by these positions and evaluated the usefulness of their positions as analytical tools for studying the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will vis-à-vis

Jesus' foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot, his selection of Judas Iscariot and Judas Iscariot's role in the arrest and death of Jesus.

This chapter showed that the Reformed Tradition emphasizes the sovereignty of God whereby he governs his creation providentially and decretively, as well as predestines/elects humans either to eternal salvation or to eternal damnation without their participation. In other words, God annuls the involvement of human free will in their salvation or damnation. However, Reformed Tradition admits that there is an element of human responsibility in the economy of salvation in relation to grief for sins and repentance, so that God is not the author or causer of sin, or of human violence. The mention of 'repentance' implies the use of human freedom of choice and culpability.

Chapter 2 also showed that both the Reformed Tradition and the Arminian Tradition accept that humans do exercise free will in their relationship with God. In addition, the Lutheran Tradition holds to God's sovereign governance and predestination of some people just as Calvinism does. Nonetheless, unlike the Reformed Tradition, the Lutheran Tradition limits God's predestination to eternal salvation rather than to eternal damnation.

Concerning God's foreknowledge, Reformed Tradition, Lutheran Tradition and Arminian Tradition generally agree that God has foreknowledge of past, present and future events. Nonetheless, they disagree on the scope of that foreknowledge. For instance, the Reformed Tradition generally holds to the view that God foreordains and influences peoples and events through his foreknowledge, whereas the Arminian Tradition holds generally that God's foreknowledge enables him to know about the certainty of all happenings.

These happenings may be good or evil, and contingent on human actions. However, they do not necessarily cause God to foreordain or influence all events and human actions. The Lutheran Tradition goes along with the Arminian Tradition on God's foreknowledge. Like the Arminian Tradition, the Lutheran Tradition teaches that people are saved by faith/belief, repentance and personally choosing God's offer of salvation, not without God's foreknowledge and his enabling grace (Senor 1999:268-270; Cooper 2015:11; cf. John 3:3-21,36; 5:24-29). Moreover, chapter 2 showed that

Openness Theology holds that God permits humans to accomplish their desires, which he knows are probable; however, he does not foreordain their desires.

With reference to the influence of divine foreknowledge and the role of Judas Iscariot in the death of Christ, this chapter showed that the gospels particularly, suggest that Jesus had a present and a future knowledge that Judas Iscariot would betray him (Matt 26:21-5 [cf. v. 2]; John 13:18-30). Notwithstanding, Jesus chose him as one of his twelve apostles (Matt 10:1-4; Mark 3:13-19). The chapter indicated that Judas Iscariot was greedy and that that greed may have caused him to betray Jesus. Furthermore, these traditions did not discuss Jesus' foreknowledge of Judas Iscariot and Jesus' election of him, or of the nature of Judas Iscariot's role in the arrest and death of Jesus—that is, whether he acted freely, or acted under divine coercion. Finally, chapter 2 reviewed the approaches of the philosophical and discovered that, except for Boethius (who advocated for incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will), the other philosophers (e.g. Aristotle, Ockham, Frankfurt) argued in favor of compatibilism between divine foreknowledge and human free will. In other words, they concurred that divine foreknowledge does not annul human liability for their actions.

One main conclusion that guided the investigation of this dissertation was drawn. It was that the incompatibilists' and compatibilists' points of view regarding the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will required a more thorough investigation grounded in a specific account such as the narratives of Judas Iscariot's involvement in Jesus death. This would mean looking at passages of the Gospels, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans, which directly speak to these problems and show how various commentaries dealt with them. The aim was to explore how their points of view might or might not be reflected in these passages.

Chapter 2 therefore provided a methodological framework for investigating the Scriptures to show how key Old Testament and New Testament passages handle the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. It was proposed that a major contribution of this dissertation was to show that when characterizations of Judas Iscariot given as a betrayer or traitor by Luke (6:16b) and 'a devil' and 'thief' by John (6:70; 12:6) are taken earnestly, they form a useful discipleship model for preventing a disciple of Jesus from apostatizing.

7.3 Summary of Chapter Three

The third chapter was devoted to a twofold task. Firstly, it was to show that the Scriptures themselves gave rise to the debates on the apparent contradiction between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Secondly, it was to show specifically how various philosophical traditions and major Christian traditions handled some key biblical passages on the interface between these two doctrines. It started with an examination of passages that depict God (explicitly or implicitly) as having foreknowledge about particular individuals and nations and predestining or electing them to fulfill specific tasks so that they might bring about specific outcomes. Four observations were derived: (1) Yahweh had foreknowledge of individuals and nations that he predestined and elected to accomplish his plans and purposes; (2) individuals whom Yahweh elected to carry out specific tasks for him chose freely to object to and reject his specific commands; (3) Yahweh overruled the willful objections and rejection of those he elected or predestined and caused them to accept his appointments; and (4) Yahweh did not acquit of personal responsibility those whom he commissioned and who freely objected to their commissioning .

Those whom Yahweh did not acquit when they freely objected to their commissioning from culpability included Pharaoh (Exod (9:12; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:8; cf. 4:21; 7:3; 14:4; 7:13, 14, 22; 8:15, 19, 32; 9:7, 34, 35; 13:15), Samson (Judg 14:1-4), Jeremiah the prophet (Jer 1:4, 5), Moses (Exod 3:4-12), Saul (1 Sam 9:15-10:24) and Jonah (Jonah 1:1, 2; 3:1-3). The story of God's interaction with Pharaoh emphasized the relationship between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will, though paradoxically. God foreknew that Pharaoh would respond stubbornly to his command (Exod 3:19), yet he raised him up (ἐξήγειρα) in order to show his power through him (Exod 9:16 LXX; cf. Rom 9:17).

In the process God hardened Pharaoh's heart so that Pharaoh refused to release Israel from Egypt (Exod 9:12; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:8; cf. 4:21; 7:3; 14:4). Pharaoh hardened his own heart also (Exod 7:13, 14, 22; 8:15, 19, 32; 9:7, 34, 35; 13:15) so that he would not release Israel from Egypt. Pharaoh's admittance of sinning against God by repeatedly refusing to let Israel leave Egypt (Exod 9:27, 28; 10:16, 17) pointed to the use of his free will even though God was involved in Pharaoh's

obstinacy in order to fulfill his divine plan. Thus, Yahweh held Pharaoh liable for hardening his heart against him.

The third chapter also examined the varieties of approaches to resolving the tensions between divine foreknowledge and human free will, according to literature of Second Temple Judaism. These approaches apparently reflected the different socio-historical and cultural contexts of the writers and communities the text represented. The conclusion was that they too demonstrate compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

7.4 Summary of Chapter Four

The fourth chapter analyzed relevant passages of Matthew, Mark, Luke, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans on Judas Iscariot. The goal was to seek to establish whether these passages exhibited variations in how they characterized Judas Iscariot in the light of the confluence between divine foreknowledge and human free will, and if so what may well account for any differences identified. In other words, the analysis of chapter four was intended to help test whether the ways in which these passages implicitly and explicitly portrayed Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Christ might help explain the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will. The aim was to help determine how the use of παραδίδωμι to describe Judas Iscariot's role in Christ's death—both active (e.g. Matt 26:14-16; Mark 14:10, 11; Acts 1:15-25) and passive (e.g. Luke 22:3, 4)—reflected their general theological understanding of Judas Iscariot's character and choice within the context of God's foreknowledge.

The examinations of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts showed that all of them agreed on Judas Iscariot being a prominent disciple and an apostle of Jesus (Matt 10:1-5; Mark 3:13-19; Luke 6:13-16; Acts 1:17, 25). They also agreed that Judas Iscariot's action had been divinely predicted, as well as it had fulfilled Scripture (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Acts 1:15-20). This fulfillment of Scripture by the action of Judas Iscariot suggests that God had foreknowledge of his action; yet, it does not infer that God's foreknowledge annulled Judas' action. The passages also showed that Judas Iscariot received remuneration for his action (Matt 26:15; Mark 14:10;

Luke 22:5; Acts 1:18) and that Judas guided those who arrested Jesus (Matt 26:48-50; Mark 14:44-46; Luke 22:47, 48; Acts 1:16).

Matthew and Acts reported that Judas Iscariot hanged himself (Matt 27:5; Acts 1:18). Furthermore, the Synoptic Gospels recorded that Judas Iscariot initiated the bargaining with the chief priests about betraying Jesus to them (Matt 26:14; Mark 14:10; Luke 22:4) and that he determinedly sought to betray Jesus (Matt 26:16; Mark 14:11; Luke 22:6). His determination to betray Jesus indicated his willfulness to achieve his own objective. It was noted that these books differed on certain minor details regarding Judas Iscariot. For example, Luke indicated in his gospel that Satan influenced the role that Judas Iscariot played in betraying Jesus (22:3, 4); however, he indicated in Acts that Judas was completely responsible for his actions (1:15-20).

Furthermore, Matthew and Acts differed in their reports regarding Judas Iscariot's response after he realized that the religious leaders had condemned Jesus to death. Matthew's account was that Judas 'returned the thirty silver coins to the chief priests and the elders' (27:3, NIV), while Acts stated that he 'bought a field with the reward he had received from the chief priests for betraying Jesus to them (Acts 1:18). Also unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts reported that the remuneration that Judas Iscariot received was a result of his wicked action (1:18). Moreover, Acts recorded that another person would replace Judas Iscariot (1:20). The mentioning of Judas Iscariot receiving a reward for his wickedness made him liable for his actions.

Mark and Luke indicated that the chief priests promised to pay Judas Iscariot if he betrayed Jesus to them (Mark 14:11; Luke 22:5, 6), while Matthew indicated that they paid Judas Iscariot before he began to seek an opportune time to betray Jesus (26:15, 16). Matthew and Mark used παραδίδωμι to describe the action of Judas Iscariot and thus they did not call him a 'betrayed' explicitly. Luke used προδότης notwithstanding, and portrayed Judas Iscariot as a traitor (Luke 6:16). Finally, unlike the Synoptic Gospels, Acts did not use παραδίδωμι or προδότης with reference to the role of Judas Iscariot in the arrest of Jesus. Paul's Letter to the Romans (Rom 4:25a) used παραδίδωμι but with allusion only to Judas; it did not mention the name of Judas Iscariot explicitly or suggest anything about his character.

Chapter 4 showed too that the various passages that it examined portrayed Judas Iscariot's character negatively. For instance, they indicated that he was a greedy traitor who, of his own free will, betrayed his master to the Jewish authorities, even though Luke suggested a satanic influence. Furthermore, the chapter showed that Judas Iscariot was liable for betraying Jesus in spite of Jesus' foreknowledge that he would betray him, and in spite of Jesus choosing him as a choice disciple/apostle. The findings in this chapter showed too that Judas Iscariot regretted his action and subsequently hanged himself. These actions signified his culpability.

Finally, chapter 4 showed the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in Judas Iscariot's role in the betrayal and arrest of Jesus (e.g. John 6:70). Overall, the chapter indicated that these evangelists may have intended to teach their audiences about the probability of any of them whose character was like Judas Iscariot's apostatizing. Moreover, they may have intended to teach their audiences that God would hold them culpable for their actions, irrespective of any demonic or satanic influence.

7.5 Summary of Chapter Five

The fifth chapter had a twofold objective. Firstly, its aim was to examine relevant passages of the Gospel of John, so that it might explore how John characterized Judas Iscariot, especially concerning its comparison with the Synoptic Gospels. Secondly, it was to explore how John configured the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in relation to Judas Iscariot. The aim of this examination was to help test whether the manner in which John characterized Judas Iscariot's personality, betrayal and fate might also help to explain more precisely the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will.

The Gospel of John presented Judas Iscariot, explicitly and implicitly, in at least nine noteworthy ways: (1) John presented him as an unbelieving disciple and 'a devil' who, being 'one of the twelve', would later betray Jesus (6:70, 71; cf. Wright 2009:544-559). (2) John presented him as 'a thief' who would betray Jesus (12:4-6). (3) John presented him as the disciple whose heart 'the devil' induced to betray Jesus (13:2). (4) John presented him as the disciple to whom Jesus gave a piece of bread to in order to identify him as his betrayer (13:21-26). (5) John presented him

as the disciple whom Satan entered into 'after he received the piece of bread' (13:26b, 27). (6) John presented him as the disciple who apostatized after he received the piece of bread from Jesus (13:30). (7) John presented him as the disciple who 'lifted his heel' against Jesus (13:18, 19). (8) John presented him as 'the son of destruction' (17:6-12). (9) John presented him as the one who took a detachment of soldiers and police into the garden to arrest Jesus (18:1-5).

Chapter 5 indicated that the Gospel of John appeared to compare Judas Iscariot's betrayal with that of David's trusted counselor, Ahithophel (John 13:18; cf. Psa 41:9; 2 Sam 15:12). John stated that Judas fulfilled Scripture by this action (13:18). Furthermore, John indicated that Jesus did not protect and keep Judas Iscariot from becoming lost because Judas Iscariot was already lost and that this fate was in fulfillment of Scripture (17:12). John's mention of scriptural fulfillment implied divine foreknowledge, whereas the ways in which John portrayed the character of Judas Iscariot and his act of betrayal suggested that he held Judas liable for his character and his action (cf. Kelly 1995:38-40). John's dual presentation of these issues therefore indicated the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will (cf. Oropeza 2010:345-349).

In a pastoral context, John might have featured Judas Iscariot as he did in order to challenge his past and present audiences about their response to Jesus—whether they would respond to him positively or negatively whenever he encountered them (Bennema 2013:19). John also indicated that Jesus assured his believing Jewish audience that they were his disciples only by continuing in his word, rather than because they were Abraham's children (John 8:31-40).

7.6 Summary of Chapter Six

The objective of chapter 6 was to synthesize the insights gained from the examination of the preceding chapters, and theologically argue the hypothesis of this dissertation, namely: that the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible in the specific test case of Judas Iscariot. Specifically, it asserted that when it comes to Judas Iscariot, the New Testament holds divine foreknowledge in tension with human freedom to the extent that there is no conflict between them, apparent though that might seem. The chapter summarized the philosophical

approaches, the approaches of major Christian traditions, and the views of specific literature that related to Judas Iscariot, which were pertinent to compatibilism, with the view of synthesizing the arguments that had been presented.

The chapter used as examples God's interaction with Adam, Cain, Moses, Saul, Jeremiah and Jonah to reveal that God foreknew them and elected them to carry out particular responsibilities. The findings were that these individuals freely disobeyed God's word (e.g. Adam and Saul) or freely objected to their election (e.g. Moses, Jeremiah, and Jonah). In the cases of Moses, Jeremiah and Jonah, the chapter showed that God overruled their objections to their election so that they could carry out his assignments. For Adam and Saul, God allowed their will to stand and they bore the consequences of their willful actions. I reasoned that Adam could have resisted Eve's offer of the forbidden fruit, retained his relationship with God, and lived. Likewise, Saul could have obeyed the words of God, retained his relationship with God, and remained king.

Regarding Judas Iscariot, it was concluded that he might have willfully chosen not to believe in Jesus (cf. John 6:64), as well as that he chose willfully to betray him (cf. Matt 26:14-16; 27:3, 4; Mark 14:10, 11; Luke 22:3-6). Additionally, it was concluded that even though God may have had his hand in Judas Iscariot's role in the arrest and death of Jesus, Judas might have used his free disposition to betray Jesus. In other words, Judas Iscariot's bad character caused him to betray Jesus (John 12:4-6; 6:70). I thought that Judas Iscariot's determination to betray Jesus, to the extent that he disregarded Jesus' prediction that one of the twelve would betray him (Matt 26:21, 23; Luke 22:21-23; John 13:18), may have been due to Judas' character of greed (cf. Matt 26:15; John 12:6) or because he was already lost (John 17:12).

Thus, Judas Iscariot's act of betrayal may not have been the result of divine foreknowledge or of Jesus choosing him, or of Satan entering into him and influencing him. All the New Testament passages in relation to Judas Iscariot underlined the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in a non-contrastive transcendent manner, even though some placed different emphases on the degree of this compatibility, and others underlining a complicated role for even Satan himself. Overall, chapter 6 argued the compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will.

7.7 Pastoral Implications of the Study for Leaders and Members of the Wesleyan Church of Liberia

This dissertation has shown that the subject of the interface between divine foreknowledge (encompassing divine predestination/election) and human free will has provoked continual divergent academic discussions among biblical and theological scholars. At the root of this is the dilemma of the sovereign God foreknowing and electing individuals (i.e. to eternal salvation, to eternal damnation or to service) and then holding them culpable for their negative actions or inactions. The Gospels' accounts of Judas Iscariot fall within this dilemma.

For instance, they describe Judas Iscariot as 'one of the twelve' disciples/apostles whom Jesus foreknew (John 6:70) and chose (Matt 10:1-4; Mark 3:16-19; Luke 6:14-16; cf. Acts 1:15-17), and that his role and its consequences fulfilled the Scriptures (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22). Since Judas Iscariot's role fulfilled Scripture, he should be acclaimed for obedience rather than be accused for betrayal. For this reason, the need for an examination of relevant passages of the gospels, Acts and Paul's Letter to the Romans, which relate to Judas, in order to determine their general theological understanding of Judas' character and choice within the context of God's foreknowledge, has become vital. Since Judas has been investigated as a 'test case' for the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free will, the above findings could indeed serve as one of the means of informing the reflections on these doctrines and the role of contemporary church leaders and church members.

In this regard, one main implication of the study may be outlined—related to the character of Judas Iscariot. The Gospels and Acts depict Judas Iscariot's character in such ways that indicate that his character influenced his role in the arrest and death of Jesus. For example, Matthew depicts him as a greedy disciple who was willing to receive any amount of pay from the Jewish religious leaders to betray Jesus to them. Luke depicts him as a traitor (προδότης), while John depicts him as a 'thief' and 'a devil'. Moreover, Acts depicts him as a wicked person. The study observed that each component of Judas Iscariot's character was sufficient to drive him to his betrayal and subsequent demise. As a greedy 'thief', he habitually

embezzled what was put in the moneybag belonging to the entire group, including Jesus (John 12:6).

Therefore, betraying Jesus for any amount of money/silver was not difficult or impossible (Matt 26:14-16). As 'a devil' (John 6:70), Judas Iscariot could not and did not believe in Jesus (John 6:64, 65), even though he was a choice disciple who had gone on preaching and healing missions (Matt 10:1-9). In view of these, it is likely that his character caused Satan to prompt him (John 13:2) and to eventually enter into him to strengthen his resolve to betray Jesus. Judas Iscariot subsequently apostatized and escorted a crowd, including military personnel to seize Jesus (Matt 26:47-56; Mark 14:43-50; Luke 22:47-53; John 18:3-11). Judas Iscariot may have apostatized because he was already 'lost' (John 17:12), despite the fact that he was a choice disciple of Jesus. Jesus could therefore not protect or guard him as he protected and guarded the other disciples (John 17:12). This outcome of Judas Iscariot is therefore recommended to serve as warning to leaders and members of the Wesleyan Church of Liberia.

Concerning the interface between divine foreknowledge and human free will, this study has offered two important contributions—one positive, and the other negative. Positively, it has emphasized that God does have complete foreknowledge of all future events and he predestines/elects to service particular individuals without annulling their free will. This takes into consideration those individuals whose free objections to his election (to service) he overruled.

Negatively, the study may pose a major caution for contemporary leaders and members of the Wesleyan Church of Liberia. It is that an active, divinely gifted church leader or church member might apostatize because of a greedy, diabolical character and refusal to heed repeated warnings by God's Spirit. Jesus warned Judas Iscariot repeatedly about his pending action. Nonetheless, Judas did not take heed. Today, the Holy Spirit abides within all Christians—church leaders and church members—to 'convict...of guilt in regard to sin and righteousness and judgment: in regard to sin' (John 16:8, 9 NIV). Therefore, leaders and members of the Wesleyan Church of Liberia should pay heed to the Spirit's convictions so that they might repent from sins about which he might convict them. The result would be that they will remain in good, acceptable, perpetual relationship with Jesus.

Leaders and members of the Wesleyan Church of Liberia would do well to heed the words of John Wesley so that they might please the Lord God Almighty and live with him eternally:

Desire not to live but to praise his name; let all your thoughts, words, and works tend to his glory...Have a pure intention of heart, a steadfast regard to his glory in all your actions. For then, and not till then, is that 'mind in us, which was also in Christ Jesus,' when in every motion of our heart, in every word of our tongue, in every work of our hands, we 'pursue noting but in relation to him, and in subordination to his pleasure;' when we too neither think, nor speak, nor act, to fulfill 'our own will, but the will of Him that sent us...' (Wesley 1872:368).

7.8 Recommended Areas for Further Study

This study has shown that Jesus himself chose Judas Iscariot to be one of his choice disciples. He gave him, along with the other eleven disciples, the authority to preach, to exorcise demons and to heal the sick (e.g. Matt 10:1-8). During the passage of time, Judas willfully sold Jesus and led a crowd, including soldiers and guards to arrest him (Mark 14:43-45; John 18:2, 3). Judas Iscariot's action, though foreknown by God and that it fulfilled Scripture (e.g. Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; John 13:18; Acts 1:16, 17), Scripture suggests that God held him culpable for his actions (e.g. Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22; Acts 1:18-25).

Matthew reports that Judas 'was seized with remorse and returned the thirty silver coins to the chief priests and the elders' (27:3) and confessed to them that he had 'sinned' (27:4). The four gospels report that Peter disowned Jesus (Matt 26:69-74; Mark 14:66-72; Luke 22:55-62; John 18:16-18, 25-27) to the extent that 'he began to call down curses on himself' and to swear, in order to stress his denial (Matt 26:74; Mark 14:71). Such manner of denial is tantamount to apostasy. However, they report too that 'he...wept bitterly' for his action, thus suggesting that he too was 'seized with remorse' (Matt 26:75; Mark 14:72; Luke 22:62).

John does not report on Peter's bitter weeping or his cursing of himself and swearing to strengthen his denial of Jesus. However, Jesus himself addressed Peter earlier as 'Satan' and 'a stumbling block' to him (Matt 16:23; Mark 8:33). John's accounts of

Peter and Judas Iscariot show that he portrays Judas more negatively (e.g. as 'a devil', a 'thief', a heel-lifter against Jesus and 'the one destined to be lost') than he portrays Peter. This study has not analyzed John's purpose or purposes for doing this. This suggests that an investigation to determine John's purpose or purposes in this regard will prove insightful.

In relation to Judas Iscariot being described as 'the one destined to be lost' (John 17:12) rather than Peter, this study has not investigated the cause and the point at which Judas Iscariot became 'destined to be lost'. The intention will be to discover whether he was 'destined to be lost' before his birth or during his ministry with Jesus. The answer will help determine if Judas Iscariot can be held liable for his betrayal or not. An investigation to determine a satisfactory biblical-theological answer to this concern will be insightful.

In view of these concerns, I recommend the following: (1) that a biblical-theological investigation be carried out to determine John's purpose or purposes for portraying Judas Iscariot more negatively than he portrays Peter. (2) That a biblical-theological investigation be carried out to determine why Jesus, already knowing that Judas Iscariot was 'a devil' chose him to be his disciple. (3) That a biblical-theological investigation be carried out to determine the cause/agent for Judas Iscariot becoming 'the one destined to be lost' and the point at which he became 'the one destined to be lost'.

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